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Author Topic:   Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 132 of 210 (358987)
10-26-2006 11:16 AM
Reply to: Message 129 by JavaMan
10-26-2006 10:24 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Yes - I take it back, when he steps into the imaginary parlour it will be too early. Curse my predeliction for hyperbole!
But if its predictable a fraction before the event - and I mean a fraction before the preconcious decision - then doesn't the point still stand?
Thanks for the article, I'll have a look at that on my long dark evening shift of the soul later. I suspect its going to be about something they had in New Scientist that caught my eye five years ago but I never followed up.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 129 by JavaMan, posted 10-26-2006 10:24 AM JavaMan has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 133 of 210 (358994)
10-26-2006 11:36 AM
Reply to: Message 131 by nwr
10-26-2006 10:53 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Oh sure - its an obscene idea... but I was imagining that it was possible to feed it just as much sensory stimulous as the real world can, of such a high quality that the brain clone wouldn't see the experiential join between its old self and its new faked existence.
In a way, that's just a silly build up to the fundamental question, which is - ...if the scientists can't ever be surprised, then does the clone-brain (and by implication everyone else) really ever make meaningful choices?
By the way, I don't think you need the amazingly insightful observer for this point to still stand - this observer merely has access to reality in a way that we don't. It is the reality that contains the seed of the future - and whether it is determined or arbitrary I personally can't see room for free will.
Imagine there is an almost omnipotent, almost omniscient God. It can do everything and anything except know what is going to happen in the future. But while it can't know the future for sure, it can make predictions based on everything which it knows now, which is everything. Those predictions are going to be pretty damn good. I can't imagine a situation where this God ever says to itself "Bugger me! I didn't see that coming! I thought he was going to choose the other one!" Even if you have what feel to you to be utterly ambivalent feelings about vanilla and chocolate, this god is going to know even before your preconcious mind has made its mind up.
He can see all the same stuff that the scientists could see in the previous example, and more. I contend that this god can't be surprised. And if it can't be surprised, then can the subjects it observes be said to have a meaningful kind of free will?
Note that the universe doesn't have to be deterministic for free will to be bypassed. If truly random things happen, then they don't bring free will any closer.
I know you disagree, but I just can't understand why. It would really help me to understand where you think I'm going wrong (if you can be bothered of course!) if you could address this point. I know that you don't think people are input/output machines. Maybe that's the fundamental difference. But the question remains: if people don't work like that, where does the uncertainty - that isn't plain randomness - come from that could surprise a god as described in this post? It sounds supernatural to me.
Edited by Tusko, : "-- that isn't plain randomnesss --"

This message is a reply to:
 Message 131 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 10:53 AM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 134 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 11:50 AM Tusko has replied
 Message 136 by JavaMan, posted 10-26-2006 4:22 PM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 135 of 210 (359051)
10-26-2006 2:33 PM
Reply to: Message 134 by nwr
10-26-2006 11:50 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I think you've hit the nail on the head! Well done. I've been running in circles like a headless chicken.
I like your definition of free will. I don't think I agree with it, but it has two advantages over mine, namely - 1)It's short and 2)It exists.
My definition would be something like:
quote:
Free will is the ability to make decisions without being bound by a chain of causality (if it exists), and without the influence of randomness and arbitrariness.
For me its one or the other so I can't see how free will can exist. I don't see how our ability to reason, and indeed our ability to "do science" can reasonably be considered to exist outside a chain of causality (this actually chimes with Schraf's new thread that touches on the sequential nature of scientific discovery), and I can't really see how it would be random either.
Reasoning is cool, fun, interesting to do, but I think that any decision we reach is merely the signing and sealing of something that has already been written.
I think that we would be allowed to do all the things that your definition offers if, as a see it, free will doesn't exist. I don't see the lack of free will as something threatening.
Of course, I might be wrong, and I might be drowning in it. I just don't see where it fits in - perhaps because my definition is wacky?

