Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)

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Sorry to be pedantic, but that isn't Hume's fork

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And sorry for being pedantic about your pedantic comment, but Hume's Fork is used to describe both those ideas (though my definition is sometimes called Hume's Fork II).For instance, it is the definition used in Blackburn's Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.

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That depends on how you define "possible". If you define it as requiring that there must be a non-zero probability that you will choose either option (given tht EXACT situation), and where that probability is not simply an expression of ignorance then you are requiring a random element in decision-making.

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But how is that "free will" ? Surely that random element cannot be called "will" nor does it offer any freedom worth having. So I conclude that the premise - that "free will" requires such a possibility - is false.

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I'm denying free will (for arguments sake), so saying that the other option (an element of randomness) cannot be considered free will does nothing to help your point.

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That's easy. The moon isn't a thinking decision-making entity. You are.

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I thought you'd say this, but now you are just begging the question. I asked:Why doesn't it makes sense to say "The moon chose to orbit around the earth" and it does make sense to say "I chose to write this post."Your reply: Because people have the ability to choose. Don't you see how that is kind of a vacuous answer? The question is: what definition of "choose," "decide," "option," etc. are you using so as to make the one sentence nonsensical and the other make sense?

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Compatibilism denies the idea that deteminism in itself removes responsibility. It may remove ultimate responsibility, but unless we assume an omniscient creator there is no entity to take on that burden.

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Until you can satisfactorily answer the question above (which you may be able to, though I'm not yet convinced) then you are responsible for your actions in the same way the moon is.Edited by JustinC, : No reason given.

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I'm denying free will (for arguments sake), so saying that the other option (an element of randomness) cannot be considered free will does nothing to help your point.

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No, you're not. You're arguing that determinism is incompatible with free will. Pointing out that indeterminism doesn't save free will does help my point - because my point is that the determinstic, compatibilist, version of free will is the only view that makes sense.

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I thought you'd say this, but now you are just begging the question. I asked:
Why doesn't it makes sense to say "The moon chose to orbit around the earth" and it does make sense to say "I chose to write this post."

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And I answered, wihtout begging the question. The moon is not a thinking, decision-making entity and you are. Are you claiming that no thought or consideration went into the writing of your post ?

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Your reply: Because people have the ability to choose. Don't you see how that is kind of a vacuous answer? The question is: what definition of "choose," "decide," "option," etc. are you using so as to make the one sentence nonsensical and the other make sense?

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I mean the ability to weigh up and evaluate the options available and select one on that basis. The moon can't do that. You can.
And before you aruge that there is a contradiction with determinism we get right back to the point that you said "didn't help my case" - indeterminism has nothing to do with weighing up options and selecting the one preferred. There is no contradiction and no question-begging - at least on my part.

