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Author Topic:   Induction and Science
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 648 of 744 (593423)
11-27-2010 1:36 AM
Reply to: Message 635 by nwr
11-26-2010 7:23 PM


Re: Nwr: "Scientific theories have nothing to say about how nature behaves"
nwr writes:
Stephen Push writes:
Scientific predictions always assume general principles (e.g., the uniformity of nature) that can be derived by no method other than inductive reasoning.
I am still waiting for the proof that they can be derived by no method other than inductive reasoning.
[list]

This message is a reply to:
 Message 635 by nwr, posted 11-26-2010 7:23 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


(1)
Message 651 of 744 (593466)
11-27-2010 9:50 AM
Reply to: Message 635 by nwr
11-26-2010 7:23 PM


Re: Nwr: "Scientific theories have nothing to say about how nature behaves"
nwr writes:
Stephen Push writes:
Scientific predictions always assume general principles (e.g., the uniformity of nature) that can be derived by no method other than inductive reasoning.
I am still waiting for the proof that they can be derived by no method other than inductive reasoning.
  • The principle known as the uniformity of nature holds that nature will behave in the future as it has in the past.
  • The only evidence for the truth of this principle is that, so far, we have observed that nature has behaved in the present as it had in the past.
  • It is impossible to observe in the present what will happen in the future.
  • Therefore, specific observations that nature has behaved in the present as it had in the past are the only way to justify the generalized conclusion that nature will behave in the future as it has in the past.
  • Therefore, the uniformity of nature principle can be derived by no method other than inductive reasoning.
The deductive reasoning above can be applied to prove the inductive nature of other scientific laws, theories, or models that claim to predict what will happen in the future based on what has been observed in the past.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 635 by nwr, posted 11-26-2010 7:23 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


(1)
Message 652 of 744 (593484)
11-27-2010 11:10 AM
Reply to: Message 638 by nwr
11-26-2010 7:35 PM


Re: What would induction in science look like
Stephen Push writes:
Specific observation:
Thus, the evolution of this phenotype was contingent on the particular history of that population.
Generalized conclusion:
More generally, we suggest that historical contingency is especially important when it facilitates the evolution of key innovations that are not easily evolved by gradual, cumulative selection.
nwr writes:
That reads more as a proposed hypothesis, rather than as an inductive conclusion.
You stated what for you would constitute evidence for induction in science, and I provided precisely what you requested.
The first sentence I quoted is clearly a specific observation. Note the use of the past tense, singular nouns, and terms such as "this phenotype" and "that population." In the second sentence, the authors alert us that they are proposing a generalized principle by starting off with the clause "More generally," by switching to the present tense, and by writing about plural "innovations" rather than this innovation or that innovation.
Is the second sentence a proposed hypothesis? It is only if you are using the broad sense of the word "hypothesis," which is synonymous with "generalized principle." It is not a proposed hypothesis in the narrow sense of a proposition that can be tested by observation or experiment. The latter use would require specific cases of the generalized principle.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 638 by nwr, posted 11-26-2010 7:35 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 653 of 744 (593502)
11-27-2010 1:55 PM
Reply to: Message 639 by nwr
11-26-2010 7:42 PM


Re: Nwr: "Scientific theories have nothing to say about how nature behaves"
nwr writes:
It's an interesting paper. It aims at making a persuasive argument, but it is not a refutation.
It does correctly point out some problems with Popper's thesis, particularly in the way it uses corroboration. But it doesn't address the reason that Popper disagrees with induction (the reason is already in the text I quoted from SEP in Message 600, though it seems that reasoning is invisible to most of participants in this thread).
Salmon’s paper is a refutation of Popper’s view of induction in science. Salmon shows that induction is necessary for rational prediction — at least in practical decision-making and probably in theoretical work as well.
I’m a fan of Popper’s view of the value of falsifiability in the demarcation of science from other fields. But I do not believe that induction and falsifiability are mutually exclusive or that induction-free science is necessary to defend Popper’s view of demarcation.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

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 Message 639 by nwr, posted 11-26-2010 7:42 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 655 of 744 (593522)
11-27-2010 3:53 PM
Reply to: Message 600 by nwr
11-25-2010 7:10 PM


