Ground Rules

Here we go again. What fallacy, specifically, RAZD? A belief that something exists in objective reality != subjective preference. Or do you believe that other beliefs regarding objective reality (my pet is a cat, the Earth is round, etc) are similarly arbitrary, and a person may believe in whatever they like regardless of evidence and it is equally rational?True, a person who holds one arbitrary unsupported belief is not compelled to hold all other arbitrary beliefs, but holding one and not others despite equivalent levels of evidence (ie, none) is inconsistent. It's special pleading - which is a logical fallacy.

Doesn't this force us to view all viewpoints to be equally valid? If we hold that all of our knowledge is tentative pending additional information, and that tentativity forces us to consider even those views that directly contradict our tentative knowledge as valid, then must we not consider any and all viewpoints to be valid?Doesn't it make more sense to consider the validity of a viewpoint only by the amount of evidence supporting it? The Theory of Evolution, for example, has mountains of evidence supporting its accuracy. Despite the fact that this view is tentative pending evidence that contradicts evolution, would we not generally consider the viewpoint that all life was created three hours ago by a giant fish to be generally invalid, because there is no evidence supporting such a view and plenty of evidence against it?I'd suggest that all viewpoints are equally invalid until they are supported by evidence, and that their validity resembles an asymptote where our certitude increases with the amount of supporting evidence, approaching but never actually reaching absolute certainty (and similarly our certitude that a viewpoint is completely false increases with the lack of positive evidence and the existence of contrary evidence, approaching but never quite actually reaching absolute certainty that the viewpoint is absolutely false).In this way I would consider the theory of Evolution to have very high validity, supported by the weight of evidence, while Creationism is almost certainly false, because of the weight of contradictory evidence and the dearth of any evidence supporting such a viewpoint.To parse it out as you did:If {A} and {B} are contradictory, but neither {A} nor {B} are supported or contradicted by evidence, then neither {A} nor {B} is valid.If {A} and {B} are contradictory, and {A} is based on objective evidence, then {A} is tentatively valid (with the tentativity decreasing as evidence increases) and {B} is tentatively invalid (with tentativity decreasing as evidence for {A} increases).I'd also be pretty comfortable with saying that the theory of Evolution is a valid viewpoint, where Creationism is not.By your standard above, I should tentatively side with Evolution while constantly acknowledging that Creationism is still a valid possibility.Do you consider Last Thursdayism to be a valid possibility due to the tentativity of human knowledge? Ghosts? Fairies?Your dreaded Intangible Pink Unicorn?Are all of these viewpoints "valid" because our knowledge of their nonexistence is tentative, despite the fact that there is absolutely no objective evidence supporting any of them whatsoever?Atheism, to use another example, would be the recognition that the existence of a deity {A} is invalid because there is no evidence supporting {A}. If one proposed contradictory deity (or deities) {B} without supporting evidence, there would be no validity to either {A} nor {B}. Belief in vaguely-defined deity {C} which could actually be deity {A} or {B} or any number of other deities, also without supporting evidence, would also have no validity. Belief in {A}, {B}, or {C} would be a matter of subjective personal preference (on the level with choosing a favorite color), with no objective validity whatsoever, and could logically be placed in the same category as all other unsupported beliefs that have no validity. Depending, of course, on how one defines reality. Given that all of our sensory inputs (and therefore all of our information) seems to come from the physical world, I'd certainly consider the physical world "real" even if it actually turns out to be a computer simulation like the Matrix. It's certainly real for all practical purposes, and what else matters? This is true, except that tentativity need not be an absolute, binary consideration. I tentatively hold the Theory of Evolution to be an accurate representation of a real-world process. I tentatively hold that my computer will not randomly shut off in five minutes, but with much less certainty. I am far more tentative regarding the possibilities of a sudden random shutdown than I am in the Theory of Evolution being incorrect. From your words (and forgive me if this isn't what you actually mean) I should consider Creationism (contradictory to evolution) and the likelihood of a power outage in five minutes time to be equally valid viewpoints because of the absolute presence of tentativity in my beliefs.I think that the degree of tentativity should also be included. I think that one can include degrees of tentativity without losing open-mindedness. I agree, however, that absolutism is a poor basis for thought, and that tentativity, even when that tentativity is extremely minor, confidence is high and evidence is strong, should still be acknowledged.

