Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)

I go into this a bit in the thread about a society without free will.My answer would be that cause and effect is not simply an external thing - it is an interaction between you and your environment. It is generally accepted that in situations where the choice is dominated by external circumstances that your chocie is not free. Therefore nder compatibilism you do have a choice in that it is YOU that decides. That your nature dictates the choice does not change the fact that you are the source of the decision.But suppose we abandon that idea. How can we have more "freedom" ? Adding a random element to the decision - which is the only alternative to determinism - makes it possible for you to choose differently, but how can that be called "will" ? And to the extent that the random factor contributes to the choice, it takes choice away from you.So in my view compatibilism offers the only way in which you can be said to make a choice. Libertarian Free Will necessarily denies will in the name of "freedom", but is that a real freedom, worth having ? I think not.

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But if determinism is true, then what are you deciding between?

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The options presented to you, of course. The fact that given that precise situation YOU would end up inevitably choosing one of them doesn't make it any less your decision.

I say that you choose and the choice is a function of your nature. It would be pretty silly to say that your nature didn't at least strongly influence your decisions. But how could that make your decisions less free ? If you were offered the choice of two flavours of ice cream and one was your favourite and the other was one you didn't like would you say that your choice wasn't free because you would always choose the first ?

Whatever optiosn are available to you in the situation. Which does not, of course, guarantee that the future would be signfiicantly different.

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I still cannot see how determinism and free will are compatible. The options must be different future states. In order for a future state to be to be considered an option it must be possible for that future state to come about.

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That depends on how you define "possible". If you define it as requiring that there must be a non-zero probability that you will choose either option (given tht EXACT situation), and where that probability is not simply an expression of ignorance then you are requiring a random element in decision-making.But how is that "free will" ? Surely that random element cannot be called "will" nor does it offer any freedom worth having. So I conclude that the premise - that "free will" requires such a possibility - is false.However if we remove that constraint we end up with compatibilism.

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Can you explain why it would be wrong to say "the moon chose to orbit the earth" and it makes sense to say "I chose to write this post" if determinism is true?

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That's easy. The moon isn't a thinking decision-making entity. You are.

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Humes Fork: Either our actions are determined, in which case we are not responsible for them, or they are the random, in which case we are not responsible for them.

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Compatibilism denies the idea that deteminism in itself removes responsibility. It may remove ultimate responsibility, but unless we assume an omniscient creator there is no entity to take on that burden.Edited by PaulK, : No reason given.

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I'm denying free will (for arguments sake), so saying that the other option (an element of randomness) cannot be considered free will does nothing to help your point.

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No, you're not. You're arguing that determinism is incompatible with free will. Pointing out that indeterminism doesn't save free will does help my point - because my point is that the determinstic, compatibilist, version of free will is the only view that makes sense.

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I thought you'd say this, but now you are just begging the question. I asked:
Why doesn't it makes sense to say "The moon chose to orbit around the earth" and it does make sense to say "I chose to write this post."

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And I answered, wihtout begging the question. The moon is not a thinking, decision-making entity and you are. Are you claiming that no thought or consideration went into the writing of your post ?

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Your reply: Because people have the ability to choose. Don't you see how that is kind of a vacuous answer? The question is: what definition of "choose," "decide," "option," etc. are you using so as to make the one sentence nonsensical and the other make sense?

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I mean the ability to weigh up and evaluate the options available and select one on that basis. The moon can't do that. You can.
And before you aruge that there is a contradiction with determinism we get right back to the point that you said "didn't help my case" - indeterminism has nothing to do with weighing up options and selecting the one preferred. There is no contradiction and no question-begging - at least on my part.

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I think the problem has to do with the vague notion of free will.
If I give you an argument that x is incompatible with y, and the only reply you make is that ~x is also incompatible with y, then the most obvious solution is that there is a problem with the idea of y.

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Firstly you haven't made an argument to that effect. Secondly the position I am arguing for is that "x" IS compatible with "y".

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Maybe thought and consideration, but did I have a choice? I don't know, maybe its just an illusion.

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If you're a fatalist I can't help you. But I argue that you did have a choice.

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And are these options future states. Yes or no. Are you claiming that two different future states are compatible with the present state?

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No, they are the options available to you at the time. You could chose to attempt to produce a particular future state but the ability to choose does not guarantee that you will succeed in such an effort.

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And "select one" is basically synonomous with "choose", which seems to make your definition circular. And to clarify, I don't know how to define it without it being circular.

