I've browsed this thread a couple of times, but haven't really gotten into it yet.
What steps would you take to identify a false religion?
I would start with false beliefs.
The world is not flat - any belief that the world is flat is falsified by evidence that proves it is a false belief.
The world is not the center of the universe - any belief that the world is center of the universe is countered by evidence that shows that the earth orbits the sun, and the sun orbits the center of this galaxy, and the galaxy is moving in space, showing that this is a false belief.
The earth is very old - any belief that the world is not very old is falsified by evidence that proves it is a false belief.
The universe is even older - any belief that the universe is not extremely old is falsified by evidence that proves it is a false belief.
There has not been one universal world wide flood - any belief that there was a world wide flood is falsified by evidence that demonstrates that it is a false belief.
That is just some examples of false beliefs.
Whether believing one or more of these means that one's religion is false, however, is a different matter: if these beliefs are inconsequential to the core beliefs of the religion, and those core beliefs are not contradicted by evidence, then those core beliefs of the religion per se can be (tentatively considered) valid.
However, if the religion depends on the validity of core beliefs that are falsified, then that religion is probably false (in whole or in part).
Beyond that, I don't believe that there is any way to tell how valid an untested (not invalidated) belief may be, and if the religion is founded on such untested (not invalidated) beliefs then there is no way I can see to gauge the validity of the religion.
quote:
4. Logic: a.Containing premises from which the conclusion may logically be derived: a valid argument. b.Correctly inferred or deduced from a premise: a valid conclusion.
It's just something that may be true if the premises are true (not invalidated). If the premises are not disproven, then the conclusion may be (tentatively considered) true.
In addition, a religion is usually (in my experience) composed of more than one specific belief, but on a structure that ties many beliefs together. Thus the reason to believe {inset religion here} does not usually lie in one specific belief.
No. If those beliefs are inconsequential to the core beliefs of the religion, and those core beliefs are not contradicted by evidence, then those core beliefs can be tentatively considered not disproved.
You can believe this, of course, for this is just your opinion. Curiously, being opinion doesn't make it correct, but it is a valid opinion if it is not contradicted by fact -- IMHO.
Of course, by your own argument, it isn't reasonable to tentatively consider your belief to be true, based on the fact that it hasn't been invalidated. Have fun with that.
Now - perhaps - we (including bluegenes) can discuss the topic, rather than rehash old battles that are off-topic here.
The lack of evidence to the contrary is not in and of itself a reason to believe a claim.
Interestingly, I did not say that just because something has not been invalidated means you must consider it true (this is the pink unicorn fallacy of course), just that you may consider it (tentatively) true, and thus that it is not unreasonable if someone does believe it.
Such a belief is not a false belief, because it has not been invalidated. A host of such beliefs (ie a religion) pointing to the same general conclusion is sufficient for many people to consider their beliefs valid.
Any religion that does not incorporate any falsified beliefs, cannot be considered (identified) de facto a false religion, on the basis of available evidence.
But any religion that relies heavily on one or more falsified beliefs is fair game, and the more falsified beliefs are involved, the worse it is.
Personally, I consider any fundamentalist form of "young earth" creationism to be a falsified religion. Note that this does not mean that christianity, islam, etc, are false religions, just the fundamentalist splinter sects that insist on believing a false belief in a young earth.
Re: false beliefs - do they add up to false religion?
Ah, Phage0070, we have been over this.
If you don't understand this, it is no wonder you are a theist.
Is this supposed to be an ad hominem ? I didn't realize that just being a theist was a bad thing.
Or is it just a poor argument from consequences?
Following the thread of logic, discussing the topic is impossible if you are going to insert untrue premises. A wildly incorrect view of logic makes any response you might offer on the topic pointless to discuss.
Poisoning the Well fallacy?
No, it may not, at least not on those ground alone. For instance:
Premise 1: The IPU is invisible. Premise 2: The IPU is pink. Premise 3: The IPU is a unicorn. Premise 4: The IPU exists. Conclusion: An invisible, pink unicorn known as the IPU exists.
This is a valid argument. It has no premises which are disproved. However, those elements are NOT enough to tentatively consider the conclusion true.
Congratulations on repeating the IPU fallacy ... again ...
Those elements are not enough to say that you must consider the conclusion true, certainly, but they are also not anywhere near enough to tentatively or otherwise consider the conclusion false either.
Amusingly, therefore, if someone wants to believe in the IPU, this shows that such a belief is not unreasonable.
