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Author Topic:   Terrorism - Criminal Act or Act of War?
Quetzal
Member (Idle past 5893 days)
Posts: 3228
Joined: 01-09-2002


Message 31 of 36 (60949)
10-15-2003 3:14 AM
Reply to: Message 29 by Silent H
10-14-2003 5:10 PM


Please forgive me if I take 2-3 days for each response. In fact, give me up to five days for a reply. I don't think I'll need that much, but you never know.
Take all the time you need. If it ever comes to a point where "real world (tm)" constraints means you are simply unable to keep working this thread, let me know and we can figure out some way of continuing the discussion off-line at our leisure. The main downside of using an Internet forum for this type of discussion - requiring a fair amount of research and/or reading - means that at some point the thread drops off the radar, until Brad resurrects it.
In fact that is what makes TO's impervious to military responses. They can have countless splinter cells working independently with little to no coordination. They just know the goal is to harass an enemy through sudden, brutal acts.
I completely agree with your reasoning that led up to this. I disagree with the conclusion. If anything, the cellular structure of most global terrorist organizations has even greater implications for the inability of law enforcement to eliminate or reduce the threat from the organization as a whole. Arresting or eliminating any number of members, or even entire cells, has little effect on the organization as a whole. OTOH, it has been shown historically that disruption of the top leadership of a cellular organization has grave implications for the survival of the organization. France, Italy and Germany were only able to finally come to grips with Action Directe, the Brigata Rossa, and Badr-Meinhoff/Red Brigades (no relation) respectively, after successfully killing or capturing the leadership of the organizations. They had quite a few of the lower level operatives in custody but that had no effect on either the capability or deadliness of the organizations as an entity. In fact, the cellular structure itself is designed to thwart law enforcement/security by limiting members' knowledge of other cells' operations and personnel. However, the leadership has to have that knowledge - at least in general terms - and only they can maintain the connections that permit logistics and operational support to the members "in the field" that are supposed to carry out the activity. Even eliminating the "middle tier" has only short-term effects, as with the leadership still in place they can eventually reconstitute a new organization from the ashes of the old, even if they have completely lost contact with the original membership. This is especially true with ideological fanatics - it's pretty easy to find more martyrs for the cause. It's much more difficult to find a new personality with the management and leadership skills to direct the organization, motivate the followers, and provide a symbol to rally around. Al Qaeda may in fact be in that position now, after several key lieutenants have been eliminated. However, with bin Laden still alive and kicking (apparently), the organization may have been checked, but it certainly hasn't been checkmated. Why do you think he keeps making video tapes?
About my only issue... or the question raised in my mind... is that if we concentrate on the comprehensive paradigm, it actually allows Nations to avoid thinking about illegitimacy of their own actions at all. They can just pass it off as "having to play as dirty as the bad guys".
I answered this above:
quote:
IF we start as I suggested with an honest appraisal of our own uses of this illegitimate form of war, and IF we can proceed from there to develop a more viable progressive war strategy in our own future conflicts — and by our I’m referring to the community of so-called civilized nations — then and only then can we realistically avoid falling into the trap you have mentioned. And then and only then will the benefits you listed of this paradigm be operationalized.
Looking forward to your reply.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 29 by Silent H, posted 10-14-2003 5:10 PM Silent H has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 33 by Silent H, posted 10-15-2003 7:45 PM Quetzal has not replied

Quetzal
Member (Idle past 5893 days)
Posts: 3228
Joined: 01-09-2002


Message 32 of 36 (60962)
10-15-2003 7:05 AM
Reply to: Message 30 by PaulK
10-14-2003 6:31 PM


