Theory Evolution (not "Theory of Evolution")

quote:

---

dear fundies,
please read the structure of scientific revolutions
love,
da couch.

---

I think fundie's would love Kuhn's essay, since it is basically an attack on traditional views of science by an anti-realist constructivist.

I mean, it does lay out a useful framework for which to interpret scientific development, ie, paradigms, normal science, anomolies, etc. Kuhn is a great historian so his book is very informative with regard this.The problem comes when he starts talking about science as a non-progressive enterprise and asserts that different paradigms are incommensurable.His main point is that paradigm shifts aren't progressive, they just lay out different rules and give us different models for which to interpret the world; science is progressive within a paradigm but outside of it. He even goes on to say that paradigms change how our perceptions, so different scientists actually view different worlds. According to him, Copernican astronomy is no more 'real' than Ptolemaic; they are just different models which both have there limits of applicability. He would say the same with the transition from Newtonian dynamics to GR.I think his main problem is that he denies Popperian science, i.e, that falsifiability is the central attribute of scientific theories. He states that no paradigm ever explains all the observable data, so we would have to have degrees of falseness. of course, he's pretty vague about how communities choose between competing paradigms. He denies falsifibility because it will be in degress. He denies verificationism for the same reason. He states we would should directly compare the paradigms, but I don't even know what that means outside of some falsification or verification criteria.I'm rambling now, but I think there is some very controversial claims in the essay that creationists or anti-science folks would greatly enjoy.

quote:

---

well. ptolemaic solar system based things still work. in reality, we do view the world differently. both systems are based on observations. just different ones. the sextant still works, and sailors still use it.

---

It kind of depends on what you mean by "view the world differently." Kuhn claims we "view a different world" and scientists "work in a different world." This is a little different than viewing the world differently. He saw paradigms as changing our perceptions (he destinguished between stimuli, perceptions, and interpretations).

quote:

---

the translations people make of him. a heliocentric universe is fundamentally incompatible with a terracentric one just as a yec creation is completely incompatible with geology and biological evolution and astrophysics. it is a perfectly reasonable assertion that within paradigms science is progressive but not without. who says we're anywhere close to right?

---

It's not that we know we are close to right; it's that we know (according to some)we are getting closer to the right answer, though it may practically never be possible to be absolutely right. We approach it assymptotically.This is what Kuhn denies; he denies inductive logic. I'm not saying he's wrong, I'm just stating his position. According to Kuhn, we will never get closer to the "right" answer. GR is no closer to reality than Newtonian dynamics.

quote:

---

I'm not sure why you see this a problem. Kuhn perhaps overstated things here, but then largely corrected the overstatement in his 1969 postscript (at the back of the 1970 edition).

---

Because some, like myself, view the change from Newtonian dynamics to Special Relativity to GR as progressive. Each incorperated the former into the new paradigm, so I don't see how they are incommensurable.Also, it seems that we cannot say theories are ever false with his view. They are simply incommensurable with modern theories. I think we are actually removing the chaff, not just switching our rules for which to interpret the world.

quote:

---

As a critic of falsficationism, I don't see this as a problem in Kuhn's work.

---

Keep in mind these are my opinions. I'm not trying to state that it is an objective problem; i understand others disagree.So, as a critic of falsificationism, are you a verificationist? How do we distinguish scientific theories from crack pot theories? Why is an explanation that can handle all observations (explain everything and anything)not science? How do we choose between competing paradigms?I'm not trying to berate you or anything, these are serious questions and the answers aren't very clear to me.

quote:

---

Kuhn was not anti-science. He was criticizing the traditional epistemology assumed by philosophers of science. He was not criticizing the science itself.

---

I understand he was not anti-science and what he was trying to do with his work. But, he was a science antirealist. So, if his view is assumed by fundies, they can claim whatever they want about the world and science can say nothing to contradict them. After all, science just sets up explanatory frameworks whose truthfulness is impossible to know (according to Kuhn). Science is no more true than whatever it is they are doing (pseudoscience?).

quote:

---

There is a good reason why creationists rarely use Kuhn in their arguments. For creationists are themselves pretty strongly committed to the kind of epistemology that Kuhn criticizes. To adopt Kuhn's critique, they would have to admit to problems in the epistemological assumptions that underly their own theology.