Following the thread of logic, discussing the topic is impossible if you are going to insert untrue premises. A wildly incorrect view of logic makes any response you might offer on the topic pointless to discuss.
Curiously, I am not the one that posted a self contradicting opinion about the validity of belief.
... A valid argument could be made for something that has solid evidence to the contrary, simply by including untrue premises. ...
And interestingly, just because arguments with untrue premises can be valid, does not mean that that arguments with premises that have not been invalidated cannot be valid.
No, that isn't what "valid" means in the context of logic. A logically valid argument is one where the conclusion follows from the premises. A valid argument could be made for something that has solid evidence to the contrary, simply by including untrue premises. Evidence to the contrary is therefore irrelevant to determining the logical validity of an argument.
Intriguingly, what I said was:
quote: It's just something that may be true if the premises are true (not invalidated). If the premises are not disproven, then the conclusion may be (tentatively considered) true.
... and the definition provided in Message 103 shows that a conclusion is valid if (a) the form is properly constructed and (b) if the premises, taken as true in the argument, lead to the conclusion.
This does not mean (I repeat) that the conclusion is proven , just that it is valid.
A logically valid argument is one that may be (tentatively considered) true if the premises are not known to be false.
No, it is not reasonable to consider something true if a logically valid argument can be presented to prove it, and there is no contradictory evidence.
Again, YOU consider this statement true even though you have no evidence to prove it, it is just your opinion. Repeating your opinion does not prove it is true either. Curiously, the fact remains, that this statement means that this statement cannot itself be considered reasonable. Have fun with that.
Now do you want to continue with the topic, or continue to wallow in mud slinging?
Re: false beliefs - do they add up to false religion?
So you wallow in mud, ah well Phage0070, that's your choice.
We can go on and on, and you will continue to choose to misunderstand, because you have your opinions that you think are true, even though your "test" for reasonable arguments invalidates itself.
You just said it in the first paragraph, and then completely ignore it in the second.
"May" is not "must" -- please read.
Now let's see if you can focus on the topic rather than attack the messenger.
Do you or do you not agree that holding false beliefs means that a religion is questionable at best?
Is this or is this not a valid test for determining whether a specific religion may be false.
failed old arguments are still failed old arguments
Hi bluegenes
Are you disagreeing with the point that your statement would be very odd coming from someone who claims to be a "completely impartial agnostic" on the age of the earth?
Which just goes to show that you didn't pay attention to the previous argument that you dredged this up from. It was fairly evident to me that you seemed unable\unwilling to understand the concept involved because it ran counter to your pet beliefs\worldview.
It is fascinating to see the behavior of people that run into cognitive dissonance.
The topic on this thread is Identifying false religions .
Now, my first post on this topic presented a relatively simple concept for testing when a religion may be false - or at least suspect - when it holds one or more beliefs that have been falsified by science.
Curiously, the fact that these beliefs have been falsified by science has absolutely nothing to do with my personal beliefs one way or the other.
Amazingly, it seems that people would rather revive their old failed arguments with me than discuss the topic. Sad.
Do you want to discuss the topic?
Do you agree that any belief that is falsified makes the religion that depends on such a belief suspect?
The strange thing is that the two of you are agreeing vociferously past each other.
Agreed, and I have tried to point this out.
You seem to be saying 'that an idea has not been falsified means the belief is valid'.
As was established on several other threads,
when there is no invalidating evidence then there is a possibility that a concept may be true, and
when there is no validating evidence then there is the possibility that a concept may be false:
either position is rational (not contradicted by evidence), and
what you decide to believe about the concept being true or false is based on your personal worldview and opinions, not on facts (for you don't have any).
You may believe the concept is true, you may believe it is false, or you may believe that you do not need to decide at this time (and wait for further evidence). Whichever way you go, however, it is a belief based on personal opinion.
Could you explain what you mean by 'valid belief'?
Interestingly, this thread is not about identifying true religions, but false ones.
Therefore the emphasis should be on what are invalid beliefs, and how they affect religions that incorporate them in various degrees.
The point I made in the original post here:
quote:
What steps would you take to identify a false religion?
I would start with false beliefs.
The world is not flat - any belief that the world is flat is falsified by evidence that proves it is a false belief.
The world is not the center of the universe - any belief that the world is center of the universe is countered by evidence that shows that the earth orbits the sun, and the sun orbits the center of this galaxy, and the galaxy is moving in space, showing that this is a false belief.
