Existence of the soul

I'm not at all surprised to find that this is your opinion. I respectfully disagree with it. The measurable functions of the mind are affected (i.e. the brain), its capabilities to operate may not be. That you think this leads me to believe that you continue to misunderstand my argument. It is relevant as it illustrates the indepenance of the mind from the physical organism. That you carry the arbitrary presupposition that the brain is ontologically primary relative to the mind will obviously produce inconsistencies, but to declare my statments invalid on that basis is begging the question. How so? As I said above, it will obviously appear absurd if one arbitrarily presupposes the ontological primacy of the physical organism. That is what in dispute here, so your arguments which stem from that presupposition will all beg the question. Excuse me? Perhaps you should re-read posts 35 through current. Not hardly. It suggest to me that you haven't fully considered the problems associated with attempting to assail the properties of the mind experimentally.Blessings,::

I've looked over your posts and nowhere is there any attempt to deal with the FACT that severing the corpus callosum DOES break the link between the hemispheres. And that is something that has very basic effects on the operation of the mind.Arguing over whether or not the hemispheres COULD communicate if the corpus callosum were replaced ignores the whole issue.As for your assertion that accpeting that severing the corpus callosum has the effects that it is observed to have "arbitrarily presupposes the ontological primacy of the physical organism" - how ridiculous can you get ?The effects have been observed, now can you reasonably explain them without accepting that the hemispheres DO rely on the corpus callosum to communicate ? Or will we see more of thees diversionary tactics you have been throwing up about "misunderstandings" and "presuppositions" ?

That may be because I do not dispute this. What I dispute are the conclusions drawn from it. This is an unreasonable conclusion and conflicts with your acceptance of the remaining mental capacity to walk even absent two properly functioning legs. There is no way to objectively test for the remaining mental capacity to walk save from restoring the leg an observing the subject walking. Likewise, there is no way to test for the persistence of the mental capability to commnicate across the corpus collosum short of setting it back in place. Basically your conclusion is objectively unfalsifiable. Perhaps, however, it lends credibility to the notion that capacities persist over the course of dissassembly and reassembly of parts of the human anatomy. Your increasingly confrontational tone and resistance to considering the possibilities I present give me the impression that you have something more personal at stake here than simply an interest in open pursuit of useful knowledge. My statements are perfectly valid since the conclusion that altering the brain necessarily alters the mind only makes sense if one first supposes that the mind is the emergent property of complex brain function. Nothing in the experimental data you supplied refutes that, and instead the conclusions in each of those papers are built upon the same presupposition. The problems with them are precisely the source of Chalmer's Hard Problem (with which you've already indicated your familiarity). Objective testing cannot assail subjective experience which is precisely where the knowledge of mental capacities lies. It is you who is dismissing the unassailability of these mental attributes out of hand, and my only purpose in this discussion has been to demonstrate that this dismissal is arbitrary and limiting. I'm not contesting what has been observed -- just as I don't contest that the body relies on the legs to walk -- I'm contesting what you are conlcuding from those observations, namely, that the mind's capacities are necessarily affected after the physical body is. I can understand why you regard them as diversionary because they obsviously do not restrict themselves to operating upon your unspoken premise of ontological materialism. Instead, it calls that premise directly into question, and you continue to dismiss this challenge instead of attempting to address it. The fact remains that without that presupposition, it is unreasonable to conclude that the behavioral changes in an individual following a procedure such as amputation of an appendage or severing the corpus collosum reliably indicates direct changes to the properties of the mind.Blessings,::

No offense, but this just seems stupid. Like, you're saying that "my ability to cross this canyon is only relevant to whether or not there's a bridge here if you assume the ontological primacy of bridges." Like, the lack of a bridge doesn't hamper your ability to cross, if only there was a bridge.Like, "I could cross this canyon if there was a bridge there. Assume there is a bridge. Now, I can cross this canyon. Ergo my crossing ability is not related to bridges."I'm no logician, but I'm sure that's fallacious.At the end of the day, you can either walk or you can't. Both legs and minds are required to walk. If you're missing one, you don't have the ability to walk. There's no "mental vs. physical ability to walk". There's just walking, and not walking.

