Does Evolution Have An Objective?

It can do.. Randomness has many meanings.

Indeed. But the idea most people have of freewill and the basis upon which they want to use it to assign moral responsibity bears little relation to the esoteric notions of "freewill" and single outcome "choice" being put forward by compatibalist philsophers.

quote:

---

A number of psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers have been doing experimental work relevant to these issues. One especially interesting set of results come from the work of Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe. In one experiment, they gave their subjects descriptions of two different universes, one in which everything is completely caused by whatever happened before it, and the other a universe in which almost everything is determined by whatever happened before except human decision making. Then, they asked their subjects to identify which universe is more like ours. Roughly 95 percent of respondents describe the second universe (the one in which human decision making was indeterministic) as the one most like ours. This result seems to strongly favor the view that our ordinary self-conception of human agency is incompatibilist (specifically, libertarian). It is difficult to imagine why we would suppose human decision making is exempt from determinism if it were not linked to our having free will.

​

What the experimental data appear to show is that we really do imagine ourselves to be agents with genuine, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities, and we really do, at least in moments of cool, abstract consideration, tend to favor an alternative possibilities requirement on moral responsibility. So, the experimental data seem to be something of a victory for incompatibilist diagnoses of commonsense.

---

Link(BTW this link on a modern development on the freewill problem - Revisionism or Semi-Combatilism - is well interesting and well worth a look IMHO) The problem only exists if you decide that there has to be something called "freewill" on which moral responsibility must be based. I suggest that in practical terms the problem is a false one.Whether freewill exists or not we need to assign moral responsibility for practical reasons. So why not assign moral responsibilityl on the basis of achieving our practical aims? Aims such as deterrence, altruism, respect for the rights of others etc. etc. etc. This seems like a far more productive approach than endless wrangling about what the word freewill philosophically means and the related bickerings about whether we actually possess it or not.We should first ask the question why it is that we want or need to assign moral responsibility in the first place. What is it exactly we are trying to achieve by doing this? Once we have the answer to that we can work out how to assign moral responsibility so as to best achieve that aim. With this pragmatic approach the question of whether or not freewill is actually real or just an operationally valid human fiction becomes largely irrelevant. All that matters is whether it works or not (i.e. whether it achieves our social aims)And I suspect our social aims will be best achieved by adopting something very close to the operationally valid "could have done otherwise" illusion on which most of our morality and laws are based in practise anyway.

That past events over which you have no control contain elements of randomness makes no real difference to the determinism Vs freewill debate. Either way your actions and entire cognitive state are caused by historic events over which you have no control. Edited by Straggler, : Fix quotes

Perhaps the following will help you understand why it is so many people have objected to your use of the terms "choice" and "freewill" to describe single possible deterministic outcomes.

quote:

---

A number of psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers have been doing experimental work relevant to these issues. One especially interesting set of results come from the work of Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe. In one experiment, they gave their subjects descriptions of two different universes, one in which everything is completely caused by whatever happened before it, and the other a universe in which almost everything is determined by whatever happened before except human decision making. Then, they asked their subjects to identify which universe is more like ours. Roughly 95 percent of respondents describe the second universe (the one in which human decision making was indeterministic) as the one most like ours. This result seems to strongly favor the view that our ordinary self-conception of human agency is incompatibilist (specifically, libertarian). It is difficult to imagine why we would suppose human decision making is exempt from determinism if it were not linked to our having free will.

​

What the experimental data appear to show is that we really do imagine ourselves to be agents with genuine, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities, and we really do, at least in moments of cool, abstract consideration, tend to favor an alternative possibilities requirement on moral responsibility. So, the experimental data seem to be something of a victory for incompatibilist diagnoses of commonsense.

---

LinkI know you don't like it but - Words conceptually mean what people use them to mean. They don't always mean what is scientifically accurate or philosophically coherent.

I'm not sure why you find discovering a lot of other people being wrong so exciting that you need to post it twice in this thread. When people say "I chose the pink shirt" they are talking about what they did when they selected the pink shirt from the available shirt and put it on. When I say "they chose they pink shirt" I am talking about what they did when they selected the pink shirt from the available shirt and put it on.We are talking about exactly the same thing.There is utterly no need for a new word. We make choices; these choices causally affect the universe. I am not using the word is some bizarre and esoteric way.Your repeated objection to using the word is getting us utterly nowhere.