The earth is very old - any belief that the world is not very old is falsified by evidence that proves it is a false belief.
The universe is even older - any belief that the universe is not extremely old is falsified by evidence that proves it is a false belief.
There has not been one universal world wide flood - any belief that there was a world wide flood is falsified by evidence that demonstrates that it is a false belief.
That is just some examples of false beliefs.
Now, do you agree that any religion that depends on one or more false beliefs, beliefs that have been invalidated by contradictory evidence, is suspect at best, or false itself at worse (to the degree it is based on false beliefs)?
I understand what the topic is, but I though would have more to contribute than 'we can identify false religions by finding religions which rely on empirically falsified notions' - but it seems not.
Well, yes, trivially.
So we have a starting point. Mind you, this holds for any belief set on any philosophical topic that is outside the realms of science (and scientific testability) - presuming that we start there (having accepted the validity of scientific knowledge that is based on evidence and testing and validation).
This does not tell you what {belief/s|notion/s|religion/s|philosophies} may be true, only ones that are suspect at best, or false at worse (to the degree they are based on false beliefs).
But you suggest that where there is support for or against the notion, then either believing it or not are both rational? What do you mean by 'rational' here? Merely 'not falsified'?
Did you miss a negative? Where there is no evidence for, nor against, a notion, then we don't know, we can't know, we don't have enough information to know. One can have an opinion about whether the notion is true or false, and as long as one recognizes that it is opinion based on belief\worldview, and not a conclusion based on fact, that is okay with me.
Logically, it seems to me, it is equally rational to think that X may be tentatively considered to possibly be true, as it is to think that X may be tentatively considered to possibly be false, due to the lack of evidence on which to base a logical decision: all you have either way is opinion based on belief\worldview.
The truly rational position, of course is that we don't know, we can't know because we don't have enough information to know, and therefore cannot decide the truth or falseness of the notion/s ... and thus any decision made must necessarily be opinion, and must be held as a tentative possibility at best.
... assuming, of course, that the {belief/s|notion/s|etc} form a logically valid and consistent argument.
This would bring us to a second test for false religions: inherent logical contradictions, and logical fallacies within a specific belief should also render that specific belief suspect at best, or false at worse, and likewise any religion that depends on one or more logically invalid beliefs, beliefs that have been invalidated by self contradiction or that are logical fallacies, is suspect at best, or false itself at worse (to the degree it is based on false beliefs).
If there is a wealth of objective evidence in favour of a competing theory then it is quite obviously rational to give that explanation more credence than an unevidenced explanation. No matter how unfalsifiable the unevidenced explanation may be. Do you actually disagree with this?
Same old same old same old message. And if there is no evidence?
Failure to acknowledge this fact will leave you in your usual position of being confronted with a collection of questions regarding the unfalsifiable concepts that you loathe so much but have no actual answers to.
Which I have already answered, and it still appears that you can't accept the answer: amusingly you even quote it here:
quote:The truly rational position, of course is that we don't know, we can't know because we don't have enough information to know, and therefore cannot decide the truth or falseness of the notion/s ... and thus any decision made must necessarily be opinion, and must be held as a tentative possibility at best.
Why must it be purely opinion? Why can conclusions that lack absolute certainty not be evidence based? In fact is that not the norm? Are not all evidence based conclusions necessarily made on the basis of incomplete evidence and thus tenative to some degree anyway?
Because we start with the fact\precept that there is no evidence one way or the other in this specific case. Without evidence it cannot be "evidence based" no matter what you think about it.
That means that any decision you make must be opinion. You have yours. Curiously we all know that opinion is not able to affect reality in any way, and thus - logically, rationally - one should never pretend that their opinion is actually true, ... but with an absence of contradictory evidence, it is rational (but not strictly logical) to tentatively conclude the possibility of truth. This is what you do with your examples of "undetectable gravity gnomes" and other examples: you form an opinion, and you act on that opinion.
Now, interestingly, the topic on this thread is "how to identify false religions" and it would appear that this should be right up your alley.
Perhaps you can show how your system identifies false religions?
Well you're closer than Straggler ever got, now let's complete the thought.
Is it then down to personal opinion to even suggest the possible identity of the murderer?
You will note that I did not say that you must make a decision (and in fact many times have asked why some people seem to need to make a decision even when there is insufficient evidence), just that if you do that then you need to accept that it is an opinion based on belief and worldview, and not on evidence. Certainly, in a case of murder I would argue that a decision not be made unless there were sufficient evidence.