Hello, crashfrog, and thank you for weighing in with your comments. In the short time that I've been posting on this forum, I've come to appreciate your posts as consistently well-reasoned and knowledgeable. I hope that your added perspective will help avoid the tunnel vision that can result from a strictly two-way discussion.With that said, I must disagree with you slightly... It seems that you and PaulK are unable to discern the difference between possessing a capability and having the means to demosntrate the possession of that capability. Your canyon and bridge analogy is a good one, though slightly inaccurate in characterizing my leg/walk analogy, but I will use it in attempt to make my position clearer.Assume that I stand before a canyon with no bridge to the other side. Assume also that I have a perfectly functioning body. I'm arguing that in my state I possess every capability for crossing that canyon that I can possibly possess myself. Now, I cannot demonstrate that capability because there is no bridge. If we installed a bridge, I personally would have gained no new inherent capability, though now I can demonstrate that I have this capability by walking across the bridge. PaulK's argument seems to be that a person who cannot demonstrate his capability doesn't have the capability at all, which I believe is an unreasonable conclusion perfectly evidenced as such by the fact that installing a bridge does not add to the individual's inherent capability at all. The capability was always there, though the means to measure it were not. Well, I think that it's unclear what qualifies "could" or "can" in those statements, and the fuzziness is probably at the heart of the disagreement. I feel a closer reprensentation of my argument would be "I can cross this canyon but there is no bridge. Assume there is a bridge. Now, I can show you that I can cross this canyon. Ergo my crossing ability is not negated in the absence of a bridge." I think this simplistic rationale ignores the existence of real capabilities which merely cannot be measured because of a commitment to ontological materialism. When I say someone "can" do something, I mean that they possess the legitimate potential for performing a certain act, yet they may not possess the necessary physical means for actualizing that potential (i.e. they don't have a bridge). It seems that PaulK (and you?) concludes that the inability to actualize a potential (and thereby measure it) reasonably implies that the potential doesn't exist. I think that is an inductive fallacy.Blessings,::[This message has been edited by ::, 08-25-2003]

I think that we're saying that there is no difference to discern. (I won't speak for PaulK but that's what I'm saying, at least.)A potential that can't be taken advantage of doesn't exist. Inherent in the idea of "potental" is the ability to make use of that potential. I confess that my rationale is, indeed, simplistic. All in all I take a dim view of philosophy for complicating things that, at heart, are very simple. I'm pragmatic, like that.But, to get back to the argument, "ontological materialism" includes that which can be measured, and rejects that that cannot. So we don't reject your potentials-that-can't-be-used because we don't like them, or something, but because it's impossible to measure that that has no effect.You measure that which can be measured. That which cannot be measured cannot be known to exist. Thus, I measure the ability to cross canyons by how many canyons you can cross - not now many you could cross under such-and-such conditions. Trying to measure anything else is trying to measure that which cannot be measured.As for walking, you're saying that it takes the unique capabilities of both brains and legs to walk. But what you're implying is a third thing - that if you had legs that could not walk, and a brain that could not tell legs to walk, there would be a third, untestable entity that still possessed the ability to walk. But how do you know that's the case?

It seems that you are having a great problme understanding the fact that I am talking about the actual affects of severing the corpus callosum. The ACTUAL breaking of the communication between the hemispheres.
All this stuff about potentials DOES NOT ADDRESS MY POINT.So can you stop being so obtuse and deal with the real issue ?[This message has been edited by PaulK, 08-25-2003]