Let's try and get a more detailed reply out, dealing wiht points in your earlier posts as well.
Great! Take your time. I’ll look forward to it.
1. I think my point that the methods that are best for dealing with other nations are different from the best for dealing with private, covert organsiations still stands. 2. Now in a few cases it may make sense to recognise a terrorist organsiation as a nation (the PLO and possibly the ANC - although I'm not sure how far they used terror tactics, would be examples) 3. but that just goes back to my point that we should take each organisation as it is, rather than relying too heavily on systems of classification. (numbers added to clarify response)
1. Yes, I’m aware that this is your position. You have clearly defined your position on this several times. It is pretty much the point of view that holmes is coming from. I’m not sure, however, that you have made the case for accepting this point, although holmes seems to be working on it. In a superficial sense, what you have stated is completely true — the diplomacy and international laws and treaties that ostensibly govern relations between states are inapplicable to covert organizations. I think we both agree that global terrorist organizations have placed themselves outside the law by their refusal to abide by those norms, and hence the organizations and their actions are criminal by definition. However, the moment we formally invoke crime — even war crime or crime against humanity - in relation to terrorism, we accomplish two things: a) we invoke a whole host of legal protections for the practitioners, not least of which are the evidentiary requirements and due process, and b) we have surrendered the initiative, as law, including that falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC, is a reactive and punitive process, rather than a deterrent or preventative measure.
This then, is the question that has yet to be addressed. In my opinion, it is the question on which the validity and utility of the entire judicial approach hinges. How does this approach contribute to or even address the prevention of terrorism before it occurs? International legal norms do not permit states to engage in pre-emptive actions. Period.
2. I can think of no occasion where it is either legitimate or practical to consider any terrorist organization a nation. Nor, I might add, have I ever advocated this. This is a very strange contention on your part. The Palestinian Authority is a legitimate government. It was composed initially in large measure of members of the al-Fatah guerrilla organization. As such, the PA can be considered the representative of a nation. (Although it would require a rather lengthy off-topic digression to explain why, the PLO is not, and has never been.) I know little except generically about the ANC, as my focus has primarily been on the Middle East, but I suspect the cases are not dissimilar — except that I think the ANC has been legitimized as a political party, rather than becoming a government as was the case with al-Fatah.
3. You have made this point only peripherally, in arguing against my differentiation between international and domestic terrorism. Since it is one of the key foundations of the methodology of flexible response I propose — and is in fact, the opposite of the judicial approach which lumps both practitioners and responses into a single category - I’m not sure how it either helps your position or refutes my own.
quote:
From post 21:
Each individual terrorist act or organization must be weighed, and the appropriate counter strategy utilized. This isn’t a shoot first, shoot often, shoot more later approach. As I have noted previously, response should be flexible. Under current constraints, flexibility is disallowed — it’s often a case of all or nothing. I submit that you must, in fact, make the awkward consideration as a matter of course. It is fundamentally impossible to defend against the lone nutcase (although you can make it difficult in the extreme). Somewhat counterintuitively, it isn’t impossible or even impractical to defend against and proactively disrupt global organizations — merely difficult.
quote:
From post 28:
Following that, specific thresholds of response would be invoked, depending on the nature of the organization, scope, potential or threat for future acts, etc., and the most effective method for preventing, disrupting or eliminating them would be initiated.
Perhaps you would be willing to explain how your statement follows from the approach you advocate, and also how your understanding of the statement refutes what I’ve written?
Now I still think that the U.N and the ICC are the start of a route that may lead to a way of dealing with "terrorist" actions by nations - and I see no way of doing so that would not involve a similar system. Now it is certainly not guaranteed to succeed, and there really is no way to deal with a timescale when it depends critically on U.S. Hence my suggestion that there is at least the HOPE for further improvements. politics. Yes, the U.S. with it's reluctance to risk having it's military officers subjected to war crimes charges is one of the major obstacles. However this also weakens your case - because if the U.S. will not accept that then how can it accept that it has been guilty of serious acts of terrorism ?
C’mon Paul. I’m beginning to wonder whether you’re reading the thread. Or do you consider that holmes, you and I are having two distinct unrelated conversations? I never mentioned anything about what the US considers the obstacles. In post 20, I provided some details as to the legal and operational problems in relegating the issue to the ICC. In post 21 — addressed to you, btw — I discussed the Rome Statutes that the ICC operates under, and some of the problems relating to them. In post 25 I asked you specifically — in response to your statement concerning the use of force to compel compliance — how that would work in the case of a major power like the US short of war. In post 27, I specifically asked you how, given geopolitical reality, you thought the ICC could work. You have either ignored, missed or skipped over the discussion I’ve already made on this issue. Or at least, you’re not showing how that discussion/argument fails. And finally as to the last sentence in this paragraph, you are ignoring every single thing I have written about the necessity for self-analysis and recognition of our own use of the tactic as the initial requirement for the paradigm shift, which has been consistently presented in almost everything I’ve written from the OP onwards.
