The Kalam cosmological argument

I wholeheartedly disagree90% caused me to chuckle a bit. I think the terms are quite clear; though I will stop short of asserting they are univocal. Based on your quotations, I think you agree that proof here constitutes an unnecessary burden. I would argue that these terms are self evident and don’t require further explanation. Perhaps we could lay aside the wordplay for the time being and think about the merits of the argument. This is, after all, a discussion about the KCAsemantics notwithstanding. You may not agree that the terms are descriptive of an ultra-mundane being, but you obviously apprehend their meanings. As before, proof may or may not be instantiated by the use of these terms; nonetheless, I do not accept your assertion that the language as stated is equivocal or otherwise unintelligible.Moreover, the idea of a multiverse seems quite superfluous. Are you then advocating a necessarily existent universe or ensemble of universes? (I think I know the answer to this somewhat rhetorical question.) I agree there are a number of models that indeed hypothesize many-worlds; however, most are tenuous at best or even speculative. E.g. bubble universe models; quantum tunneling models; chaotic inflationary models; the Hartle-Hawking model etc. These theories are metaphysical in nature and may never be subject to empirical falsification. So, in this regard at least, they are on equal footing with the God hypothesis. Not so fast. There are a great number of possible explanations for apparent fine tuning, the Hartle — Hawking model being just one. I certainly wouldn’t call it a clear example, as it remains to be seen whether or not conclusive evidence existsaside from mathematical postulatesin support of the Hartle-Hawking model. Further, it is argued by proponents of KCA that mathematical concepts such as those invoked by Hawking et al are not feasible in the actual world. There are other reasons why the model should not be espoused over competing models; however, the lack of evidence is its most significant hurdle. For this reason alone, one should proceed with caution. Further, I see no reason to discardor build upon by extrapolationthe standard model. Even if a multiverse is possible, what possible explanations can it hold? If an infinite number of universes formed simultaneously (Vilenkin et al), and each was excised by an event horizonsuch that they would never coalesce, and an observer in each universe would perceive an absolute beginningwhere does this lead, and why would this seemingly metaphysical concept be posited? I have my suspicions, but that is for another discussion altogether. The fine tuning has also been recognized by the majority of scientists which I think constitutes strong evidencein the neutral, a-religious, sense. Your assertion, however, presupposes the anthropic principle and the viability of the multi-verse as a whole, which have already been show to be speculative; it is therefore unsubstantiated. Ok. What relevance does it have? I am quite familiar with this concept as it relates to space time boundries, in both the standard model and the Hartle-Hawking scenario, among others. Nevertheless, I see no relevance to the Kalam Argument. Please enlighten me. No comment about the definition of non-being except to refer you to my initial statement on definitions. Thank you for the concession regarding quantum theory. I think we agree on a number of things, based on my readings of your recent posts. I have been an inactive member here for almost a decade and have learned a great deal from persons like you. I am not a dogmatist in regard to most topics. I am, however, a theist who writes on these topics as a mere lay person; so please forgive my ignorance on some matters. I hope that my somewhat abrupt appearance and my subjective opinions revealed in this discussion do not offend. Thank you again for responding in a cordial fashion.Regards,
Shimbabwe

There's no reason why an agent should be exempt from any reasoning that one might apply to states or events. In fact, anyone not wishing to split unsplittable hairs might use the term "thing" to include the whole lot of 'em.I don't see why the mere property of intelligence, when added to a thing, allows it to transcend logic. It takes more than being smart to manage that. Because the theist believes in the existence of an "agent" who is an uncaused cause, but not a "state" or "event". Way to assume the thing to be proved. You really shouldn't use the words: "according to the Kalam Cosmological Argument" when the correctness of that argument is the very thing you're trying to justify. You're not "aware of" this "agent", either. You're trying to infer it. You can't go: "God is the only thing I know of that could create the universe, the universe exists, therefore God created it, therefore I know that there is a God."Starting with a blank slate and no theological presuppositions, we don't know what caused the universe, therefore ... we don't know what caused the universe. That's about it.

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I wholeheartedly disagree90% caused me to chuckle a bit. I think the terms are quite clear; though I will stop short of asserting they are univocal.