No, I don't mean that choice would only be meaningful if two different choices were made at the same instant... clearly that isn't going to happen in this universe (unless Groundhog Day happens!). I'm asking how anyone could make a different choice at a given instant given the personal circumstances that lead up to that choice.It seems to make a mockery of reason to say that someone could take the same past experience and evidence that is available to them at any given moment and come to two diffenent conculsions with it. If you could do something different gven all the circumstances leading up to the moment of choice, it would suggest that reason lead you to arbitrary choices... and to me arbitrary choices don't seem free... they just seem arbitrary.This isn't to say that our ability to reason is perfect. We can just work with what we have, imperfectly.Its not your concious mind's ability to reason that I'm talking about, its also unconscious mind's ability to reason that I would expect to produce the same result however many times you played the tape of history back (sorry I keep using this phrase, it just seems appropriate)... given the individual's past experiences. And if the choices are inevitable, then I don't see how they can be considered free by any stretch of the imaginiation.Maybe I wasn't being explicit enough when I was talking about choosing not to fly and stuff... what I was trying to say was that I think that we are constrained in all these different ways: by the laws of physics etc... and I think the constraint produced by our past experiences+our ability to reason (consciously and unconsciously) are just as unyielding. I do believe that what we are going to do is mapped out in some way. I think that some of it is probably predictable, and some of it might not be predictable. But at no time do I think that meaningful choices happen. I can't prove it but I just can't see where there is room for some ability to make choices. It seems to me to come back to the choice between either saying that all choices are pre-ordained or arbitrary - neither of which seem free in any way.Basically I envisage everyone's lives unfolding before them on rails comprised of predetermination and arbitrariness, though I don't know the proportion. Because no-one can calculate what the map of their future actions is, then I don't see it as that much more constraining than a libertarian idea of free will.The libertarian free basically seems to me to be like rolling a die whenever a choice comes up, and deciding to follow the result of the die, whatever it is. That doesn't seem free to me. You could argue that you could exercise your free will to not do what the die tells you, but I would argue that this decision would be the result not of free will but instead of your past experiences acting on the moment and telling you whether you should do this particular thing or ignore the die in this instant.So to me libertarian free will seems meaningless and hollow. I real choice to me seems as though it should be a moment when you could do either one thing or another, and that either one could happen. Given past experience, I don't see how something like this could happen unless if was purely arbitrary.I think it is possible that things happen, in some circumstances, truly arbitrarily. If the outcome of these things can't be predicted, and these affect things that are so regular that they can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, then it isn't possible to say how far in advance things can be predicted. However, with this slow-dance between the truly arbitrary and the reliably predicatble, I don't see any room for 'choice'.By the way, I'm not sure that some things are truly arbitrary, I'm just acknowledging that this might be the case with some things. As I see it, it might be possible that there is no such thing as arbitrariness at all, and everything may be necessarily caused. I see free will as something that relates not to the universe as a whole but to a very specific subset of the whole - beings with the ability to reason.I feel like I'm woofing up the wrong willow here... is this making sense? Is my definition of choice one that is in line with yours?

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No, you're not. You're arguing that determinism is incompatible with free will. Pointing out that indeterminism doesn't save free will does help my point - because my point is that the determinstic, compatibilist, version of free will is the only view that makes sense.

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I think the problem has to do with the vague notion of free will.If I give you an argument that x is incompatible with y, and the only reply you make is that ~x is also incompatible with y, then the most obvious solution is that there is a problem with the idea of y.You have to find a flaw in my argument, not just offer a counterargument. Maybe there is a flaw, I just want it explicitly pointed out.

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And I answered, without begging the question. The moon is not a thinking, decision-making entity and you are. Are you claiming that no thought or consideration went into the writing of your post ?

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Maybe thought and consideration, but did I have a choice? I don't know, maybe its just an illusion.

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I mean the ability to weigh up and evaluate the options available and select one on that basis. The moon can't do that. You can.

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And are these options future states. Yes or no. Are you claiming that two different future states are compatible with the present state?And "select one" is basically synonomous with "choose", which seems to make your definition circular. And to clarify, I don't know how to define it without it being circular.

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And before you aruge that there is a contradiction with determinism we get right back to the point that you said "didn't help my case" - indeterminism has nothing to do with weighing up options and selecting the one preferred. There is no contradiction and no question-begging - at least on my part.

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And I would argue that determinism has nothing to do with "selecting" since the idea seems to be incompatible with an immutable future state. The future state was determined even before you were born according to determinism.

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I think the problem has to do with the vague notion of free will.
If I give you an argument that x is incompatible with y, and the only reply you make is that ~x is also incompatible with y, then the most obvious solution is that there is a problem with the idea of y.

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Firstly you haven't made an argument to that effect. Secondly the position I am arguing for is that "x" IS compatible with "y".

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Maybe thought and consideration, but did I have a choice? I don't know, maybe its just an illusion.

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If you're a fatalist I can't help you. But I argue that you did have a choice.

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And are these options future states. Yes or no. Are you claiming that two different future states are compatible with the present state?

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No, they are the options available to you at the time. You could chose to attempt to produce a particular future state but the ability to choose does not guarantee that you will succeed in such an effort.

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And "select one" is basically synonomous with "choose", which seems to make your definition circular. And to clarify, I don't know how to define it without it being circular.

