Euthypro Dilemna

A number of issues arise though.1. You might not consider it a problem that rape and murder could be morally good and charity could be morally evil but most people do.2. God is good is not a definition. It is a property that God has 'goodness'. It is kind of touched in the dialogue, but it is difficult to translate it to morality because the actual topic was piousness and gods don't be pious. Goodness could be defined as 'that which god approves of' which would be better.3. If it was carefully worded (getting around issue 2 above), it would be tautological and would tell us nothing about whether x is good under y conditions. Is it good to kill someone who is terminally ill or not? God knows (but we don't).4. It falls prey to the naturalistic fallacy (defining goodness in terms of a fact about the world - in this case things God has said or done).5. It leads to a potential paradox. If God commanded you to kill your neighbour then it would be 'good'. If God then damned you to an eternity of torture (death/separation whatever) because, in his words, 'you killed your neighbour which is evil' that would still be 'good'.Like Aquinas your argument is that it is a false dilemma since goodness is an essential characteristic of God which I agree raises some points. You might not consider them problems, as I indicated earlier - but they are there and many people find at least some of the bothersome.This all basically condensed and regurgitated from having just re-read the dialogue (it isn't that long so if you haven't already done so, give it a read - it's quite an entertaining exchange, quite similar to ones we see on forums today - including making excuses for avoiding the subject and attempting to exit the 'thread' gracefully ) and the wiki article about how it has been adapted and viewed over the millennia. Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

*Text deleted in edit*A follow up question might make things interesting and help understand the dilemma: Why does god say 'kill that tribe'? Is it because killing that tribe is good? Or is it essentially a reasonless 'whim'?Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

Actually, no. God can't have done it because it was good, since the only comparison for whether it was good or not is whether God has done it. God can't consult some external chart to see if killing the tribe is 'good'.Most people get a little uneasy with morality being defined by the whims of another. I say it again - if you don't feel that this is a problem then you won't feel the dilemma. If you are comfortable with 'just following orders' kind of amorolism then it won't bother you at all. I'm not using one. I'm asking you about yours. But why is God prepared to tolerate sin for only so long? Is it because doing so is good? Or is doing so good because God does so? That's only one element. The other is that it turns god into a whimsical being that doesn't do something because it is good, but just because it wants to and we are all obliged to be yes-men about it.

No 'because I wanted to' is not a reason. When someone asks why did you do 'x', 'because I wanted to' is a given. The question being asked is 'why did you want to do x?' If it is the only reason why, then it is whimsical - he killed the tribe for no other reason than a passing fancy or desire that he acted on. That's whimsy.If he did it because it was the moral thing to do - that would be excusable. Yes we do choose what standard of good to follow. Except God. Who doesn't do things according to a standard of morality, according to you. How could you possibly determine if god's standard is best of all? Surely not by some standard of 'goodness' - because that would be circular madness. When I am talking about good - I am talking about your understanding of it. Not for you, no. As I've said several times. And if you are happy with a whimsical god too - then it would seem there is no dilemma for you at all. So you agree there is no actual moral reason for Yahweh to tolerate sin for only so long? You don't need a definition for what I mean by 'good'. You seem to agree that God does not do something because doing that something is 'good'.As Plato/Socrates might say: you know that an object is carried because someone carries it. Not that someone carries an object because it is carried.So is an action good because god does it as opposed to god doing the action because it is good? You've misunderstood. I was merely expressing that what God says goes and we don't have any choice in that.Besides we are obliged to be yes-men in the sense you described. As with any obligation we can break it and there will be consequences. If someone puts a gun at my head and tells me to give them my money, I could refuse...but most people would agree that I was being forced to give them my money nevertheless.

I assume then, that you don't bother reading the Holy Bible?