Assuming an actual vacuum of evidence (while I don't think any such thing exists, I can debate a hypothetical...), what reason could you have for pulling one or even several ceonceivable hypotheses and estimating their probability to be higher than any other conceivable hypothesis?
Which is why an agnostic position -- that we don't know is the logical rational conclusion ... as I have said many times.
Many people suggest that a murder has occurred. However, there is no evidence of a murder to be found - no bloody knife, no discharged firearm, no body, no signs of a struggle, etc. Assume that we have some hundreds of thousands of people without solid alibis; the hypotheses that each (or several) could have committed the murder have not been falsified.
Again, if you don't have sufficient evidence to form a logical conclusion, then the logical answer is that we don't know, we can't know, because we don't have the evidence to know.
Let's try another exercise. I have a 6-sided die. It is conceivable that any side could come up on top when the die is rolled, and no possible result is falsified. Is it rational to say, "I think that the die will most likely come up as 6; I believe 6 will be the result"? If all of the hypotheses are equally possible, are all logically consistent, none have been falsified, and there is no evidence to differentiate one from the other, is it rational to estimate one possible result as more likely?
And again, the logical conclusion, the rational position, is that you don't know, you can't know, because you don't have the evidence to know.
When you say "I believe..." you are actually saying "I estimate this particular hypothesis to have a higher probability of accuracy than all competing hypotheses; I think this one is the most likely." How is it possible to claim rationality or even logical consistency when estimating one possible hypothesis to be more likely than other competing hypotheses in a dearth of evidence?
Now explain this point to Straggler and bluegenes, and anyone else that believes that there is a higher likelihood that the atheist position is true.
As I have said before, the logical position is agnostic: that we don't know, that we can't know, because we don't have enough evidence to know.
Message 124: The irrationality lies in saying that 7 is more likely even though the actual probability that 7 will be the result is identical to the other possibilities.
RAZD's irrationality doesn't necessarily lie in believing that an unlikely possibility is the most likely (though that's still a far cry from confidently saying that the unlikely possibility is likely to reflect reality...).
Hi irrationality lies in selecting one of many equally probable or improbable possibilities and saying "this one is more likely because it's personally preferable to me."
So then it is a good thing - in your opinion - that I don't actually do that, yes? Perhaps you should restrict your claims about what I say to actual quotes, rather than make stuff up.
If I roll 20-sided dice, each possible result has a 5% chance - far more than once chance in an infinite set. It would be irrational in the extreme to say "the dice will come up as a 7, because I like 7." The chance that it will be 7 is exactly the same that it will be 8, or 12, or 20.
But you can say that one of the numbers will come up, yes? The probability of winning a lottery is small, but the probability that a lottery will be won is high.
...
...
Well, now that we have covered this topic once again, so everyone can have had their say and make their pet pronouncements of what they believe is true, perhaps we can get on with the topic:
If an actual probability analysis shows that all of the competing hypotheses are equally probable (regardless of how likely or unlikely they are), what reason do you have for then inflating the probability of one of those equally likely hypotheses in your own mind?
Does this argument provide you with a test to determine whether or not a specific religion is false?
It seems to me, curiously, that all you have is, that it would be your opinion (based on your own argument of not having evidence one way or the other), that it is probable that the (fill in this blank with your favorite) religion is false because it is one of many.
Somehow that is not much of a test, would you not agree?
So we can (finally) scrap the "it's made up" concept as unworkable?
Hi Straggler,
Still having trouble with the basic concept of agnosticism I see.
... nothing other than a rehash of your much stated and discredited demands for disproof.
Amusingly it is only in your mind that it is discredited ... perhaps because you are one that specifically has failed again and again to provide evidence to support your position, and yet fail to see that this failure means your position is highly suspect, at best.
Will you agree that disproving unfalsifiable god concepts is an unnecessary step in determining whether or not a religion is probably false?
Why should I agree to something that is purely your opinion? Especially when I think your opinion is wrong on this issue?
The fact that unfalsifiability makes it difficult for you to decide whether god/s may or may not exist is not my problem.
No amount of evidence favouring human invention can ever in practise actually disprove the existence of any concept envisaged to be empirically irrefutable.
In other words, you agree that your much vaunted "evidence favouring [in your opinion] human invention" is incapable of helping to determine whether a specific religion is false or even suspect.
