Question: If the specific god under consideration is immaterial and wholly empirically undetectable how can it have originated as a human concept from anywhere other than the internal workings of the human mind?
and if it isn't?
Then it is empirically detectable and able to be investigated empirically.[/qs]
Which still does not address the question of whether or not god/s exist.
Are the god concepts under discussion empirically imperceptible or not?
Irrelevant. Either they exist or they don't. Your personal ability (or lack) to perceive or detect them is not required for their continued (if they do) existence.
RAZD writes:
Whether you can identify actual tests that show that actual beliefs are false is the issue of this thread.
And how we go about this will very much depend on whether or not you are talking about empirically detectable gods or not.
No, it depends only upon talking about false beliefs and determining that they are false.
Whether god/s exist or not is relatively inconsequential to the question of false beliefs.
Belief in the IPU, and what the IPU means, can be totally irrelevant to the existence of god/s
Would you like to point to a bluegenes post in which the claim is made that bluegenes can make a probability calculation on what books you've got in your room? Would you like to point to a bluegenes post that makes the claim that bluegenes can make probability calculations on everything in the world?
Ah so finally it sinks in that you have no basis for judging the likelihood of the existence of god/s, that you have nothing more than your personal opinion, based on your worldview and biases.
Here you go:
What bluegenes claims is this: It is rational and productive to make probability estimates on many things without being able to mathematically quantify the probability.
In other words you make up pseudo-probabilities to fit your opinion/s, rather than have any real calculation.
You call it rational, I call it confirmation bias, based on your worldview, opinions, experiences and biases, with a touch of cognitive dissonance thrown in for good measure.
The probability is either 1 or 0 that there is a non-science fiction book in my library.
The probability is either 1 or 0 that god/s exist.
Said person is of the belief that they saw Bigfoot as an objective observation, distinct from their subjective opinions on other things. Anyone else they make the claim to may be unable to distinguish this from their opinion, but the observer presumably *can*.
Or they could be mistaken. An open-minded skeptic would say "I think I saw a bigfoot, but I could be wrong."
Note, that I argued with Straggler that such a person would have a valid reason to believe that they saw bigfoot (or an alien, etc), however I don't think they necessarily would come to that conclusion. It would depend on the person, how committed they are to believing their experience was what they thought it was.
The point is that the observer's "opinion" of seeing Bigfoot as you state it shouldn't be confused with other opinions, such as their preference for there being a million dollars in their bank account, or preference for there to be a god. The observer *must* be able to distinguish these things with some regularity, otherwise they are suffering from mental illness.
Let's not confuse the issue with preferences. Having a "preference for there being a million dollars in their bank account" does not necessarily mean they would be of the opinion or belief that there is a million dollars in their bank account. It certainly does not affect my opinion or belief about the amount in my account.
I don't think there is that much difference between belief and opinion in practice:
versus
There might be some difference in connotations, but do these words form different levels of confidence in their validity: is belief more valid than opinion or opinion more valid than belief? Is one more likely to be true than the other?
And by doing so you lack belief in Bigfoot's existence, correct?
No, I am open minded to the possibility that bigfoot may exist, but remain skeptical about it, needing more evidence before deciding one way or the other.
Or they could be mistaken. An open-minded skeptic would say "I think I saw a bigfoot, but I could be wrong."
Exactly, presumably they misinterpreted a real experience they had. Confusing it with a dream, or a personal preference toward it's existence is much less reasonable.
RAZD writes:
No, I am open minded to the possibility that bigfoot may exist, but remain skeptical about it, needing more evidence before deciding one way or the other.
It's more like lacking disbelief.
So you don't believe Bigfoot exists, but you cannot say it because your personal cult of insanity doesn't allow you to admit it for fear of becoming an atheist.
Every regular at EvC is familiar with this, but it bears outlining for those new to the forum.
Ah so finally it sinks in that you have no basis for judging the likelihood of the existence of god/s, that you have nothing more than your personal opinion, based on your worldview and biases.
My personal opinions and world views are based on intelligent assessments of the available evidence.
It's my personal opinion and world view that, if you go into your bathroom, it's very improbable that you'll find a mermaid in the bath. It's my personal opinion and world view that, if you go into your bedroom, you won't find any fairies there.
I can make 1000 such statements with a very, very, very high level of confidence without ever having been in your house, and sitting thousands of miles away from the place. You check it out, and I'll be right every time. 100%. Why?
According to you, because I cannot know whether or not there are mermaids in your bathroom, or fairies in your bedroom, I should be uncommitted. So who is rational?
Now, how can I assess the precise mathematical probability of a mermaid being in your bathroom, or fairies being in your bedroom? I can't.
But if I can be right 1000 times, my estimates must be very, very good.
Now, on scientific theories. Do you understand why your:
RAZD writes:
This is the theory that you can't falsify:
A supernatural being can exist that is not a figment of the human imagination..
is not a scientific theory, just an unsupported assertion? Creationists make such unfalsifiable assertions all the time, and it's hard to believe that you've been here on EvC for six years without understanding what's wrong with this.
"All supernatural beings are figments of the human imagination" is a theory/law for which I can present positive evidence (loads), which can be falsified, and which makes many predictions (Obama won't turn out to be the anti-Christ, for example).
The human mind is the only known source of supernatural beings, just as horses are the only known source of horse shit, and bulls are.......well, err, someone's posts on this thread that contain the phrase "confirmation bias" might challenge that law.
Perhaps there is no reason for you to think that GOD exists.
Aside from wholly internally derived personal conviction or personal appeal what reason is there for anyone to believe in this GOD?
jar writes:
If there is a GOD, the creator of all that is, seen and unseen, then the gulf between that entity and me is greater than the gulf between me and slime mold.
