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Author Topic:   Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 127 of 210 (358933)
10-26-2006 4:34 AM
Reply to: Message 120 by Max Power
10-25-2006 12:48 PM


AI and Free Will
Let me ask you this, do you think that it is possible to create an AI which can have a free will in a meaningful way
I would say, Yes.
I agree with nwr that the kind of symbolic system that you and he have been discussing is unlikely ever to produce an artificial intelligence that shows the same cognitive properties as a human being.
But connectionist systems are another matter. My feeling is that consciousness, reasoning, free will, and all the other higher faculties are emergent properties of the massively inter-connected network of neurons we call a brain. So if you built a connectionist system as sophisticated as the human brain I would expect it to show evidence of all those cognitive properties, including free will.
I don't have time at the moment, but I'll try to find some references to the kind of research that is being done in this area. The emergent properties of quite simple connectionist systems (e.g. the ability to form generalisations from particular instances) are pretty impressive.
ABE: The following paper is a good example of the kind of work going on in this field. The authors are using an artificial connectionist network to understand how the brain works (in this case, trying to understand what factors may affect the recovery of patients with acquired dyslexia).
Connectionist Modeling of Relearning and Generalization in Acquired Dyslexic Patients
Edited by JavaMan, : typo
Edited by JavaMan, : Added link to paper

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 120 by Max Power, posted 10-25-2006 12:48 PM Max Power has not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 129 of 210 (358973)
10-26-2006 10:24 AM
Reply to: Message 128 by Tusko
10-26-2006 9:45 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I am saying that this doesn't seem right to me because the scientists studying your brain-clone would know what it would choose as it walked through the door of the ice-cream parlour, before it even knew what ice-creams were on sale.
They would know its preferences and the memories they were based on, and consequently the brain couldn't surprise the scientists.
Sorry to butt in on your debate with nwr, but I'd disagree with this assessment of the situation. nwr has insisted that he doesn't really have a preference when it comes to chocolate and vanilla. If that's the case, then it's quite possible that the scientists wouldn't be aware of which choice he was going to make until just before he became conscious of it himself. I certainly wouldn't expect them to be able to predict his choice even before he entered the ice cream parlour - his brain will perform millions of operations between crossing the threshold and reaching the counter - what makes you think none of those operations would influence his final choice?
By the way, you might find this modern neuroscience article interesting. It discusses precisely the kind of things we've been discussing in this thread:
Preconscious Free Will

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 128 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 9:45 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
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JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 136 of 210 (359088)
10-26-2006 4:22 PM
Reply to: Message 133 by Tusko
10-26-2006 11:36 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
Imagine there is an almost omnipotent, almost omniscient God. It can do everything and anything except know what is going to happen in the future. But while it can't know the future for sure, it can make predictions based on everything which it knows now, which is everything. Those predictions are going to be pretty damn good. I can't imagine a situation where this God ever says to itself "Bugger me! I didn't see that coming! I thought he was going to choose the other one!" Even if you have what feel to you to be utterly ambivalent feelings about vanilla and chocolate, this god is going to know even before your preconcious mind has made its mind up.
That would seem to be the case wouldn't it? If you could see all the details of cause and effect laid out before you it's difficult to see how you could be surprised by anything. Even so, I can see some problems:
1. What precisely is the nature of the events your quasi-God is supposed to be observing? We say cause and effect, but are we talking aabout events at the sub-atomic level, at the molecular level, the biological level, the social level? The point I'm trying to make here is similar to one made earlier in the thread by RickJB - that the immutable, deterministic paths of sub-atomic particles, or atoms, or whatever don't really have any bearing on the question of free will, which is a question from a different domain.
Knowing everything about the properties of sub-atomic particles, for example, doesn't allow you to predict how chemicals behave. At the sub-atomic level all chemicals are the same. Similarly, knowing everything about the properties of all chemicals found in biological systems doesn't allow you to predict the behaviour of a biological system. At the chemical level all biological systems are identical - all organisms are made up of the same stuff. Now imagine that brain signals and subjective experience stand in exactly the same relation as sub-atomic particles and the chemicals they make up, or as chemicals and the biological systems they make up. What if the operations of your brain generate a higher level system (your subjective experience) that has rules of its own that can't be predicted from the brain signals you're observing? And further, what if one of the emergent properties of that higher level system was a self-awareness that was capable of reflecting on and acting upon the contents of its own awareness?
2. As my wife is after the PC, I'll deal with my second point in a later post (possibly). But RAZD in an earlier post about chaotic systems made essentially the same point I was going to make here (just in case I don't get back to it ).

