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Author Topic:   The Kalam cosmological argument
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 36 of 177 (653826)
02-24-2012 4:48 PM
Reply to: Message 31 by Noetherian Atheist
08-24-2010 8:17 PM


Neotherian Atheist writes:
The point of the KCA, and why it is different from the argument you set forth, is that it deals with the problem of infinite regress by adding a further step to the argument: infinite regress cannot occur in "actuality" (nothing infinite can exist in actuality), and therefore the chain of anitcedant causes must stop.
Hello Neotherian Atheist,
Thank you for the synopsis. A couple of points, however, need clarification. The KCA does not aspire to rule out an actually infinite; or, the argument itself would be self defeating. God is actually infinite according to KCA. A temporal succession of actually infinite events (and a collection of an actually infinite number of things) is what the Kalam argues against.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
Wherever it stops is a "final" (or "first" if you prefer) cause which does not itself have a cause: a good candidate for God. Btw, I think this second step is invalid: IMO it is far from obvious that nothing infinite can exist in actuality, but that's not the point.
.
Here again the argument -- in its current form propounded by William Lane Craig et al. -- does not aspire to rule out mathematical concepts of the actually infinite which may or may not exist in reality. I am curious to know what other examples you have in mind regarding the actually infinite, in spite of your reservations here.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
So, my point was that if the argument is valid & proves the universe has a cause, then it can be turned round and applied to that cause of the universe (why not?) to prove that "Cause 2", a cause of the "cause of the universe", exists, and thence "Cause3" and so ad infinitum.
Not really. As here we come to the point the KCA does indeed aspire to posit; a first uncaused cause, which by definition rules out the necessity of other (causally) prior causes. Consequently, cause 2 etc. are immediately discarded.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
However, if your next step after KCA is to deduce that God exists (he's the creator of the universe), then the existence of an infinite regress of causes does present a problem for the standard Judaeo-Christian-Islamic (and many more, no doubt) definition of God: God has to be uncaused - whereas each cause in the infinite chain established by KCA has an antecedant cause (and so can't be God).
You seem to have misunderstood the argument. An Infinite regress of causes is exactly what the argument rules out. No infinite chain of causes, therefore, exists. This presents no difficulty for proponents whatsoever because, to the contrary, antecedent causes for God are not possible according to Kalaam. You cannot apply the conceptual idea of an actually infinite in the same manner as a potentially infinite -- a potentially infinite is finite in the past but continually moves toward infinity as a limit (I say this for the benefit of others who may not be familiar with this distinction, though I am confident you are.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
You cannot (using this line of reasoing) get from the deduction that the universe has a cause to "God exists" without first ruling out infinite regress. The point of KCA is it does (or attempts to) do this - it deals with the problem of infinite regress without appealing to God's properties.
Agreed. I think the Kalam convinces on this point.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
None of this deals with the second part of my post, which was explains what IMO is the the most serious flaw in the Cosmological Argument, and pretty much all similar arguments (KCA included) - it doesn't matter how you phase the first premise: "exists", or "begins to exist", nor whether the God you infer may be subjected the Argument himself.
On the contrary, the argument stands or falls on the terminology within the proposition. From "exists" one may infer necessary and or eternal existence;"begins to exist" eliminates this possibility.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
No, the argment simply can't be applied to the universe because of premise 2. The universe is not a "thing" in the same sense as the "things" referred to in Premise 1. Here I am making absolutely no assertions concerning God, either for or against, it's about the validity of the argument as it applies to the universe.
Why is the universe not a thing according to premise 1? What assumptions about the universe are you making in order to assert that it is a different kind of thing? Im curious, as I have not seen this objection before. I usually see the ones like"fallacy of composition" etc. to refute the Kalam.
Neotherian Atheist writes:
On a side note, I think these types of argument are fundamentally unconvincing. In an earlier post, nwr makes an excellent point:
nwr writes:
It's a general principle of logic. Perhaps it is also a general principle of life, but it is specifically, a general principle of logic. Roughly speaking, that general principle says:
There is no such thing as free lunch.
In logical terms, the principle is that a conclusion can never yield more than is already implicit in the premises. All logic can do is rearrange the assumptions, so as to make more obvious part of what was assumed. Perhaps it is because of my background in mathematics, that this principle of logic is particularly apparent to me.
I don't think a purely logical argument can really either prove or disprove anything about the real world: the theist will invariably argue that God is not subject to the laws of logic (as you did). In fairness, this line of argument must work both ways - could God really be proven by a logical argiment? For that argument to be true, logic would need to apply to God - God would subject to logic, which is not something any theist I know would accept. I think these type of arguments are more like parlour games - the point is to work out what the "trick" is, why they don't really work.
Interesting points, however, I think this would apply to any and all propositional statements; therefore nothing can be said to be true, definitively. Admittedly, I do not feel the force of this objection because it applies to every premise of every logical argument.
As for admitting that God is subject to logic presents no insuperable difficulty for the theist -- as God is wholly logical and this would be a natural outworking of his divine nature -- just as he is subject to good, and justice, and love, and any other concept of ultimate rationale.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : Formatting error