Iano,
I said earlier that 'Like Aquinas your argument is that it is a false dilemma since goodness is an essential characteristic of God'. And if you are comfortable with defining 'good' as 'that which is good', and going no further then as I have said, you won't feel any sense of dilemma.For other people, struggling to know what is the 'right' thing to do when faced with a loved one who is going to suffer a painful drawn out death and begs to be released painlessly...that isn't much help."The right thing to do is what God would do."
"And what would God do?"
"The right thing." Indeed. God is like a bank robber with something in his pocket. It might be a banana or it might be a gun. And the lights are off, so the robber might not even be there. Sometimes the darkness gives the bank teller a bout of paranoia and they worry that there is a robber out there with a gun. In fact only the unverifiability of the robber's non-existence suggests that it might be there.When the teller decides to act in accordance with his duties, or out of care for their friends, family and dependants and not hand over their employer's money to a stranger that might be a robber...the teller gets shot in the face. And this is good: after all the teller accepted the consequences for not believing there was a robber with a gun.Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

I'm glad you agree it is nonsense. And what God will is what is good. So if the two are synonymous we can substitute them.good = what God wills.Thereforewhat God wills = good.Therefore 'good is that which God wills' means the same as 'good is that which is good' which means the same as 'what God wills is that which God wills'.Which as you say is a 'nonsense definition'. But you seem happy with that. You should probably read the dialogue. The central thrust of it is that Socrates wants a definition of piety, or morality so that he can tell the court that what he did was moral or confess his guilt and beg forgiveness.You would be unable to help Socrates. Either I know there is a gun pointed at my head or I don't. I first implied that I did, but you corrected me. So which is it? Am I compelled to obey god like a man with a gun pointed at his head or am I not?Do I know the consequences or don't I? If I do then I am obliged like a man being robbed. If I don't then I am obliged like a blind man being robbed by a silent thief that never touches him.

Nope. Cats, dogs, cows, crocodiles, flies with mishaps are all four legged creatures that are not dogs. We cannot say that four legged creature is synonymous with a dog. You, however are defining good in terms of god and god in terms of good and that's why you have arrived at this nonsense definition.You'd have done better to say 'tetrapod'. Still the correct wording would be:A tetrapod is something with four legs.
A leg is something a tetrapod has four of.Here we are defining legs in terms of tetrapods. So all we are actually saying here is that a four legged thing is a four legged thing. It is meaningless. If we only had some independent meaning of the word 'leg' to refer to we'd know what a tetrapod actually was. No - but I think not knowing the consequences will mean you could well choose wrong (especially if they are important consequences). If I didn't know I was being robbed and that by not giving my money to that stranger he will shoot me, I will likely choose wrong (I won't give him my money and I'll get shot). I could choose to give my money to all strangers I pass by in an attempt to not fall foul of this eventuality, but that would considered foolish (though maybe virtuous if my reason was 'because I want to help people').

You'll need to be rigorous. I gave you a better example. You can do the same thing with genetic codes and the like if you want, but it is the same as the tetrapod/leg argument. It is a nonsense definition if you define both sides of the equation in terms of the other side of the equation. If you defined 'this genetic coding' with 'the coding that is posessed by a dog' then we would still have no idea what a dog is or what 'this genetic code' was.You have insisted that this setup be true from the getgo (that each side is defined in terms of the other) - so you are stuck with a consequence that you admit is basically nonsense. But good is defined in terms of God and God is defined in terms of 'good'. This ends up with a nonsense definition. Much like when we defined tetrapods in terms of legs and legs in terms of tetrapods. When I say 'right choice' I mean 'the choice I would have made had I had all the information at my disposal'. I don't have the information at my disposal, so I can't make the 'right choice'. As long as we're clear on that, that's all I was saying.Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

Assuming that everything that Good is in accord with Gods Will and that everything that is accordance with Gods Will is Good then you haven't escaped the conundrum, just reworded it. It still means the same thing as 'that which is good is good' or 'That which is Gods will is Gods Will'.It would be like saying 'This is Coke' and someone asking 'What is?', "This collection of Chumbra, Rhumbra and Chrumba I hold in my hand". 'What on earth is Chumbra, Rhumbra and Chrumba?', comes the reply. "Coke', the answer. So 'this thing that is Coke is Coke'? Thanks, great work there.I'd like to know, what motivates god to do as he does? Are we agreed that he doesn't do things because they are the right thing to do?