---

Creationism is largely a reaction by fundamentalist Christians to the views that science is teaching. If it is realized that scientific theories aren't true or closer to being true than any other explanatory framework, they should have nothing to worry about.This message has been edited by JustinC, 12-08-2005 03:24 PM

quote:

---

well see. the thing is that newtonian to special relativity is progressive. it's string theory that may or may not be. if things work additively, then they are progressive. if not, then they are a paradigm shift.

---

Kuhn would disagree. Progress only occurs when a paradigm gets more and more articulated. SR was a new way to interpret the observations, with whole new conceptions of time and space. Thus it was paradigm shift. String theory would have to reduce to GR, so I think you would view it as progressive.I agree with you that it was progressive, but Kuhn wouldn't (atleast 1969 Kuhn).

quote:

---

some sciences have not experienced a paradigm shift. i think that's the biggest problem most people see but don't realize. people try to claim that certain discoveries seem like paradigm shifts but aren't.

​

like i said. the elusive quest continues has a whole chapter on people claiming that they're shifting the paradigm when, in fact, they are not.

---

I think the problem is that the term is ridiculously vague. What is it again? I think Kuhn described it as the beliefs, values, instruments, etc. of a scientific community. Since paradigms apply to communities, some small discoveries may cause a paradigm shift within that community. Paradigms aren't necessarily huge explanatory frameworks like QM or GR. The people may have been shifting paradigms within their small community according to Kuhn.

quote:

---

a paradigm shift, for example, would be the transfer of our current scientific knowledge to a gaia based one like capra describes.

---

That would be an example, though it doesn't have to be that radical.

I have finals this Friday and Saturday so I probably won't respond until Sunday.

Maybe not sunday.

quote:

---

There are several ways of looking at a scientific theory.

​

We can look at the equations. From this perspective, it does look progressive.

​

We can examine the metaphysics. Here it is clearly not progressive. According to Newtonian metaphysics, there is an occult force of attraction between any two masses, and the geometry of space-time is euclidean. According to GR, there is no such force, but space-time is non-euclidean and gravitation is explained as due to local curvature of space-time induced by the mass.

---

I never really understood why people say gravity isn't a force. I understand that gravity is just the motion of objects travelling in a straight line (longest proper time) through space time, but does that really mean it isn't a force?It seems to me that Newton defined a force as anything which causes an acceleration in a mass in space. So, gravity is a force and it is explained by curved space-time the same way electromagnetism is a force an is explained by photon interactions.That's my opinion. Cavediver HELP!

quote:

---

We can look at what typical observation statements say about the world. And again, what they say under Newtonian physics is quite different from what they say under relativity, and the change is non-progressive. Under Newtonian physics, the basic concept time is a reference to a univeral property, while under relativity it is a reference to a property which is relative to the frame of the observer.

---

Einstein expanded on the concepts of time, space, mass, etc. but I don't see that as causing an incommensurability in any non-trivial sense. Yes, the concepts were different, but at the local scales they reduce to the previous concepts. The previous concepts were too myopic in scope, but I don't think that means they are incompatible with the new ones.Do you see incorperating previous theories into grander theories the same as going from phlogiston to oxygen theories of combustion? Or going from Aristotolean physics to GR?I don't think incommensurability comes in degrees.

quote:

---

It seems that way to you, because you are always assuming GR. But you have to examine these theories according to their own standards.

​

To say that an object is 1 metre long in Newtonian physics, is to say that if I take it to Paris, and compare to a famous platinum rod, then its length exactly corresponds to the marks on that rod. To say that an object is 1 metre long in GR is to say that it will take a certain number of ticks of a portable atomic clock for light to traverse from one end to another. These clearly mean different things. That's where the incommensurability comes in.