This message is a reply to:
 Message 31 by Noetherian Atheist, posted 08-24-2010 8:17 PM Noetherian Atheist has not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 39 by cavediver, posted 02-25-2012 9:52 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 37 of 177 (653831)
02-24-2012 6:45 PM
Reply to: Message 16 by Fiver
08-17-2010 4:15 PM


Re: Reply to cavediver and nwr
I have never understood why this argument is used anywhere ever. There are two main flaws that I see.
Fiver writes:
1. If scientists are correct (and I understand that there's some disagreement on this point), then the Big Bang was actually the inception point of time itself. Therefore, assuming that "come into existence" means "goes from a time of non-existence to a time of existence", then the universe never came into existence: it's like asking what is south of the south pole.
Hello Fiver,
Perhaps I can elucidate. My understanding of the theistic model currently propounded by William Lane Craig et al, is that it posits an immaterial, timeless, beginningless, extremely powerful, and personal creator -- an agent who wills to create -- who is causally prior to the universe, but not chronologically prior to it. The being is timeless without the universe and temporal with the creation of the universe. An infinite cause with a finite effect cannot be the result of event/event causation or state/state causation. Therefore it must be personal!
The metaphysical idea of a divine mind is, I think, consonant with big bang cosmology. An immaterial entity, an unembodied mind for example, is not constrained by space and time, and may exist without the universe in an undifferentiated state, perhaps contemporaneously. My personal opinion is that this proposal is as plausible as any multi-verse scenario -- those that accord with Borde, Guth, Vilenkin, at least -- because many worlds hypotheses neither explicate nor avert an absolute beginning. Of course, one may posit quantum fluctuation models or string theory models or oscillating models or any "infinite" model he chooses in an attempt to avoid a beginning. Occam's razor, nevertheless, dictates we not multiply causes unnecessarily.
Because the standard model is heavily supported by evidence, and agreed upon by the majority of scientists, I see no reason to jettison it at this point. Moreover, the idea of a multiverse seems quite superfluous. Why posit a series of parallel universes -- whether these universes coalesce at some future point or not -- in order to explain apparent fine tuning in our known universe? The mechanism which produces the multiverse will ultimately require explanation for its fine tuning; so, we're back to square one. Occam's razor certainly applies here.
With respect to your conclusion, it does not follow from the premises above. An inception (point of time) is coming into existence, by definition. Asking what is south of the south pole has no relevance here, so far as I can see.
Fiver writes:
2. What is more likely is that the KCA means something different by "come into existence" than most people think. In which case, we may suppose that the universe had a cause. It may be an interdimensional bubble, or a fluctuation in dimensions unknown to us, or it may be a god, or aliens, or even the aftermath of a "Big Crunch", but there's nothing to favor the god interpretation over any other.
Come into existence means precisely that from a theistic standpoint; nonexistence -- there is no state of non existence as such, there simply is no existence, no properties etc. -- to existence. Yes, there is a vast chasm between being and non being that is rarely appreciated. Quantam fluctuation models don't begin to appreciate this disparity.
fiver writes:
Help me out here, Creationists... what's the point of this argument?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 16 by Fiver, posted 08-17-2010 4:15 PM Fiver has not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 38 by Dr Adequate, posted 02-24-2012 8:27 PM Shimbabwe has replied
 Message 40 by cavediver, posted 02-25-2012 10:10 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 41 of 177 (653976)
02-25-2012 5:58 PM
Reply to: Message 38 by Dr Adequate
02-24-2012 8:27 PM


Re: Reply to cavediver and nwr
Dr Adequate writes:
You need some reasoning before the word "therefore".
Hello Dr. Adequate,
Thank you for your response. I was merely presenting an outline for the argument as proposed by Dr. Craig et al. The theist in this context would, nevertheless, assert that there are three primary types of causation, state, event, or agentsome would argue only two. By default agent causation is the only viable candidate for the theist because the other alternatives would necessarily introduce an infinite regress of events or an eternal universe, both of which are untenable according to the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Moreover, the only other entities (I am aware of) that qualify as beginningless, timeless, and immaterial, are numbers or abstract objects. These entities, however, are believed to be causally effete, e.g. numbers don’t stand in causal relationships.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 38 by Dr Adequate, posted 02-24-2012 8:27 PM Dr Adequate has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 47 by Dr Adequate, posted 02-26-2012 7:18 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 42 of 177 (653983)
02-25-2012 6:42 PM
Reply to: Message 39 by cavediver
02-25-2012 9:52 AM


Philosophy of Time
cavediver writes:
Yes, by taking an erroneous and naive view of time. This is what happens when theologians and philosophers try to discuss theoretical physics. You may like to read my old messages in this thread to understand this point.
Hello cavediver,
I am happy you have responded, as I anticipated a response from one who argues against the tensed view of time. I am quite familiar with other conceptual views; so, it won't be necessary here to exploit my naivet. Moreover, your response is not a valid critique of the Kalam Argument, as such. If the tensed view of time is correct, then temporal becoming is implicit in relation to matter within the universe. My assumption is that you disagree with this point. Therefore, I will respond more thoroughly in a few hours, or perhaps tomorrow. I am just home from work and haven't had my daily dose of spiritual vitamins...
Regards,
Shimbabwe

