Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)

It's the expression of nonrandomness. To model the moon's orbit at 100% complexity, you'd have to take into account every piece of matter's effect on every other piece of matter within a sphere 27.4 billion ly across. The fact that we can't do this doesn't mean the universe can't.

Unsupported assertion. Nor do I need to. Burden of proof's on the one who asserts that the Rebels (or anyone else) have freedom. Over and over again, with no mechanism in sight that would allow for change. I did. It is inevitable that the Rebels will blow up the Death Star.

How does "nonrandom" apply to sets? Is the set of primes non-random? What about the set of ordinals less than the first uncountable ordinal? What about the set of real numbers, which have a 7 as the 29th digit in their decimal expansion? What about a set chosen using the axiom of choice?I can't see how "random" or "nonrandom" applies to most sets, unless I am dealing with sets in a probability space. Neverthelss there is no formula, unless you have some very strange meaning for "formula". Being able to model something is not the same as saying that it follows a formula.

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Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber

Ugh. Try this:Effects are locked to their causes. Thus, the state of future things is locked to the state of past things.
Everything in the past is in a set state; therefore, everything in the future is in a set state.
Set = locked into immobility. Anything locked into immobility isn't free.

Yes. You can get the set of all primes by following a very simple recipe: Take the set of all numbers and remove everything that isn't prime. Probably because all the ones you're thinking of are nonrandom. You're right. While the former contains the latter, it says some other things as well.

I'd agree with this, apart from the limitation of 'beings with the ability to reason'. I'd change this to 'beings with the ability to choose' - reason is only a very small factor in most of my choices; there seems to be a whole realm of unconscious processing in there. You seem to have accepted that freedom defined as 'freedom from causation' is meaningless, so I think you're half-way to a compatibilist position . The sticking point is choosing between alternatives.I like coffee and tea pretty much equally, and when my work colleagues ask me what I'd like to drink, it's pretty arbitrary which I choose. I could make it perfectly arbitrary by tossing a coin every time I was asked the question and it wouldn't make any noticeable difference to my quality of life.On the other hand I prefer pistachio to strawberry ice cream, and, given the choice, I would nearly always choose pistachio. I could fulfil the determinist/libertarian definition of freedom by tossing a coin every time I was asked which ice cream I wanted so that my choosing was independent of causation. But the result would be a bit paradoxical, don't you think? In order to prove that I can choose equally between alternatives I would end up doing something that I would prefer not to do, i.e. eat strawberry ice cream.Now there's nothing to stop me going through the whole of my life like this, and if I did, then the hard determinist would have to accept that I was acting freely, because I'm acting in a way that is free from causation.A compatibilist, on the other hand, arguing that freedom is 'freedom from coercion', rather than 'freedom from causation', would not accept that I was acting freely because I was not doing what I wanted.Which position would you take?

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'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

I'd just like to emphasise how grateful I am that you're taking the time to go through this with me here; stay with me if you can bear it!I don't think you quite got what I was saying when I was talking about reasoning (I have to admit to drink-posting on Sunday which probably didn't help). I am not JUST talking about conscious reasoning, but all mental processing, conscious and unconscious that leads to a choice.In your tea/coffee example I'd say that because your preferences and beliefs - established over a lifetime - are so finely balanced, that your ultimate decision is being swayed by subconcious factors that you aren't aware of so it feels arbitrary but in fact it is determined. (ABE - If, hypothetically there could be a circumstance where you felt so equally balanced about the choice that it really was 50/50, then I guess it could be described as truly arbitrary.. but I don't see that as free)In the ice cream example, I'd say that your preferences and beliefs, established again by the unique interaction between your sensory input and your mind over a lifetime, have led you a long way down the (dark) path to pistachio. If you tossed a coin, it would be arbitrary. But if you think that "freedom from coersion" gives choice any more meaningful than that, I'd disagree. Given the choice, you're nearly always going to choose pistachio. This is as a result of your memory and your biological inheritance. Your previous experience is decisively influencing you as a chooser. Very occasionally, you might choose strawberry. But I'm saying that there's going to be a very good reason in this case, brought about by cirumstances, that wouldn't have allowed any other choice. Because we don't know how circumstances influence us fully, it isn't possible for anyone to make accurate predictions of their own or other's behaviour. But just because you can't predict it doesn't mean that it isn't devoid of meaningfully free choice.For example, next time you get the choice between a delicious bowl of strawberry and some of that nutty stuff you might think to yourself consciously or unconsciously "That Tusko! I'll show him! I'll choose the one I don't like very much just to demonstrate how free I am!"This wouldn't be a meaningfully free choice, though I would agree that it would be a choice made free from obvious external coercion. Your choice would have been prompted by our exchange + your desire to be right + numerous other learned and inbuilt factors. In other words this exchange made it happen, and it would not be "free" in a meaningful sense. I'm just saying that all choices are like this.In both these examples I seem to be making a bald assertion: that anything choice that is made is dictated by circumstances and so inevitable. Maybe I am. However, what it looks like to me is that I'm just applying the belief that circumstances constrain us more consistently.To return to my previous example, you accept that you can't choose to fly, because you can't choose to break physical laws. But when it comes to choice, you arguing as a compatablist, say that freedom to be ruled by our biological hard-wiring or our past experience imparts a meaningful freedom. I'd say we just have the freedom to do what we have learned is right... which doesn't give much by the way of meaningful choice.To put it another way, It seems to me that compatiblists are ignoring previous experience and biological inheritance - two luminous flashing elephants - when talking about freedom from coersion. Sure those factors aren't conscious agents, coercing you like a naked man with a whip and an uncannily life-like Horus mask might, but to me they are inherited circumstances as insurmountable as physical or chemical laws.Edited by Tusko, : No reason given.Edited by Tusko, : little grammarEdited by Tusko, : No reason given.Edited by Tusko, : sorry! I really should have checked this grammatically before posting!Edited by Tusko, : added a bit of clarification about the tea coffee example