---

I don't really get this. Does GR really make any statements about conventions of measurements? The latter is more precise and more replicable, but that seems like a practical weights and measurement type thing, not a theoretical problem.

quote:

---

I'm not sure that "our rules for which to interpret the world" is actually meaningful. We interact with the world, but I don't see that we interpret. We make measurements of the world, and we interpret those measurements. But the world is not our measurements. The world is what we are trying to measure. And we certainly do change the rules by which we measure the world, and we correspondingly change the rules by which we interpret those measurements.

---

By "world" I mean our perceptions. Who knows if there is an actual "fixed and objective" world. We certaintly do interpret our perceptions. By interpret, I mean deliberately choose between various alternatives.

quote:

---

Not in the form that verificationism is usually presented.

​

As I see it, a scientific theory is neither true nor false. We judge scientific theories on pragmatic grounds, not on veridical grounds. That is, we want theories that work well (as in making good predictions), and we are not interested in theories that don't work.

​

Maybe that doesn't sound too different from Popper's philosophy. But the difference is that there is no convincing evidence that accepted theories are declared false on the basis of failed predictions. The evidence is that accepted theories are rejected only when a better replacement theory is available.

​

Roughly speaking, we evaluate theories on goodness of fit, not on truth or falsity.

---

In a sense, I think theories are declared false by failed predictions if the data is sure to be correct. It may not happen right away because the theory is good as making other predictions; but these "anomolies," as Kuhn calls them, pave the way for new theories.But whether you think that means they are false seems like a problem of inductive logic, though I'm not sure how you feel about it.

quote:

---

Maybe there is a different way to put it. If you believe that we evaluate scientific theories in terms of their truth or falsity, then you owe me a comprehensive theory of truth such as would make it possible to determine whether a theory is true or false.

---

I believe inductive logic can be used to evaluate plausibility of the truth of a claim. "Goodness of fit" is good reason to believe something is likely to be true.According to you (I may be wrong), it seems we can never convict someone of a crime that wasn't observed. All we have is the data and the model, but this in no way indicates whether the defendent actually committed the crime. Is this a right interpretation of your view?This is all the time I have now, I have to get ready for a test. I'll try and get to the rest ASAP.edited for typosThis message has been edited by JustinC, 12-10-2005 06:59 AM

quote:

---

"Incommensurability" is Kuhn's term, so we are stuck with it. If I were picking terminology, I would prefer "concept change".

---

I don't think that's a valid equation, i.e., incommensurability=concept change.Everyone agrees there are concept changes, but not everyone agrees the new concepts are incommensurable with the previous ones. Kuhn is trying to say that the Newtonian physicist and the GR physicist will basically be talking past each other when trying to communicate their ideas on physics.

quote:

---

Newtonian mechanics is a limiting case of GR from the point of view of the mathematics and the methodology. The change to GR is a total upheaval from the perspective of its metaphysics.

---

Why is it a "total upheaval?" Is any concept change a total upheaval? The new metaphysics, which I'm not sure can be seperated from the mathematical formalisms, shows why are previous assumptions were only approximations. How can you seperate the metaphysics from the math? It's not that we just changed from "absolute space" to "relative space," we changed from "absolute space" to "space which is viewed differently depending on one's frame of reference, in a very specific manner governed by equation E1, E2, etc."

quote:

---

Copernican astronomy is mainly a changed in coordinates from Ptolemaic astronomy, when considered from the perspective of the mathematics and methodology. It is a total upheaval in terms of its metaphysics.

---

Again, I don't think the mathematics and the metaphysics can necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive. Copernican astronomy's metaphysics and math doesn't reduce to Ptolemaic astronomy.

quote:

---

J.B. Priestley developed some pretty good predictive empirical science on the basis of phlogiston, leading to Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen. In terms of the mathematics and methodology, the change from phlogiston to oxygen is quite small. We make phlogiston the butt of science jokes because we reject its metaphysics.

---

I really don't like the term metaphysics because it seems so vague and undefined. Can you maybe clarify what you mean? Can metaphysics be mathematical in nature?For instance, were the metaphysics of quantum mechanics derived from the mathematical formalisms or vice versa?I have to admit that I don't use the word metaphysics to much, nor have studied what it means extensively so I could be way off with regard to this.

quote:

---

I doubt that. We don't perceive X-rays, but I suspect that you consider them to be part of the world. What we mean by "world" is a complex issue, and perhaps best left for some other discussion.