This message is a reply to:
 Message 39 by cavediver, posted 02-25-2012 9:52 AM cavediver has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 43 by cavediver, posted 02-25-2012 6:58 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 44 of 177 (653986)
02-25-2012 7:18 PM
Reply to: Message 43 by cavediver
02-25-2012 6:58 PM


Re: Philosophy of Time
cavediver writes:
Just a quick note whilst awaiting your larger response - I don't argue against the tensed view of time. I argue against those that use the terms "tensed" and "untensed" views of time, whether they themselves fall into A-theorists or B-theorists. Neither tend to have the first clue about the real nature of time
Very well then. I hope our discussion proves fruitful. I'm quite happy to utilize whatever terms work for you. On philosophy of time, one is certainly not limited to these alternatives. Nevertheless, we may limit our discussion to those prevailing theories if you wish.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 43 by cavediver, posted 02-25-2012 6:58 PM cavediver has not replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 46 of 177 (654049)
02-26-2012 2:35 PM
Reply to: Message 40 by cavediver
02-25-2012 10:10 AM


Re: Reply to cavediver and nwr
Shimbabwe writes:
My understanding of the theistic model currently propounded by William Lane Craig et al, is that it posits an immaterial, timeless, beginningless, extremely powerful, and personal creator -- an agent who wills to create -- who is causally prior to the universe, but not chronologically prior to it. The being is timeless without the universe and temporal with the creation of the universe. An infinite cause with a finite effect cannot be the result of event/event causation or state/state causation. Therefore it must be personal!
cavediver writes:
There's a whole lot of words in this paragraph, and 90% of them have virtually no agreed definition. How can you possibly try to advance an argument that supposedly creats a "proof" of something with such nebulous terms?
I wholeheartedly disagree90% caused me to chuckle a bit. I think the terms are quite clear; though I will stop short of asserting they are univocal. Based on your quotations, I think you agree that proof here constitutes an unnecessary burden.
cavediver writes:
What is "immaterial"? What is "timeless"? What is "beginningless"? What is "powerful" and how much is "extremely"? What does "personal" mean? Are your definitions unique and universally accepted such that this "proof" can be unambiguously understood?
I would argue that these terms are self evident and don’t require further explanation. Perhaps we could lay aside the wordplay for the time being and think about the merits of the argument. This is, after all, a discussion about the KCAsemantics notwithstanding. You may not agree that the terms are descriptive of an ultra-mundane being, but you obviously apprehend their meanings.
cavediver writes:
Basing an argument on such terms does not generate "proof", only obfuscation.
As before, proof may or may not be instantiated by the use of these terms; nonetheless, I do not accept your assertion that the language as stated is equivocal or otherwise unintelligible.
Moreover, the idea of a multiverse seems quite superfluous.
cavediver writes:
No, it actually seems necessary - that is, a multiverse of one form or another is implicated in many post-Standard Model ideas.
Are you then advocating a necessarily existent universe or ensemble of universes? (I think I know the answer to this somewhat rhetorical question.) I agree there are a number of models that indeed hypothesize many-worlds; however, most are tenuous at best or even speculative. E.g. bubble universe models; quantum tunneling models; chaotic inflationary models; the Hartle-Hawking model etc. These theories are metaphysical in nature and may never be subject to empirical falsification. So, in this regard at least, they are on equal footing with the God hypothesis.
Shimbabwe writes:
Why posit a series of parallel universes... ...in order to explain apparent fine tuning in our known universe?
cavediver writes:
For one, because we already have an excellent example of parallel worlds creating the appearance of fine-tuning.
Not so fast. There are a great number of possible explanations for apparent fine tuning, the Hartle — Hawking model being just one. I certainly wouldn’t call it a clear example, as it remains to be seen whether or not conclusive evidence existsaside from mathematical postulatesin support of the Hartle-Hawking model. Further, it is argued by proponents of KCA that mathematical concepts such as those invoked by Hawking et al are not feasible in the actual world. There are other reasons why the model should not be espoused over competing models; however, the lack of evidence is its most significant hurdle. For this reason alone, one should proceed with caution. Further, I see no reason to discardor build upon by extrapolationthe standard model. Even if a multiverse is possible, what possible explanations can it hold? If an infinite number of universes formed simultaneously (Vilenkin et al), and each was excised by an event horizonsuch that they would never coalesce, and an observer in each universe would perceive an absolute beginningwhere does this lead, and why would this seemingly metaphysical concept be posited? I have my suspicions, but that is for another discussion altogether.
cavediver writes:
The Earth's "extraordinary" biosphere has long been touted by theists as blatent fine-tuning evidence of a divine hand. However, it is quite clear that the fine-tuning that gives rise to the Earth's remarkable qualities is simply the anthropic selection effect on a large number of worlds throughout the Universe, each taking a point in the vast parameter-space of possible qualities.
The fine tuning has also been recognized by the majority of scientists which I think constitutes strong evidencein the neutral, a-religious, sense. Your assertion, however, presupposes the anthropic principle and the viability of the multi-verse as a whole, which have already been show to be speculative; it is therefore unsubstantiated.
Shimbabwe writes:
Asking what is south of the south pole has no relevance here, so far as I can see.
cavediver writes:
You are correct - you cannot see the relevance. But that does not negate the relevance.
Ok. What relevance does it have? I am quite familiar with this concept as it relates to space time boundries, in both the standard model and the Hartle-Hawking scenario, among others. Nevertheless, I see no relevance to the Kalam Argument. Please enlighten me.
Shimbabwe writes:
Yes, there is a vast chasm between being and non - being that is rarely appreciated. Quantum fluctuation models don't begin to appreciate this disparity.
cavediver writes:
This I can agree with, but I would stress that you have no good definition of your term "non being".
No comment about the definition of non-being except to refer you to my initial statement on definitions. Thank you for the concession regarding quantum theory. I think we agree on a number of things, based on my readings of your recent posts. I have been an inactive member here for almost a decade and have learned a great deal from persons like you. I am not a dogmatist in regard to most topics. I am, however, a theist who writes on these topics as a mere lay person; so please forgive my ignorance on some matters. I hope that my somewhat abrupt appearance and my subjective opinions revealed in this discussion do not offend. Thank you again for responding in a cordial fashion.
Regards,
Shimbabwe