I don’t mind in the least if you completely disagree with me. I don’t mind in the least if you see it as your mission to utterly destroy my arguments. I have no problem defending and/or modifying them as I become convinced I’m incorrect (which is already happening in my conversations with holmes in certain areas). I DO mind taking the time to present my case and then having it ignored. Rebut the argument, destroy the assumption, whatever. That’s what a discussion is all about. But please do me the courtesy of showing that you read the responses by specifically referencing the points I raise, the arguments I’ve presented, and answering the questions I’ve asked. I’m not some fundy moron who denies evolution ’cause I ain’t related to no monkey. I’m also not some knee-jerk Bush supporter who can’t think beyond the end of their neo-Right nose. Do me a favor and stop treating me like one in your responses.
I don't think that I underestimate the effectiveness of military action agaisn terrorist groups - it has not worked against Hamas, it has not defeated Al Quaeda even though they had substantial assets in place in Afghanistan and were relatively vulnerable.
However, my statement concerned underestimating the capability of small-scale, tactical operations carried out by trained regular military specialists and/or man-guided standoff systems (like the Predator) to both target and tactically discriminate between target and non-target. Neither the invasion of Afghanistan nor the Israeli punitive actions against Hamas fall into this category. There is appropriate military response, and then there is massive, indiscriminate use of military force. You don’t use a high explosives to kill a cockroach. Well, you could, I suppose, but you’re liable to do significantly more damage to neighboring structures and people, and could conceivable completely miss the actual target — which is precisely what has occurred in both cases you mention.
Also consider that military action in civilian areas itself at least verges on terrorism as you define it,
Exactly the problem that the tactical, limited methods I mentioned is designed to address. You can’t accomplish this with high-altitude bombing, long range missile strikes, etc. A point which I have already discussed, but would be willing to provide further clarification and examples if needed.
strikes across an international border without the permission of the country being attacked is a serious provocation or even an act of war.
This is certainly a consideration. Interestingly enough, there appears to be a threshold level of cross-border activity that nations are willing to, if not overlook, at least not make a causus belli over. The Predator attack in Yemen is one example — there was a brief flurry of pro-forma outrage in the region, but the overall reaction was muted. Compare that, for example, with the on-going hate-you-forever reaction still occurring over Afghanistan, and the radicalization of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Part of the response analysis process is a determination of just how bad the reaction to a particular response might be, both locally and regionally. Depending on the nation, you might encounter the same extremes from a country where you simply demand extradition of one of its citizens for trial as a war criminal by the ICC. Effective counterterrorism is highly dependent on context.
Again international cooperation, including intelligence sharing is my recommendation.
And if you had read my previous posts, you would see this is one of the possible avenues. However, intelligence cooperation — as with law enforcement cooperation — is predicated on the current and future diplomatic relations between states. As again, I have already mentioned. Even so, this begs the question as to response or preemption. Intelligence cooperation IS a requirement for making the appropriate response determination, and would be absolutely critical in criminal proceedings, obviously, but has no operational or deterrent aspect on its own.
However, how are we to get this if it is linked to another contentious issue where national pride is involved ?
???
Back to the list, You have answered the first part of the question - but not the second which was to explain *why*. Personally I do not see any clear dividing line and I would not classify any of them as combatants. Going down the list, the actions becoming increasingly risky to their own lives - but I don't see that as a deciding factor. And if motive were the key then there would be no doubt about Goldstein's status - there doesn't seem to be that much between him and the suicide bombers on that ground. So what ARE your reasons ?
I provided a fairly detailed reasoning behind why I classify the individuals/organizations on the list as terrorist/non-terrorist. This reasoning stands as valid for the combatant/criminal classification. However, what you have consistently failed to realize is that my invoking the term combatant is based on the nature and scope of the threat. It is designed to enable a broader array of potential options in both the reactionary mode (i.e., punitive or preventative of future actions) AND the preemptive mode. Hence the DC snipers are not combatants, because in the first place they are not terrorists. Hamas is both combatant and terrorist, because the of nature of their activities (terrorist) and their scope (combatant) which may require use of more aggressive options in order to disrupt or prevent. Goldstein was apparently an ideological murderer targeting unarmed civilians (terrorist), but speculation as to whether he could have been prevented from carrying out his activities by the use of more aggressive measures is moot because he’s dead and you’re asking me to attempt to develop an a postieriori determination in the absence of data (hence the maybe response on whether combatant is appropriate terminology). IF, in Goldstein’s case, prevention of his activity necessitated some form of preemptive military response, then the combatant classification would have been appropriate because there is no other legal option for disrupting him, and the military option is specifically disallowed by the criminal classification. I never claimed there was a clear dividing line, any more than there is a clear dividing line between species in biology. Each individual and organization involved in terror — and as far as that goes, each individual terrorist act — must have this level of analysis performed. This has been a constant theme in all my responses on this thread, which once again leads me to wonder whether you are bothering to read the thread.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 30 by PaulK, posted 10-14-2003 6:31 PM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 34 by PaulK, posted 10-16-2003 4:44 AM Quetzal has not replied