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Based on my personal experience I am afraid that I have to say that most supporters of the Kalam argument seem to view "timeless" as a meaningless label, a label that is only used because it is theologically convenient.For instance consider the premise that "everything that begins to exist has a cause". If there is no time prior to the universe does it really "begin to exist" as we would normally understand it ? Can we really extend an intuitive claim to a situation that is radically different from our experience in a way that directly challenges that intuition ?Consider also how the notion of timelessness affects our ideas of causation. Is a timeless agent cause significantly different from state causation ? I would think not.I would also like to point out that the multiple-universe scenarios are not proposed simply to explain "fine tuning". They are a consequence of theoretical work - speculative, yes, but so are all competing hypotheses. This in itself puts it above the "fine tuner" idea which has no such basis (and has other problems, too). Really you are treading very close to rejecting multiple universes BECAUSE they explain "fine tuning" which is obviously not a valid position.

An agentwhom I reckon as a thing, of courseneed not be exempt from reasoning. The difference is that it may act volitionally. This capability is necessary if the being is to perform creative act(s). There is nothing inherently unreasonable about a being who acts volitionally in a non — deterministic fashion.Granted your assertion about states or events may be trueI’m not sure about that. I would argue that no events occurred before the universe. It is also plausible that no physical state of affairs exists outside the universe; whereas an immaterial entitythat exists timelessly without the universe in an undifferentiated statemay will to create time and matter and space etc. Yes. This is precisely why theists press the idea of an enormously powerful entity. It cannot be impotent. Moreover, only intelligent beings can act with volition. I don’t think I am asserting that this being transcends logic as this proposition appears unintelligible. An ultimate cannot transcend its personal attributes. For example, the ultimate being could not transcend goodness, or justice, in any non - platonist sense. The reasoning here is not circular in my opinion. The agent is the least arbitrary stopping point in what would be an infinite regress of causes. I think the Kalam argument cogently precludes such a regress. The question really is are the two premisses true? If so, the conclusion follows logically. Agree. I really thought of changing this statement to on theism. Correct. I do infer an uncaused cause. As for being aware of the agent, I contend that I amnot exclusively for reasons listed here. Moreover, I think inference to the best explanation is wholly justified in the absence of some defeater. The argument need not demonstrate absolute proof, but need only be more plausible than its negation. Evidence that constitutes warrant for one, however, may be trivial for another. The argument only need have greater explanatory scope and explanatory power than rival hypotheses. I think these burdens are carried by the KCA. I respect your agnosticism on this subject; it would be my default position if I were not convinced of theism.

But not causative ones. Alternatively the reverse is also plausible --- that the "state of affairs" exists but the "entity" that "wills" does not. What I meant was that any argument against a thing causing the universe is not escaped by a thing that thinks. Why? I think it needs to be more plausible than saying: "we don't know". Well in that case the KCA isn't much use, is it? If you have to be convinced of theism before you find it plausible, then since the purpose of it is to make theism plausible, it doesn't do the job it's meant to do.Edited by Dr Adequate, : No reason given.

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An agentwhom I reckon as a thing, of courseneed not be exempt from reasoning. The difference is that it may act volitionally. This capability is necessary if the being is to perform creative act(s). There is nothing inherently unreasonable about a being who acts volitionally in a non — deterministic fashion.

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Personally I find it very questionable to assume that personal agents and only personal agents are capable of truly random behaviour. The assumption of near-universal determinism with a sole exemption for personal agents does not seem very reasonable to me.But that is not the point. The point, which you have evaded is how an agent - especially a timeless agent - escapes the objections that rule out both event and state causation. An argument by elimination that relies on NOT examining the preferred option (because it would also be eliminated) is not reasonable at all. It is not even honest.

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Granted your assertion about states or events may be trueI’m not sure about that. I would argue that no events occurred before the universe. It is also plausible that no physical state of affairs exists outside the universe; whereas an immaterial entitythat exists timelessly without the universe in an undifferentiated statemay will to create time and matter and space etc.