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 Message 134 by nwr, posted 10-26-2006 11:50 AM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 138 of 210 (359290)
10-27-2006 10:26 AM
Reply to: Message 136 by JavaMan
10-26-2006 4:22 PM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Apologies, this is a rambler. I'm tempted to sit on it a bit longer to sort it out, but the desire to just get it out there and hope that it makes enough sense to you to respond has won through. Hope thats okay!
As you may already have guessed, I've only been looking at people's responses to me and not reading the whole thread. This is a learned response: I always find that if I read many people's posts I always want to reply to them all and then, having bitten off more than I can chew, I give up on the whole thread.
I read RAZD's post 8, and although I think his position (like yours I'd imagine) is perfectly fine, I just can't get my head around it. Its strikes me as though he's offering not a god of the gaps but a free-will of the fissures, if you will. But that's not my real objection.
To me its a Scylla and Charybdis situation. Determinism and arbitrariness. The universe could be unfolding along predetermined lines. It could be unfolding upon entirely arbitrary lines (but to look around this office everything seems pretty stable), or it could be a mixture of the two - which seems just as possible as it being entirely predetermined. This third option is what I think you might believe in too, and you might be arguing that free will might fit in amongst the random things, and so escape predetermination. To me though, chaos is chaos, and doesn't happen for a reason. The ability to come to decisions seems to be the antithesis of the random to me. Its the ability to look at evidence and come to a conclusion. The same evidence interpreted in the same way will always lead to the same conclusion. Thats the beauty and the power of reasoning. If it could come to two different answers from the same evidence it wouldn't have any power at all.
I can also concieve of a fourth option, where events are determined in some cases by randomness, in others predetermination, and it yet other still by neither arbitrariness nor predetermination but by free choice. This free choice would be the ability to see two options and genuinely be able to do either but to choose one. I don't know how any creature could do this, or how such a mechanism could operate. I don't think such a creature would think anything like a human, that is rationally.*
RAZD's right - choice might be possible, and it could be that choice might be a legitimate part of a chaotic system. To me though, that doesn't make any sense, and is just as demeaning to us as the idea that everything is predetermined. We are rational beings. That's amazing. We do things for reasons, as far as I can see. They might not be rational reasons in an objective sense, but they are for reasons. So it all seems arse about face to say that there's something chaotic about choice.
If anything, the human condition is an escape from the arbitrary, and so to steer towards the Charybdis of randomness merely to escape the Scylla of predetermination seems supremely pointless.
The amazing thing about the human condition to me seems to be that it allows us to go through a much richer decision-making process than a tennis racket or a tapeworm. That's enjoyable and life affirming for me, regardless of whether I could do anything else given the circumstances - like a rollercoast is enjoyable and life affirming. But if we reject this, which you do I think, then please tell me how to access the (to me) mysterious third way that isn't governed by predetermination or randomness?
*I can't think of a better word than rational but I don't mean rational like a logic machine. Mad people are rational in the sense that they draw conclusions from evidence - its just the very subjective evidence that they have access to.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 136 by JavaMan, posted 10-26-2006 4:22 PM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 139 by Hyroglyphx, posted 10-27-2006 12:41 PM Tusko has replied
 Message 140 by nwr, posted 10-27-2006 6:41 PM Tusko has replied
 Message 142 by JavaMan, posted 10-28-2006 10:25 AM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 141 of 210 (359465)
10-28-2006 9:45 AM
Reply to: Message 119 by PaulK
10-25-2006 12:24 PM


Re: Free Willy
Whoops, I hadn't noticed I hadn't responded to this one.
When you talk about "a freedom worth having", I completely and utterly agree with you, so I'm not sure what you are getting at. I agree that adding a random element to avoid determinism doesn't confer a meaningful freedom. All I'm asking - I assume you know this already - is how can free will fit in at all if we accept determinism and/or randomness occur? Both seem contrary to free will. Nwr suggests this is because I have an eccentric definition of free will. I guess that's where this confusion is stemming from.
In my view there has to be some third way that avoids arbitrariness and predetermination for free will to work, and I haven't got the faintest idea how that would be arranged. I don't see any gap where free could manage to squeeze in between these two bad boys.