I had begun to suspect that already. Yes, BUT I'm not speaking of potentials which are known to be impossible to actualize. I would agree with you if that were the case. I'm speaking of potentials which CAN be measured under the proper circumstances. Obviously persons who could formerly walk or communicate the hemispheres of their brains actualized a legitimate potential which was measured. We therefore know that the potential at least existed at one time, and I'm arguing that its fallacious to assume that momentary inability to measure it means that it no longer exists. That's like arguing that the world goes away when you close your eyes. I sincerely hope that you did not take my statement as an insult. As I said before, I am well aware of your ability to reason. I simply think that the rationale which you're supporting (not your reasoning in general) is overly simplistic. Again, I'm not saying its completely impossible to measure. I'm saying that the circumstances to make a measurement are presently unavailable, and may or may not be available again. I'm sure that Haley's comet exists, even when it flies well beyond the range of our telescopes. Likewise, I see no reason to believe that potentials cease in the instance that the ability to measure them does. Please note that there is a subtle difference between "canyons I can cross" and "canyons I do cross." It is unreasonable to conclude that I cannot cross canyons simply because I do not. Again, that is like saying the visual world cannot exist because I do not see it when I close my eyes. I'm not certain that it is entirely untestable in principle, though at present we are unable to test it. We return again to Chalmer's Hard Problem - to which I know of no easy solution except to invert our entire ontological paradigm to one of idealism or panpsychism.Blessings,::

I understand what you think are the actual effects, and some of them are not in dispute. Others are. Perhaps, then, you would be so kind as to explicity describe what your point is, how I have misunderstood or misrepresented it, and how my statements fail to address it. I've noticed that your posts have consistently dwindled in size and content in the last few pages of this thread, yet your tone has become increasingly hostile. If you are becoming as aggravated as you seem, perhaps it would save you the stress to instead provide a bit more detail with regard to your argument instead of merely telling me that I'm not addressing it. Show me.I'll also note that none of the content of your post to which I'm now responding addresses any of my points from my previous response to you. It seems we don't agree as to what the real issue is. I don't dispute that we don't observe communication across the corpus collosum once it is severed, just like the ability to observe a man crossing a canyon ceases when the bridge goes out, and the ability to observe the visual world ceases when you close your eyes. I'm disputing your position which seems to me to be (feel free to correct me) that it is reasonable to conclude that the ability to communicate across the corpus collosum, or the ability to cross a bridge, or the visual world itself cease to exist simply because it cannot be observed momentarily. In any of those instances the priciples of rational induction are identical.Blessings,::

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Further, it seems that you might be confusing normal function of the brain with normal function of the mind. It is not a given that the two are one-and-the-same in this discussion.

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Considering that all of the facts and information we have point to the brain producing the mind, and none of the facts and information we have points to anything other than this, I wonder why you give such a large consideration to the idea that the mind is somehow independent of the brain.

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The tests for "normal function" which are described in your articles only can only assail the former, and by arbitrarily presupposing the ontological primacy of matter they conclude that therefore the mind necessarily malfunctions to that extent also.

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What positive evidence do you have that anything else is at work to produce the mind other than the neurological activity of the brain?If you have no such evidence, then there is no reason to invent a separation.You seem to equate the brain, which is the oragan which all evidence points to producing that which we call "mind" with a leg, which is controlled by the nervous system of which the brain is a part and more or less has control over.My husband is a brain scientist. I'll have him look over this thread when he gets home and see if he wants to join the discussion.

No, I certainly didn't take it as an insult.The thing is, I lean towards a default view of material ontological supremacy because it's the simplest. It explains everything we can observe without introducing unneeded entities. True. But it is also unreasonable to conclude that you can cross canyons until you do. (Unless I've seen someone just like you do it.)Materialism is about all we can know we know. You're talking about things we can't know we know. Now, it may be the case in the future that we're able to measure the effects of whatever is telling my brain to tell my legs to move - but even at that point, I can admit you were right about these potentials, and still be a materialist. But until there's some evidence that can only be explained by what you're talking about - a soul, perhaps? - I can't conclude that it exists from a position of materialism.That's why I stick with materialism, I guess - it's simple. I only have to know what we know we know.

doctorbill writes:

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The question is one of subjective experience. So, whether or not the brain is responding to stimuli seems to be beside the point.

