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Author Topic:   The Kalam cosmological argument
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 78 of 177 (654827)
03-04-2012 11:30 PM
Reply to: Message 67 by PaulK
03-03-2012 4:57 PM


Re: Reply to PAulK
PaulK writes:
This is problematic because it is essentially an intuitive idea, because the relationship between having a beginning and having a cause is unexplained, and because the concept of "beginning" is not adequately defined.
This means that in precisely the case we wish to consider - the zero point of time - we cannot be sure if this claim is applicable or not. Does something that has always existed (in that there is no time when it did not exist) have a beginning ? Is it does, then does it require a cause, and if so, why ?
I would say no. Something that has always existed is beginningless by definition and would require neither a cause nor an explanation of its existence on the Kalam argument. Nevertheless, I agree that this argumentas is the case with any philosophical proposalis intuitive as such and relies on a number of presuppositions. It is, nevertheless, rooted in the metaphysical principle that something cannot come from nothing. This intuition is continually reinforced by our experience, and seems quite reliable. Simply asserting that the argument is intuitive does not lead to the conclusion that the first premiss is false. As a matter of fact, intuition plays a necessary role in apprehending any and all propositional truths.
I agree with you that there was not a time when nothing existed. If timecosmological time as it werebegan to exist, simultaneous with, as a constituent of, and in relation to, all reality; then your assessment is in fact correct. We may, though, infer that at T-0 there was an absolute beginning of the universe; and this accords with the Borde, Guth, Vilenkin theorem, irrespective of the physical description of the universe or of the space-time boundary.
As to your assertion that the premiss is equivocal, I disagree. The first premiss does not commit the fallacy of equivocation since begins to exist may be defined univocally in the following manner; X begins to exist at T, if and only if X exists at T, and X does not exist at any time prior to T.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 67 by PaulK, posted 03-03-2012 4:57 PM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 81 by PaulK, posted 03-05-2012 1:37 AM Shimbabwe has replied
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Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 79 of 177 (654828)
03-04-2012 11:44 PM
Reply to: Message 77 by Percy
03-04-2012 1:23 PM


Re: Reply to PAulK
Percy writes:
You cannot begin with examples of creation that come about through the mere movement of matter around into different shapes and combinations to extrapolate to the creation of matter itself in the form of atomic particles. There is no proximal cause of atomic decay that we know of. Saying that it is the nature of some atomic nuclei to decay is just another way of saying you don't know why a particular atomic nuclei decayed when it did. The Contemporary form of the Kalam argument uses the term "external cause", and there is certainly no "external cause" for atomic decay.
One need not explain the mechanism(s) of a cause to infer a cause. Else there would be, of necessity, an infinite regress of explanations. Moreover this objection begs the question in favor of materialism. Even if one grants that virtual particles move about indeterminately without a cause, or that radioactive decay occurs without a causeI’m not saying they doneither of these facts constitutes a defeater of the first premiss of Kalam. The theist is perfectly comfortable with the idea that some events are (yet) unexplained. Moreover these events are always relational to some pre-existing state, e.g a sea of fluctuating energy on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 77 by Percy, posted 03-04-2012 1:23 PM Percy has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 82 by Percy, posted 03-05-2012 8:52 AM Shimbabwe has not replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 90 of 177 (655613)
03-11-2012 9:06 PM
Reply to: Message 81 by PaulK
03-05-2012 1:37 AM