Re: Nwr: "Scientific theories have nothing to say about how nature behaves
nwr writes:
Here's a quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Popper
quote:
Popper is unusual amongst contemporary philosophers in that he accepts the validity of the Humean critique of induction, and indeed, goes beyond it in arguing that induction is never actually used by the scientist. However, he does not concede that this entails the scepticism which is associated with Hume, and argues that the Baconian/Newtonian insistence on the primacy of ‘pure’ observation, as the initial step in the formation of theories, is completely misguided: all observation is selective and theory-ladenthere are no pure or theory-free observations. In this way he destabilises the traditional view that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology; in contradistinction to this, Popper holds that there is no unique methodology specific to science.
It seems that I am in agreement with a lot of what Popper says.
I agree inductive methodology does not distinguish science from non-science. But that doesn't mean science must be induction-free to be distinguished from non-science.
Do you believe that acknowledging a role for induction in science would refute Popper's view that falsifiability is the hallmark of science?
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 600 by nwr, posted 11-25-2010 7:10 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 656 by RAZD, posted 11-27-2010 5:36 PM Stephen Push has replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 662 of 744 (593582)
11-27-2010 8:29 PM
Reply to: Message 656 by RAZD
11-27-2010 5:36 PM


Re: induction vs deduction elements
Welcome to the fray, RAZD.
RAZD writes:
Let's say we have tested all the elements in A and find that every one has the elements of B as well.
Based on the evidence of A that is B, we deduce that all A is B. This predicts that any new A will also be B.
Any A that is notB invalidates the concept
Any A that is B expands the area covered by A, but does not confirm that all A is B (there could be A outside B in the diagram).
If there could be A outside B in the diagram, then "all A is B" would be an induction, not a deduction.
Based on the absence of any evidence of any B that is notA, we can, by inductive logic, extend that conclusion to the possibility that all B is A, and then use that to formulate testing of that concept.
Any B that is notA invalidates the concept
Any B that is A expands the area covered by A, but does not confirm that all B is A.
Since "all A is B" is based on induction, I don't see any logical difference between that conclusion and the conclusion "all B is A."
I second Panda's request for a real-world example. I believe the hypothetical you have introduced is different from the types of problems generally encountered in science. In the real world, we wouldn't be able to study every A and every B. We wouldn't even know whether the elements of A and B that we measured are all of the elements that exist.
Personally I think it is a weaker stance, being more of a "best guess" than a logical conclusion.
Science often uses inference to the best explanation (IBE), which is a non-deductive method. For example, Darwin used IBE when he marshaled information about many plants and animals to make the case for common descent.

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 Message 656 by RAZD, posted 11-27-2010 5:36 PM RAZD has seen this message but not replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 663 of 744 (593591)
11-27-2010 9:47 PM
Reply to: Message 659 by RAZD
11-27-2010 7:34 PM


Re: induction vs deduction elements
Thanks for the real-world example, RAZD.
RAZD writes:
All dogs are observed to be canines
All canines are observed to be mammals
A new (species) is observed to be a dog subspecies
Deductive conclusion\prediction:
Any new dog species will still be a canine
Any new canine species will still be a mammal
That is technically a deductive argument, but it conceals a lot of non-deductive work. The first two lines of your syllogism rely on the work done by Darwin and others -- using the non-deductive IBE method -- to establish the theory of evolution. To know whether the third line is true, scientists would have to use IBE to determine where this new animal fits into the tree of life.
After non-deductive methods have done all of the heavy lifting, the remaining deductive argument is trivial.
Conversely the inductive conclusion\prediction:
Any new canine species will be a dog
Any new mammal species will be a canine
While it is possible that the new mammal species would be a dog\canine, this is a much weaker prediction than that a new dog species will be a canine\mammal.
Rather than a "best guess," that sounds like a shot in the dark. I find it hard to imagine how such a line of reasoning could be useful in actual scientific research.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 659 by RAZD, posted 11-27-2010 7:34 PM RAZD has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 664 by RAZD, posted 11-27-2010 11:01 PM Stephen Push has replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 666 of 744 (593601)
11-28-2010 1:34 AM
Reply to: Message 664 by RAZD
11-27-2010 11:01 PM


Re: induction vs deduction elements
RAZD writes:
Darwin et al:
  1. selection in isolated domesticated animals leads to variations that are noticeably different from wild populations.
  2. selection in the wild occurs through natural differences in breeding success and survival success
    ∴ selection in the wild can lead to variations that are noticeably different in isolated population
In my opinion, that is an eminently sound bit of reasoning. But it is not deductive, because the conclusion is not a necessary consequence of the premises.
That current known dogs are canines is an observed fact of common ancestry, not an inductive conclusion.
That current known canines are mammals is an observed fact of common ancestry, not an inductive conclusion.
As I said in my previous post, your dog-canine-mammal syllogism is deductive. But it is not very helpful because it presupposes common decent, a concept which I believe was developed largely by non-deductive means. If we were to presuppose special creation rather than common decent, it would not be an observed fact that dogs are canines or that canines are mammals.
Of course, part of this is that the definition of canine includes dogs and the definition of mammals includes canines.
Precisely. It is a true but trivial deduction.
That's not to say that I deny the value of deduction in science. Deduction is useful in deriving testable hypotheses from theories. Mathematical deduction is useful in models and statistical analysis.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 664 by RAZD, posted 11-27-2010 11:01 PM RAZD has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 670 by RAZD, posted 11-28-2010 9:16 AM Stephen Push has replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 682 of 744 (593731)
11-28-2010 11:28 PM
Reply to: Message 670 by RAZD
11-28-2010 9:16 AM