However, I can imagine some God, in this case the generic Judaic-Muslim-Christian God. That is something totally different then GOD, something where I can assign a few more characteristic. I understand that my God is just some caricature, some human creation of language designed to help me concentrate and think.
You seem to think that increased ambiguity justifies some sort of significant distinction between this concept of GOD and any other immaterial and empirically imperceptible God/god concept.
You can apply the labels "unimaginable" and "incomprehensible" to your concept of GOD if you like. But it remains the case that your conception of this unimaginable, incomprehensible, immaterial creator of all that is, seen and unseen (i.e. GOD) is just as necessarily a product of human imagination as any other empirically imperceptible concept.
(Random chance and philosophical possibility aside)
Perhaps there is no reason for you to think that GOD exists.
Aside from wholly internally derived personal conviction or personal appeal what reason is there for anyone to believe in this GOD?
None. However that also has nothing to do with whether the entity really does exist or not.
Straggler writes:
jar writes:
If there is a GOD, the creator of all that is, seen and unseen, then the gulf between that entity and me is greater than the gulf between me and slime mold.
However, I can imagine some God, in this case the generic Judaic-Muslim-Christian God. That is something totally different then GOD, something where I can assign a few more characteristic. I understand that my God is just some caricature, some human creation of language designed to help me concentrate and think.
You seem to think that increased ambiguity justifies some sort of significant distinction between this concept of GOD and any other immaterial and empirically imperceptible God/god concept.
You can apply the labels "unimaginable" and "incomprehensible" to your concept of GOD if you like. But it remains the case that your conception of this unimaginable, incomprehensible, immaterial creator of all that is, seen and unseen (i.e. GOD) is just as necessarily a product of human imagination as any other empirically imperceptible concept.
(Random chance and philosophical possibility aside)
No, I actually explained the definition I was using, no more, no less. I attempted to explain precisely what the distinctions were between the terms I used.
Of course my concepts are the product of my imagination, but again, that is irrelevant to the question of whether or not such a critter really does exist.
Anyone so limited that they can only spell a word one way is severely handicapped!
Then it is empirically detectable and able to be investigated empirically.
RAZD writes:
Which still does not address the question of whether or not god/s exist.
But it does address the question of whether or not the god in question could have been conceived of as a result of perception or, necessarily, as a product of the internal human mind alone.
If the latter then, whilst it might actually exist, the chances of someone randomly but correctly imagining some aspect of an imperceptible reality that may or may not exist is rather remote would you not agree?
RAZD writes:
Belief in the IPU, and what the IPU means, can be totally irrelevant to the existence of god/s
But belief in gods and where this belief is necessarily derived from is wholly relevant to identifying gods that are (random chance and philosophical possibility aside) necessarily the products of human creativity and imagination.
RAZD writes:
Whether god/s exist or not is relatively inconsequential to the question of false beliefs.
Huh? So believing in the existence of a god that we know must have been imagined does not constitute a false belief?
You do know that even the existence of fat jolly magically undetectable Santa has not actually been falsified in the sense of being disproven don't you? Yet the overwhelming evidence favouring human invention of this concept makes this entirely irrelevant to all but the most philosophically pedantic.
RAZD writes:
No, it depends only upon talking about false beliefs and determining that they are false.
And you agreed that where there is evidence of human invention this is sufficient grounds upon which to consider a concept refuted. E.g. Santa.
So how can an empirically imperceptible concept be the result of anything but human invention?
Straggler writes:
Are the god concepts under discussion empirically imperceptible or not?
No, I actually explained the definition I was using, no more, no less. I attempted to explain precisely what the distinctions were between the terms I used.
And these distinctions demonstrate nothing but your attempt to internally differentiate your own self defined GOD from your definitions of God or god by means of increasing ambiguity.
Of course my concepts are the product of my imagination, but again, that is irrelevant to the question of whether or not such a critter really does exist.
Not irrelevant at all. The chances of your imagined concept of GOD actually existing are no more or less than any other concept humanity can pluck from it's collective arse.
So in answer to the question of whether or not your GOD exists it seems fair to say - Almost certainly not.
Which in turn makes belief in the existence of this GOD almost certainly false.
And these distinctions demonstrate nothing but your attempt to internally differentiate your own self defined GOD from your definitions of God or god by means of increasing ambiguity.
Of course, they let you know what distinctions I am making so that when I write god, or God or GOD you know which definition I am using.
Straggler writes:
Not irrelevant at all. The chances of your imagined concept of GOD actually existing are no more or less than any other concept humanity can pluck from it's collective arse.
So in answer to the question of whether or not your GOD exists it seems fair to say - Almost certainly not.
Okay.
Straggler writes:
Which in turn makes belief in the existence of this GOD almost certainly false.
Huh?
My belief in the existence of GOD is most certainly not false, I believe it.
Now if you are asserting that the GOD I believe in is false, then of course you are free to hold that opinion. Just understand though that whether or not you happen to think the GOD I believe in is false is really irrelevant beyond being a statement of your personal belief.
Anyone so limited that they can only spell a word one way is severely handicapped!
Now if you are asserting that the GOD I believe in is false, then of course you are free to hold that opinion.
Asserted.......?
How can any empirically imperceptible concept be conceived of by means other than the internal workings of the human mind?
jar writes:
Just understand though that whether or not you happen to think the GOD I believe in is false is really irrelevant beyond being a statement of your personal belief.
Are you actually disagreeing that the likelihood of this empirically imperceptible GOD actually existing is greater than random chance alone?
If so on what basis?
Do you consider it rational to believe that this "creator of all that is seen and unseen" GOD is more likely to have created the universe than the fart of a celestial cow?
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