Pseudoskepticism and logic

Not necessarily, if he does not dismiss the evidence of something else. But your quote missed the point entirely (a reading comprehension issue I might add *you* have done before).Straggler points out that an explanation supported by objective evidence (in this case strongly, but I would include "at all") must be considered to be superior to any explanation that lacks objective evidence whatsoever. This is only bias in the sense of an inclination toward the truth. In these cases we have no particular inclination to expect such phenomenon to be objectively real; this does of course assume that you consider reality to be non-subjective. In a situation where objective evidence isn't possible such as the "beauty" of a statue, we conclude that the beauty of the statue is a subjective opinion. We have no indication that beauty is a quality that can be objectively observed, and we have no obligation to consider it a possibility unless someone can reasonably claim it is so. No it isn't. The burden of proof is to show that it provides a better explanation than the competing theories. Expecting objective proof of every circumstance, regardless of even their existence, is a ridiculous expectation.

Certainly, but when compared to an explanation that lacks *any* evidence to support it, *any* evidence in support of the other position fulfills that requirement.I doubt you will find any argument against the concept that theories provide evidence to back them up. I am confused as to what exactly you think is being debated.

This has once again become far too vague for more discussion.

RAZD, the default position is indeed the suspension of judgment when lacking any data. For instance: for a god that is consistent with our observations of reality and appears completely plausible to exist, yet lacking in any evidence of existence, it would be appropriate to suspend judgment as the truth is unknown. Straggler is not talking about that type of god, he is talking about one that lacks evidence to even think possible to exist; that is to say, a god that is supernatural.There is a point at which suspension of judgment becomes unreasonable. For example compare the difference between the unsubstantiated claim that there is a person in an adjacent room. We have no evidence indicating that there is, or is not, a person in the room so we truly cannot know one way or another. All we have is the claim, and depending on how much we trust the claimant would determine our reaction. Compare that example to the claim that there is a gargantuan dragon in the adjacent room. We again have no evidence supporting or disproving this claim, but the claim itself is implausible. Our experience and knowledge of the world suggests that dragons never existed, do not exist, *cannot* exist, and regardless would not fit in said room even if they did.The reasonable course of action would be to consistently not believe there is a dragon in the adjacent room. It is ludicrous to expect people to consistently operate on the assumption that *anything* could exist outside of their direct observation regardless of its confirmation to known reality. After all, don't you operate on the belief that there are not gnomes under your bed, even without looking? Don't you admit that this is reasonable, even though the lack of evidence proving that there are gnomes does not disprove the possibility of their existence under your bed?--Now, to spark further discussion I propose that there are some circumstances where pure skepticism is insufficient for practical application. For instance, I assume you are fairly confident there is not a live armadillo in your living room. Is this reasonable? After all, armadillos exist and could possibly be in such a location, despite you having made it extremely difficult for one to attain such a position. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to operate under the assumption that there is no armadillo and to usher guests into the room without even a cursory check for armored intruders.Surely this is the application of "absence of evidence" being used as "evidence of absence", and is illogical. Inevitably it seems someone would be wrong in making such an assumption. However, is this behavior *unreasonable*?

How about this: I am a 6 on that scale. My evidence to back this up is that every system of belief I have encountered that involves a god has either made predictions which reality fails to conform to, or is such that Occam's Razor strips out every important aspect. Reality is, to the best of my ability to determine, indistinguishable from one which does not contain a god. Therefore, it would be unreasonable of me to behave in a manner inconsistent with this conclusion until such time as solid evidence is presented to contradict it.So how about it RAZD? Does this "evidence" live up to your completely subjective concept of "acceptable", or would you consider my behavior unreasonable?

Given no compelling reason why your definition of god is any better than another, I would have to say your logic follows. Then the question is how stringent your requirements of my qualifications would be for you to be convinced. Is there anyone who would be qualified to convince you one way or the other, or have you locked yourself into 3-5 on the scale by definition? There are some things that you *must* assume. For instance, when you jump you cannot be sure that you will come down. It is not a *fact* because you cannot possibly have experimented in the future. You appear to be claiming that jumping with the expectation of coming down is illogical because you (or anyone else) cannot possibly be qualified to state it as a fact.