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 133 by Tusko, posted 10-26-2006 11:36 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 138 by Tusko, posted 10-27-2006 10:26 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 142 of 210 (359469)
10-28-2006 10:25 AM
Reply to: Message 138 by Tusko
10-27-2006 10:26 AM


Re: Brain-Clone Blues
I quite agree with your comments about randomness here. I should really have finished making my point 2, which was simply to point out chaotic systems as examples of deterministic systems that aren't predictable. (By the way, don't assume that a chaotic system necessarily includes an element of randomness - the rolling of a dice is entirely deterministic, it's just an unpredicatble deterministic process).
Point 2 was actually my lesser point - I was just trying to undermine your assumption that your quasi-God would be able to predict an outcome just because the process that led to it was deterministic.
My main point was actually point 1. I'll repeat the salient paragraph here, to save me trying to make the argument again:
Knowing everything about the properties of sub-atomic particles, for example, doesn't allow you to predict how chemicals behave. At the sub-atomic level all chemicals are the same. Similarly, knowing everything about the properties of all chemicals found in biological systems doesn't allow you to predict the behaviour of a biological system. At the chemical level all biological systems are identical - all organisms are made up of the same stuff. Now imagine that brain signals and subjective experience stand in exactly the same relation as sub-atomic particles and the chemicals they make up, or as chemicals and the biological systems they make up. What if the operations of your brain generate a higher level system (your subjective experience) that has rules of its own that can't be predicted from the brain signals you're observing? And further, what if one of the emergent properties of that higher level system was a self-awareness that was capable of reflecting on and acting upon the contents of its own awareness?
Can you conceive of free will as an emergent property of consciousness? One that depends on our subjective experience of being aware of our own thoughts?

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 138 by Tusko, posted 10-27-2006 10:26 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 145 by Tusko, posted 10-28-2006 11:35 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 148 of 210 (359748)
10-30-2006 1:09 AM
Reply to: Message 146 by Tusko
10-28-2006 12:14 PM


Re: Is randomness a problem
Javaman was talking about free will as an emergent property from randomness, but I am as yet unable to see how the ability to make decisions could be based on something random. To me it looks as though the ability to make decisions comes from the beliefs and the ability to reason (and the physical state of their brain). However the ability to reason arises and how you explain it, I think this is inescapable.
I think you misunderstood. I was claiming that free will was an emergent property of deterministic processes, not random ones.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 146 by Tusko, posted 10-28-2006 12:14 PM Tusko has not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 149 of 210 (359750)
10-30-2006 1:24 AM
Reply to: Message 145 by Tusko
10-28-2006 11:35 AM


Hard Determinism isn't Science
However the ability to make decisions is derived (is it an emergent property? is it something else?), and where this responsibility is ulitmately housed (the conscious mind? the unconscious mind?) a self-aware consciousness that is capable of making decisions will be informed by the beliefs and values that it has learned from experience... or perhaps arbitrary factors will creep in somewhere.
I realise that this has been my theme for the day and I've mentioned it in about all the posts in this thread today... but if it isn't predetermined and it isn't aribtrary, what is it, this free-will?
The problem I have with your position, and any hard-determinist position, is that you're basing these assumptions about what's possible on a rational argument, not on either our subjective experience or on any scientific evidence.
Science doesn't work like that. Science is based on experience (experiments are just very formal ways of using experience to test out an hypothesis).
Now the experience we start with is that pretty much everybody has experience of making decisions or choosing between alternatives. We do it every day. In fact it's so much part of our normal experience, that anyone who believes they're being manipulated like a puppet is considered to be abnormal (there's a technical term for this pathological condition, but I can't remember it offhand ).
The aim of science here is to understand how this situation came to be, how we came to have this subjective experience, and what the purpose of it is, not to explain it away with some overly-simplistic rational argument based on a very, very old (and very, very misleading) notion of what the material world is like.
Edited by JavaMan, : typo

