Do feelings count?

This topic has occurred to me as a result of a recent discussion about aesthetics and earlier discussions about morality. My own view is that we can make no case for any given moral system being objective. One always begs the question when trying to devise an argument in which one argues that a particular moral rule is objective. The same situation occurs in aesthetics.However, one's feelings about such matters are often quite different--or at least my feelings are. I FEEL that moral judgements, or certain moral judgements, are quite real--not subjective at all. And even in aesthetic matters, I FEEL (though less strongly) that certain aesthetic judgements are quite real.The question is whether these strong feelings we have matter--i.e., whether they are an indication that, though we cannot build a case, that perhaps some moral judgements and some aesthetic judgements are after all objective.

coffee house.

That's all very well, Faith, but there's no way to ground morality logically. However, emotionally, I probably feel as you do on most issues.

Excellent posts from both Faith and Holmes.But my feelings are so strong about certain matters--for example, my ire when witnessing deliberate cruelty--that it makes me think that there is something intrinsic to the act of cruelty itself that I am recognizing objectively.Anyone else feel this way?This message has been edited by robinrohan, 03-05-2006 10:30 AM

I agree with that.

That "thankfully" suggests some kind of objective standard.

If one has a very intense moral feeling, such as an abhorrence of cruelty, is this an indication that cruelty is evil?

One might argue that most people have some similar feelings--such as ire when witnessing cruelty--which would suggest that their feelings are responding to something objective.A few who do not have such feelings might be explained as morally coarse. That wouldn't hurt the argument.

I was asking a question. If the answer is yes, then it would follow that there is such a thing as "evil." And I suppose this would be an objective evil as well.

Perhaps an entire culture can be morally coarse. ("The banality of evil" as one writer put it).

This example is too complicated. We need something more obvious.Perhaps we could call the culture of Stalinism or Nazism morally coarse. Cruelty becomes an habitual thing, "banal." It works down and infests an entire culture.

Presumably what God thinks is right and wrong is what is really right and wrong.Admittedly, there are some logical problems here.

You can't judge an entire culture by one incident. You have to examine a culture as a whole, and you can only do that if you look at history.

One distinction we must make is between knowledge and moral judgement.Every violent act is not cruel. If a bad person deserves ill-treatment, then such ill-treatment could not called cruel (a criminal is sent to prison, for example).If a man sincerely believes that another man is evil, and thinks he has proof of some dastardly deed committed by that man, then his ill-treatment of that man may not be cruelty but justice. If he is honestly mistaken, then his act is still not "cruel." Horrible perhaps, but not "cruelty" strictly speaking.This message has been edited by robinrohan, 03-08-2006 04:39 AM

Our strong feelings tell us.