The problem I'm having is this. If people want to assert free-will by denying absolute determinism, thats fine. However, it seems to me the only recourse they have is to some argument which can ultimately be boiled down to an invocation of chaos, arbitrariness or randomness, none of which offers even the most paltry fig leaf to protect the notion of free will.
How else is it done?
Moving on...
Tusko writes:
When something is done by a person (or indeed a salmon), it is being done because it has already been predetermined by the brain state.
PaulK writes:
To clarify that it is NOT done independantly of the actual process of deciding - it is the outcome of that process that is fixed - but it only happens because the process is followed. There is no way to shortcircuit that.
I'm not really making any point more profound than this: if I have certain beliefs, then they determine what conclusion I come to. I can't see how to make a distinction between "hard-wiring" for instinct and "beliefs", conscious and unconscious. These facts, written in chemicals and electricity in a brain form the tracks along which a train of thought must necessarily run. Rationality seems to me to be only able to function effectively, indeed to be meaningful, as far as there is determinism.
I predict that this isn't going to be satisfactory for you, and its frustrating because I want to be able to see it how you do.
Edited by Tusko, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 119 by PaulK, posted 10-25-2006 12:24 PM PaulK has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 143 of 210 (359470)
10-28-2006 10:30 AM
Reply to: Message 139 by Hyroglyphx
10-27-2006 12:41 PM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I don't know whether there are some things that occur completely at random or not. It is possible I suppose for things that we observe that seem to be happening entirely at random could instead be occurring as part of a pattern as yet unsuspected. It could be that they are genuinely random and so completely unpredictable.
But whether the universe is unfolding in a way that is entirely predictable, or whether there is a degree of genuine randomness that makes such predictions impossible, I don't see how free-will fits into the picture.
Perhaps this is because my idea of free-will is a bit eccentric. Here it is:
quote:
Having free will is having the freedom to make more than one choice at a given juncture, without the outcome being predetermined or determined at random.
I simply cannot see how a choice can be neither predetermined nor random. Consequently I cannot see how there can be such a thing as free will, at least by my definition.
A libertarian notion of free will suggests that decisions are free if they are merely reached through some kind of randomness, which doesn't seem much like free will to me.
To me a compatablist notion of free will is all very well, but in a deterministic universe, and given enough information, a person's decisions could all be predicted before they are reached, and so don't seem free to me. Saying that someone is free merely if they are unconstrained physically seems to neglect the importance of beliefs and instincts in leading each person to one possible course of action.
Similarly, I don't see how, in a universe with a degree of genuine arbitrariness at some physical level, a compatablist notion of free will could allow genuinely free choices. People in such a universe wouldn't be any more free because they would be subject to the whims of the cosmic dice.
An example might help here. You might argue that if there are two things that you feel the same about (like chocolate and vanilla ice-cream), and that when you come to a decision about which one to buy in the ice-cream parlour you are exercising your free-will. To me though, this is either the product of preferences that you are conciously unaware of, or the product of a genuinely arbitrary event in the brain. This expression of true randomness might be allowed because the preferences, conscious or unconscious, are so finely balanced that they allow genuine randomness to come into play.
You might respond "well, how do you know that you are guided by subconcious preferences? Thats just a guess on your part because unconcious preferences are necessarily hidden." Alternatively you might say "how do you know that your prefences are sometimes guided by true randomness?" I agree that its speculative, but to me it seems more probable because for free will to work, it seems as though a third, unknown element is introduced into the equation that is neither random nor predetermined. To me this element seems impossible.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 139 by Hyroglyphx, posted 10-27-2006 12:41 PM Hyroglyphx has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 144 by Hyroglyphx, posted 10-28-2006 10:58 AM Tusko has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 145 of 210 (359478)
10-28-2006 11:35 AM
Reply to: Message 142 by JavaMan
10-28-2006 10:25 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
An apology is in order here - I wrote an answer to the second point, and as I walked away i remembered there was a first point too! I couldn't go back yesterday because I was busy. Thanks for rephrasing it here for me. I'll do my best to give you an answer.