This does not surprise me, as I have noted before that it is useless in demonstrating what you think it demonstrates.
I'm glad to see you agree that this inability makes your "evidence" useless in such practical applications.
Does this have any significant bearing on our conclusion as to whether or not this particular entity actually exists?
Is it critically important to you that a conclusion absolutely must be reached regarding the Easter Bunny?
In the interest of furthering this topic (rather than rehash what has already been rehashed enough), I would say that where we would most need to identify false religions is where beliefs become dangerous to society -- fundamentalist terrorist bomb behavior, cult behavior, and the like. I don't see the Easter Bunny or Santa Claus being major issues here (and these are more like folk tales than religions per se eh?)
Nor do I see - if the only issue is disproving unfalsifiable god/s - that the unfalsifiablity issue is even a minor concern.
So far, at least as far as I can tell, there seems to be agreement that two tests we have for false religions are:
that there are a number of beliefs that are contradicted by empirical evidence of reality, and the truth of these beliefs are held to be critical to the religion (flat earth, young earth, etc), and
that there are a number of beliefs that are contradicted by other beliefs from the same religion, and the truth of these beliefs are held to be critical to the religion.
Let me introduce you to the concept of the random hypothesis. Hypothesis: A god did it. That is a random explanatory hypothesis of the universe. It is random because it is completely baseless, and has no scrap of positive evidence to support it.
Excellent.
Hypothesis: No god did it.
That is a random explanatory hypothesis of the universe. It is random because it is completely baseless, and has no scrap of positive evidence to support it.
Atheists are people who see no reason to believe in that particular random hypothesis, ...
Yet, amusingly, by your own logic you see no reason to believe no god did it.
On the topic, any individual religion can be considered to be very unlikely to be true. They are all random baseless hypotheses about the world.
Except that this is just your opinion, and one that contravenes your own logic here. You have no evidence on which to base an iota of an inkling of how likely or unlikely it is, and therefore you have no reason to believe that it is unlikely.
Unfortunately, for you as well, as far as the topic goes, your personal opinion is not a test of how valid a religion is. That you personally believe that all religions are highly suspect at best, only means you have a narrow mind on this topic: your opinion does not affect reality in any way.
Now do you have a test that relies on something other than your (useless) opinion?
back up and try again, how can assumed "probability" be a test for false religion?
Hi Rahvin,
Yet curiously you feel it's appropriate to believe in a deity. Why are you comfortable making a decision given inadequate evidence to distinguish amongst multiple equally probable hypotheses in one scenario, but not in another?
Please see Straggler's compendious summary of my actual position (gosh he is learning to use quoted statements rather than try to paraphrase ... small miracles do happen) in Message 131:
quote:Actually RAZ has declared himself to be a faith based agnostic with a deistic opinion. So RAZ is an agnostic deist. Here we see that he is an agnostic with deistic leanings based on subjective "evidence". Being bound by the limits of logic and reason as he is RAZ continues to state that he is an agnostic with a desitic opinion founded on subjective evidence. Here he re-expresses his deistic opinion.
RAZD writes: As a result of the logical analysis we have: 1. Absolute Theist: knows god/s exist. (logically invalid position) 2. Strong Theist: the existence of god/s is more likely than not. (logically invalid position) 3. Weak Theist: the existence of god/s is possible, maybe likely, but not sure. (logically valid position) 4. Agnostic: god/s may exist or they may not, there is insufficient evidence to know one way or the other. (logically valid position) 5. Weak Atheist: the non-existence of gods is possible, maybe likely, but not sure. (logically valid position) 6. Strong Atheist: the non-existence of god/s is more likely than not. (logically invalid position) 7. Absolute Atheist: knows that god/s do not exist. (logically invalid position) Message 91
...
So you see, I am consistent in stating that anything other than pure agnostic is based on opinion when there is an absence of evidence pro or con. Faith (of any kind) is a (personal) opinion.
Sadly, for you, this deconstructs most of your post: you are arguing against a straw man.
Why are you incapable of recognizing that an absence of evidence always adds a higher probability to the hypothesis of absence than to any other possibility, and therefore the hypotheses with the highest probability of accuracy are that no murder ever occurred, and that gods do not exist?
To be clear, concise, precise, and specific: you are claiming that the absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
Point 1: curiously, when I stated that this is as part of atheistic belief waaaaaay back a long time ago, a large number of (angry) atheists said it was presumptuous (to put it kindly) than anyone would claim this for any atheist. It amuses me every time I see it claimed.