It is rather relevant to what people actually mean conceptually when they use the words that they do. Whether these concepts are entirely scientifically accurate is beside the point.Do you think we should change the conceptual meaning of the word "solid" to be entirely scientifically accurate? Do you think we should abandon our use of the term "now" in light of relativity? Except that your use of the word "choice" quite evidently defies what people actually conceptually mean when they use that term. Do you understand why you have received so much objection to your use of the term "choice" to describe deterministic situations where there is only one possible outcome?At this stage I am not trying to convince you of anything. I simply want to know whether you understand what people have been saying to you. The common conceptual meaning of the term "freewill" requires that we "be agents with genuine, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities" in a way that is not compatible with determinism. If determinism is true then freewill is an illusion.What I don't understand about your position is this - What is achieved by changing the meaning of the term "freewill" so that it is compatible with determinism? What purpose is served by doing this? Why do you feel the need to do that?

OK, 'choose' a number between 1.

That's just an ill-formed sentence, not a rebuttal.If I choose a number between 1 and 10, even if it was determined that I would pick '6', I am still choosing '6' when I choose '6'. It's just that the process of choosing is determined by psychological factors, making it the choice of an agent.I'm having a terrible time understanding how this has foxed so many people.

I think we should continue to use the word 'solid' for things we would normally describe as solid and as the more scientific conception of a solid in terms of phase transitions. As, you know, we do. Hang on, that's must closer to your position that mine. You're the one arguing I shouldn't use the word 'choice' for how people actually choose. I have no idea why you're objecting to me using the word choice to the means by which we actually make choices. Oh, and we do choose from multiple possible outcomes, just with a subtly different meaning of the word possible.Other people seem to want cling to nonsense conceptions of reality and selfhood. There is no "common conceptual meaning" of the term freewill.Freewill, as reasonably interpreted - we get to freely choose our actions - is 100% compatible with determinism. Although, frankly, until you actually accept that I'm using the word 'choice' to mean 'choice' it's completely pointless for us to discuss it.Edited by Mr Jack, : No reason given.Edited by Mr Jack, : No reason given.

I think Modulus has covered this pretty well, actually, but I'll pop up on it anyway. That has no relation to anything I'm talking about.You do genuinely choose. All those choices you think you're making, you are really making them, and they really effect reality in the ways you think they do. The only difference is that we beginning to figure out how the process behind how you make those choices actually work - and it's not some mystic woo, it's biology operating according to the same principles of chemistry and physics that we normally encounter. This means that, most likely, with infinite knowledge you could predict the outcome before it happened.There were still multiple options. Those options were still considered. One of those options was still selected from the range of possibilities.Now, you tell me, how is that not a choice?

Yes, I agree. It was a poor choice of sentences. I should have said ‘choose’ a number between 1 and 1.Why does dualism begin when we imagine the mind as separate from the body and not when we imagine the body as separate from the rest of the universe? So you would agree that neither the spreadsheet nor the nematode are making choices. Where is the beginning of mind? When does a child begin to make choices? When does someone suffering from alzheimer’s stop making choices? It has only been foxing them for 2500 yrs or so. I suspect that it is much like trying to decide where the line is between green and blue.

I really want to agree with you here and I certainly feel like I am making choices. This is the part that I question.Edit; they just feel like options.Edited by Dogmafood, : No reason given.

Okay.Imagine you walk into a coffee shop. They're old school so the only things on the menu are coffee or tea. You take a seat and the waitress comes over to take your order. You ponder for a moment and tell her you fancy a nice cup of tea today.That's a pretty straightforward example of a simple choice, no? But what really happened?In mystic woo universe, your dualistic "mind" gets notification from the physical body about what's going on and the choice on offer does some mystic non-deterministic thing and gets back to reality with its choice.In physical, deterministic universe your brain receives signals from your sense telling what is going on, retrieves things from memory about tea and coffee and maybe what you've had recently, and some info about the state of your body and reaches a conclusion about what you want.In both cases, the only way to find out what actually happens is to reference you. In mystic woo universe that you is some dualistic mystic gubbins; in physical, deterministic universe the you is a biological entity that processes data by electrical and chemical signalling. In both cases, the you is conscious, has memories and does all the things you do in your life with its highs and lows and feelings and cares and woes.The only difference is this: in one universe the you making the choice is not governed by any deterministic laws, maybe not by any laws at all; in the deterministic universe, the same laws we know and love are behind the thinking.So the only reason in the hypothetical rerun of a deterministic universe we get the same outcome is because you make the same choice, not because there was only one option.

The other thing I wanted to mention is that the more I appreciate the fact that choice is an illusion the easier it is to feel empathy for and to forgive people for their mistakes. Not to absolve them or hold them blameless but to feel compassion.

Yes, I realized that, but then there's the "imperfect replication" aspect and the whole "evolution has no direction" stuff too.If every mutation was bound to happen since the dawn of time, then evolution does have a direction and arguably even an "objective" as per the title.