Then perhaps I'm not understanding you correctly. If the tentativity of belief {A} forces us to acknowledge contradictory belief {B} as valid, do you also mean that the term "valid" is not a binary, black/white distinction, and that you see varying shades of validity? If so, then I would say that we agree, excepting that I hold beliefs that are unsupported by evidence to have no validity (while also not being invalid - perhaps a 0 on a validity-scale of -10 to +10). My typical response to any assertion that has not been supported by evidence is "why should I think that?" If no evidence can be given to support the assertion, I disregard it as lacking validity (even while acknowledging that it may perhaps be possible if evidence is eventually discovered). But you've said that the tentativity of our understanding of any evidence forces us to acknowledge the validity of contradicting views. You seem to be contradicting yourself here. Perhaps you could clarify?Let's take for example the proposition fo a young Earth {B}. There is a substantial amount of evidence supporting the hypothesis that the Earth is very old, on the order of billions of years {A}. If we hold belief {A}, and {B} contradicts {A}, does not the tentativity of our position then force us to regard {B} as a valid belief? That seems to be what you were saying earlier; my view was simply that, due to the strength of the evidence supporting {A}, the tentativity of the position is decreased to the point that outright dismissal of {B} as invalid is justified, even if we must still acknowledge that there is some small chance that new evidence could prove {A} to be false. So then your "ground rules" apply only to unevidenced positions, which also have no evidenced contradictory positions? If we're considering only those positions with no amount of evidence for or against, I'd say that any distinctions are rather arbitrary. Again, perhaps you could clarify?Besides, there is some small chance that the Sun does orbit the Earth. It certainly doesn't seem to be the case, and it's a rather self-centered view (requiring an arbitrary shift in point of reference), but it's not necessarily invalidated. With the Earth as the immobile center of a constantly-moving Universe, the mechanics still work. Doesn't the tentativity of our understanding of celestial motion force us to acknowledge some small possibility (unlikely as it may be in this case) that we're wrong? I agree (though I dislike the term "world view" due to its use by Creationists as a way to dismiss evidence, but I suppose it's still accurate). This is what I meant when I brought up degrees of tentativity, and evidence increasing certitude but never actually reaching 100%. I also think, however, that it's possible to give an answer while still acknowledging that all answers are tentative to varying degrees. For example, we can say that the Earth does orbit the Sun while acknowledging that there is some possibility that we aer wrong. I don't think that this represents logical inconsistency - we don't have to always acknowledge the tentativity of our positions out loud, particularly when the tentativity is extremely minor. My approach is similar, with a few key differences.I do not regard any of my beliefs (or disbeliefs) as a solid +10 or -10. Some I hold to be > 9 (the Theory of Evolution, for example; the notion that gravity will not suddenly "shut off" making me float away would be on the order of +9.99999~).When evaluating a given concept, I don't look at how likely the concept is to be true. Instead, I look first at how I would make such a determination (ie, is the concept falsifiable?). If I am completely unable to make such a determination (say, that blue is superior to green - clearly this is an unfalsifiable and unsupportable position) then I simply disregard it as personal preference at best and irrelevant at worst. This would be a 00 on the spectrum. If I am somewhat unable to make such a determination (say, the existence of ghosts - a position that is supportable if evidence can be found, but which is not actually falsifiable; this set must encompass all of those assertions regarding the "real world," as supporting evidence should always be potentially extant if something exists in objective reality) then I am able to make a small degree of determination. If no evidence for such an assertion can be found after a reasonable effort looking for it (prayers to a deity, for example, or scientific examination of a supposedly haunted location), I evaluate the concept as very slightly below 00 (the degree of variance from 00 is directly correlated to the amount of searching done, but never deviates very far). In this way, I evaluate ghosts, goblins, and deities to be somewhere between 00 and -1 (this is further exacerbated by the knowledge that peopel can and do commpletely make things up, and that other people will believe the nonsense, even when it is demonstrably falsified - see holistic medicine). Unlikely enough to say that I really don't think they exist, but even a small amount of real evidence would be sufficient to tip me the other way.The degree to which I investigate a concept has less to do with how likely the concept is to be true, and more to do with how relavent the concept is. For isntance, the existence of a kitten seven blocks away is easily investigated and can be easily supported with evidence, but is wholly irrelevant to my life, and so I choose nott o investigate it. The concept of the existence of a deity would be potentially very significant in my life, and so I have spent significant time investigating the concept (partially including my time here on this forum). I have no problem with this perspective. I find it interesting that you feel that you can interpret my "tone" as "mocking\incredulous\dismissive" over a text-only message board with no "smileys" or other such cues. I chose the timeframe and cause in my impromptu Creation myth at random, simply as something wholly different from either the specifics of Christian Creationism or modern geology. As with the case of the Immaterial Pink Unicorn, I think you feel "incredulous\dismissive" of such assertions, and project that "tone" onto me. When I use such terminology, I most typically do so with all due seriousness. When equating deities to the Immaterial Pink Unicorn, I do so not to mock belief in deities, but rather to purposefully bait