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I think that there is an equivocation here. A non-physical state is still a state - you can't rule out state causation simply by ruling out a physical state as cause (and you can't even do that). The existence of a non-physical entity necessarily entails the existence of non-physical states, so if you want to rule out state causation you cannot appeal to the assumption that there is no physical state that could be responsible.And would not a volitional decision count as an event ? In ruling out events are you not ruling out volition as we understand it ?

Perhaps I have not articulated this point well. I am not asserting that random behavior is a property of personal beings exclusively. I am not taking a position at all on the plausibility of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, for example. I do, however, contend that volitional acts are exclusive to persons. Once again, I may have misstated my claim, here. We are nevertheless getting closer to the crux of the argument. The perceptual analysis would go something like this. The initial cause must be immaterialit cannot be constrained by space sans the universe. The cause must be timelessit cannot be constrained by time sans the universe. The cause must be powerful in that it brings about creatio ex nihilo. The cause must be personal because creative acts are volitional, otherwise the entity would exist contingently.The (meta) physical evidence would be something like this. The cause of the universeon the standard modelcannot be material or else matter would have existed before it existed, which is illogical. The cause cannot be an eternally existing physical state or its effect would also be eternal, e.g. a bowling ball sitting on a cushion from infinity (The weight and density of the bowling ball has obviously created the effect; nevertheless, these entities may be conjoined from eternity for all we know.); a body of water existing eternally in a temperature of -100 degrees Fahrenheit would be perpetually frozen. Moreover the universe has been shown to have a beginning (Borde, Guth, Vilenkin) ; therefore, an eternally existing universe is improbable. For the sake of argument, I’ll grant that the act of volition is an event(This is currently debated among philosophers.). Why then cannot the act of volition be the first event? I see no problem with this notion. Moreover, I argue, with William Lane Craig et al, that it doesn’t make sense to ask, what is the state prior to the universe? There simply is no prior in the temporal sense.As for the physical state, it is precluded already by the above argument inferred from KCA. There is no equivocation. On the non-physical state, appealing to the Standard Model, there is nothing prior to the universe. All states, as it were, came into being concurrent with the initial singularity.I simply contend that neither states nor eventspersonal or otherwiseexist chronologically prior to the universe. (e.g. The old South Pole analogy.) Nevertheless, some theistic philosophers do hold views that allow cognitive events to take place prior to the universe. I do not.

Huh? Why? It simply must be not part of this universe. Huh? Why? It needs only to be not part of the space time of this universe? HUH? Why? There is lots of evidence that causes can be small, not powerful, transient and even destroyed by the very thing created. Ah, so you try to slip in "creative" under some meaning other than causative. The classic example of the carny palm the pea trick.The Kalam cosmological argument has never been anything more than a carny con.

Now, the question at hand is how you eliminate agent and state causes without also eliminating agent causes - especially timeless agent causes (if such a thing even makes sense).With that in mind:

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Perhaps I have not articulated this point well. I am not asserting that random behavior is a property of personal beings exclusively.

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OK, maybe I jumped the gun a little, although that is certainly one of Craig's arguments. But this leaves open the question of why you think that you need to invoke volition at all.This seems to be the next thing that is possibly relevant:

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The cause cannot be an eternally existing physical state or its effect would also be eternal

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Does "eternal" essentially mean "timeless" here ? If not, how is it relevant ? And if it does mean "timeless" doesn't it rule out any timeless cause ?

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For the sake of argument, I’ll grant that the act of volition is an event(This is currently debated among philosophers.). Why then cannot the act of volition be the first event?

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This utterly fails to address the question. The question is how do you rule out event causes without ruling out volition.

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Moreover, I argue, with William Lane Craig et al, that it doesn’t make sense to ask, what is the state prior to the universe? There simply is no prior in the temporal sense.

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I didn't raise the issue of priority. But since you do, Craig invokes the notion of logical priority instead of temporal priority. If your proposed cause is not even logically prior to the universe, how can you say that it is a cause at all ?

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As for the physical state, it is precluded already by the above argument inferred from KCA. There is no equivocation

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Again a complete failure to address the point. The equivocation is in arguing solely against physical states when attempting to rule out all state causes - including non-physical state causes. Simply reiterating that you are arguing against a physical state cause - when you should be arguing against all state causes - hardly contradicts that.So, what is your argument against a non-physical, logically prior state cause ?