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 145 by Tusko, posted 10-28-2006 11:35 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 150 by Tusko, posted 10-30-2006 11:38 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 152 of 210 (360062)
10-31-2006 7:59 AM
Reply to: Message 150 by Tusko
10-30-2006 11:38 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
I think you believe that when an individual is faced with a choice (and is free from obvious physical constraints that would prevent the most obvious outcomes), that they might sometimes do what seemed to be - at that moment in time and in subjective terms - the second-best course of action. Maybe even the third or fourth best. I'm not just talking about concious choice here, just to make it clear. Wherever the buck stops in terms of decision-making in the brain, I think that this is a strange thing to be saying.
Assume for a moment it is possible: why would you ever want to do it? What would be attractive about having the ability to carry out acts that seem less appropriate than others you can concieve of?
Of course, or beliefs about the world around us aren't always right. A belief can at best only be a tool to aid interaction with the world outside. But I can't see how we can have anything above or beyond those beliefs. I think this is the key area of disagreement between us.
Even if you believe that there is some discrete decision-making stage of the cognitive process, I think the burden is upon you to explain how it could act - or at least act usefully - outside the learned experience of that individual.
I'm not saying that the decision-making process acts outside the learned experience of an individual. But why are you making the unwarranted assumption that the learned experience inevitably causes the final decision? That doesn't leave any room for the decision-making itself - so what's the point of having a decision-making apparatus?
As far as I can see the learned experience is a pool of information that can be drawn upon when faced with a novel situation. The decision-making apparatus is there so that we can dip into our pool of learned experience, compare it with the novel situation, and make a decision appropriately. If our decision-making worked in the hard-deterministic way that you suggest, how could we ever deal with novel situations?
This in fact leads back to my thread that I have for the moment abandoned because this discussion feels more fundamental. In that thread I proposed a community who indoctinated their children with a different belief: namely, that we can only ever make one decision in a given circumstance. Perhaps you think this is impossible?
I'm not sure that changing what people believe would make much of a difference - I don't think that we teach our children that they do have free will, so telling them that they don't isn't really going to affect their behaviour. But, it might be interesting to imagine what a society would be like where people were discouraged from taking notice of their own subjective experience. Have you ever read BF Skinner's 'Walden Two'? - I haven't read it myself, but it's a novel about a utopian society run along behaviourist lines. Maybe that's the society you're looking for?

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 150 by Tusko, posted 10-30-2006 11:38 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 153 by Tusko, posted 10-31-2006 10:17 AM JavaMan has replied
 Message 163 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-01-2006 12:09 PM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 154 of 210 (360110)
10-31-2006 12:08 PM
Reply to: Message 153 by Tusko
10-31-2006 10:17 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
Are we ever faced with truly novel situation? I assume that neither of us have ever been gustinoflated by the wambriled zarlinger and had to pick up the pieces.
I don't know. I think I might have been a couple of times.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 153 by Tusko, posted 10-31-2006 10:17 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 156 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 4:29 AM JavaMan has not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 155 of 210 (360118)
10-31-2006 12:29 PM
Reply to: Message 153 by Tusko
10-31-2006 10:17 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
I agree that its not scientific necessarily to believe in hard-determinism but I'm finding it hard to see how it could be any more scientific to believe in free will.
I'm not really defending the notion of free will so much as criticising the dogmas of hard determinism.
One of the principal aims when you're doing science is to define a useful model of the domain you're investigating. For me hard determinism is much too crude to allow a proper scientific investigation of cognition, because it's constantly trying to conflate precisely those phenomena of cognition that we want to investigate. Examples from your past few posts include:
To me the decision-making process is inextricable from the learned experience of the individual
Everything is inextricable from everything else if you look at in a particular context. But as someone interested in neuroscience I want to understand the 'learned experience' and the 'decision-making process' that acts upon it, and I can only begin to understand them by considering them as separate things that have a relationship.
Are we ever faced with truly novel situation? As far as I see it, everything that we experience is understood in terms that we do understand. As a consequence, I don't think there is a problem dealing with novel situations because if the do arise we deal with them by either ignoring them or, if that is impossible, applying the knowledge that we think will provide the best fit.
Obviously I'm not talking about experiences completely outside my experience. But it is useful to distinguish between familiar and novel experiences - my decision-making apparatus deals with them differently.
I can't see how to make a distinction between "hard-wiring" for instinct and "beliefs", conscious and unconscious.
It's precisely questions like this that neuroscience is dealing with. You can't assume an answer based on the rational argument of hard determinism.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 153 by Tusko, posted 10-31-2006 10:17 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 157 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 5:16 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 158 of 210 (360369)
11-01-2006 9:26 AM
Reply to: Message 157 by Tusko
11-01-2006 5:16 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
I raised the point before, but I haven't really heard your thoughts on it yet so I'll mention it again. Isn't it a mistake to think that scientific investigation can be conducted in a vacuum? When scientists assume that there is free will, isn't that going to colour the investigation just as much as if they assume that there isn't?
When Velmans says:
Velmans writes:
Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.
Isn't he basically conceding the part of the investigation that would pertain to our discussion to the "commonsense view"?
He's simply taking the empirical approach that science always takes, starting from the observed phenomena. And one of those observed phenomena is that we feel as though our voluntary acts are freely chosen. Science isn't going to throw away this bit of data just because of a rational argument (hard determinism) that claims that this subjective feeling is an illusion and that all actions are predetermined.
Now your view might be right, but if you want to establish it scientifically you need to do two things:
1. Prove that actions really are predetermined and that the decision-making process really is just a rubber-stamping exercise;
2. Account for the observed phenomenon that we feel as though our voluntary acts are freely chosen.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 157 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 5:16 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 161 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 11:46 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 159 of 210 (360427)
11-01-2006 11:31 AM
Reply to: Message 157 by Tusko
11-01-2006 5:16 AM