This message is a reply to:
 Message 40 by cavediver, posted 02-25-2012 10:10 AM cavediver has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 48 by PaulK, posted 02-27-2012 1:54 AM Shimbabwe has not replied
 Message 167 by cavediver, posted 03-25-2012 5:51 AM Shimbabwe has not replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 49 of 177 (654200)
02-27-2012 6:29 PM
Reply to: Message 47 by Dr Adequate
02-26-2012 7:18 PM


Re: Reply to cavediver and nwr
Dr Adequate writes:
There's no reason why an agent should be exempt from any reasoning that one might apply to states or events. In fact, anyone not wishing to split unsplittable hairs might use the term "thing" to include the whole lot of 'em.
An agentwhom I reckon as a thing, of courseneed not be exempt from reasoning. The difference is that it may act volitionally. This capability is necessary if the being is to perform creative act(s). There is nothing inherently unreasonable about a being who acts volitionally in a non — deterministic fashion.
Granted your assertion about states or events may be trueI’m not sure about that. I would argue that no events occurred before the universe. It is also plausible that no physical state of affairs exists outside the universe; whereas an immaterial entitythat exists timelessly without the universe in an undifferentiated statemay will to create time and matter and space etc.
Dr Adequate writes:
I don't see why the mere property of intelligence, when added to a thing, allows it to transcend logic. It takes more than being smart to manage that.
Yes. This is precisely why theists press the idea of an enormously powerful entity. It cannot be impotent. Moreover, only intelligent beings can act with volition. I don’t think I am asserting that this being transcends logic as this proposition appears unintelligible. An ultimate cannot transcend its personal attributes. For example, the ultimate being could not transcend goodness, or justice, in any non - platonist sense.
Dr Adequate writes:
Because the theist believes in the existence of an "agent" who is an uncaused cause, but not a "state" or "event". Way to assume the thing to be proved.
The reasoning here is not circular in my opinion. The agent is the least arbitrary stopping point in what would be an infinite regress of causes. I think the Kalam argument cogently precludes such a regress. The question really is are the two premisses true? If so, the conclusion follows logically.
Dr Adequate writes:
You really shouldn't use the words: "according to the Kalam Cosmological Argument" when the correctness of that argument is the very thing you're trying to justify.
Agree. I really thought of changing this statement to on theism.
Dr Adequate writes:
You're not "aware of" this "agent", either. You're trying to infer it. You can't go: "God is the only thing I know of that could create the universe, the universe exists, therefore God created it, therefore I know that there is a God."
Correct. I do infer an uncaused cause. As for being aware of the agent, I contend that I amnot exclusively for reasons listed here. Moreover, I think inference to the best explanation is wholly justified in the absence of some defeater. The argument need not demonstrate absolute proof, but need only be more plausible than its negation. Evidence that constitutes warrant for one, however, may be trivial for another. The argument only need have greater explanatory scope and explanatory power than rival hypotheses. I think these burdens are carried by the KCA.
Dr Adequate writes:
Starting with a blank slate and no theological presuppositions, we don't know what caused the universe; therefore ... we don't know what caused the universe. That's about it.
I respect your agnosticism on this subject; it would be my default position if I were not convinced of theism.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 47 by Dr Adequate, posted 02-26-2012 7:18 PM Dr Adequate has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 50 by Dr Adequate, posted 02-27-2012 8:26 PM Shimbabwe has not replied
 Message 51 by PaulK, posted 02-28-2012 1:37 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 52 of 177 (654235)
02-28-2012 9:55 AM
Reply to: Message 51 by PaulK
02-28-2012 1:37 AM