Point 2: this is a logical fallacy (which is why the previous angry responses when I point this out at that time).
This is the position of the agnostic atheist: we can't know for sure, but it's more probable that no gods exist.
No, you're weaseling there: the truly agnostic atheist cannot judge the probability and knows it, it is his opinion that no gods exist, and he recognizes that it is just opinion.
As soon as you make a statement about the probability you are making a claim based on opinion and without evidence.
Please take note of #6 on the above scale:
6. Strong Atheist: the non-existence of god/s is more likely than not. (logically invalid position).
Here you have made the irrational assumption that you know something you do not know in order to "calculate" the degree of probability: you assume that you know the actual possibilities.
This is your opinion, it is not based on any facts, nor is it a logical conclusion from the available evidence. If you want to see the simple analysis (what Straggler amusingly called "bewildering attempt to mathematicalise the logic of belief") that shows that 1, 2, 6 and 7 positions are logically invalid see Message 273 - I should not need to repeat it here.
Yes and no. The question in this case is not so much identifying specific false hypotheses. The question is determining those that are most likely to be true. If a mutually exclusive hypothesis is more likely to be true than competing hypotheses, then the other hypotheses are more likely to be false. If A XOR B, and A is more likely than B, then B is more likely to be false.
And how do you determine this probability without the use of opinion? What is your metric that gives us a repeatable rating number of probability that anyone can use and come up with the same value?
Assume we have a lottery, and there an unknown number of tickets sold:
Does the hypothesis that no one will win the lottery have a higher or lower probability than the hypothesis that one specifically identified ticket will win the lottery?
Does the hypothesis that someone will win the lottery have a higher or lower probability than the hypothesis that no one will win?
Do the unknown rules of the lottery affect these probabilities?
If you cannot actually measure the actual probability, then you are left with no viable test.
Re: Faith Based Agnosticism With Opinions vs Atheist With Opinions?
Thanks Straggler, you got it mostly right.
If you follow the various links you will be rewarded with RAZD's bewildering attempt to mathematicalise the logic of belief ...
Amusingly, the mathematics of logic is well known. A better reference is Message 273 , as it has a brief summary of this analysis, one that I think is fairly clear.
... and the limits he imposes by means of his ever-changing array of scales.
I prefer to think of it as clarifying the distinctions.
And here we see RAZ's original position on his deistic faith which discludes logic as having any bearing whatsoever.
Amusingly this is the oldest post in the lot you have quoted from.
Curiously we can look up the definition of faith:
Faith is an opinion, based on personal beliefs and worldview.
And we can go to the very first post that kicked off this multithread debate, for my position on the logic and agnosticism:
The rational conclusion based on evidence is agnosticism, the uncertainty of existence of god/s.
Atheists are on one side of the line of agnosticism, deists are on the other. This may be a fine line, but the distinction is real, like the difference between negative numbers and positive numbers, with the zero position being your fine line.
The atheist believes there is no evidence of god/s and that the absence of evidence is evidence of absence (all A is B, B therefore A logical fallacy).
The deist believes that god/s is/are essentially unknowable, that all evidence points to the way the natural world functions as created, and all we can understand is how it works.
When you look back at it, you will see that I have been consistent. This still comes down to:
Message 117 : One can have an opinion about whether the notion is true or false, and as long as one recognizes that it is opinion based on belief\worldview, and not a conclusion based on fact, that is okay with me.
Logically, it seems to me, it is equally rational to think that X may be tentatively considered to possibly be true, as it is to think that X may be tentatively considered to possibly be false, due to the lack of evidence on which to base a logical decision: all you have either way is opinion based on belief\worldview.
The truly rational position, of course is that we don't know, we can't know because we don't have enough information to know, and therefore cannot decide the truth or falseness of the notion/s ... and thus any decision made must necessarily be opinion, and must be held as a tentative possibility at best.
You either have (leaving out the various distinctions in grades of beliefs):
Opinion based belief that X is true No opinion, agnostic Opinion based belief that X is not true
Re: back up and try again, how can assumed "probability" be a test for false religion?
Still assuming the consequent, Rahvin?
I don't care about your scale.
Because it identifies you as holding an irrational position of claiming to know something you don't?
2) is intended to show my own position, which has nothing at all to do with "opinion," but rather is a simple analysis of available observations.
Except that it is your opinion, and not a conclusion based on empirical evidence.