I may be some time...
Don't be surprised if you don't get any response from me for the next few days, Tusko - I'm off to the Lake District for a long weekend with the family (wife, two daughters, dog and Tom Cobley). Solving the problem of freewill vs determinism can wait .
Edited by JavaMan, : No reason given.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 157 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 5:16 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 162 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 11:58 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 160 of 210 (360429)
11-01-2006 11:34 AM
Reply to: Message 157 by Tusko
11-01-2006 5:16 AM


Duplicate post
Duplicate post
Edited by JavaMan, : duplicate post

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 157 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 5:16 AM Tusko has not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 164 of 210 (360446)
11-01-2006 12:22 PM
Reply to: Message 163 by DominionSeraph
11-01-2006 12:09 PM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
The problem is that you're assuming that the universe can change. It can't, as it can only be what it is. It cannot be what it is not.
Correction: It can only be what it has been. On this precipice of the present, nothing has happened yet. It's precisely the point of disagreement between us that you think that the future is predetermined by what has happened previous to this moment, that nothing that happens in this moment can change what will happen in the future. Whereas I am claiming that my choice is an additional determining factor.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 163 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-01-2006 12:09 PM DominionSeraph has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 165 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-01-2006 1:15 PM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 166 of 210 (360515)
11-01-2006 4:23 PM
Reply to: Message 162 by Tusko
11-01-2006 11:58 AM


Re: I may be some time...
although I don't know who Tom Cobley is
It's an allusion to a folk song (Widdecombe Fair?), where a line of people going to the fair gets longer and longer as more and more people join in. Each round ends with the line '...and Uncle Tom Cobley and all'.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 162 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 11:58 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 167 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 4:28 PM JavaMan has not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2319 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 168 of 210 (362552)
11-08-2006 3:58 AM
Reply to: Message 161 by Tusko
11-01-2006 11:46 AM


Re: Hard Determinism isn't Science
OK. Back to the fray.
I don't see why the burden of proof should be placed an determinists.
...
What I'm really interested in right now is your comment that you thought determinism was a comparitavely crude way of understanding cognitive processes. I'm very interested in why you think this is.
Don't misunderstand me. I'm a determinist too. What I'm objecting to is hard determinism.
Maybe you'll understand my objection better if I give you a bit of historical context. For the last fifty years or so, academic psychology has been dominated by behaviourism, a theory of human behaviour that attempts to explain behaviour in terms of simple, deterministic stimulus-response mechanisms. It was so dominant, so all-pervading, that it was pretty much impossible for several decades for any respectable psychologist to investigate cognition (because cognition was considered a consequence of deterministic stimulus-response mechanisms, and so was irrelevant to an understanding of the causes of behaviour). Fifteen years ago an article like Velmans would have been inconceivable.
But to me the beliefs we have are the map that gets us hopefully from where we are to where we want to be. We can't use someone else's map. We can't choose to change our map either, as far as I can see. We can just get more insight into our decision-making by trying to understand that map and perhaps watch it as it shifts as we age.
The map isn't the landscape (as jar is fond of saying), and it's certainly not the same as me walking through the landscape (if it were, how could I ever get lost?).
Consider the following two examples:
1. I sometimes make mistakes in multiplication or in spelling, especially when I'm rushed or I'm not paying attention. I have difficulty understanding how this could be the case if my mental processes were as straightforward as you seem to believe. I know how to multiply 7 by 16, how to spell misconceived, so how come one day I'll get them right, and another day I'll make a mistake, when the only difference in those cases is the amount of attention I'm paying to the task? Can you explain this phenomenon with your model of cognition?
2. How do you explain the behaviour of someone giving up an addiction? If I'm a smoker, for example, my preference every day is to smoke a cigarette (or several), but if I'm giving up, I fight that preference in order to achieve a long term goal. Not smoking, at least for the first few weeks, is an act of will. In the long term, though, what I'm doing is re-conditioning myself, re-routing the soft-wiring that determines my behaviour ('choos[ing] to change our map' in your terms).
The fundamental flaw of hard determinism, as far as I'm concerned, is that it treats cognitive processes as a special case, purely as effects in a chain of cause and effect. In the real physical world, any phenomenon can have causal relations too.
I see subjective experience as part of the physical world, having causes as well as well as being caused. To a hard determinist, subjective experience is an isolated bubble, peripheral to the physical world.
Edited by JavaMan, : Fisnished off after interruption

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 161 by Tusko, posted 11-01-2006 11:46 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 170 by Tusko, posted 11-10-2006 5:31 AM JavaMan has replied
 Message 172 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-14-2006 12:39 AM JavaMan has replied

  
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