Silent H
Member (Idle past 5840 days)
Posts: 7405
From: satellite of love
Joined: 12-11-2002


Message 33 of 36 (61071)
10-15-2003 7:45 PM
Reply to: Message 31 by Quetzal
10-15-2003 3:14 AM


I'm going to be chopping up your last three posts to create one coherent line of argument for myself while addressing all the different issues you've raised.
quetzal writes:
IF we start as I suggested with an honest appraisal of our own uses of this illegitimate form of war, and IF we can proceed from there to develop a more viable progressive war strategy in our own future conflicts — and by our I’m referring to the community of so-called civilized nations — then and only then can we realistically avoid falling into the trap you have mentioned. And then and only then will the benefits you listed of this paradigm be operationalized.
I actually understood this the first time you stated it. Apparently I didn't make my "counter" point well enough.
In a way I think we are talking past each other. It seems we both agree that:
1) Nations must recognize that they have been practicing unlimited warfare and that this sets the precedent for others to use it as well,
2) Nations must reassess and regulate the use of violent actions in warfare that directly target/affect civilian populations, and
3) Nations and the international community must recognize that TO's (and international CO's which use terrorism) require Nations to use certain methods beyond the limits of current criminal law to end their threat.
The question is how to achieve these ends and exactly what powers/methods are necessary for Nations as required by #3.
The comprehensive paradigm appears to start with #3 and works 1&2 in as part of the process. The narrow paradigm (as I am trying to suggest) recognizes all three at once but starts working on #1&2 first, before moving onto an international "legal" solution to 3.
Your first sentence in the quote above actually feels to me like you are supporting my position and that is what I tried to suggest to you... that concretely defining and legislating against terrorism does start with "an honest appraisal of our own uses of this illegitimate form of war" and so avoid the trap we are both wary of.
I understand that #3 is of EXTREME URGENCE, but I think most of our immediate needs can be addressed in domestic preventative measures (guarding prime targets) while quickly moving through #1&2 which realistically should be pretty quick to define (I think we could get it done within a month).
I am simply dubious that concentrating on the threat of TO's will ever result in bringing Nations to the table on 1&2. Okay, let me brutally honest. The US and Britain and Israel are who I am talking about. They have refused to discuss any international security measures EXCEPT in the context of threat to themselves and methods THEY need to address them.
I think the international community can begin to define #1&2 and force these three (with the possible exception of Israel) to a table. The Kyoto accords are a good example. While the US stayed out it did shame us and has forced us into some position of trying to comply with its reasoning.
It would also start the debate in public media which could be helpful.
quetzal writes:
However, the definition to me — albeit admittedly insufficient in and of itself — is not circular... All you have really done is substitute violent action for warfare. I would argue that this is a semantic distinction that may have no practical utility. For clarification, at what point does violent action become warfare?
Maybe circular wasn't the best term, but it was close to what I was trying to say. If one asks should terrorism be considered war or crime, it is a bit self-serving to start by using the term warfare, and perhaps a bit circular in that you are defining a kind of war with the term warfare.
This is why I said it begged the question of what "war" was.
I think your question at the end of the quote is exactly what I should have made clear. Let me do this using formulas...
Use of deadly force against another being=[violent action]
[violent action]+large numbers+uncoordinated/purposeless=[riot]
[VA]+large numbers+coordinated/purpose=[war]
As can be seen violent action is the base of warfare, thus we can use [war] to define certain actions (which may be a subset), or "[violent action]+". I think it is more accurate to use the most basic components for a definition.
Here are some examples why I think this...
[VA]+large numbers+coordinated/purpose+limited/sporadic harassment engagements(ie, irregular)=[guerrilla war]
[VA]+large numbers+coord/purp+lim/spor+targeting civilians for purpose of generating fear=[terrorism]
or is it...
[GW]+targeting civilians to generate fear=[terrorism]