Reply to PAulK
PaulK writes:
The Kalam argument clearly disagrees since it both insists that our universe has always existed in precisely the sense I used AND that our universe requires a cause.
I don’t think this is true at all, or else the second premiss of the KCA would refute the first premiss. If that were the case, we wouldn’t be having this discussion.
PaulK writes:
But, of course, this principle is only applicable to something which comes into existence. According to the Kalam argument there never was a time when our universe did not exist, and therefore our universe did not come into existence. Which clearly illustrates my point - an intuitive idea is being extended into a situation where it very likely does not apply.
Intuitive it may be; but, please don’t misconstrue the argument. We’re only discussing premiss one here; however, I must list premiss two and the conclusion in order to make my point. Even on a liberal reading of the premisses, it would be difficult to reconcile your assertions above with the Kalam Argument.
1. Every being which begins to exist has a cause for its existence.
2. The universe is a being which began to exist
I do agree that the premiss is only applicable to things that begin to exist. Premiss one is quite clear on that. With all due respect however, your assertion that the Kalam implies BOTH AND seems incorrect in light of the fact that the argument explicitly states; the universe began to existin premiss 2. How could it then explicate the converse? It would obviously be self-refuting.
PaulK writes:
The point is that intuition is inferior to understanding and may lead us to false conclusions - and very likely will do in situations that are radically different from our normal experience in ways that are directly relevant to the question at hand. Let us also note that the "gambler's fallacy" is a perfectly intuitive idea - but it is wrong, even in ordinary experience. A proper understanding of probability saves us from that error.
I suppose this is true if the relevant parameters are accessible; if not, intuitionhowever unreliable on your view may be the only way to attain some understanding of the data in question. Of course, empirically verifiable facts are preferred whenever possible. This fact in no way depreciates the employment of intuitive inferences. I have no way to prove I am a self, yet I have good reasons to infer it.
PaulK writes:
Which again illustrates the problem. You apparently take the view that our universe has a beginning but does not require a cause, rejecting the very premise we are discussing. But you could also have argues for a different idea of a beginning - one that rules other the specific case we are discussing - and retained the premise. Which goes back to my point that the idea of "beginning" as it appears in the Kalam argument is poorly defined.
It simply does not follow from my statements that the universe came to exist without a cause. I merely stated that there was no TIMEin the temporally prior sensebefore the universe. This in no way excludes a causallyor on your words, logicallyprior entity. I qualified the statement so as to be clear.
I understand, on your construal of the premiss, anything that could bring the universe into existence is simply defined away. It seems to me that your interpretationeven if logically soundcould be problematic. It is in fact based on your intuition that no causally prior entity exists.
PaulK writes:
Obviously simply saying that YOU can define"beginning" does not mean that the Kalam argument itself contains a clear definition. Nor does it mean that the definition you offer is the one that the Kalam argument uses - and in fact it cannot be.
I think this definition comports with a standard usage of begins to exist. The Kalam may well imply the same. I see no reason why it can’t. The definition is not a sophisticated one that would be foreign to anyone who is capable of discussing the KCA.
PaulK writes:
According to your definition, given a finite past anything that exists at T=0 has a beginning, as does anything which comes into existence later. Thus the premise "everything that has a beginning has a cause" becomes "anything that exists has a cause" (assuming a finite past).
This again does not follow. Neither the definition nor I affirm that anything that exists has a cause. In fact, if something could exist, without time, causally prior to the universe, as the Kalam implicitly affirms, it would not require a cause.
PaulK writes:
This contradicts both the Kalam argument and your own statement in your first paragraph. So I must thank you again for illustrating my point so clearly. If "beginning" was well-defined in the Kalam argument this level of confusion would simply not be possible.
In that case, you’re quite welcome. I think you may well be illustrating my pointby taking a position at all on the Kalam. If the argument were self-refuting, it would be quite obvious, and there would be little need for discussion.
PaulK writes:
ABE: Try this alternative definition. A thing has a beginning if it exists at time T, and there is a prior time T' when it does not exist.
Can you give any reason for thinking that this definition is any less accurate than yours ?
Absolutely, I can. Aside from the fact that it lends itself to special pleading for the universe; and, it may be question begging in favor of naturalism, which are very good reasons, I reject it on theological grounds, in that it precludes any entity that could conceivably exist without time. You may wish to show that such an entity does not exist; but, defining it away isn’t quite reasonable. Moreover, numbers and (other) abstract entities would necessarily be excluded on your definition. Therefore, it would be quite troublesome to many philosophers and theologians, and especially mathematicians. I suppose the mention of Platonism here, is beating a dead horsebut I digress. Obviously popular appeal does not make one definition better than anotheryours is logically sound as far as I can tell. Nevertheless, I think your definition is inferior to the one previously stated.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : squigglies

This message is a reply to:
 Message 81 by PaulK, posted 03-05-2012 1:37 AM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 91 by PaulK, posted 03-12-2012 3:26 AM Shimbabwe has not replied
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Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 135 of 177 (656153)
03-16-2012 6:17 PM


Objections to premiss one
We have seen a number of attempts to so define the beginning of the universe on such terms as to imply that the universe has always existed AND that it had an absolute beginning in the finite past. Under close examination this refutation of the causal principle (premiss one of the KCA) may be reduced to a mere tautology, e.g. the universe has existed as long as it has existedin effect, for all TIME.
One can similarly argue that my own consciousness had a beginningwhether shortly after birth, or at two years of age, or any other arbitrary time along the wayAND that it has always existed, so long as I have been aware. Nevertheless, no one I knowaside from a mysticwould assert that my conscience self has always existed. In the same way the universe can be said to be known finite to observers, and yet have existed for all TIME. The objection is not a very strong one, and presents a false dilemma for the first premiss. (Bear in mind that this example has already considered the objection of fallacy of composition, and is immune because it is merely presented as an analogy.)
The fact that the universe did have a finite beginning X number of years ago belies the aforementioned contention. Moreover, current cosmological models including any multi-verse hypothesis, alongside the Borde, Guth, Vilenkin theorem, have only reinforced the first premiss of KCA, in that the universe had an absolute beginning, and that there is a causal entity without the known universe. Therefore, no insuperable difficulties have yet been presented contra the first premiss.
The question that remains before us is: Is the causal principle invalidated by some other means? Neither radioactive decay nor virtual particles have been shown to be plausible defeaters of the first premiss. So far, it appears that the first premiss is on very strong footing.
As to the discussions on time and timelessnessmostly attacking a straw manI will happily deal with that issue as we reach our conclusion. For now, I hope to strengthen the first premiss, which appears to have warded off all challenges thus far.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : Squigglies.