No, that isn't what it means. I am not rejecting evidence that provides a possibility of god/s, I am recognizing evidence to the contrary. If a theory makes predictions and they are correct, it is evidence that the theory is correct. If a theory makes predictions and they are incorrect, it is still evidence, just evidence that that particular theory is incorrect. I am not talking about "subjective evidence", whatever that means, I am talking about your subjective interpretation of what is "convincing" evidence. You appear to set the bar so high as to make reasonable conclusions about practically anything impossible, a conclusion that I do not share. First of all, no it is not a logical fallacy. You didn't state "All A is B", you stated "A = B"; that isn't descriptive, it is definitive. You defined "God" as "pink elephants", so they are interchangeable. The following "B, therefore A" is logically sound.The premise of pink elephants not existing was false, so the conclusion that pink elephants do not exist would similarly end up as being incorrect. However, that again is not what you concluded. You concluded that, lacking any knowledge to indicate that pink elephants exist, you do not believe that they exist. This is perfectly reasonable: At the most such a conclusion is agnostic to their existence. If you believed that things you have no knowledge of existing then you would be... well, you would be RAZD. I believe I have already provided that evidence; namely, if the evidence exists I believe in it. Perhaps it is more palatable if I described my position as a proponent of the evidenced reality, and only the evidenced reality. Isn't it clear? There exists evidence and none of it is in support of theism, so all evidence is atheistic by definition! It isn't a lack of evidence for theism that makes it atheistic, it is the lack of theism in the evidence that makes it atheistic.Edited by Phage0070, : adding an "ing"

That is why I added the bit about assuming your definition is as good as any other. I know you assumed the definition was not complete/correct when you made it, but I also hoped to make the point that you didn't have any evidence to conclude any other definition was more accurate. No, you simply did not say what you meant. If you had said "I describe god as being a pink elephant" then you would be correct, but you *defined* god as being a pink elephant. Those are different concepts, despite what you may think. For instance, suppose we define pachyderm as being an elephant (and only that, since we are making the whole of the definition right now). This means that every pachyderm is an elephant but also conversely, every elephant is also a pachyderm.By changing your definition of god to be a pink elephant it precludes the possibility of there being a pink elephant out there that is *not* a god; after all, it is *by definition* a god.

Somewhat, yes. For instance I would have to ask if it is your only definition of what a god could be, or if you considered it only one of many appropriate descriptions. I would retain the concept that non-belief in something that you have no compelling reason to believe exists is an appropriate reaction.However, I still fail to see how your proposed logical error would apply. A god which is described as a pink elephant still allows the possibility of pink elephants that are not gods (The quality of being a god, A, being fully encompassed by the superset B, pink elephants). But, if there are no pink elephants at all then it is impossible for a god described as being a pink elephant to exist (assuming the description is accurate, the non-existence of superset B would also make the subset A non-existent). For it to be a logical error there would have to be gods which do not conform to your description. Once again the question becomes the accuracy and validity of your description/definition rather than the logic involved.The question really comes down to if you, RAZD, consider it reasonable to not believe in something that you have no evidence to believe exists, and if it is appropriate to behave in a manner consistent with that belief. Yes, this is a direct question to which I would like a clear answer. I think this is needlessly snippy. I can only work with what you give me, and I suspect my debating an imagined version of what you might say rather than what you do say would be much more unacceptable to you. I would appreciate you not being annoyed with me when I am unable to distinguish what you meant from what you wrote.Edited by Phage0070, : Added a "no", without which I seemed loony!

