Register | Sign In


Understanding through Discussion


EvC Forum active members: 65 (9162 total)
3 online now:
Newest Member: popoi
Post Volume: Total: 915,817 Year: 3,074/9,624 Month: 919/1,588 Week: 102/223 Day: 0/13 Hour: 0/0


Thread  Details

Email This Thread
Newer Topic | Older Topic
  
Author Topic:   Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)
PaulK
Member
Posts: 17822
Joined: 01-10-2003
Member Rating: 2.2


Message 121 of 210 (358784)
10-25-2006 1:21 PM
Reply to: Message 120 by Max Power
10-25-2006 12:48 PM


Re: Free Willy
It may well be the case that consciousness is in part complexity, but there is more to it than that - a conscious system would need to have some awareness of its own internal states and the ability to project those states onto others.
quote:
Let me ask you this, do you think that it is possible to create an AI which can have a free will in a meaningful way.
In my opinion,it is possible in principle. That is we can't do it now, I can't show that it can be done, but I think that it could be done if our understanding of consciousness and intelligence continues to advance.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 120 by Max Power, posted 10-25-2006 12:48 PM Max Power has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 137 by Max Power, posted 10-26-2006 10:25 PM PaulK has not replied

  
Max Power
Member (Idle past 6007 days)
Posts: 32
From: Minneapolis, MN, USA
Joined: 06-03-2005


Message 122 of 210 (358785)
10-25-2006 1:23 PM
Reply to: Message 112 by nwr
10-25-2006 12:13 AM


Evolution vs. Artificial Evolution
I am far from an expert on use of genetic algorithms.
Likewise, I think this is significantly different than simply modeling genetic algorithms, perhaps I should have set this up better. This programmer created a set of code that simply replicates itself (this is simple binary code that rewrites itself somewhere else). He implements a death function and a random mutation function in the rewrites. He found some extremely short codes for self replication (22 bytes) that even an MIT student couldn't get near (31 bytes), as well as a pool of parasites and other interesting "creatures".
You can setup rules which specify what will be considered pragmatic. And once you setup rules, you have managed to simulate pragmatic decisions in terms of truth/logic decisions. That's sufficient for simulations of evolution.
Is your beef with the discrete nature of the computers (1's and 0's) rather than the perceived continuous nature of the world? I see these truth/logic "decisions" as the rules of chemistry and physics in the analogy.
Some people believe that all pragmatic decision making is really a matter of true/false decisions, based on rules as to what is to be considered pragmatic. Personally, I find that implausible.
Don't our neurons work in a true/false way? I may be wrong on this but I always thought it was kind of a fire/not fire mechanism. Doesn't pragmatic mean that it makes its decisions based on what works? In the artificial evolution example the "creatures" that are still exist are there because what they do (their decisions) are the ones that worked.
Edited by Max Power, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 112 by nwr, posted 10-25-2006 12:13 AM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 124 by nwr, posted 10-25-2006 8:30 PM Max Power has not replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6408
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 5.1


Message 123 of 210 (358871)
10-25-2006 8:17 PM
Reply to: Message 116 by Tusko
10-25-2006 6:03 AM


Re: Free Willy
Where you disagree with me, and I'm having trouble seeing why, is when you say that this wouldn't work if the feelings were a bit less extreme. Say you mildly disliked vanilla, and found chocolate quite nice. And even a bit less extreme than that. And actually, pretty finely balanced (though still not identical, so that you still preferred chocolate).
What would be the point of free will, if you cannot you it to choose the flavor you prefer?
What would be the point of free will, if you could not choose to behave rationally?
The usually stated requirement of free will, is that you could have chosen otherwise. You apparently want to instead require that you would have chosen otherwise.
Let's put it this way. If we are completely free agents (i.e. have free will), and if we are rational, then we would expect that if we could replay the past we would still make the rational choices, and we would still choose the flavor of icecream that we prefer. If we did not have any free choice at all, but instead a random number generator were wired into our brains to make the selections, then we would behave quite differently on a replay of the past.
In short, I am disagreeing with your notion of "free will".

Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber

This message is a reply to:
 Message 116 by Tusko, posted 10-25-2006 6:03 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 128 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 9:45 AM nwr has replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6408
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 5.1


Message 124 of 210 (358874)
10-25-2006 8:30 PM
Reply to: Message 122 by Max Power
10-25-2006 1:23 PM


Re: Evolution vs. Artificial Evolution
Is your beef with the discrete nature of the computers (1's and 0's) rather than the perceived continuous nature of the world?
No, it is with the abstractness of computation. It wouldn't matter whether the computation were analog or digital (except that digital is better).
Don't our neurons work in a true/false way?
Some people say they do, and some people say they don't. I'm in the second group.
Doesn't pragmatic mean that it makes its decisions based on what works? In the artificial evolution example the "creatures" that are still exist are there because what they do (their decisions) are the ones that worked.
It is all done in an artificial environment, as part of an abstract computation. In that environment, "works" just means that the programmer says it works.
We are drifting away from the "free will" topic of the OP.

Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber

This message is a reply to:
 Message 122 by Max Power, posted 10-25-2006 1:23 PM Max Power has not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 126 by DominionSeraph, posted 10-26-2006 12:49 AM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Omnivorous
Member
Posts: 3978
From: Adirondackia
Joined: 07-21-2005
Member Rating: 7.3


Message 125 of 210 (358883)
10-25-2006 9:11 PM
Reply to: Message 72 by nwr
10-23-2006 11:24 PM


Re: Free will creationism
Thanks for the excellent reply--it truly is POTM worthy.
But you won't be surprised to hear that I have reservations about typifying the developmental process as self-redesign.
The genetic, epigenetic, and environmental processes that dynamically mold the individual are not chosen; the crying infant chose nothing, neither the circumstances of its hunger nor its wailing response: all inputs into the process are givens, and the hungry infant cries because the environment has created an internal state that elicits a hard-wired response.
The dynamic response of the developing child is structured around survival, not responsibility or freedom: our evolutionary path has made that development and structure complex and social, which is why moral responsibility (perhaps the quintessential social norm) is such a useful concept. Socially defined rules of moral responsibility provide another set of modifying stimuli: whether a person is truly free or thoroughly determined, their responses are modified by well-established codes of consequence.
Again, I see no sign of choice in these matters, since both individual development and social behaviors have evolved under the aegis of survival, not responsibility per se. Indeed, the degree to which social norms and mores determine an individual's actions in specific circumstances is one of the stronger arguments for determinism: Mr. Taliban, meet Mr. Quaker.
As to the insane--yes, the process can go awry in ways even the strictest moral philospher could not charge to the individual, producing, say, a psychosis; but also possibly producing merely a maladjustment, a nervous tic, an inability to postpone gratification for greater long-term gain. The distinction between the insane and the rest of us is relative, not absolute: we are all flawed creatures, and the boundaries between being held accountable and not seem blurry and arbitrary.
I think you have described the process of the development of a sense of moral responsibility quite well, and I agree that most "normal" people develop that sense. But I still cannot identify the when, why, or how of the moment (or process) in which a creature, born "alone and afraid in a world I never made" achieves sufficient remove from the chains of causality to be considered an authentically free agent.
Having said all that, I'll show the rest of my cards: I believe I do possess free will, and not just by virtue of being unpredictable or unconstrained, but the 800 lb. gorilla variety: I believe that is the hallmark of consciousness-as-we-know-it. I believe I can identify and ponder the forces that make me likely to be, say, an abusive parent or a suicidal depressive, and, somewhere in the shadow theater of memory and desire, sight and reflection, choose another path. I can find myself in a dark wood, resolve to find my way out, and slog through a good deal of hell to get there. I suppose that makes me a turbo-charged ameliorist.
Consciousness can always take another step back in its perspective--watching itself watching the movie--mirrors of near-infinite regression that, perhaps, somehow attenuate the grip of causality.
I can't justify this belief in my freedom by logic or reason, but nonetheless have no doubts on the matter. Perhaps that's what makes me, after all the postmodern irony and survivor guilt falls away, a romantic. Perhaps the attempt to reason out the mystery of freedom and will is, as has been said of other such mysteries, like building a fire in a wooden stove.
NB: Yes, the moral responsibility of a designer would make a lovely topic for Creationist studies.
Edited by Omnivorous, : typOh

Drinking when we are not thirsty and making love at any time, madam, is all that distinguishes us from the other animals.
-Pierre De Beaumarchais (1732-1799)
Save lives! Click here!
Join the World Community Grid with Team EvC!
---------------------------------------

This message is a reply to:
 Message 72 by nwr, posted 10-23-2006 11:24 PM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 130 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 10:44 AM Omnivorous has not replied

  
DominionSeraph
Member (Idle past 4755 days)
Posts: 365
From: on High
Joined: 01-26-2005


Message 126 of 210 (358917)
10-26-2006 12:49 AM
Reply to: Message 124 by nwr
10-25-2006 8:30 PM