In fact it, IF one defines "targeting civilans to generate fear" as a more general "criminal act", the definition could be...
[GW]+criminal act=[terrorism]
This may very well be arguing past each other again. We both seem to agree that terrorism involves both crime and some form of warfare. I simply believe it is better to view it (and treat it) as primarily a crime which is conducted during war, than as warfare which might be criminal.
Tomayto, tomahto? Perhaps, but I would argue that it pushes a mindset which is more inclined to find solutions to terrorism, rather than terrorists.
quetzal writes:
My belief — and I emphasize that it’s a belief, although defensible — is that by beginning with a candid reflection of our own guilt... for the use of terror, we can develop a new form of progressive war which will allow us to both take the moral high ground and develop effective humane... counters to states and organizations that continue to practice terror, and also to move our own strategy away from unfettered war.
I agree with this wholeheartedly and believe this is actually more of the narrow paradigm, which STARTS by condemning a criminal act, rather than defining the nature of the threat posed by the opposition.
Maybe I can convince you this is the major difference between the two, and that my starting point (and therefore my paradigm) is the better one?
quetzal writes:
If we can reach that point, then I think we do have the moral legitimacy to invoke the rule of law. However, this has little to do with how we confront and approach terrorist organizations, especially international organizations, and defend against them, in the interim. We may, at least on this level, be talking past each other. I’ll reserve opinion on that for the moment.
Well I do agree with this in spirit... including the emerging realization we are inches from each other in agreement, which is the only reason we are arguing.
I do argue though that if we approach and confront terrorist organizations merely because they pose a threat, rather than that the nature of that threat is indeed criminal not just a wartime enemy, we are less likely to discuss criminalizing terrorist acts.
quetzal writes:
In attempting to stake a position in opposition to the common misconception of terrorists as marginal nutjobs, I undoubtedly overstepped and overstated what I really believe.
Understood, and accepted as an explanation.
quetzal writes:
Terrorist — good enough. However, it’s not clear to me that it should be considered as a subset of guerrilla.My position is that once a guerrilla steps over the line into terror, they have forfeited any and all rights to be treated as a legitimate combatant under the rules of war —which I advocate for guerrillas
Well this is pretty close to my own assessment of why terrorism is less a subset of war than it is a major subset of crime. Kind of terrorism is to war (or guerrilla war), as terrorists are to guerrilla fighters...
quetzal writes:
My only question is why you continue to reference espionage or espionage organizations. I’m unclear as to how you are using the term. Perhaps you could provide an example? It’s a minor point, but it struck me as incongruous in the context of either irregular or conventional war.
Fair enough. The reason I used "espionage" as that in the context of warfare, they only utilize irregular warfare. For certain CIA types have been part of war forever (most famously its OSS predecessor). I realize intelligence agencies do many other things, but when in war they resemble TO's in assets, strategy, and tactics with the only exception that TO's concentrate on generating fear to cause disruption, rather than an espionage agency's generation of confusion and removal of enemy assets.
I hope this makes sense. I suppose I could have referred to them as "covert organizations".
quetzal writes:
I submit that you must, in fact, make the awkward consideration as a matter of course. It is fundamentally impossible to defend against the lone nutcase (although you can make it difficult in the extreme). Somewhat counterintuitively, it isn’t impossible or even impractical to defend against and proactively disrupt global organizations — merely difficult.
Agreed, but IF you agree that each act must be judged by law enforcement officials first whether they are act of war or just a crime, THEN it seems you are actually supporting the narrow paradigm.
I guess I view the comprehensive paradigm as resulting in a situation where by default every terrorist act must be considered an act of war, which is problematic along the lines I described.