I guess its possible that you are right, I just can't comprehend the mechanism. I think this is because I have a definition of free will that is atypical.
Javaman writes:
And further, what if one of the emergent properties of that higher level system was a self-awareness that was capable of reflecting on and acting upon the contents of its own awareness?
I might be over-simplfying what you are saying here. Perhaps I have missed the thrust of a vital subtlety? Because basically I don't see what you say as problematic.
I think we are all imperfectly rational decision-makers, but to me this is not an indicator of free-will.
However the ability to make decisions is derived (is it an emergent property? is it something else?), and where this responsibility is ulitmately housed (the conscious mind? the unconscious mind?) a self-aware consciousness that is capable of making decisions will be informed by the beliefs and values that it has learned from experience... or perhaps arbitrary factors will creep in somewhere.
I realise that this has been my theme for the day and I've mentioned it in about all the posts in this thread today... but if it isn't predetermined and it isn't aribtrary, what is it, this free-will?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 142 by JavaMan, posted 10-28-2006 10:25 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 149 by JavaMan, posted 10-30-2006 1:24 AM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 146 of 210 (359488)
10-28-2006 12:14 PM
Reply to: Message 140 by nwr
10-27-2006 6:41 PM


Re: Is randomness a problem
I think this "agent determinism" distinction is really useful; that's what I've been talking about! Thanks for giving it a name.
I think we agree than that agent determinism and free-will cannot coexist? That's what I think anyway. Although if you have been chained to the wall you have a smaller pool of options than someone who is unchained, you can still only ever reach one decision of how to act given the circumstances, and this will be determined by what the occupier of your preconscious driving seat thinks is the right thing to do given previous experience.
Cosmic randomness breaks cosmic determinism but like you I don't think that it has much effect on agent determinism. If there is loads of cosmic randomness or none, I don't see where room could be made for free will.
Javaman was talking about free will as an emergent property from randomness, but I am as yet unable to see how the ability to make decisions could be based on something random. To me it looks as though the ability to make decisions comes from the beliefs and the ability to reason (and the physical state of their brain). However the ability to reason arises and how you explain it, I think this is inescapable.
Got to dash now! Hope that makes sense.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 140 by nwr, posted 10-27-2006 6:41 PM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 147 by nwr, posted 10-28-2006 10:16 PM Tusko has replied
 Message 148 by JavaMan, posted 10-30-2006 1:09 AM Tusko has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 150 of 210 (359835)
10-30-2006 11:38 AM
Reply to: Message 149 by JavaMan
10-30-2006 1:24 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
Javaman writes:
I think you misunderstood. I was claiming that free will was an emergent property of deterministic processes, not random ones.
Okay. I agree with this then - apart from the free will bit. We both agree that genuine choice can't arise from the arbitrary. I wish I was having better luch at understanding how you believe that genuine choice can somehow emerge from deterministic processes.
I think you believe that when an individual is faced with a choice (and is free from obvious physical constraints that would prevent the most obvious outcomes), that they might sometimes do what seemed to be - at that moment in time and in subjective terms - the second-best course of action. Maybe even the third or fourth best. I'm not just talking about concious choice here, just to make it clear. Wherever the buck stops in terms of decision-making in the brain, I think that this is a strange thing to be saying.
Assume for a moment it is possible: why would you ever want to do it? What would be attractive about having the ability to carry out acts that seem less appropriate than others you can concieve of?
Of course, or beliefs about the world around us aren't always right. A belief can at best only be a tool to aid interaction with the world outside. But I can't see how we can have anything above or beyond those beliefs. I think this is the key area of disagreement between us.
Even if you believe that there is some discrete decision-making stage of the cognitive process, I think the burden is upon you to explain how it could act - or at least act usefully - outside the learned experience of that individual.
I don't see how a decision-maker can weigh up the evidence, can indeed even recognise evidence, except in the terms that their experience informs them. I don't think there is anything that we can percieve with our senses that we can have opinions about that don't relate to our experience of them.
