Why doesn't AI Falsify ID?

I didn't think that was what he was doing. It seems to me, from my reading, that he wants to argue that regardless of whether or not CSI is detectable, its presence or absence has nothing to do with design or "non-physical causation" or whatever.Makes perfect sense to me, but I imagine ID's proponents won't pay any attention. Why would they?

Right, that's what I was going by.I mean, I guess it's up to him to tell us, but when I substitute actual words for where he uses X and Y, I get: It's a little clumsy, but from that I understand him to be asserting that his argument is that CSI doesn't imply "non-physical causation" regardless of its detectability.But I guess you're right, now that I think about it. If CSI doesn't have any meaning, we can't say what it does or doesn't imply. It has to be defined, first. Doesn't it?

Point taken. I agree, obviously.

I would offer the human brain as an example of a mechanical process that is able to reason outside of information inputted by programming. Says you. Many contend that, indeed, a computer could have a stream of conscious thought. And indeed, if a computer could fool everyone into believing that it did, how would that be different? How can you prove that you're not just fooling everyone with an outward simulation of conscious thought?

I can prove it to myself, and you can prove it to yourself - but neither one of us can prove it to the other.I know I can think. I know I'm using conscious thought. How do I know that you are? How do you know that I am?Do you understand the problem, here? Just saying "I'm using conscious thought" doesn't prove it, because I could program a computer to say that. You could be just a computer, as far as I know. As far as you know, I am. The fact that no computers appear to have conscious thought yet is not proof that they never will.