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Relevant - yes. Measurable - no (not by current technology). And considering the history of neurology (before EEG), we could very well discover measurable brain function under conditions we now call "brain death." The expression is somewhat misleading. Living persons have been buried because medical "science" assessed them "dead." There is a more certain methodology: Once the corpse begins to rot, there will be no reports of 'after-death-experience'While I'm at this I want to revue a couple of things you have written in previous posts.msg 20 A thought - The preconceived notions are stored in their brains.
And a question - If the "afterlife" is real? Or if the "after death experience" is real?msg 35 If affecting the mind by affecting the brain doesn't speak to the status of the mind's existence, then what sort of experiment do you propose? Isn't your quest like that for the holy grail? A fantastic adventure based on misaprehended supposition.msg 35 I respect your faith but I believe you are mistaken. Why is it, do you suppose, that the individual mind is so intimately linked to the individual brain. I do not doubt that we can share consciousness with the brains of others but the operative word is 'share.' One needs a brain to participate. The mind dies with the brain in which it lives. There's an article of my faith.db------------------
Doesn't anyone graduate Sunday School?

My point - and I fail to see how you could possibly have missed it is that the EFFECTS of severing the corpus callosum show that the workings of the mind are - in this case - dependant on the physical brain. That the effects are too basic to the workings of the mind to accept to dismiss as simply behavioural (as you do) without argument (which you refuse to supply).SO far the only "argument" you can produce is to suggest that if the corpus callosum were restored or replaced the minsd would be restored to normal function. Which in no way contradicts my position - indeed the NECESSITY of providing a replacement supports my position as I have explicitly stated (which hasn't stopped you suggesting for some reason that my argument relies on assuming that noormal function could NOT be restored).Any hostility you may detect is entirely due to the misrepresentations amd evasions that have characterised your posts.

I believe the standard philosophical refutation of Cartesian mind/brain dualism - that the brain is physical and the mind is non-physical "mind-stuff" - is the problem of how the non-material interacts with the material. How could the two interface? And if they don't, then the mind is just irrelevant to the physical, which no one wishes to claim.I know of no actual answer to the question of how a non-physical entity can affect a physical entity, other than "it just does". If you want to believe "it just does", feel free, but count me out.The other way to approach the problem is empirical, and the overwhelming evidence shows that consciousness depends on brain state. The "hard problem" of how subjective experience arises is arguably not spoken to by any possible evidence; and even if you interpret it in such a way that it *is* testable, I know of no such *test*. Knock yourself out coming up with such a test.

These are not facts but merely your interpretations of evidence. Interpretations, I imagine, which presuppose ontological materialism. And I wonder why you do not. The existence of subjective experience and phenomenal facts. The evidence points there when the question is begged, yes. You seem to assume that the mind emerges as a consequence of neural activity, which is precisely the assumption that I'm challenging, and precisely the assumption that may be shown plainly false by things like the existence of subjective experience, phenomenal facts, and/or even the problem of solipsism. The issue at hand is the relation of mind to matter, so basically there is no difference between the relation of the mind to the brain or the mind to the leg since the latter in both instances fall under the category "matter".The point is that materialism cannot account for specific mental facts such as phenomenal experience, qualia, etc. At most you can invoke the "materialism-of-the-gaps" claim and insist that the workings of the brain are simply too complex to comprehensively catalogue brain states such as to exhaust the infinitely diverse spectrum of subjective experience but you "know" that it must be possible anyway. As if, given enough information about an individual's brain state, we could discern precisely what he is thinking. The problem with that is still subjective experience: significance, meaning, value, qualia... these things are individually unique and cannot be singularly associated with a particular brain state. That is the core of the argument which aims to falsify ontological materialism. Qualia are real facts which cannot be explained in material terms.Your only alternative to that is to deny that subjective experience exists thus denying that qualia exist and are real facts. If that is your position I have to wonder what motivated you to respond to this post in the first place.Blessings,::