If I am wrong about this then I am a bit confused as to why this debate started as a question of whether terrorism is an act of war or a criminal act. Certainly if it is criminal first, and later determined to be war or not, than it is basically a criminal act, right?
quetzal writes:
If it is at all possible to operationalize the concept, without indulging in hyperbole that can lead to the blank check and slippery slopes you refer to, I am all for using a different term. Remains, of course, to identify what that term might be.
I think coming up with new terminology may very well be needed. Perhaps this is exactly what we should be working on.
I think such terminology should center on words similar to those covering covert operations and foreign intelligence operatives... specifically those which cause harm.
Or maybe we should look at Ian Fleming novels to see what terms are used for minions of Dr No and all those other crazy organizations which are without question the very model of what we are fighting now.
quetzal writes:
The problem remains that military response is specifically disallowed if we go with a legal or law enforcement approach.
Okay, I will accept that the comprehensive paradigm does not necessitate military action alone, if you grant me that the narrow paradigm does not necessitate law enforcement alone.
The narrow paradigm simply says that the beginning and end result is the sphere of law enforcement. What happens in between may very well involve military action, and intelligence style information gathering.
quetzal writes:
However, even here you need to be clearer on what you mean by cooperation. I noted in my previous post the difficulties between law enforcement and intelligence approaches to data collection... I would be interested in hearing your views on how the different approaches, methodologies and objectives between law enforcement and intelligence agencies can be rationalized. In addition, it might be worthwhile to revisit some of my argument concerning the ineffectiveness of law enforcement outside the territorial limits of the nation.
Once it is determined via normal law enforcement information gathering techniques, that an individual is involved with a TO, or CO or army that uses terrorism, intelligence methods are allowed for gathering information.
This may mean that intelligence agencies take over, or that law enforcement agents gain greater power. This latter could be accomplished by writ from a judge or panel of judges. It's like a broader search warrant.
Of course intelligence agents are normally investigating TO's and may provide (share) intelligence with law enforcement agents in order to build the case that the individual is part of a TO, etc etc.
In the open court trial afterward (which I believe should be open court because actions are against civilians) evidence collected using intelligence methods, which may not normally be eligible in a court of law, can be admissable. Certain types of info may be qualified (much like lie detector results), but methods of accumulating evidence are much much wider.
I agree that local law enforcement agencies are incapable of fighting TOs outside their nation. That is when national level, or international law agencies should take over.
I am certainly hoping that the end result of 9-11 is the total revamping of how intelligence and evidence is handled and shared among organizations, both nationally and internationally.
Along these lines, there must be an international anti-TO organization. Much like NATO, but for nations wanting to promote "civilized" Nations against Nations and Organizations using illegitimate warfare methods.
Indeed, this would create the law body necessary to create real concepts of "warcrimes" which do not functionally exist today.
quetzal writes:
In one breath you label all terrorism a criminal act, and in the same breath you admit that in some cases it may be an act of war. By what criteria do you delineate the two?
I hope I've answered this to some extant already. In essence all acts of terrorism are acts of war in the broad sense of war. They are also in both the broad and narrow sense, criminal acts. The question of whether we should legally define any act of terror as an act of war (the legal definition of war, not the broad sense), comes down to the nature and intent of the perpetrator.
It is my contention that TO's, or anything less than a Nation or Rebel Army, are unable to meet the specific legal concept of War. They just do not operate that way, and so acts made by them while maybe an act of hostile conflict, should not be considered War. This could change if a TO is being used as an arm of another Nation (that would make the TO a specific covert army or intelligence organization of that Nation).