Yes. The absence of an observation of a prediction always more strongly supports the hypothesis of absence more strongly than other possibilities.
According to your opinion. This then leads you to confirmation bias.
Projection much? I'm not weaseling one iota, and neither is my position based merely on my own subjective opinion.
It is pure opinion. Claiming that it is not opinion doesn't prove a thing: you need to substantiate it with evidence.
Making up hypothetical situations only proves Straggler's position that some people make some things up some of the time. Curiously sometimes is not very conclusive, and that is why - pure and simple - his much touted "evidence" is useless.
Likewise your claim that the "absence of evidence is evidence of absence" can be shown by a number of instances to have been just evidence of an absence of evidence, and thus it can only be be considered (at best) true some of the time. Thus if fails for the same reason Stragglers "made up evidence" fails: it cannot lead to a conclusion if it is only true some of the time and you cannot tell when it is true.
Assuming that you can would be the logical fallacy of using part for the whole, assuming the consequent, etc etc etc.
Argument 1 • There is no empirical objective evidence that X true • The absence of evidence is evidence that premise 1 is most likely false ∴ X (most likely, high probability, etc) is false.
If Argument 1 is a logically valid construction for X, then it is also valid for Y:
Argument 2 • There is no empirical objective evidence that Y is true • The absence of evidence is evidence that premise 1 is is most likely false ∴ Y (most likely, high probability, etc) is false.
Let Y = notX and you end up with X and notX both being (most likely, high probability, etc) is false.
You end up with a contradiction because premise 2 - the common premise, the premise you use - is false.
Amusingly the absence of evidence for god/s cannot be used to contradict in any way the absence of evidence for no god/s because that would be confirming the consequent.
The absence of evidence is only evidence of the absence of evidence.
Here is why your probability argument is false:
Compare:
to:
OR:
If the logical form is true for any X then it is true for Y, now let Y = notX:
... and by the form of the argument, X(a) still can be true true ... which is valid, and a true conclusion is reached.
3D, 4C and 5E fit this pattern. Possibility is a valid conclusion from a lack of contradictory evidence.
versus:
... and by the form of the argument, X(a) is still absolutely true ... which is a contradiction ... unless you have objective empirical evidence that directly contradicts one or the other being true: without such evidence there is a contradiction in the form of the argument and the argument is invalid, falsified, void.
As the second premise is the same as above, we see that the first premise is falsified. 1A and 7B fit this pattern and are logically FALSE arguments.
OR:
... and by the form of the argument, X(a) is still more likely true than false ... which is a contradiction ... unless you have objective empirical evidence that directly contradicts one or the other being true: without such evidence there is a contradiction in the form of the argument and the argument is invalid, falsified, void.
As the second premise is the same as above, we see that the first premise is falsified as well. 2F and 6G fit this pattern and are logically FALSE arguments.
You need empirical evidence, not wishful thinking based on something that is true sometimes and false sometimes, that you have no idea how often true vs false, and no way of telling whether true or false in any specific instance.
2) in reality, we do not have an absence of evidence. While most god hypotheses are equivalent to each other in probability of accuracy, the hypothesis that there are no gods is better supported by the observations we can make.
In your opinion.
Like Straggler's made up evidence, all you have is opinion based on confirmation bias, where you only see the result you want to see and ignore the contrary results. This, of course, is the reason for the lottery analogy.
Invalid analogy
Cognitive dissonance avoidance behavior.
You base your probability argument regardng the existence of god/s on their being a large number of tickets in the lottery, so the likelihood of one ticket winning is minute, and conclude that it is probable that the lottery will not be won because of this minute possibility for any single ticket, correct?
Your problem though is not whether a single specific ticket wins the lottery, but whether the lottery is won by any ticket.
quote:Does the hypothesis that no one will win the lottery have a higher or lower probability than the hypothesis that one specifically identified ticket will win the lottery?
You have assumed that it has a higher probability, yes?
quote:Does the hypothesis that someone will win the lottery have a higher or lower probability than the hypothesis that no one will win?
This is the probability that you have not taken into consideration. Now one could argue that the probability is higher that the lottery will be won than not, and thus that it is more rational to conclude that it is probable that god/s exist ... if one were to use your logic.
Basing an argument on a perceived probability that is made up (a pseudo-probability) is really just you expressing your opinion.
If you cannot actually measure and document the actual probability, then what you have is opinion based on your personal biases and worldview.
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