Re: Evolution vs. Artificial Evolution
nwr writes:
It is all done in an artificial environment, as part of an abstract computation. In that environment, "works" just means that the programmer says it works.
I see you don't have a clue about self-replicating programs.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 124 by nwr, posted 10-25-2006 8:30 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 127 of 210 (358933)
10-26-2006 4:34 AM
Reply to: Message 120 by Max Power
10-25-2006 12:48 PM


AI and Free Will
Let me ask you this, do you think that it is possible to create an AI which can have a free will in a meaningful way
I would say, Yes.
I agree with nwr that the kind of symbolic system that you and he have been discussing is unlikely ever to produce an artificial intelligence that shows the same cognitive properties as a human being.
But connectionist systems are another matter. My feeling is that consciousness, reasoning, free will, and all the other higher faculties are emergent properties of the massively inter-connected network of neurons we call a brain. So if you built a connectionist system as sophisticated as the human brain I would expect it to show evidence of all those cognitive properties, including free will.
I don't have time at the moment, but I'll try to find some references to the kind of research that is being done in this area. The emergent properties of quite simple connectionist systems (e.g. the ability to form generalisations from particular instances) are pretty impressive.
ABE: The following paper is a good example of the kind of work going on in this field. The authors are using an artificial connectionist network to understand how the brain works (in this case, trying to understand what factors may affect the recovery of patients with acquired dyslexia).
Connectionist Modeling of Relearning and Generalization in Acquired Dyslexic Patients
Edited by JavaMan, : typo
Edited by JavaMan, : Added link to paper

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 120 by Max Power, posted 10-25-2006 12:48 PM Max Power has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 101 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 128 of 210 (358960)
10-26-2006 9:45 AM
Reply to: Message 123 by nwr
10-25-2006 8:17 PM


Brain-Clone Blues
I'm not convinced that somehow I'm not just playing word games with all this somehow.
To address your points though:
nwr writes:
What would be the point of free will, if you cannot you it to choose the flavor you prefer?
I'm arguing that there isn't really free will, so I don't understand why you would think I would be trying to justify its worth.
What would be the point of free will, if you could not choose to behave rationally?
I don't think its possible to not choose to behave rationally. I think we as individuals are essentially compelled act rationally, if acting rationally is to enact learned responses to given stimuli.
The usually stated requirement of free will, is that you could have chosen otherwise. You apparently want to instead require that you would have chosen otherwise.
This is the part of your post I've found it hardest to understand. I'm having trouble because I think it suggests that I haven't made myself properly understood. I don't think that I require that I 'would' have chosen otherwise, though I can't be sure if I understand you.
How 'could' you have chosen otherwise if your brain and your ability to reason, and your circumstances are all leading you to a particular decision? What appears to be the exercising of free will to you just seems to be the final filter on possible actions through which only one can emerge.
Here's a wacky example that might help:
Imagine it were possible to make a brain physically identical to yours at 1413 and 13 seconds today in a biotech lab, and then boot it up, sustain it and feed it sensory input so that it thought it was just you having a normal day.
If the scientists studying it knew enough about it - and I mean exactly how it worked - then they could accurately predict what it would do in any subsequent situation.* They would know what it would choose to do. You would know this because you would have the banks of memory and experience that it draws its understanding of the world from, and they would know how it would interpret them and use them.
You are saying, if I'm understanding you correctly, that whenever your brain-clone was faced with the free choice between vanilla and chocolate ice-cream in a pretend ice cream parlour in its synthetic reality, it could exercising its free-will to choose one. I am saying that this doesn't seem right to me because the scientists studying your brain-clone would know what it would choose as it walked through the door of the ice-cream parlour, before it even knew what ice-creams were on sale.
They would know its preferences and the memories they were based on, and consequently the brain couldn't surprise the scientists.
(Well, as I suggested in the footnote, actually it could surprise them - but only if some part of the cognitive process was random - and so as a consequence wouldn't be free.)
I’d be grateful if you could explain two things:
1) Assuming cognitive randomness can be conclusively proved to be banished, how could your brain-clone be described as making a free choice given that the scientists can't ever be surprised?
2) ABE - if you think this isn't a fair thought experiment, How does the situation of your brain-clone differ from our situation?
* This is assuming that arbitrariness can't creep in at some molecular level, which would also lead to unfree choice.
Edited by Tusko, : "just [me] having a normal day" ... but its nwr's brain now!
Edited by Tusko, : "free choice [of icecream] given " lets make this more general!
Edited by Tusko, : 2) isn't really necessary if s/he agrees