Acts of terror committed by anything less than a Nation, would have to use separate and new terminology. Again, perhaps that used to describe a covert agency's armed conflict against another Nation's covert organization.
Or maybe "crime against humanity" or "civilization" should be used. That would be pretty appropriate as it denotes who the victims are.
quetzal writes:
I would argue that deterrence or outright elimination of the threat is paramount. I would like to hear some additional argument from your standpoint as to why criminal prosecution is the preferred end state.
I am only arguing that a courtroom is the natural endpoint of the players involved with a terrorist act. I totally agree that elimination and deterrence of the threat posed by TO's is paramount.
This latter task can be accomplished by intelligence agencies, or new international legal agencies proactively investigating and prosecuting TO's.
I don't think military actions (even smallscale surgical operations) should be employed against an organization which has not officially become a TO. This means just because an organization looks extremist, if it has not committed a crime, extreme actions should not be taken against it.
To be honest, while law is reactive, especially with regard to any specific terrorist act, the law may very well be used to disrupt future operations.
Part of this whole new paradigm is recognizing that the individuals who commit a terrorist act are not the only guilty parties. If in a TO, all high ranking members should be held directly responsible according to law. They may then be approached and arrested for any act committed by the organization.
They may also be arrested for conspiracy to commit crimes as intelligence is collected along these lines. Repeated arrests based on conspiracy may very well break line of communication, or at least the stages of planning.
It would also be important to approach them with carrots, instead of just sticks. Why not empower members (especially the high level ones) to get some of their issues addressed. I don't mean terrorists should be coddled or their outrageous demands appeased. But there must be some recognition that it is desperation regarding some issue which has created the organization. It can be derailed from its course of a TO, by addressing the realistic portions of their issue.
After all I'd rather have an angry organization, than a TO.
Thus my answer is that law may be used as a proactive tool to some degree, based on the FACT that TO's are constantly planning and committing criminal acts. If intelligence techniques are allowed for collecting evidence in these matters, law is empowered to a much greater degree.
quetzal writes:
How do you convince a state such as the US (or France, or the UK, or whomever) that it is in their interest - they only way they'll accept such an idea - to accede to an international body of this nature?
France is ready. I can only think that the world's Nations accepting the idea of, and creating, something along the lines of NATO, but against terrorism, the US and UK would be shamed for not participating.
They may choose not to, but it could start a large world paradigm shift against the US as the cop people need to solve their problems.
quetzal writes:
If anything, the cellular structure of most global terrorist organizations has even greater implications for the inability of law enforcement to eliminate or reduce the threat from the organization as a whole. Arresting or eliminating any number of members, or even entire cells, has little effect on the organization as a whole. OTOH, it has been shown historically that disruption of the top leadership of a cellular organization has grave implications for the survival of the organization.
Absolute agreement. This is why I think while Nations must define terrorist acts as crimes, laws must be changed to recognize the different nature of criminal organizations (specifically those which are built on covert operation models). Maybe they should be called covert criminal organizations, to differentiate them from Mafia types which do not necessarily engage in terrorism (except against other mafia members?).
I think these changes only need to relate to collection of evidence, inclusion of organizational heads to the acts by their members, and expanded use of force when acting against members of the TO (which will undoubtedly revert to paramilitary mode in that situation).
On a side note: Pat Robertson--- after having already led a prayer offensive against the US Supreme Court--- has this week suggested (twice) that a small tactical nuclear device be used against the US State Department.
When will this jackass get treated by the public like the traitor he is?
------------------
holmes