Re: induction vs deduction elements
RAZD writes:
The fact remains that common descent is highly tested, and has not yet been falsified for a single species. As such, it is not "presupposed" but evidence based and a highly tested theory.
I agree. The point I am trying to make is that this evidence-based and highly tested theory has been developed largely with non-deductive methods. Your deductive syllogism seemed to take that prior work for granted and thus appeared to give deduction credit for knowledge that had been discovered non-deductively.
In this experiment wild foxes were bred into dog-like foxes, but they are still foxes by common descent:
Link
Imagine that one of these dog-like foxes escaped and you found it without knowing what it was or where it came from. How would you determine its origins? Could you do so by a completely deductive method? I think not. You might look at morphology, behavior, biochemistry, and genetics. You might try to breed it with other canids to see with which species it produced viable, fertile offspring. I submit that you would be using induction and/or inference to the best explanation more than deduction in this research.
Which, in essence, falsifies special creation, via deductive logic, as we see that they (a) are canines (posses the characteristics of canines), (b) are mammals (posses the characteristics of mammals), and (c) bear the evidence of common descent in DNA and fossil records.
There it is again. A facile deductive argument is given credit for the really interesting work that was done to establish (a), (b), and (c) using mostly non-deductive methods.
Presupposition is a bad way to do science, because it is not based on evidence but on wishing based on opinion. Unfortunately, for presuppositionists, opinion has little effect on reality.
Please forgive me if I didn't explain my position clearly. I never meant to imply that presupposition is a good way to do science. By "presupposes" I meant that your deductive argument assumed the truth of the premises without explaining why that assumption was justified.
I'm not trying to nit-pick. I believe it is important to disclose the justifications for the premises because I think doing so will reveal that this supposed deductive reasoning is basically non-deductive reasoning in disguise. Once we have established -- largely though non-deductive methods -- that dogs are canines, canines are mammals, and this new mystery animal is a kind of dog, the deductive argument seems to me to be nothing more than a tautology.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 670 by RAZD, posted 11-28-2010 9:16 AM RAZD has seen this message but not replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 687 of 744 (593790)
11-29-2010 1:53 PM
Reply to: Message 659 by RAZD
11-27-2010 7:34 PM


Re: induction vs deduction elements
RAZD writes:
All dogs are observed to be canines
All canines are observed to be mammals
A new (species) is observed to be a dog subspecies
Deductive conclusion\prediction:
Any new dog species will still be a canine
Any new canine species will still be a mammal
When I first read this statement, I thought you had constructed a formally correct but trivial deduction. I guess I did that because I consider dogs to be canines, and canines to be mammals, by definition. If these phylogenetic relationships are definitive, then there is no possibility of finding a dog that is not both a canine and a mammal.
On re-reading your post, however, I now realize that you apparently were not considering these relationships to be definitive. You seem to be saying that all dogs observed so far are canines, allowing for the possibility that one might find a dog that is not a canine or a canine that is not a mammal. (By the way, I don't know why you included the third premise. It seems unnecessary.)
If the latter is what you meant, then your argument is inductive rather than deductive, because you have drawn generalized conclusions from specific observations. The terms "any new dog species" and "any new canine species" may seem specific, but those terms are synonymous with "all dog species" and "all canine species."
I apologize if I misinterpreted your post.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 659 by RAZD, posted 11-27-2010 7:34 PM RAZD has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 696 by RAZD, posted 11-29-2010 9:21 PM Stephen Push has replied

  
Stephen Push
Member (Idle past 4881 days)
Posts: 140
From: Virginia, USA
Joined: 10-08-2010


Message 742 of 744 (594346)
12-03-2010 2:40 AM
Reply to: Message 696 by RAZD
11-29-2010 9:21 PM