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To put it another way, It seems to me that compatiblists are ignoring previous experience and biological inheritance - two luminous flashing elephants - when talking about freedom from coersion.

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They're not ignored - they're just not considered coercion. And I would have to agree. Both affect you only so far as in they contribute to your nature or to your evaluation of the options available. And that doesn't seem like coercion to me - coercion would be an attempt to force a choice that would otherwise not be taken - for instance by threats of violence.

Yes - argg - I knew I should have made myself clearer. I don't think they "coerce" because they aren't concious agents. I do think that they determine the outcomes though and so prevent meaningful choice... so a compatiblist may say you are free if free from coercion. I say that you would be free if you could be free from all determining factors, external (coercion) and internal (memory, biology). I don't think that kind of freedom can exist though.

I have to disagree with that. It's impossible for anyone to be ultimately responsible for their nature so that any idea of "choice" which requires that is impossible. Any sensible concpet of choice has to accept that the chooser has a particular nature that may well lead them to strongly prefer one of the available options. The only case where that might be taken as negating free will is the case where that nature was explicitly manipulated or controlled by another conscious entity (which would therefore have to take at least part of the responsibility).And why would avoiding a particular option because past experiene suggests that it is a bad idea be seen as a constraint on chocie rather than a relevant consideration ? If that's not what you meant then how does past experience affect choice in your view ?

I'm not a philosopher. I'm just winging it . It's as much an exploration for me as it is for you. Yes, I know. Which is why I needed to throw a coin to be sure that the choices were arbitrary. My point with these two examples was to show that it is possible for me to live in a way that isn't bound by determinism, but that the 'freedom' so gained is meaningless, and isn't what anybody really means by freedom anyway. On the contrary, freedom for a compatibilist is freedom to do what I want - and what I want is determined by my biological inheritance and previous experience. They are what make me, me. So as long as I'm free to choose pistachio over strawberry ice cream, then I'm free in the compatibilist sense. But if someone coerces me into choosing strawberry ice cream when really I want pistachio (if the ice cream police make dealing in pistachio an offence, for example) then my freedom is lessened.

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'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

My response to freedom in the compatiblist sense is: "whoop-de-do!" To me that isn't freedom in any sense. So I guess I agree with compatiblism, but I don't agree that it should be called freedom. I don't draw a distinction between external coercion (people with guns), external scientific laws (gravity), and internal constraining factors (my biological inheritance, my lifetime of experience and their effect on me). To do so seems artificial. EVERYTHING is effecting me, pushing me towards making a certain decisin at every instance. If there isn't a man with a gun telling me what to do, then there is some alliance between my brain cells, memory and concious ability to reason in my mind. I'm not saying thats BAD. The only alternative is arbitrariness, and that seems even less attractive. At least this way we do things for reasons.But I'm failing to see how we can ever be said to have choice, and thats the only way I'm able to understand freedom.

But you haven't yet provided a definition of freedom where one could be said to have choice. You've already rejected the determinist/libertarian definition as being meaningless. And you reject the compatibilist notion because you say 'To me that isn't freedom in any sense'. So what is your definition of freedom?

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'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

I hope you realise how silly that sounds. In what way is it artificial to distinguish between you doing something because you want to do it, and you doing something because someone is holding a gun to your head?

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'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

Let's suppose I use "/dev/random" on my computer to generate a set of 10 numbers. You would probably consider that a random set. Suppose I next solve an equation that has 10 solutions, and take the set of those solutions. You would probably consider that a nonrandom set.But what if the two sets happen to be identical. Then we have the same set is now both random and nonrandom. How can that be? It seems nonsensical to me.We can apply "random" or "nonrandom" to the method we use to generate a set. But it doesn't make sense to apply it to the set.There is a notion of Kolmogorov complexity, and that is sometimes called "Kolmogorov randomness". Some people consider this a definition of a random sequence of numbers. But a set is not a sequence, and I still can't see how to make sense of "random" or "nonrandom" as a property of sets.

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Compassionate conservatism - bringing you a kinder, gentler torture chamber