I think a case in point arises in your post 149 to me. You say
Javaman writes:
Now the experience we start with is that pretty much everybody has experience of making decisions or choosing between alternatives.
To me, all this demonstrates is that we are taught to believe that we have the ability to choose between alternatives. Where does this belief come from? From other individuals who were taught it in turn. I don't see why it wouldn't be possible to teach children something entirely different.
This in fact leads back to my thread that I have for the moment abandoned because this discussion feels more fundamental. In that thread I proposed a community who indoctinated their children with a different belief: namely, that we can only ever make one decision in a given circumstance. Perhaps you think this is impossible?
For this reason I'm a bit skeptical about beleifs that many hold as self-evident, like the fact that at any moment there might be two different things one could do.
Subjective experience is so malleable that I don't think its very useful for evaluative the existence of non-existence fo free will. Consequently, I don't think your attack on hard determinism from subjective experience is pursuasive.
That leaves science. Or does it? Isn't it true that the questions that scientists are able to pose are influenced strongly by culture? And that the interpretive frameworks for their results they are similarly hobbled? Could the idea of natural selection have come about without the contribution of Malthus and Lamark? I'm not sure they could.
But that's not a whole answer. As you have probably already guessed, I'm not very hot on the latest (or indeed any) developments in cognitive science. But I'd be interested if you could offer me any scientific studies that proport to offer evidence for free-will.
(By the way, I'm going to have a look at that article you mentioned now.. I forgot about it... but I think I'd be quite surprised if it was able to offer evidence that free-will existed.)
Personally, I don't see the belief in free-will as any more scientific, and less coherent than a belief in hard-determinism... at least at the level of the choice-making agent.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 149 by JavaMan, posted 10-30-2006 1:24 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 152 by JavaMan, posted 10-31-2006 7:59 AM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 151 of 210 (359913)
10-30-2006 4:12 PM
Reply to: Message 147 by nwr
10-28-2006 10:16 PM


Re: Is randomness a problem
nwr writes:
Actually, no. We don't agree.
Right, good. I got a bit confused at that point!
We agree on the robot stuff. I don't think a robot could be considered to have free will. However, I think the comparison between humans and robots isn't really that helpful with regards to free will. The implication is that a determinist thinks that humans are like robots, and although ultimately I'm going to have to accept that, I think there are also some fundamental differences between humans and robots in a determinist universe.
I'm reluctant to call a human a robot because I think they are so much more complex than robots. Also, I don't think robots are an appropriate comparison because we have a complex and rich internal life and experience of consciousness and I don't imagine an Aibo does. The comparison with robots is only appropriate for me with regards to choice. Our experiences and beliefs frame our understanding of, and so ultimately dictate our choices, and the software and hardware of an Aibo does for them.
Having said this, human actions remain much more difficult to predict than those of an Aibo, and whether you are a believer in free will or not, you probably don't have much luck in predicting how other individuals will act, even if you are married to them. But I don't think that determinists make any claim that for their beliefs to be true they should be able to predict the behaviour of themselves or others.
nwr writes:
It seems perverse to credit decisions made in the behavior of that person to any agent other than the person.
I don't think I'm crediting anyone's actions to a specific agent. People arrive at decisions themselves. But I think they are only able to judge situations and reach decisions based on their personal experiences and their learned beliefs, and that these things are as far as I can see inherited and not chosen. Maybe I'm wrong - but our framework for understanding the world provided by language seems like a closed system to me, and I don't know on what basis you could choose to step outside it and make a choice unfettered to our past. What, indeed, would make this desirable?
As I mentioned in a post earlier today to Javaman, it seems to me that it would be a mechanism by which you would be able to carry out actions which you thought weren't the most appropriate given the circumstances.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 147 by nwr, posted 10-28-2006 10:16 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 153 of 210 (360088)
10-31-2006 10:17 AM
Reply to: Message 152 by JavaMan
10-31-2006 7:59 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
Javaman writes:
That doesn't leave any room for the decision-making itself - so what's the point of having a decision-making apparatus?