I must admit here, I don’t feel the force of this objection. Moreover, it is not within the purview of KCA to preclude causal states or causal events, only to show that they are contingent upon and subordinate to an ultimate. This ultimate causea personal and immaterial agent which may exist a-temporally is free to act with volition in order to produce either states or events as effects. These secondary states or events may be causally prior toor chronologically prior to other states or events in the chain, as it were. They may not be (causally or chronologically) prior to the ultimate cause. No. Timeless means not subject to temporal succession or temporal becoming; atemporal . Eternal would be synonymous with infinity on my view. In regard to matter, I should probably use a qualifier e.g. past-eternal, future-eternal. A physical being can neither be eternal nor timeless because it is subject to temporal becoming and to the laws that govern nature, e.g. decay etc. Additionally, a physical entity, it seems, must have an absolute beginning. An immaterial entity, on the other hand, is not subject to temporal becoming in the way physical states or physical events are. It may be timeless.For the sake of argument, I’ll grant that the act of volition is an event(This is currently debated among philosophers.). Why then cannot the act of volition be the first event? I don’t think it is necessary to rule out event causes, only an infinite regress of (event) causes for Kalam to be credible in this regard. Again, a beginningless entity would not be subject to this principle. I would agree with Craig on this point. I prefer the usage of causally prior; but, that would be splitting hairs. I suppose logically prior works fine, with one caveat. Logical priority does not imply causal efficacy. I take no stance against Craig’s argument as you state itpun intendedand I hope I have addressed your other concerns in the above discussions. If you are suggesting that the ultimate cause is a state cause, I have to say I disagree, as I regard this immaterial cause as an agent, or indeed a person. I have not hidden my inclination toward theism in this thread.

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I must admit here, I don’t feel the force of this objection

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It's a question, not an objection. And one you seem unable or unwilling to answer.
Of course, it could lead to the objection that your position was logically inconsistent, which would seem to have adequate force.

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Moreover, it is not within the purview of KCA to preclude causal states or causal events, only to show that they are contingent upon and subordinate to an ultimate

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Then let me remind you of what we are discussing. You claimed that: The question here is whether the same arguments that eliminate state and event causation would also apply to your preferred option, causation by a timeless agent. If they do then your position is logically inconsistent and must contain some error.Now let us note that you certainly assume the existence of states and apparently even the existence of events in your logically prior timeless realm. And you need to be able to eliminate these possibilities for your claim to be true. It is very odd then, that these are completely ignored in all your discussion, because they are the most important cases to be dealt with.

If my attempts to clarify thus far have failed, perhaps I am unable to answer it. Very well then; the answer is no. The other candidates are ruled out as ultimate causes because they are neither timeless, nor beginningless, nor immaterial, and are consequently subject to all the laws of nature, as well as to temporal becoming. I have yet to suggest they be eliminated as secondary states, secondary events, or proximate causes.As for your objection to volition, perhaps one may posit an immaterial, transcendent, beginningless, changeless, and powerful, entity that brought the universe into existence (ex nihilo) without volition; but, I have no idea what that might be. I think my views are implicit in my replies thus far. So, I briefly mentioned the position you describe, which is held by some theologians, in an earlier post; however, I reject this view on philosophical grounds. I don’t hold the view that a succession of events (cognitive or otherwise) can take place timelessly without the universe. You have ascribed it to me. I maintain the position, as before, that this is an unintelligible proposition equivalent to asserting that some thing existed before anything existed. My somewhat curt reply seems the only alternative for making the point.Moreover, I don’t think the position I hold is illogical. I do not confer state-ness on an immaterial, timeless, beginningless, entity as you claim. I am asserting that statesand events, as a matter of fact exist in time. If you wish to confer state-ness to this first cause, that is your prerogativeand you may very well be justified. I think, conversely, this is tantamount to assigning the property of nothingness to nothing. Therefore, I have not suggested the idea in any of my replies. If so, I erred in making the assertion.The uncaused cause did not exist in a state of timelessness as it were, biding its time until the moment of creation. There is no before state. Some have trouble conceptualizing the ideaI am not suggesting you do. And, for this reason, I think, Dr. Dawkins (erroneously) contends, as he has remarked on occasion, that the universe must first exist if the gods are to have a place to stand. I reject this notion, even if he is half joking.I agree with the scientific evidence on the standard model that nothing exists temporally prior to the universe. This is not mere word play. Dr. Craig (et al) suggests that the proposed ultimate cause is timeless without the universe and temporal in relation to the universe. I have not explored this option fully; but, I see no reason to reject it. The agent may be changeless but not immutable in that case.All this being said, I speak merely as a layman on these topics; so, my assumptions are to be taken as that. I am open to other views, including yours. On balance, there remain scores of people who are not convinced by the Kalam argument. I happen to believe that it is not only logically sound, but that it is a good argument. The KCA is but one element of a comprehensive proposal for theism. Even so, I find it convincing as a standalone argument.Edited by Shimbabwe, : No reason given.Edited by Shimbabwe, : Typo-Omission