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All definitions are ultimately circular. And if you can't find a better way to say it, then why complain ? Why not make a substantive point ?

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And I would argue that determinism has nothing to do with "selecting" since the idea seems to be incompatible with an immutable future state. The future state was determined even before you were born according to determinism.

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Well we seem to be at a slight cross-purpose here. I wouldn't argue that the universe is deterministic, just the mind.However you do seem to be confusing determinism and fatalism. According to determinism (speakin of the universal view, not just the mind) your choices are part of wroking out that inevitable future state. It is not that you don't make choices or that your choices will have no effect - it is just that they, too are inevitable.

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i. Free will, defined by the ability to decide between options (Paul K, not verbatim).

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ii. What are the options? The options can be viewed as future states.

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For instance, I have a choice to go to grad school or not to go to grad school.

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The problem here is that even if you choose to go to grad school events may occur which prevent you from doing so. Equating the choice with future states means denying that the choice was made, if future events should make realisation of the choice impossible.

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iii.In order for something to be considered an option, it must be possible for it to be chosen.

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Only in the sense that it must be available to be chosen - and we would typically restrict it to options a "reasonable" person would consider. (I would add that we certainly should not use "possible" in the sense of probability here).

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The state of of time 2 is completely determined by the state at time 1. Therefore, only one state is possible at time 2, i.e., the state dictated by time 1. There is only one possible state for each time, so therefore there is only on possible future.

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"Possible" here is not used in the same sense as should be used in premise iii. Any argument which relies on equating those two usages would therefore fail.

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To put it another way, It seems to me that compatiblists are ignoring previous experience and biological inheritance - two luminous flashing elephants - when talking about freedom from coersion.

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They're not ignored - they're just not considered coercion. And I would have to agree. Both affect you only so far as in they contribute to your nature or to your evaluation of the options available. And that doesn't seem like coercion to me - coercion would be an attempt to force a choice that would otherwise not be taken - for instance by threats of violence.

I have to disagree with that. It's impossible for anyone to be ultimately responsible for their nature so that any idea of "choice" which requires that is impossible. Any sensible concpet of choice has to accept that the chooser has a particular nature that may well lead them to strongly prefer one of the available options. The only case where that might be taken as negating free will is the case where that nature was explicitly manipulated or controlled by another conscious entity (which would therefore have to take at least part of the responsibility).And why would avoiding a particular option because past experiene suggests that it is a bad idea be seen as a constraint on chocie rather than a relevant consideration ? If that's not what you meant then how does past experience affect choice in your view ?

It seems to me that your idea of meaningful choice is not meaningful. It seems to demand that personal preferences or values have nothing to do with the choice, that it is just an arbitrary selection between alternatives that are all equally good to the chooser. But how can that be a meaningful choice ?

But I don't think that it is a freedom worth having. The freedom that compatibilists are concerned with is relevant because it is worth having.As I see it compatibilism offers a view of free will that is both very close to our intuitive idea of it - and is actually possible. Freedom in any other sense is opposed to will - turning "free will" into an oxymoron.

But I don't think that it is a freedom worth having. The freedom that compatibilists are concerned with is relevant because it is worth having.As I see it compatibilism offers a view of free will that is both very close to our intuitive idea of it - and is actually possible. Freedom in any other sense is opposed to will - turning "free will" into an oxymoron.I draw the line between internal dispositions and external constraints on the basis that your internal constraints are part of you - if they were different you would not be the person you are. I cannot see any way in which you can be "free" of that without ceasing to be a person (even if you were someone else you would just have a different set of constraints).

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So maybe the choice would be an immediate action, i.e., how one should act. In that case, you are still choosing between atleast two future states: 1.) where you act in x manner, and 2.) where you act in ~x manner.

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Which means disqualifying choices which don't fit that restriction. If you need to change the definition of choice to fit your argument then there's something wrong with your argument.

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I don't quite see the equating.

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So you are saying that you don't see your own conclusion ? If you can't see it, then you don't understand your own argument.

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Can you be more explicit in the two different senses in which it is being used.

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I WAS more explicit in my response to your point iii. It is quite clear that in your conclusion you are not using "possible" in the sense that I stated should be applied in iii and yet you try to equate the two usages.And your proposed rewording of option iii is also unacceptable. I've already explicitly stated that "possible" should be restricted to the availability of options to a reasonabke person, and no further.

That depends. If AI researchers succeeded in producing the program that was conscious and had a human level of understanding then it would have the same sort of freedom. To the extent that the program lacks that then it would be rather meaningless to attribute any degree of free will to it.