No. AKA doesn't change anything. It's the same thing using different words. Right, and in Coke we are talking about Coke also being known as 'Chumbra, Rhumbra and Chrumba' because those are the names for the ingredients that the CEO of Coke has come up with.Coke = God's will.
Chumbra, Rhumbra and Chrumba = good.If you want you could also add 'Krfumpa' and define it as everything that doesn't go into Coke. It doesn't change things I'm afraid. So he does the things he does because he wants to do the things he does?Sounds useless to me.The definition of 'nature' here is probably important, and I think you show the flaws in your definition: Well, technical point I don't hate paedophilia. I do hate child abuse, so I'll roll with that instead.What motivates my actions and reactions to child abuse? The fact that I consider it morally wrong.This is not an answer, as I think you agree, that God can give. So we're agreed on that much. So he doesn't do it because it's what he does (or at least, that means nothing so we ignore that). He doesn't do it because it is morally right. So why does he do it?

OK - I agree that ultimately all language is somewhat circular - but there are some definitions which, as you agreed are 'nonsensical'.A more useful definition would be something that wasn't just examples. A more general principle so that a novel situation can be analysed so that we can decide if an action is good or not based on some overarching principle or criteria.Perhaps an example will show you.It can be argued that God killed people and that we should be cool with this because it was toward some end (he caused Jesus to die to relieve suffering or to pay a ransom or whatever). So it is moral to kill someone toward some end (since it God did it it must be good). But not all ends.
So to which ends?
If Jesus died to relieve the suffering of all of mankind by providing salvation, does that mean it is morally good to kill someone to relieve the suffering of one person? Or does it have to be two people? What if the suffering person is the one that is killed? What if it was to relieve the suffering of a million people?One method might be to put yourself in the shoes of every person affected by the decision and see if in that position you would still be happy with the consequences. If you were one of those that had to die, would you agree with the decision? If it were a loved one that had to die? A sort of categorical imperative as it were.Now, even if we regard 'good' as being 'God's will' or not - this gives us a way of knowing what it actually is. It gives us something to go on as to what in this world is 'good'.A more Christian example might underscore the point, and you might argue it is a Christian phrasing of the same imperative outlined above.Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.Extrapolating your position here is how I see you arguing:

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It is God's will that thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself - therefore it is good. Which is what I've been saying all along.

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But I remind you that this is nonsense. It is fine to say

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It is God's will that thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself

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and

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It is good to love thy neighbour as thyself

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OK.So we can define a certain moral philosophy as being 'God's will' and we can define God's will to be 'good'.Somebody presents this moral philosophy and I ask "Why should I love my neighbour as myself?"
You would have to answer, ultimately,
"The reason is because if you don't follow it there will be negative consequences after you die."Now - this strikes at a certain grammatical ambiguity surrounding 'why'. There are at least two ways to answer this question:Motivation: What is my motivation for doing that? (Oh yeah? Why should I?)
Justification: What is the purpose for or reasoning behind that? (Why is that the way things are?)I'm really asking the latter. So what is the justification for imploring us to loving our neighbours? Why is this something god saw fit to instruct us to do? To what end? But I don't know what you mean by 'nature'. If you say that an aspect of God's nature is love then I have to ask, love of what? It sounds like you are going to end up saying that God loves God's actions.Yes - why is God the way God is. Exactly. Is there some principle he is drawing upon or is it ultimately without reason? Yeah - I don't think answering me with another meaningless tautology is going to help, I'm afraid. If I asked a man why he killed another man and he says 'I wanted to'
and I ask 'Why?',
'Because it's my nature to want to'
'And what is that nature?'
'I am what I am'I've not learned any information surrounding why he killed another man. No. I was using it specifically to separate it from your concept of 'evil'. 'Evil' is that which god finds abhorrent. Morally Wrong are the the things I find abhorrent. And I can provide justifications as to why I feel they are abhorrent. Can God?And what about his nature means he hates when things don't go his way? I'm assuming it isn't 'pettiness'. Maybe so - but the reason I separated it out is because I can give justification for hating it. I'm asking if we know if God can justify hating it. So ultimately none of it has any meaning? There is no rhyme or reason that exists for doing good things? Ultimately the answer to question to
"What is a good way to live?"
is
"To do what is in our nature."And in a nutshell that's the problem. The question is 'what is good' doesn't really get answered, we never find out what the point of goodness is. Trying to understand the nature of good, you just replace it with the question of trying to understand the nature of god and then traditionally there follows gesticulating and spooky noises or a proverbial finger wagging.