Re: induction vs deduction elements
RAZD writes:
No matter how well established a theory is, it can never be more than possibly true, because inductive logic does not give you a conclusion of true\fact. This holds even when a theory is called a law. I believe that this is, in essence, your argument (or a major portion thereof) in this thread, yes?
Yes, that's essentially my position, although I would prefer to say that a theory is never more than probably true. Much of the discussion in this thread has been driven by the assertion advanced by nwr that induction is never used in science. I appreciate that you are bringing to this discussion a more nuanced examination of how both induction and deduction may be used in science.
In this regard, the inductive element in science is not to determine what is fact\true, but to show what should be tested to see if it can help define what is fact\true.
I think the words fact and true should be used with great care in science. Scientific knowledge is perpetually tentative. Scientists sometimes use deductive reasoning. And of course deductive conclusions are necessarily true when the premises are true. But I believe that the premises are often, if not always, subject to error and revision.
The important thing, as I see it, is that this process sifts evidence and concepts and eliminates falsified concepts while organizing facts into an explanatory framework -- our "best guess" or "best known explanation" of the evidence -- and that the pool of known evidence\facts is increased whether a theory is falsified or not. In this way the process is an incremental approximation of truth that continually gets closer to reality, even if it can't arrive at a definitive conclusion.
I agree with you, because I’m a scientific realist. An instrumentalist, however, would claim that there is no way to know whether we are getting closer to reality.
As we see above, the facts\truths that we can know are determined deductively from the original evidence and the added information from the testing. This knowledge is discovered by the testing and deductive evaluation parts of the process, not by the inductive process. Let's try an analogy:
I have a rifle set up on a fixed mount 1000 yards from a target. With the gun-sight I make my first approximation of aiming the rifle at the target. I take 10 shots with that setting, then measure the results. The scatter in the shots from their mean value determines how effectively the rifle reproduces the same results from a test, the difference between the mean value and the target center determines the accuracy of the initial approximation. I make a vertical adjustment in the rifle setup in the direction that the mean value was vertically off from the target center and repeat the shots and measurements, then make another vertical adjustment towards the center in proportion to the remaining delta to the center and the difference in the two shot patterns. I do the same thing in the horizontal adjustments. All else being equal, and not having any other variables that are not controlled by the rifle setting (variable cross-wind etc), I should be able in fairly short order to reach a reasonable accuracy within the ability of the rifle to reproduce the same results in repeated tests, regardless of where my initial shots ended up.
It is the deductive process in the evaluation of the evidence that brings the pattern closer to the target center. If I just relied on induction then I could go back and forth with varying degrees of success, but never approaching the center in the way that deductive analysis does. . . .
. . . Yet it is the deductive evaluation of the evidence that either invalidates the theory or shows that we have additional evidence that is consistent with the evidence used to formulate the theory. The deductive analysis of the results of testing brings us closer to reality, and this refines the inductive hypothesis for the next round of testing.
If I understand your position, you are saying we can make a prediction from a tentative theory and then measure how an actual experimental result differs is from the prediction. We can then modify the theory, make a new prediction, and see if we have gotten any closer to reality.
A problem I see with that approach is that, by adding post hoc theory modifications, even a theory that is a poor representation of reality may become more accurate for the purpose of making predictions. By adding epicycles, for example, the Ptolemaic model became better at making predictions, but it never got any closer to reality.
Using cladistics to compare all the common and different elements you should then find that the most parsimonious explanation was that the dog-like fox was a descendant of wild foxes. {phase three}
This would be a statistically deduced most likely answer:
Link
quote:
Cladistics is also distinguished by its emphasis on parsimony and hypothesis testing (particularly falsificationism), rather than subjective decisions that some other taxonomic systems rely upon.[3]
This is the kind of rigorous empirical testing and deductive evaluation used in biology to validate common descent in the larger picture.
I can see how deduction plays a role. For example:
  • Mammals have hair, produce milk, etc.
  • New animal has hair, produces milk, etc.
  • Therefore, new animal is a mammal.
But in the dog-like fox hypothetical, I think your conclusion is an inference to the best explanation rather than a deduction. In fact, you refer to it as the most likely answer. While descent from the current wild fox population is the most likely explanation, based on the evidence, you would not be able to rule out completely other possibilities. For example, the foxes may have descended from a dog-like fox ancestor that is now nearly extinct. I agree the latter explanation would be highly unlikely, but given the available evidence, it is not a logical impossibility.
Doesn’t your use of the term parsimonious suggest the use of non-deductive reasoning?
I agree that cladistics is less subjective than some other taxonomic systems, but I don’t think it is any more deductive.
If we were to start by assuming special creation of the dog-like fox, then we would test for elements that are not consistent with dogs, foxes, canines or mammals. Not finding any we would conclude that there is no evidence of any process other than common descent from existing species. This leaves special creation as god-directed evolution causing what we see as natural processes, and that still results in the most parsimonious explanation being that the dog-like fox was a (directed) descendant of wild foxes. As such your complaint is irrelevant.
Nicely done! I can see you have used deductive reasoning to show that, if the evidence supports common descent, whether that process is "natural" or God-directed is irrelevant. Nevertheless, the premise that the evidence supports common descent was derived non-deductively. You have again invoked parsimony in defense of the premise.
Edited by Stephen Push, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 696 by RAZD, posted 11-29-2010 9:21 PM RAZD has seen this message but not replied

  
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