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If my attempts to clarify thus far have failed, perhaps I am unable to answer it.

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I would say that you have yet to even offer a genuine attempt at answering the question. Whether that is because you don't understand the Kalam argument or because the answer would reveal a problem in your position I cannot know,

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Very well then; the answer is no. The other candidates are ruled out as ultimate causes because they are neither timeless, nor beginningless, nor immaterial, and are consequently subject to all the laws of nature, as well as to temporal becoming. I have yet to suggest they be eliminated as states, events, or proximate causes.

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The "other candidates" are state and event causation. This argument is, therefore, clearly nonsense.

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As for your objection to volition, perhaps one may posit an immaterial, transcendent, beginningless, changeless, and powerful, entity that brought the universe into existence (ex nihilo) without volition; but, I have no idea what that might be.

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More likely we will reject the idea of an timeless cause altogether, since it is deeply problematic. Which may well be the reason that you won't discuss it - or perhaps it is simply beyond your understanding.

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I think my views are implicit in my replies thus far.

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What I find implicit in your answers is an inability to discuss the Kalam argument.

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So, I briefly mentioned the position you describe, which is held by some theologians, in an earlier post; however, I reject this view on philosophical grounds. I don’t hold the view that a succession of events (cognitive or otherwise) can take place timelessly without the universe. You have ascribed it to me. I maintain the position, as before, that this is an unintelligible proposition equivalent to asserting that some thing existed before anything existed. My somewhat curt reply seems the only alternative for making the point.

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Now you are badly misrepresenting the discussion. All that was said was that I regarded a volitional decision as an event and you said that you were willing to accept that. Since you regard the creation of our universe as a volitional act it would seem to follow that you accept the possibility of timeless events. I did NOT claim to believe in timeless events myself (and in fact I reject the idea).

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Moreover, I don’t think the position I hold is illogical. I do not confer state-ness on an immaterial, timeless, beginningless, entity as you claim.

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Well there we see the problem. You claim that your position is not illogical and then go on to make a completely illogical claim... Of course an immaterial, timeless, beginningless entity will have states - indeed it's existence itself would be considered a state or part of one.

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I am asserting that statesand events, as a matter of fact exist in time. If you wish to confer state-ness to this first cause, that is your prerogativeand you may very well be justified. I think, conversely, this is tantamount to assigning the property of nothingness to nothing. Therefore, I have not suggested the idea in any of my replies. If so, I erred in making the assertion.

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If you feel that it is absurd to state that your "first cause" exists, then so be it.

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The uncaused cause did not exist in a state of timelessness as it were, biding its time until the moment of creation. There is no before state. Some have trouble conceptualizing the ideaI am not suggesting you do. And, for this reason, I think, Dr. Dawkins (erroneously) contends, as he has remarked on occasion, that the universe must first exist if the gods are to have a place to stand. I reject this notion, even if he is half joking.

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I don't see any point in raising an objection that you don't feel applies. And I suspect that you fail to understand Dawkins' point (which at the least is sensible in that an absence of space entails the absence of any places to be).

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I agree with the scientific evidence on the standard model that nothing exists temporally prior to the universe. This is not mere word play. Dr. Craig (et al) suggests that the proposed ultimate cause is timeless without the universe and temporal in relation to the universe. I have not explored this option fully; but, I see no reason to reject it. The agent may be changeless but not immutable in that case.