Re: Reply to PAulK
PaulK writes:
Personally I find it very questionable to assume that personal agents and only personal agents are capable of truly random behaviour. The assumption of near-universal determinism with a sole exemption for personal agents does not seem very reasonable to me.
Perhaps I have not articulated this point well. I am not asserting that random behavior is a property of personal beings exclusively. I am not taking a position at all on the plausibility of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, for example. I do, however, contend that volitional acts are exclusive to persons.
PaulK writes:
But that is not the point. The point, which you have evaded is how an agent - especially a timeless agent - escapes the objections that rule out both event and state causation. An argument by elimination that relies on NOT examining the preferred option (because it would also be eliminated) is not reasonable at all. It is not even honest.
Once again, I may have misstated my claim, here. We are nevertheless getting closer to the crux of the argument. The perceptual analysis would go something like this. The initial cause must be immaterialit cannot be constrained by space sans the universe. The cause must be timelessit cannot be constrained by time sans the universe. The cause must be powerful in that it brings about creatio ex nihilo. The cause must be personal because creative acts are volitional, otherwise the entity would exist contingently.
The (meta) physical evidence would be something like this. The cause of the universeon the standard modelcannot be material or else matter would have existed before it existed, which is illogical. The cause cannot be an eternally existing physical state or its effect would also be eternal, e.g. a bowling ball sitting on a cushion from infinity (The weight and density of the bowling ball has obviously created the effect; nevertheless, these entities may be conjoined from eternity for all we know.); a body of water existing eternally in a temperature of -100 degrees Fahrenheit would be perpetually frozen. Moreover the universe has been shown to have a beginning (Borde, Guth, Vilenkin) ; therefore, an eternally existing universe is improbable.
PaulK writes:
I think that there is an equivocation here. A non-physical state is still a state - you can't rule out state causation simply by ruling out a physical state as cause (and you can't even do that). The existence of a non-physical entity necessarily entails the existence of non-physical states, so if you want to rule out state causation you cannot appeal to the assumption that there is no physical state that could be responsible.
And would not a volitional decision count as an event ? In ruling out events are you not ruling out volition as we understand it ?
For the sake of argument, I’ll grant that the act of volition is an event(This is currently debated among philosophers.). Why then cannot the act of volition be the first event? I see no problem with this notion. Moreover, I argue, with William Lane Craig et al, that it doesn’t make sense to ask, what is the state prior to the universe? There simply is no prior in the temporal sense.
As for the physical state, it is precluded already by the above argument inferred from KCA. There is no equivocation. On the non-physical state, appealing to the Standard Model, there is nothing prior to the universe. All states, as it were, came into being concurrent with the initial singularity.
I simply contend that neither states nor eventspersonal or otherwiseexist chronologically prior to the universe. (e.g. The old South Pole analogy.) Nevertheless, some theistic philosophers do hold views that allow cognitive events to take place prior to the universe. I do not.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 51 by PaulK, posted 02-28-2012 1:37 AM PaulK has replied

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 Message 53 by jar, posted 02-28-2012 10:09 AM Shimbabwe has not replied
 Message 54 by PaulK, posted 02-28-2012 12:21 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 55 of 177 (654333)
02-29-2012 9:49 AM
Reply to: Message 54 by PaulK
02-28-2012 12:21 PM


Re: Reply to PAulK
PaulK writes:
Now, the question at hand is how you eliminate agent and state causes without also eliminating agent causes - especially timeless agent causes (if such a thing even makes sense).
I must admit here, I don’t feel the force of this objection. Moreover, it is not within the purview of KCA to preclude causal states or causal events, only to show that they are contingent upon and subordinate to an ultimate. This ultimate causea personal and immaterial agent which may exist a-temporally is free to act with volition in order to produce either states or events as effects. These secondary states or events may be causally prior toor chronologically prior to other states or events in the chain, as it were. They may not be (causally or chronologically) prior to the ultimate cause.
PaulK writes:
OK, maybe I jumped the gun a little, although that is certainly one of Craig's arguments. But this leaves open the question of why you think that you need to invoke volition at all.
This seems to be the next thing that is possibly relevant
Does "eternal" essentially mean "timeless" here ? If not, how is it relevant ? And if it does mean "timeless" doesn't it rule out any timeless cause ?
No. Timeless means not subject to temporal succession or temporal becoming; atemporal . Eternal would be synonymous with infinity on my view. In regard to matter, I should probably use a qualifier e.g. past-eternal, future-eternal. A physical being can neither be eternal nor timeless because it is subject to temporal becoming and to the laws that govern nature, e.g. decay etc. Additionally, a physical entity, it seems, must have an absolute beginning. An immaterial entity, on the other hand, is not subject to temporal becoming in the way physical states or physical events are. It may be timeless.
For the sake of argument, I’ll grant that the act of volition is an event(This is currently debated among philosophers.). Why then cannot the act of volition be the first event?
PaulK writes:
This utterly fails to address the question. The question is how do you rule out event causes without ruling out volition.
I don’t think it is necessary to rule out event causes, only an infinite regress of (event) causes for Kalam to be credible in this regard. Again, a beginningless entity would not be subject to this principle.
PaulK writes:
I didn't raise the issue of priority. But since you do, Craig invokes the notion of logical priority instead of temporal priority. If your proposed cause is not even logically prior to the universe, how can you say that it is a cause at all ?
I would agree with Craig on this point. I prefer the usage of causally prior; but, that would be splitting hairs. I suppose logically prior works fine, with one caveat. Logical priority does not imply causal efficacy.
PaulK writes:
Again a complete failure to address the point. The equivocation is in arguing solely against physical states when attempting to rule out all state causes - including non-physical state causes. Simply reiterating that you are arguing against a physical state cause - when you should be arguing against all state causes - hardly contradicts that.
So, what is your argument against a non-physical, logically prior state cause ?
I take no stance against Craig’s argument as you state itpun intendedand I hope I have addressed your other concerns in the above discussions. If you are suggesting that the ultimate cause is a state cause, I have to say I disagree, as I regard this immaterial cause as an agent, or indeed a person. I have not hidden my inclination toward theism in this thread.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 54 by PaulK, posted 02-28-2012 12:21 PM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 56 by PaulK, posted 02-29-2012 12:27 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 57 of 177 (654376)
02-29-2012 7:28 PM
Reply to: Message 56 by PaulK
02-29-2012 12:27 PM