emotional reactions towards equivalent assertions in order to demonstrate a lack of consistency. In this specific case, I wasn't even doing that - I was simply picking a completely random combination of ideas with which to manufacture a Creation myth.I understand and agree, however, with your point that we need not assign all conceivable possibilities as equally probable. This I somewhat disagree with. If we hold belief {A} because of the weight of evidence, and belief {B} contradicts {A}, I think the tentativity of our belief {A}, while significantly diminished by supporting evidence, still requires us to acknowledge that {B} may potentially be true. That doesn't mean we should investigate {B}, but that's a different determiantion altogether. Judging that an assertion has no initial validity (a 00 on our scale) does not mean we should not investigate it, especially when we determine (as with a Sudoku game) that our assertions are both supportable and falsifiable given that investigation. It simply means that we can have no confidence that "3" should go in a given square initially.Most assertions begin with observation, meaning we already have some amount of evidence granting validity. Idle speculation must start from 00 on the scale, but if the idea is of significant relavence, and is at least falsifiable and/or supportable with potentially extant evidence, it's still worthwhile to investigate such speculations. We can do the same thing while assigning a default validity of 00 to any given solution until the solution is investigated. We simply cannot consider that the validity of a given solution is negative before investigating, which is somewhat different. Being that those things describe the core of Creationism, yes. I assume you're drawing a distinction between the specifics of the story and the far more general "goddidit," since the former are all falsifiable (and in fact falsified) while the latter is not. Of course. That's a ratehr empty response. We can all express our opinions. But do you agree or disagree with the relative assignment of validity?Evolution {A} is supported by enormous amounts of evidence, and thus ranks very high on our validity scale (approaching but not reaching +10). Creationism {B}, as a contradiction of {A}, and which also contains specific claims which have been falsified by evidence (the Flood, young Earth, etc), has a very low negative validity (approaching but not reaching -10). Do you agree that this is sufficient to label Evolution as "valid" and Creationism as "invalid," while still acknowledging the minute tentativity of such a determination? Certainly - but the exercize is specifically manufactured such that a belief {A} can be held, and another belief {B} can contradict {A}, such that we can examine whether our belief in {A} must necessitate labelling {B} as invalid. The exercise says absolutely nothing about the validity of {C}, {D}, or {E} - they simply aren't part of the consideration. They're irrelevant. Assuming that we do hold belief {A}, does the contradictory nature of belief {B} allow us to judge {B} as invalid, or does the tentativity of our position {A} force us to label {B} as valid? That was your parsed-out statement. I'm pointing out that simply holding a belief is irrelevant - only evidence can assign relative validity to positions, and tentativity decreases as evidence increases. Certainly, but again that's part of how {B} contradicts {A} when {A} is supported by evidence. In fact, this would be a perfect example of how, when tentativity decreases sufficiently due to the weight of evidence, it is acceptable to label {A} as valid, and {B} as invalid. Agreed. I simply think that, when tentativity is small enough, it is acceptableto label an assertion as so likely to be invalid to simply call the assertion invalid. Certainly, you cannot label as invalid those specific concepts (such as the existence/involvement of a deity) which are unfalsified (or in this case unfalsifiable). You can, however, say that concepts that are unsupported by evidence have no validity (a 00 on the scale). Pink isn't so bad. My girlfriend manages to make it look quite good - though she tends to use hot pink rather than softer shades It seems we are in agreement that tentativity forces us to acknowledge that even incredibly unlikely possibilities are not proven impossible. However, I would still label those ideas as lacking any validity. For those that make specific assertions about objective reality (that is, {A} exists) but are unfalsifiable, I think that after reasonable investigation has been undertaken to search for possibly extant supporting evidence, it's acceptable to label the ideas as "invalid" if only slightly (for instance, I regard deities and ghosts as somewhere between 00 and -1 on the scale). More interestingly, I never claimed to have evidence of the absence of god/s. Absence of evidence is suggestive of absence when reasonable investigation ahs been undertaken, but is not actually evidence of absence. Perhaps you have me confused with a different atheist? My lack of belief is extremely tentative, and I say "there's no such thing as god/s" only because the absence of evidence after significant investigation is suggestive that no god/s exist, and I have no reason to think otherwise. And practically speaking, such considerations are nothing more than irrelevant navel-gazing. They are both unfalsifiable and unsupportable, and are no different from determining whether blue or green is the superior color (excepting that we actually know that the colors blue and green exist). I agree. When I speak of Creationism, I am typically referring to the young-Earth, special-Creation, global Flood version. And I have a laptop, but you still got my point. I agree with that as well. But I also think that some opinions are more valid than others. Clearly, while there are still today some people who believe the Earth is flat, their opinion is invalidated by evidence. Where no evidence exists (or can exist), the waters become more muddied. When someone proposes an unfalsifiable assertion with no supporting evidence, by default I tend toward thinking that the assertion has been completely fabricated because of the long and well-proven track record of human beings to do exactly that.I'm curious RAZD - where on the -10 to +10 scale would you place your confidence that god/s of some undefined form exist?