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I would see a fundamental problem with it. Change (unlike states) would seem to be necessarily temporal. Thus to cease being timeless and become temporal would - in being a change - require that the entity is ALREADY temporal.I suspect that Craig introduced the idea because a changeless cause must of necessity be always producing it's effect which in Craig's view requires that the effect must be eternal. This seems to involve an badly mistaken view of eternity, but unfortunately the error is intrinsic to Craig's version of the Kalam argument so he cannot admit it and deal with it.Another fundamental problem is how we may infer a timeless cause, something I have already alluded to. If there is no time prior to the existence of our universe (a speculative idea at this point) then it follows that our universe has "always" existed (for all of time) - it has never failed to exist. THerefore we cannot require a cause to bring it into existence because it never was brought into existence. This leaves the Kalam argument dead in the water. Indeed, it follows that our universe must exist timelessly - time is something within our universe not something that can be taken as an "external" perspective. You can argue that a cause might somehow be possible, but even if you can that is a long way from successfully arguing that there IS a cause (and if timelessly existing entities can be caused then you cannot rely on the invocation of timelessness to assume that the cause of our universe did not itself have a cause).

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All this being said, I speak merely as a layman on these topics; so, my assumptions are to be taken as that. I am open to other views, including yours. On balance, there remain scores of people who are not convinced by the Kalam argument. I happen to believe that it is not only logically sound, but that it is a good argument. The KCA is but one element of a comprehensive proposal for theism. Even so, I find it convincing as a standalone argument.

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I believe that you have done a good job of showing that cavediver was correct, at least to the point of providing yet more evidence that those who think that the Kalam argument is a good argument do not understand it (and I would include Craig in that).

How is a state-less, immaterial, timeless, beginningless thing different from something that just does not exist at all? What is the difference between its "existence" and non-existence?Edited by Catholic Scientist, : subtitle

You may have scored points with your audience on this remark. My omission of the qualifier secondary was a simple copy and paste error; I must have inadvertently hit the space bar as I changed adjectives. You certainly don't think I would contend that states are not states, do you? Thanks for pointing out the typo, nonetheless. I won't return the favor. By the by, the sentence will be edited to match my earlier statement in this thread, lest I be indicted on further equivocation charges. I assume by your silence in relation to the paragraph as a whole that you agree with the first premise of the KCA. I have not yet rejected the idea. You have failed to articulate a view at all on the idea of timelessness. Simply taking swipes at straw men will not ameliorate this glaring problem. I don't hold the view that timeless events are possible, nor have I suggested you hold this view--It seems we agree on this point. I merely stated that you attributed this view to me which is a false assumption--perhaps the term ascribed is foreign to you. Metric conventionalism simply does not appeal to me. Moreover, any event taking place must, I believe, be in time. This intuition is neither problematic nor illogical on my view. Even on A theory of time, events may be simultaneous with their cause(s). On a static view this is even less problematic. My reply also addresses your assumption that the cause need (already) be temporal prior to the event. This is simply not true, e.g. A volitional act may be simultaneous with an event. You seem to infer a passage of time between the cause and event. I disagree with this assessment. This is a common materialist misconception; conferring states upon the absence of such, e.g. the state of nothingness. This, I suspect, is why you have difficulty espousing or perhaps understanding the KCA. I have not implied this. Again, you fail to understand my view. Hardly. I will address this at a later time as I have company just now.One final note:My rejection of particular causes--whether they are state, event, or agent causes--need not consign me to the position that all such causes be eliminated. This illogical proposition would eliminate any and all causes. Why should I not eliminate material causes as primary on my view for reasons already discussed? Material entities simply don't arise spontaneously, quantum fluctuation models notwithstanding; nor do they exist infinitely in the past.I granted that timelessness is a state for arguments sake, and you wish to press me on this issue. I simply will not espouse the proposition that the causal entity I infer existed in a timeless state, temporally prior to its effect, the effect in this case being the inception of the universe. I have addressed this concern on a number of occasions, and maintain my position that it is a non sequitur Edited by Shimbabwe, : Formatting error