Re: Reply to PAulK
Shimbabwe writes:
I must admit here, I don’t feel the force of this objection.
PaulK writes:
It's a question, not an objection. And one you seem unable or unwilling to answer.
Of course, it could lead to the objection that your position was logically inconsistent, which would seem to have adequate force.
If my attempts to clarify thus far have failed, perhaps I am unable to answer it.
Shimbabwe writes:
Moreover, it is not within the purview of KCA to preclude causal states or causal events, only to show that they are contingent upon and subordinate to an ultimate
PaulK writes:
Then let me remind you of what we are discussing. You claimed that:
The theist in this context would, nevertheless, assert that there are three primary types of causation, state, event, or agentsome would argue only two. By default agent causation is the only viable candidate for the theist because the other alternatives would necessarily introduce an infinite regress of events or an eternal universe, both of which are untenable according to the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
PaulK writes:
The question here is whether the same arguments that eliminate state and event causation would also apply to your preferred option, causation by a timeless agent. If they do then your position is logically inconsistent and must contain some error.
Very well then; the answer is no. The other candidates are ruled out as ultimate causes because they are neither timeless, nor beginningless, nor immaterial, and are consequently subject to all the laws of nature, as well as to temporal becoming. I have yet to suggest they be eliminated as secondary states, secondary events, or proximate causes.
As for your objection to volition, perhaps one may posit an immaterial, transcendent, beginningless, changeless, and powerful, entity that brought the universe into existence (ex nihilo) without volition; but, I have no idea what that might be.
PaulK writes:
Now let us note that you certainly assume the existence of states and apparently even the existence of events in your logically prior timeless realm. And you need to be able to eliminate these possibilities for your claim to be true. It is very odd then, that these are completely ignored in all your discussion, because they are the most important cases to be dealt with.
I think my views are implicit in my replies thus far. So, I briefly mentioned the position you describe, which is held by some theologians, in an earlier post; however, I reject this view on philosophical grounds. I don’t hold the view that a succession of events (cognitive or otherwise) can take place timelessly without the universe. You have ascribed it to me. I maintain the position, as before, that this is an unintelligible proposition equivalent to asserting that some thing existed before anything existed. My somewhat curt reply seems the only alternative for making the point.
Moreover, I don’t think the position I hold is illogical. I do not confer state-ness on an immaterial, timeless, beginningless, entity as you claim. I am asserting that statesand events, as a matter of fact exist in time. If you wish to confer state-ness to this first cause, that is your prerogativeand you may very well be justified. I think, conversely, this is tantamount to assigning the property of nothingness to nothing. Therefore, I have not suggested the idea in any of my replies. If so, I erred in making the assertion.
The uncaused cause did not exist in a state of timelessness as it were, biding its time until the moment of creation. There is no before state. Some have trouble conceptualizing the ideaI am not suggesting you do. And, for this reason, I think, Dr. Dawkins (erroneously) contends, as he has remarked on occasion, that the universe must first exist if the gods are to have a place to stand. I reject this notion, even if he is half joking.
I agree with the scientific evidence on the standard model that nothing exists temporally prior to the universe. This is not mere word play. Dr. Craig (et al) suggests that the proposed ultimate cause is timeless without the universe and temporal in relation to the universe. I have not explored this option fully; but, I see no reason to reject it. The agent may be changeless but not immutable in that case.
All this being said, I speak merely as a layman on these topics; so, my assumptions are to be taken as that. I am open to other views, including yours. On balance, there remain scores of people who are not convinced by the Kalam argument. I happen to believe that it is not only logically sound, but that it is a good argument. The KCA is but one element of a comprehensive proposal for theism. Even so, I find it convincing as a standalone argument.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : No reason given.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : Typo-Omission