This message is a reply to:
 Message 31 by Quetzal, posted 10-15-2003 3:14 AM Quetzal has not replied

PaulK
Member
Posts: 17825
Joined: 01-10-2003
Member Rating: 2.2


Message 34 of 36 (61145)
10-16-2003 4:44 AM
Reply to: Message 32 by Quetzal
10-15-2003 7:05 AM


I only have time to raise a few points - most of which will be corrections and clarifications.
The most important one is how do *you* intend to deal with a lack of cooperation from the U.S. ? You imply that it is not an issue, but if I understand correctly your position is just as dependant on the U.S. and seems to require the U.S. to make greater concessions. In my view the only answer that does not require willing cooperation from the U.S. is one where the U.S. makes no concessions whatsoever and simply tries to bully weaker natiosn into a one-sided agreement.
I shall also point out that though you complain that I have apparently ignored your points (although in the context issued it seems to be due to a misunderstanding of what I was saying anyway) - but you tll claim that the military cannot get involved in criminal situations despite the clear counter-example introduced earlier (the Branch Davidians).
Now of the corrections and clarifications.
I am not sure why you inserted the numbers into the initial quote - but it seems to have led you to mistake my raising the issue of the PLO and ANC as referring directly to your position rather than forestalling a possible objection to the initial point.
I get the impression that you believe that I am suggesting that the ICC shoudl deal with terrorist organisations, when in fact I am suggestign just the opposite. That the ICC should deal with war-time actions and that the clandestine terrorist organisations should be dealt with primarily by police and intelligence services of the nation where they are located with military backup where necessary and in conjunction with the police, intelligence and military of other nations affected by the organisation.
You seem to be very much agaisnt the idea of terorist suspects - or rather international terorists - having legal rights. Am I correct in thinking that this means that if a terorrist suspect happens to be abroad that the U.S Intelligence services and military would effectively act as judge, jury and executioner with no legal burden to provide justification for their action ?
My point that military action in civilian areas verges on terrorism WAS directed directly at your idea of using Predator-launched missiles or small units to make tactical strikes. If you really think that either does not pose a risk of civilian casualties and is unlikely to induce fear in the local population then I think that you need to look clearly. I also point out that such tactics have bene used by Israel and in Afghanistan (although you seem to think otherwise).
As to the list it now seems that your argument is just getting more confused. The "combatant" designation is not based on actions, nor even - now - motivations. Instead we now have an addiitonal requirement that there must be some preemptive action that can legally be taken. Well that is very, very odd. It looks to me as if there is a bit of circular justification - the "combatant" classification is used to justify measures but now the potential usefulness of such measures is being put forward as a justification for using the combatant "classification".

This message is a reply to:
 Message 32 by Quetzal, posted 10-15-2003 7:05 AM Quetzal has not replied

Quetzal
Member (Idle past 5893 days)
Posts: 3228
Joined: 01-09-2002


Message 35 of 36 (61741)
10-20-2003 6:43 AM


Just bumping this as a reminder to myself that I have replies hanging, and an assurance to the other participants that I haven't forgotten.

Adminnemooseus
Administrator
Posts: 3974
Joined: 09-26-2002


Message 36 of 36 (159341)
11-14-2004 12:15 PM


Bump and closing topic
The theme of this topic has been taken over by the newer Just what IS terrorism?.
Please read this one also, and feel free to bring material from here to the new topic.
Will edit a link here, into message 1 of the new topic.
Closing this one down.
Adminnemooseus

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