---

"World" is used in several different way. All we have access to is our perceptions, so in a sense that is the "world." The rest, like electromagnetic radiation, is apart of a theoretical framework for how we interpret the world, and may be indicative of some deeper underlying reality.

quote:

---

We are quick to declare proposed theories false. In some cases we may later accept them as true, after originally declaring them false (roughly what happened with plate tectonics). But what about an established theory? Is an established theory ever declared false before there is a successor theory available to replace it? I cannot think of any examples where this has happened.

---

It's not that we declare them false, it's that we declare we think they are false.During times of "crisis" a lot of communities begin to believe the previous theories are false even though there is no alternative theory. Before the whole QM framework was layed down, people saw serious deficiences in Newtonian mechanics at microscale, and I would think many thought that Netwonian mechanics was indeed not the whole story.Many people began to believe that Ptolemaic astronomy was false when it got to the point that adding an epicycle created problems in another part of the orbits, so another epicycle had to be added, etc. I remember a quote by some scientist at the time who said something to the effect of "if God created such a system, he should have consulted me first."I think scientists certainly believe the way a theory is formulated at a given time is false before a new theory can replace it. That doesn't mean they'll stop using the previous one though.

quote:

---

No, that would not be my view at all. In any case the analogy is bad. But pretending that it is similar, the conclusion would only be that we cannot conclusively prove guilt. We can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but not beyond all doubt.

---

Why is the analogy bad? We use inductive logic in both. With regard to scientific theories, you say that "goodness of fit" is not an indicator of any "truth value." In criminal case, you say it is an indicator of "truth value." Why the difference? I can maybe think of one significant one, but let me hear what you come up with first.I'm not saying scientific theories will ever conclusively prove they are correct, that goes against inductive logic. You can only support hypothesese through inductive logic.Sorry, I have to go again. I will get to the rest of this post and the rest of the previous post ASAP. I want to some reading before I respond to your the rest of your previous post and can't find the time til finals are over (Wed).Thanks for your patience.

quote:

---

Justin, first you have to define waht you mean by the term "force"

---

Yeah, I don't really know. I remember reading in the Principia that force is defined as what causes an acceleration.

quote:

---

I couln't diasgree more. We are talking paradigm shift of the millenium. GR reduces to Newtonian mathematics, it does not reduce to Newtonian thinking.

---

I might just have a wrong view of incommensurability. When I read that terms, I think uncomparable. I think one guy describes gravitation as the curved space-time, another as as angels pushing inward. They can't even have a valid conversation as to whose views are "correct."I don't see this in Newtonian/GR. I could just be ignorant of the history. Were scientists saying, wrt SR, "Space is defined as static and unchanging, you are not making any sense!" Are the new concepts completely different than the old ones, or are they just refinements? Is every refinement incommensurable? And what is the difference between a refinement and upheaval?

JustinC writes

quote:

---

Einstein expanded on the concepts of time, space, mass, etc. but I don't see that as causing an incommensurability in any non-trivial sense.

---

Cavediver responds

quote:

---

I couln't diasgree more. We are talking paradigm shift of the millenium. GR reduces to Newtonian mathematics, it does not reduce to Newtonian thinking.

---

I don't think it reduces to Newtonian thinking. I'm referring to Kuhn's concept of incommensurability. According to Kuhn, we cannot say that Newtonian thinking was wrong and that GR is correct (or more correct). They are simply paradigms which apply different rules for how to solve different puzzles.Space is not absolute or relative; these are just different models which have varying degrees of success in describing empirical data. And they don't even have the same empirical data because the paradigms themselves influence our perceptions of reality.This is according to Kuhn. Do you agree with him with regard to Newtonian dynamics and GR, i.e., they are just different rules for solving the puzzles of the "world," and the "world" isn't even the same because how we view the world hinges on our paradigm?I don't necessarily see them as incommensurable because SR grew out of the problems of Newtonian dynamics. It wasn't like physicists just said, "Ok, lets throw this garbage out and start from scratch."This message has been edited by JustinC, 12-14-2005 09:10 AM