This message is a reply to:
 Message 56 by PaulK, posted 02-29-2012 12:27 PM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 58 by PaulK, posted 03-01-2012 1:54 AM Shimbabwe has replied
 Message 59 by New Cat's Eye, posted 03-01-2012 4:09 PM Shimbabwe has not replied
 Message 61 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-02-2012 12:53 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 60 of 177 (654510)
03-01-2012 9:51 PM
Reply to: Message 58 by PaulK
03-01-2012 1:54 AM


Re: Reply to PAulK
PaulK writes:
The "other candidates" are state and event causation. This argument is, therefore, clearly nonsense.
You may have scored points with your audience on this remark. My omission of the qualifier secondary was a simple copy and paste error; I must have inadvertently hit the space bar as I changed adjectives. You certainly don't think I would contend that states are not states, do you? Thanks for pointing out the typo, nonetheless. I won't return the favor. By the by, the sentence will be edited to match my earlier statement in this thread, lest I be indicted on further equivocation charges. I assume by your silence in relation to the paragraph as a whole that you agree with the first premise of the KCA.
PaulK writes:
More likely we will reject the idea of an timeless cause altogether, since it is deeply problematic. Which may well be the reason that you won't discuss it - or perhaps it is simply beyond your understanding.
I have not yet rejected the idea. You have failed to articulate a view at all on the idea of timelessness. Simply taking swipes at straw men will not ameliorate this glaring problem.
PaulK writes:
Now you are badly misrepresenting the discussion. All that was said was that I regarded a volitional decision as an event and you said that you were willing to accept that. Since you regard the creation of our universe as a volitional act it would seem to follow that you accept the possibility of timeless events. I did NOT claim to believe in timeless events myself (and in fact I reject the idea).
I don't hold the view that timeless events are possible, nor have I suggested you hold this view--It seems we agree on this point. I merely stated that you attributed this view to me which is a false assumption--perhaps the term ascribed is foreign to you. Metric conventionalism simply does not appeal to me. Moreover, any event taking place must, I believe, be in time. This intuition is neither problematic nor illogical on my view. Even on A theory of time, events may be simultaneous with their cause(s). On a static view this is even less problematic. My reply also addresses your assumption that the cause need (already) be temporal prior to the event. This is simply not true, e.g. A volitional act may be simultaneous with an event. You seem to infer a passage of time between the cause and event. I disagree with this assessment.
PaulK writes:
Well there we see the problem. You claim that your position is not illogical and then go on to make a completely illogical claim... Of course an immaterial, timeless, beginningless entity will have states - indeed it's existence itself would be considered a state or part of one.
This is a common materialist misconception; conferring states upon the absence of such, e.g. the state of nothingness. This, I suspect, is why you have difficulty espousing or perhaps understanding the KCA.
PaulK writes:
If you feel that it is absurd to state that your "first cause" exists, then so be it.
I have not implied this. Again, you fail to understand my view.
PaulK writes:
I would see a fundamental problem with it. Change (unlike states) would seem to be necessarily temporal. Thus to cease being timeless and become temporal would - in being a change - require that the entity is ALREADY temporal.
How could an already temporal entity cease being timeless if it never was timeless. This is patently absurd! It seems you have either mischaracterized your straw man or perhaps misunderstood the argument.
PaulK writes:
I suspect that Craig introduced the idea because a changeless cause must of necessity be always producing it's effect which in Craig's view requires that the effect must be eternal.
Again, this is an absurd notion! It completely fails to appreciate the volitional aspect of an agent cause.
PaulK writes:
This seems to involve an badly mistaken view of eternity, but unfortunately the error is intrinsic to Craig's version of the Kalam argument so he cannot admit it and deal with it.
I have no need to defend Craig, as I disagree with him on a few things, myself.
PaulK writes:
Another fundamental problem is how we may infer a timeless cause, something I have already alluded to. If there is no time prior to the existence of our universe (a speculative idea at this point) then it follows that our universe has "always" existed (for all of time) - it has never failed to exist.
Nonsense! This simply does not follow at all. I would call it affirming the consequent. In addition, you err by using the verbiage prior to the universe; then you insist it has never failed to exist!
PaulK writes:
THerefore we cannot require a cause to bring it into existence because it never was brought into existence. This leaves the Kalam argument dead in the water. Indeed, it follows that our universe must exist timelessly - time is something within our universe not something that can be taken as an "external" perspective. You can argue that a cause might somehow be possible, but even if you can that is a long way from successfully arguing that there IS a cause (and if timelessly existing entities can be caused then you cannot rely on the invocation of timelessness to assume that the cause of our universe did not itself have a cause).
Hardly. I will address this at a later time as I have company just now.
One final note:My rejection of particular causes--whether they are state, event, or agent causes--need not consign me to the position that all such causes be eliminated. This illogical proposition would eliminate any and all causes. Why should I not eliminate material causes as primary on my view for reasons already discussed? Material entities simply don't arise spontaneously, quantum fluctuation models notwithstanding; nor do they exist infinitely in the past.
I granted that timelessness is a state for arguments sake, and you wish to press me on this issue. I simply will not espouse the proposition that the causal entity I infer existed in a timeless state, temporally prior to its effect, the effect in this case being the inception of the universe. I have addressed this concern on a number of occasions, and maintain my position that it is a non sequitur
Edited by Shimbabwe, : Formatting error