To me the decision-making process is inextricable from the learned experience of the individual. If there is a surge in brain activity just before someone carries out an act, then that activity to me can only be a rubber-stamping procedure.
What is the purpose of the decision-making apparatus? Its to make decisions clearly. But decisions cannot, as far as I can see, be made apart from the beliefs of the decision-maker. As you are aware, I'm not talking about general beliefs like your politics or religion. I mean every single belief that has been learned in the course of a life-time and is availible to the decision-making executive. Without beliefs the decision-maker would, if it made decisions at all, make ones that couldn't be considered free.
So my question is: how do you separate the decision making process from the learned experience of the individual?
Javaman writes:
If our decision-making worked in the hard-deterministic way that you suggest, how could we ever deal with novel situations?
Are we ever faced with truly novel situation? I assume that neither of us have ever been gustinoflated by the wambriled zarlinger and had to pick up the pieces. I wouldn't know what to do in this circumstance - but would anyone, whether free-will existed or not? As far as I see it, everything that we experience is understood in terms that we do understand. As a consequence, I don't think there is a problem dealing with novel situations because if the do arise we deal with them by either ignoring them or, if that is impossible, applying the knowledge that we think will provide the best fit. Does that seem like an adequate explanation?
I don't think that we teach our children that they do have free will
Really? I think we do. I think that a belief in free will is fundamental to our attempts to socialise chidren (through attempting to make them morally responsible). Also, the trivial belief in choice happens every day with children, surely? And when you grow up, isn't the whole legal system based on the assumption of free will?
Moving on - Thanks a lot for the mention of Walden Two. That's just the kind of thing that I might be after. I'm going to see if I can order that on the internet today.
I have still only partially read that article you recommended about pre-conscious free-will so I'm not in a position to comment on it in any detail. What I did think was interesting with relation to the discussion in the last couple of posts was that the author took pains in the opening page to point out that the assumption the studies have been built on is one that free-will exists.
Thanks again for helping to clarify my thoughts on this issue. I agree that its not scientific necessarily to believe in hard-determinism but I'm finding it hard to see how it could be any more scientific to believe in free will.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 152 by JavaMan, posted 10-31-2006 7:59 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 154 by JavaMan, posted 10-31-2006 12:08 PM Tusko has replied
 Message 155 by JavaMan, posted 10-31-2006 12:29 PM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 156 of 210 (360333)
11-01-2006 4:29 AM
Reply to: Message 154 by JavaMan
10-31-2006 12:08 PM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
Are we ever faced with truly novel situation? I assume that neither of us have ever been gustinoflated by the wambriled zarlinger and had to pick up the pieces.
I don't know. I think I might have been a couple of times.
My deepest sympathies go out to you at this difficult time. But to paraphrase Wilde:
To be gustinoflated by the wambriled zarlinger once, Mr. Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune. To be gustinoflated by the wambriled zarlinger twice looks like carelessness.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 154 by JavaMan, posted 10-31-2006 12:08 PM JavaMan has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 157 of 210 (360340)
11-01-2006 5:16 AM
Reply to: Message 155 by JavaMan
10-31-2006 12:29 PM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
Javaman writes:
I'm not really defending the notion of free will so much as criticising the dogmas of hard determinism.
No dogma is useful. Surely the dogmas of free-will are just as distracting as the dogma of hard determinism - and isn't the idea of free will much more pervasive in our society than hard determinism?
I can't see how to make a distinction between "hard-wiring" for instinct and "beliefs", conscious and unconscious.
It's precisely questions like this that neuroscience is dealing with. You can't assume an answer based on the rational argument of hard determinism.
I'm not assuming that hard determinism is true. I just can't see how free will would work. If you can point me at studies that a layman might be able to understand that directly address the question that we are debating, I'd really love to read them. I'm crying out for evidence that free will exists.