This is difficult more in the sense of being able to form a single definition of god/s that is all inclusive, rather than demonstrating the improbability of it being real. However, I still maintain that demonstrating the improbability of something's existence is not required for non-belief. Are you truly only agnostic toward unevidenced concepts, even concepts that cannot have evidence to the contrary? For instance, suppose that I claim there is a thirty-foot wide, 150 foot deep chasm around where you are currently sitting/standing/whatever. This chasm is of course undetectable, and the only thing that will fall into it is you (and no testing with parts of your body, etc. it is all or nothing).My claim has no evidence to support it, but isn't impossible except in the sense that you have never heard of undetectable chasms before. Supposing you were not aware of its usefulness as a theoretical example, would you really behave as completely agnostic toward my claim? Would you perhaps get someone to carry you across the 30 feet "just in case" the roughly 50% chance you would plummet to your death, or would you judge the threat to your life as slim enough to ignore it?My question isn't if you think it exists or not, because as it is defined you cannot know one way or another. My question is about how you *behave*. If you behave as if the chasm does not exist then it is like an atheist behaving as if there is no god. The alternative is maintaining your position and claiming you are roughly 50% open to any concept lacking evidence to support it, which I doubt is your actual behavior.

Interestingly, providing made-up evidence to support the claim that people make things up seems poetically appropriate.

No, I don't. Human beings, despite superficial differences in culture, tend to have many of the same general concerns. This is the reason behind things like murder being shunned by society despite isolation preventing the communication of the idea, and it applies equally well in the case of imagined beings. Your observation of the bird, without independent corroboration, is indeed subjective. The conclusion (Birds are outside!) is overwhelmingly objectively evidenced, so the observation isn't unexpected.The claim that the chances of you making the observation up outweighs the evidence for you actually seeing it is ridiculous, especially when applied to Straggler's point. If you had a consistent history of making up fake sightings of birds then people might doubt your new sighting, even while maintaining that the conclusion is correct. Straggler maintains that such a history exists for mankind in general with regard to supernatural beings. The only way your point would make sense is if you are suggesting that mankind has a consistent history of claiming false sightings of birds, and does so with far more regularity than accurate sightings.

Think so? They both die, they both have moral standards their society expects them to maintain, they both have fear of the unknown.Also, Native Americans believe in a "spirituality" that is very different from the religion of Imperial Britain; for instance, Native American spirituality does not offer anything religious for sale, compared to say paying a priest to forgive sins. A Native American spirit does *not* perform the same role as the god of an Imperial Britain. Because for them it isn't murder if it is an outsider, it is protecting the tribe. Even our society shares the conviction that soldiers performing their duty are not murderers. The Amazon tribes would still would consider it bad to kill one of their own though, right? What stunning powers of debate. Truly I have been soundly refuted. Then color me confused, because it really seems that it does take that history into account. That history would be the indisputable objective evidence referenced in the quote.

As far as I know (please correct me if I am wrong), all cultures have a spoken language. Would you consider this to be proof that language is not a product of the human mind (or proto-human) and instead based in a fundamental quality of the universe? If so, how can you explain how they are so different in structure and use while maintaining some fundamental properties (distinction of subject, actions, speaker, etc..)?I think language and religion have some very instructive similarities in that they can be very different and develop completely independently, while still sharing some important features.

Nope, as I said that is not required for my position of non-belief. *You* are the person that keeps asking for my evidence of its improbability, I still consistently maintain that it is not required for my position. Of course, my claim is based on "subjective evidence" that requires some sort of sixth sense I am unable to explain. Seem familiar? Not so, you simply have evidence that you are unable to detect some pits. You also would need to revise your understanding of how pits operate. Right! That is the point of the example; you are unable to prove the non-existence of the pit, so by your logic you would need to remain in fear of it constantly. Wait for *what* other evidence? If the claim is true then not getting any evidence to support its existence would be consistent with the claim. On the contrary, I am delighted. The concept that you claim to be sitting next to your computer waiting for evidence that will never come, halfway open to the concept that a trip to the bathroom would kill you, is fulfilling in and of itself. That you will forever consider traversing that room a game of Russian Roulette tickles me to no end.