This message is a reply to:
 Message 58 by PaulK, posted 03-01-2012 1:54 AM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 62 by PaulK, posted 03-02-2012 2:06 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 63 of 177 (654726)
03-03-2012 10:37 AM
Reply to: Message 62 by PaulK
03-02-2012 2:06 AM


Re: Reply to PAulK
Hello PaulK, my new internet friend. I am sorry if you were offended by my behavior, which was in jest. You can rest assured that offending was not my intent. I was simply returning tit for tat; as I felt you were being facetious. Now back to the discussion. Perhaps I should refocus on the two premises of the KCA.
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence.
What is your opinion on this premiss? Why is it problematicas you have indicatedon your view?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 62 by PaulK, posted 03-02-2012 2:06 AM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 64 by Percy, posted 03-03-2012 11:44 AM Shimbabwe has replied
 Message 67 by PaulK, posted 03-03-2012 4:57 PM Shimbabwe has replied
 Message 68 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-03-2012 5:28 PM Shimbabwe has not replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 69 of 177 (654761)
03-03-2012 9:14 PM
Reply to: Message 64 by Percy
03-03-2012 11:44 AM


Re: Reply to PAulK
Percy writes:
This is falsified by the existence of virtual particles that flit in and out of existence with no cause whatsoever.
The evidence for short lived virtual particles on vacuum fluctuation models is not a refutation of the first premiss. These particles, though indeterminate on Heisenberg, are subsumed in a vast sea of energywhich is not nothing and do not come to exist at any specific point. Effectively, they already exist in the vacuum. Moreover, indeterminacy isn’t the only game in town, though I concede here it is the prevailing view.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 64 by Percy, posted 03-03-2012 11:44 AM Percy has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 70 by Percy, posted 03-03-2012 9:21 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 71 of 177 (654763)
03-03-2012 9:28 PM
Reply to: Message 61 by Dr Adequate
03-02-2012 12:53 AM


Re: Reply to PAulK
Dr. Adequate writes:
And we are in a particularly poor position to find out. If I had spent my whole life inside a large hollow tree, how much do you suppose I would know about the origin of trees? What could I know? In order to find that out I'd have to escape to the wider world in which trees are situated. If I supposed that they were built by something much like myself, this would be all very anthropomorphic, and a great sop to my vanity, but it would also be completely wrong. And if you showed me a tiny seed, I suspect that I would laugh at you ... but so it is, that's how it works.
I won’t attempt to chop down this tree analogy, as I take great liberty with it in making a point. It actually quite strengthens my view. It is conceded here that the intention of your analogy may be viewed, in some sense, as a mark against theism. On closer examination, however, this is not necessarily the case. For this analogy to hold, the tree-universe must be at least observable from the inside.
We could deduceperhaps over a vast amount of time and many generationsthat our tree-universe were expanding, decaying etc. Much like our real universe, we may be able to extrapolate from these known facts, among others, that our tree-universe had a beginning and that it is not future eternal. Perhaps the seed, which you have shown me, would be meaninglessan event horizon precluding my certainty. This, however, would be irrelevant to my inferring that this tree-universe had an absolute beginning, irrespective of the number of other tree-universes existing outside the purview of my knowledge.
To posit a tree-multiverse at this point would be highly speculative, though in your analogy it would be true. It could just as easily be falsewe wouldn’t know. The tree-universe in which I found myself may be the only one. If more than one tree-universe existed, or even a tree-multiverse, this would in no way lessen the need to explain the tree-universe planter. Additionally, the tree-universe planter would be unknowablea point for agnosticismunless the tree-universe planter wished to poke a hole in the side of my tree-universe and reveal itself. Agent causation in the ultimate sense would be plausible in that case.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : formatting error-squigglies

This message is a reply to:
 Message 61 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-02-2012 12:53 AM Dr Adequate has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 74 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-04-2012 2:13 AM Shimbabwe has not replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3870 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 72 of 177 (654766)
03-03-2012 10:54 PM
Reply to: Message 70 by Percy
03-03-2012 9:21 PM


Re: Reply to PAulK
Percy writes:
But everything has a cause, right? What causes virtual particles to flit into existence?
At the expense of appearing petty, I will say no. Everything that BEGINS to exist has a cause according to Kalam. I suppose the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument would address this issue, but that is not up for discussion. It is not within the purview of the KCA to do so.
As to what causes virtual particles to flit into existence? I have virtually no idea.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 70 by Percy, posted 03-03-2012 9:21 PM Percy has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 73 by Evlreala, posted 03-03-2012 11:41 PM Shimbabwe has not replied
 Message 75 by Percy, posted 03-04-2012 8:07 AM Shimbabwe has not replied

  
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