Everything is inextricable from everything else if you look at in a particular context. But as someone interested in neuroscience I want to understand the 'learned experience' and the 'decision-making process' that acts upon it, and I can only begin to understand them by considering them as separate things that have a relationship.
I can't see why you would think a belief in determinism necessitates a cruder approach. It would be really helpful if you could explain this to me.
If there is a decision making executive somewhere, then how can it function outside its beliefs? If there are neurological processes and structures that it must necessarily use, how could it function in any other way?
In this way I see both un/conscious beliefs and "hard-wiring" as the only things that can inform this executive, so how can it make a decision that would be inappropriate to those beliefs and hard-wiring? If it could, would that be free either?
Obviously I'm not talking about experiences completely outside my experience. But it is useful to distinguish between familiar and novel experiences - my decision-making apparatus deals with them differently.
This makes sense. A novel experience has to be addressed in a different way to a familiar experience. But you have only the general principles to fall back on, only the physical resource between your own two ears to help you come to a decision. However the mechanics of decision making work, surely it is the nature of the experience, memory, protein structures that are the fuel for the decision-making fire. Without these, the executive is in a vacuum and however it functions is not able to come to any decisions. Isn't it what you've learned that shapes your response rather than the precise mechanism by which the brain turns experience into action?
I raised the point before, but I haven't really heard your thoughts on it yet so I'll mention it again. Isn't it a mistake to think that scientific investigation can be conducted in a vacuum? When scientists assume that there is free will, isn't that going to colour the investigation just as much as if they assume that there isn't?
When Velmans says:
Velmans writes:
Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.
Isn't he basically conceding the part of the investigation that would pertain to our discussion to the "commonsense view"?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 155 by JavaMan, posted 10-31-2006 12:29 PM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 158 by JavaMan, posted 11-01-2006 9:26 AM Tusko has replied
 Message 159 by JavaMan, posted 11-01-2006 11:31 AM Tusko has replied
 Message 160 by JavaMan, posted 11-01-2006 11:34 AM Tusko has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 161 of 210 (360433)
11-01-2006 11:46 AM
Reply to: Message 158 by JavaMan
11-01-2006 9:26 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
I don't see why the burden of proof should be placed an determinists. The only reason it seems to be is because
a) Most people think they have free-will.
and
b) Errr... that's it.
To me the idea of free-will doesn't seem coherent. I'd be happy to accept it if someone could explain how it could work to me. Because a majority of people believe in it does it become more likely that it exists? The main study cited by Velmans points out how unreliable feelings can be when it comes to understanding congition.
You argue that the reason people think they have free-will is that they feel themselves reaching decisions. I don't deny that we reach decisions. We do reach decisions, and it is a cognitive process that has lead us to this decision. But to me the beliefs we have are the map that gets us hopefully from where we are to where we want to be. We can't use someone else's map. We can't choose to change our map either, as far as I can see. We can just get more insight into our decision-making by trying to understand that map and perhaps watch it as it shifts as we age.
Sorry to repeat it again: I just don't see how we could reach other decisions, given what we have experienced.
But I think that's not looking at the situation adequately. It is making the assumption that all people experience the sensation of free-will. I think that this feeling has to be learned, just as I think it would be possible to teach others not to feel as though they had free-will.
What I'm really interested in right now is your comment that you thought determinism was a comparitavely crude way of understanding cognitive processes. I'm very interested in why you think this is.
Edited by Tusko, : "But I think that's not.." paragraph added

This message is a reply to:
 Message 158 by JavaMan, posted 11-01-2006 9:26 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 168 by JavaMan, posted 11-08-2006 3:58 AM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 100 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 162 of 210 (360436)
11-01-2006 11:58 AM
Reply to: Message 159 by JavaMan
11-01-2006 11:31 AM


Re: I may be some time...
That sounds lovely - and although I don't know who Tom Cobley is, I'm sure you are in safe hands.
I just think you've got your priorities way out of line - especially since we've almost cracked it.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 159 by JavaMan, posted 11-01-2006 11:31 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 166 by JavaMan, posted 11-01-2006 4:23 PM Tusko has replied

  
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