This message is a reply to:
 Message 123 by nwr, posted 10-25-2006 8:17 PM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 129 by JavaMan, posted 10-26-2006 10:24 AM Tusko has replied
 Message 131 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 10:53 AM Tusko has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 129 of 210 (358973)
10-26-2006 10:24 AM
Reply to: Message 128 by Tusko
10-26-2006 9:45 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I am saying that this doesn't seem right to me because the scientists studying your brain-clone would know what it would choose as it walked through the door of the ice-cream parlour, before it even knew what ice-creams were on sale.
They would know its preferences and the memories they were based on, and consequently the brain couldn't surprise the scientists.
Sorry to butt in on your debate with nwr, but I'd disagree with this assessment of the situation. nwr has insisted that he doesn't really have a preference when it comes to chocolate and vanilla. If that's the case, then it's quite possible that the scientists wouldn't be aware of which choice he was going to make until just before he became conscious of it himself. I certainly wouldn't expect them to be able to predict his choice even before he entered the ice cream parlour - his brain will perform millions of operations between crossing the threshold and reaching the counter - what makes you think none of those operations would influence his final choice?
By the way, you might find this modern neuroscience article interesting. It discusses precisely the kind of things we've been discussing in this thread:
Preconscious Free Will

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 128 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 9:45 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 132 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 11:16 AM JavaMan has not replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6408
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 5.1


Message 130 of 210 (358981)
10-26-2006 10:44 AM
Reply to: Message 125 by Omnivorous
10-25-2006 9:11 PM


Re: Free will creationism
The genetic, epigenetic, and environmental processes that dynamically mold the individual are not chosen; the crying infant chose nothing, neither the circumstances of its hunger nor its wailing response: all inputs into the process are givens, and the hungry infant cries because the environment has created an internal state that elicits a hard-wired response.
I agree that they are not chosen, in the sense of a conscious decision by the child. A newborn child has at most only a minimal consciousness (in my opinion). However, in my view, how the child develops is not completely dictated by the genes either. Learning is a creative activity, not a genetically determined one.
The dynamic response of the developing child is structured around survival, not responsibility or freedom:
I fully agree with that. Responsibility comes from learning to adapt to life in a society.
But I still cannot identify the when, why, or how of the moment (or process) in which a creature, born "alone and afraid in a world I never made" achieves sufficient remove from the chains of causality to be considered an authentically free agent.
There is no magic instant where one becomes "an authentically free agent". "Freedom" is a relative term. Few, if any, of us is fully autonomous. We are tied to living in a society, and most of us would have great difficulty surviving in the wild, separated from our social support systems.
Having said all that, I'll show the rest of my cards: I believe I do possess free will, and not just by virtue of being unpredictable or unconstrained, but the 800 lb. gorilla variety:
I agree, although exactly what "free will" means is a contentious issue.
According to conventional wisdom, at least within philosophy, we are rational agents. I disagree with that. I believe that is a misunderstanding of human nature.
I say that we are opportunistic agents. The most central aspect of our cognition is in our perceptual systems. We use our perception to recognize opportunities, and to seize those opportunities as they become available.
We are typically faced with a number of opportunities. Often there is no rational basis for selecting between them, although we are very proficient at concocting after-the-fact rationalizations to justify our choices. Looked at this way, I believe our notion of free will comes from this opportunism, and our need to select between opportunities. Our notion of moral responsibility has to do with whether we honor our social obligations as part of our process of selecting between competing opportunities.
Incidently my skepticism toward AI, is because AI is attempting to build a rational agent rather than an opportunistic agent. I been known to say, with a deliberate play on the double meanings of the words, that rationality is irrational and logic is illogical.

Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber

This message is a reply to:
 Message 125 by Omnivorous, posted 10-25-2006 9:11 PM Omnivorous has not replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6408
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 5.1


Message 131 of 210 (358983)
10-26-2006 10:53 AM
Reply to: Message 128 by Tusko
10-26-2006 9:45 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Imagine it were possible to make a brain physically identical to yours at 1413 and 13 seconds today in a biotech lab, and then boot it up, sustain it and feed it sensory input so that it thought it was just you having a normal day.
I can only respond that I believe this impossible. A person is intricately connected to the environment. If you maintain a brain replica in a lab situation, then you sever this connection. The brain-in-a-vat might well die due to sensory deprivation.
I strongly disagree with the notion of the person as a stimulus-response machine. If anything, that has it backwards. Life is better described as the person stimulating the environment, so that the environment will respond in ways useful to that person.

Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber

This message is a reply to:
 Message 128 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 9:45 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 133 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 11:36 AM nwr has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 101 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 132 of 210 (358987)
10-26-2006 11:16 AM
Reply to: Message 129 by JavaMan
10-26-2006 10:24 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Yes - I take it back, when he steps into the imaginary parlour it will be too early. Curse my predeliction for hyperbole!
But if its predictable a fraction before the event - and I mean a fraction before the preconcious decision - then doesn't the point still stand?
Thanks for the article, I'll have a look at that on my long dark evening shift of the soul later. I suspect its going to be about something they had in New Scientist that caught my eye five years ago but I never followed up.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 129 by JavaMan, posted 10-26-2006 10:24 AM JavaMan has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 101 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 133 of 210 (358994)
10-26-2006 11:36 AM
Reply to: Message 131 by nwr
10-26-2006 10:53 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Oh sure - its an obscene idea... but I was imagining that it was possible to feed it just as much sensory stimulous as the real world can, of such a high quality that the brain clone wouldn't see the experiential join between its old self and its new faked existence.
In a way, that's just a silly build up to the fundamental question, which is - ...if the scientists can't ever be surprised, then does the clone-brain (and by implication everyone else) really ever make meaningful choices?
By the way, I don't think you need the amazingly insightful observer for this point to still stand - this observer merely has access to reality in a way that we don't. It is the reality that contains the seed of the future - and whether it is determined or arbitrary I personally can't see room for free will.
Imagine there is an almost omnipotent, almost omniscient God. It can do everything and anything except know what is going to happen in the future. But while it can't know the future for sure, it can make predictions based on everything which it knows now, which is everything. Those predictions are going to be pretty damn good. I can't imagine a situation where this God ever says to itself "Bugger me! I didn't see that coming! I thought he was going to choose the other one!" Even if you have what feel to you to be utterly ambivalent feelings about vanilla and chocolate, this god is going to know even before your preconcious mind has made its mind up.
He can see all the same stuff that the scientists could see in the previous example, and more. I contend that this god can't be surprised. And if it can't be surprised, then can the subjects it observes be said to have a meaningful kind of free will?
Note that the universe doesn't have to be deterministic for free will to be bypassed. If truly random things happen, then they don't bring free will any closer.
I know you disagree, but I just can't understand why. It would really help me to understand where you think I'm going wrong (if you can be bothered of course!) if you could address this point. I know that you don't think people are input/output machines. Maybe that's the fundamental difference. But the question remains: if people don't work like that, where does the uncertainty - that isn't plain randomness - come from that could surprise a god as described in this post? It sounds supernatural to me.
Edited by Tusko, : "-- that isn't plain randomnesss --"

This message is a reply to:
 Message 131 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 10:53 AM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 134 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 11:50 AM Tusko has replied
 Message 136 by JavaMan, posted 10-26-2006 4:22 PM Tusko has replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6408
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 5.1


Message 134 of 210 (359002)
10-26-2006 11:50 AM
Reply to: Message 133 by Tusko
10-26-2006 11:36 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I know you disagree, but I just can't understand why.
I'm sure that a large part of our disagreement is over the meaning of "free will." You have a considerably more expansive view of what it means, than I have.
Here, for the record, is my tentative definition:
free will is the ability to do science. That is, it is the ability to make the choices necessary for the critical testing of hypotheses and predictions.

Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber

This message is a reply to:
 Message 133 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 11:36 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 135 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 2:33 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 101 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 135 of 210 (359051)
10-26-2006 2:33 PM
Reply to: Message 134 by nwr
10-26-2006 11:50 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I think you've hit the nail on the head! Well done. I've been running in circles like a headless chicken.
I like your definition of free will. I don't think I agree with it, but it has two advantages over mine, namely - 1)It's short and 2)It exists.
My definition would be something like:
quote:
Free will is the ability to make decisions without being bound by a chain of causality (if it exists), and without the influence of randomness and arbitrariness.
For me its one or the other so I can't see how free will can exist. I don't see how our ability to reason, and indeed our ability to "do science" can reasonably be considered to exist outside a chain of causality (this actually chimes with Schraf's new thread that touches on the sequential nature of scientific discovery), and I can't really see how it would be random either.
Reasoning is cool, fun, interesting to do, but I think that any decision we reach is merely the signing and sealing of something that has already been written.
I think that we would be allowed to do all the things that your definition offers if, as a see it, free will doesn't exist. I don't see the lack of free will as something threatening.
Of course, I might be wrong, and I might be drowning in it. I just don't see where it fits in - perhaps because my definition is wacky?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 134 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 11:50 AM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Newer Topic | Older Topic
Jump to:


Copyright 2001-2023 by EvC Forum, All Rights Reserved

™ Version 4.2
Innovative software from Qwixotic © 2024