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All definitions are ultimately circular. And if you can't find a better way to say it, then why complain ? Why not make a substantive point ?

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And I would argue that determinism has nothing to do with "selecting" since the idea seems to be incompatible with an immutable future state. The future state was determined even before you were born according to determinism.

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Well we seem to be at a slight cross-purpose here. I wouldn't argue that the universe is deterministic, just the mind.However you do seem to be confusing determinism and fatalism. According to determinism (speakin of the universal view, not just the mind) your choices are part of wroking out that inevitable future state. It is not that you don't make choices or that your choices will have no effect - it is just that they, too are inevitable.

I didn't explicitly make an argument, no. So here is a rough idea of what my thoughts are.Premisesi. Free will, defined by the ability to decide between options (Paul K, not verbatim).ii. What are the options? The options can be viewed as future states.For instance, I have a choice to go to grad school or not to go to grad school.I am choosing between two future states of the world, namely one where I am in grad school and another where I am not in grad school.All options can be viewed as future states.iii.In order for something to be considered an option, it must be possible for it to be chosen.Conclusion:From 1, there must be more than one option (options is plural).From two, these options are future states. From three, each option must be possible.So i. becomes:Free will, defined by the ability to decide between possible future states.Determinism:The state of of time 2 is completely determined by the state at time 1. Therefore, only one state is possible at time 2, i.e., the state dictated by time 1. There is only one possible state for each time, so therefore there is only on possible future.There is only one possible future according to determinism.That is obviously incompatible with free will as defined in the conclusion of the previous argument.I know you disagree with 2 (atleast), so I would like to hear your thoughts on that. Edited by JustinC, : grammar

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i. Free will, defined by the ability to decide between options (Paul K, not verbatim).

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ii. What are the options? The options can be viewed as future states.

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For instance, I have a choice to go to grad school or not to go to grad school.

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The problem here is that even if you choose to go to grad school events may occur which prevent you from doing so. Equating the choice with future states means denying that the choice was made, if future events should make realisation of the choice impossible.

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iii.In order for something to be considered an option, it must be possible for it to be chosen.

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Only in the sense that it must be available to be chosen - and we would typically restrict it to options a "reasonable" person would consider. (I would add that we certainly should not use "possible" in the sense of probability here).

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The state of of time 2 is completely determined by the state at time 1. Therefore, only one state is possible at time 2, i.e., the state dictated by time 1. There is only one possible state for each time, so therefore there is only on possible future.

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"Possible" here is not used in the same sense as should be used in premise iii. Any argument which relies on equating those two usages would therefore fail.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought the context was about making a choice on an action.Determinism - the choice is determined and so the action is caused, therefore the person is not responsible, they cannot avoid the choice they make.If the action is free however, then the choice is the determining factor and the person who makes the choice is responsible for the results.

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we are limited in our ability to understand
by our ability to understand

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RebelAAmericanOZen[Deist
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As an analogy you could have 99 equations in 100 variables that define the result. The solution is inderminate and the final "Why" value depends on the {X} marks the choice input.The person making the choice is responsible for the choice, but the final result is also controlled by other factors in addition to the choice.

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we are limited in our ability to understand
by our ability to understand

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RebelAAmericanOZen[Deist
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to share.