That's not the kind of thing I was talking about. I can't apply the aka argument in practical everyday situations, can I? But it helps us to understand the essence of goodness. We can determine whether or not an action is good based on it. We cannot determine whether or not an action is good based on your argument because it is immediately circular it provides us with nothing.Unless you want to argue that it is impossible to convey information using language? I keep giving an example that you keep ignoring, perhaps for perfectly valid reasons. Might I suggest we explore it though, since it might make my point clearer.If I am deciding whether or not euthanising an elderly relative how do I decide if it is a good thing to do?
Whether or not it is gods will!
How can we know what god's will is?
Because god's will has a 'good' flavour to it.
And how do I know what a good flavour is?
Whatever is God's Will has a good flavour.You see how it proves difficult to go anywhere here?To put it in Socrates' terms, you have just given me an attribute of 'good' (that it is also known as God's will) but you haven't given me the essence of the term itself. As a direct paraphrase

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Thus you appear to me, iano, when I ask you what is the essence of goodness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence-the attribute of being also known as God's Will. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of goodness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what 'good' really is, whether or not it is also known as God's will.

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I truly understand what you are saying. I'm just saying that it doesn't tell us anything useful and therefore doesn't answer the actual question, but answers a different question.You are answering the question 'What else can we call 'good'?'. I'm not worried about that, since it is just a word. I'm asking to understand what the word means. I'm trying to anticipate what I think is your best argument here. I'm trying to figure out if an action is good. Simply saying that there other words we can use in place of the word 'good' doesn't tell us what 'good' actually is. The correct moral justification for loving your neighbour depends on your metaphysical beliefs? That's a remarkable thing to claim. It's not clear to me. Explain. Why should a believer love their neighbour? I'm afraid that statement is a statement of a moral philosophy. So they should (try to) love their neighbours to prove they can't perfectly do so. But why 'love their neighbours'? Ultimately because that's what God does, or wills or whatever. But why does God will 'love one's neighbours'? Is there some property in loving one's neighbours that God uses to determine that is something he wants us to do? Or is it just happenstance? That isn't justification for loving neighbours. That's motivation. Our motivation is our sense of obedience to the Creator that he is entitled to (I've already commented on my problems with the 'obligation theory' so I'll refrain from going there again). But why 'love thy neighbour' and not 'build a house made of seashells'? What is it about neighbour loving that makes God Will it and why does God not Will that we build marinelife based abodes?

I'm not looking for examples of 'good'. I was asking what makes a thing 'good'. I was asking what makes a thing 'willed by God'. I was asking for an answer to both of those questions at once without each other being used as an answer. If I knew what the good thing to do was, I'd know what the good thing to do was. It can be seen as a negative thing, and a good thing. Yes it is different. So intentions have some contribution to whether it is good or not? But knowing that intention to do good can make one act good where an intention to not do good can make an act bad doesn't help me. What if the calculating move to wrest the inheritance from an aunt was to secure the funds to give to charity? Is intention the biggie? Does one just have to believe that what one is doing is good for it to be 'good'? If Hitler (our old standby) earnestly believed that what he did was 'good' and was the desire of God - do you think that what he did could be considered 'morally good'?I would have thought that it would still be considered morally bad, but because Hitler's motivations were good, God would forgive him. I don't think that's true of Plato's use of the terms. I still don't know if euthanising my wealthy and suffering aunt is good. On the one hand you say suffering isn't inherently bad. On the other hand if you suggest it is good if it is motivated by God's will. That is it is good if it is motivated by good. How do I know if it is motivated by good/God's will or not? If I can't use suffering as a guide, what should I look to? It seems that you are saying here that goodness can be described in terms of your position in a war. So God wills us to pick the kingdom of God's side. So if we are deciding over euthanasia, how do we know which is congruent with the aims of the kingdom of God?

Hi Iano,
I still don't know what good is. It seems you are basically shrugging your shoulders on the issue.As near as I can tell God wills us to love our neighbour as a tactic in some ambiguous war. I'm not sure how this works, and I have no way of being able to determine what any given tactic's effect on the war effort will be.To paraphrase Socrates again

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Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of good and evil; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Iano, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.

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At best we have learned that the word 'good' is redundant, and it has merely been replaced with another phrase 'god's will' and that this is focussed towards the aforementioned war.