Hi again, nwr. You think with great clarity, and I hope to profit from it. Okay. Never mind that, then.The essential bone I was worrying in my reply was your assumption of intentional behavior; my essential objection can perhaps be best illustrated by my "bootstrap" question.Take my brother. Please.He's insane.Perhaps he became a paranoid schizophrenic at 17 due to infectious agents from the cats my mother always favored; perhaps because my mother was first-trimester pregnant during the influenza pandemic of 1957; perhaps my father's aging sperm was responsible; perhaps all those things plus my father's schizotypal genetic load, perhaps that and those and more.Who would assert that he possessed free will when he emerged, not yet ill, from the womb? We commonly grant that small children lack moral comprehension and responsibility. But, at some point before his disease erupted, common wisdom (and law) holds that he became morally responsible for his actions. Then later, ill, he became not responsible for his actions: yet the causes of both the responsible and the not-responsible periods of his lfe were not materially different--genetics, epigenetics, environment, etc.--from yours or mine.How did he--or any of us--change from a pure product of genes and circumstance to a freely intentional actor? The infant wasn't accountable, the toddler wasn't accountable, the...what? when?...became accountable.How? What is the mechanism of our moral liberation/enchainment? There seems to be a gulf between the bald contingency of our origins and moral responsibility. That is the "bootstrap" moment--the POST of free agency--that I am seeking.Surely my little brother did not will his illness or choose to stab my father. Yes, I know I am speaking of an outlier case, someone even the law might absolve of moral responsibility: yet I cannot find logic to support the notion that his contingencies were more or less...contingent...than yours or mine.It seems to me that philosphical defenses of free will have abandoned the field by adopting truncated definitions: free will is an unconstrained will; free will is an unpredictable will. This is pale stuff.In the sense that we most commonly understand free will, I think it can be claimed only as an article of faith, a bit of magic, a subjective preference more allied to theology than philosophy or reason: free will is the creationism of moral philosphy.

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The first thing to keep in mind, is that if there are two people discussing free will, there will be at leasttwo different ideas as to what free will is. Much disagreement results from this.I see you are keying your discussion to moral responsibility. That's good, because there is more agreement about moral responsibility than free will. I agree with most of that. My disagreement is over the last part, on material difference. He is schizophrenic, but we are not. To me, that's a material difference (i.e. a difference that matters). Are you asking for my complete theory of cognition Let's start with something simpler.Suppose that I were to design a mechanical robot, using the kinds of designs that we expect today. If that robot did something to cause injury or death of a person, you would not hold the robot morally responsible. You would hold me responsible, as the designer. You would also deny that the robot had free will, for you would take it that the robot was simply following the rules that I had programmed into it as part of the design.So what's different about a person?Here is one way to look at it. There is a sense in which a person is self-designed. The self-designing goes on throughout life, but is most pronounced during the period a child is learning about its world. As every parent knows, children don't turn out the way the parents would have intended. As every teacher knows, you cannot actually teach a child anything. The teacher can make the ideas available, and provide a congenial environment. But it all depends on the learning by the child.In my view, learning is very different from what the machine learning researchers are trying to do. A learning child isn't merely accumulating facts. Rather, the child is reconstructing himself, redesigning his own cognitive system to allow him to better deal with the world.If the moral responsibility goes to the designer of the robot, rather than to the robot itself, then as the child redesigns himself he takes on more and more moral responsibility as the designer.In the case of an insane person, something has gone wrong with the neural system that prevents the self-designed behavior from being expressed. So in this case, we cannot hold the designer responsible unless we can show that it was the design that caused the neurological failures.Let's return to that question: My own view is that intentions are already present in the newborn child. That we can have intentions, is part of our biological makeup. That a robot cannot have intentions is due to how we design robots. However, at birth, the child's intentions are directed inward rather than to the world. Until the child learns to understand the world, it lacks the ability to direct intentions outwardly. A young child has a lot of psychology, which shows up in moods, fits of anger, colic, etc. This is the child's inwardly directed intentions in operation.This initial inward intentionality is quite important. For it is what drives and empowers the learning process. The child learns by redesigning herself so that she can use external behavior to solve internal problems (such as hunger, pain, and a host of others).At least that's my current opinion. I agree with you there. But I wouldn't blame all philosophers for that. There are many who will agree that free will is meaningless if it does not give you the freedom to act rationally.Footnote: A question occurred to me, while making those comments about design, self-design, and the moral responsibility of the designer. What are the implications for the proponents of Intelligent Design?

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Thanks, nwr. That was a thoughtful reply.I'll sleep on it and respond tomorrow.

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The one who gave you the ability to choose + the one who determined what you would choose. You can't use freedom.And please keep your religious nonsense out of the science forums.

Are you choosing for me?