Replies to this message:
 Message 136 by PaulK, posted 03-16-2012 6:41 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 137 of 177 (656165)
03-16-2012 7:23 PM
Reply to: Message 136 by PaulK
03-16-2012 6:41 PM


Re: Objections to premiss one
PaulK writes:
More correctly, we have seen an examination of the Kalam argument which SHOWS that given the assumptions of the argument, the universe has always existed. The Kalam argument denies that there ever was a time when the universe did not exist therefore according to the Kalam argument the universe has always existed.
Sadly supporters of the Kalam argument have great difficulty coming to grips with this simple fact. And I think it is not going too far to say that their inability is due to the fact that this point poses a serious problem for the Kalam argument that they cannot address.
Hello again PaulK. You are quickly becoming my favorite non-theist, as I enjoy your quick retorts. Sadly, I doubt we can discuss the entire Kalam Argument before this thread ends because of the vast chasm between our philosophical views. Hopefully, though, we can explore most of the objections levied toward the first premiss. You are a formidable opponent; I only wish you would address the first premiss specifically before going after the argument as a whole.
Shimbabwe writes:
One can similarly argue that my own consciousness had a beginningwhether shortly after birth, or at two years of age, or any other arbitrary time along the wayAND that it has always existed, so long as I have been aware. Nevertheless, no one I knowaside from a mysticwould assert that my conscience self has always existed.
PaulK writes:
Of course this is NOT analogous. It is not analogous because there was a time BEFORE your consciousness existed. Your consciosuness has NOT existed for all time.
Of course it has in the very same way you have continually asserted that the universe has always existed, i.e. as a sole observer of my conscious self, I adamantly claim that it has always existed in the very same manner you claim the universe has. The universe doesn’t gain an exemption because it has multiple observers.
Shimbabwe writes:
In the same way the universe can be said to be known finite to observers, and yet have existed for all TIME
PaulK writes:
But this is not the objection that is being made. The objection is that since there is never a time when the universe did not exist, the universe has always existed. From this we question why the universe should require a cause. And you agreed that anything which existed at the first moment of time did NOT require a cause.
I have not stated anywhere in my replies that the universe did not require a causeyou have inferred thisI simply granted that there was no TIME BEFORE the universe, which is perfectly congruent with my view of a causally prior entity.
PaulK writes:
Your strawman objection and your false analogy do nothing to diminish the strength of the actual objection.
The real question before us is, given the assumption of the Kalam argument that the universe has always existed, did it have a beginning or "begin to exist" in a sense which requires a cause as the Kalam argument claims? So far there has been no progress on demonstrating this at all.
So at this point I believe that I can fairly say that the Kalam argument is dead, at least so far as the discussion here is concerned. The supporters of the argument have been unable to rationally defend it and by all the evidence they are incapable of doing so.
The answer here is, quite simply, yes. The universe does require a cause. But that is for later, in the discussion on premiss two.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 136 by PaulK, posted 03-16-2012 6:41 PM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 138 by PaulK, posted 03-16-2012 7:49 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 139 of 177 (656184)
03-16-2012 8:58 PM
Reply to: Message 138 by PaulK
03-16-2012 7:49 PM


Re: Objections to premiss one
Shimbabwe writes:
Of course it has in the very same way you have continually asserted that the universe has always existed, i.e. as a sole observer of my conscious self, I adamantly claim that it has always existed in the very same manner you claim the universe has. The universe doesn’t gain an exemption because it has multiple observers.
PaulK writes:
This is just obviously false, as I have already explained First, it is the Kalam argument that makes the claim, not I., Secondly the claim of the Kalam argument is that there never was a time when the universe did not exist - which is exactly the same as saying that the universe always existed. And THIS point is missing from your strawman.
I’ll be sure to add it then. Not really, because my version of the Kalam is the 12th century version propounded by Al Ghazali that certainly could not have foreseen your objection, which is based on modern cosmology. Consequently, it did not make the claims you are assigning iteven though I clearly understand your objection. I just don’t think the objection is as strong as you would like to believe, or the argument would certainly be dead in the water.
Shimbabwe writes:
I have not stated anywhere in my replies that the universe did not require a causeyou have inferred thisI simply granted that there was no TIME BEFORE the universe, which is perfectly congruent with my view of a causally prior entity.
PaulK writes:
This is also false.
In Message 78 you replied to my question:
Does something that has always existed (in that there is no time when it did not exist) have a beginning ? Is it does, then does it require a cause, and if so, why ?
With:
I would say no. Something that has always existed is beginningless by definition and would require neither a cause nor an explanation of its existence on the Kalam argument
So you explicitly stated that if there is never a time when a thing does not exist, it is beginningless and requires neither cause nor explanation.
So now I am a liar? Just kidding. Be careful here. I am stating that a beginningless entity need not have an explanationor else one starts on the slippery slope of explaining the explanation ad infinitum. The universe may have existed for all TIME and yet require an explanation. An ultimate causal entity need not require an explanation. If the universe is the ultimate, I concede that it requires no cause. This however, has not been demonstrated.
The answer here is, quite simply, yes. The universe does require a cause. But that is for later, in the discussion on premiss two.
PaulK writes:
My point is that the the premises need to be discussed together to avoid equivocation and contradiction. We've seen enough of that already. Apologists have a slippery habit of taking points in isolation and producing answers that don't fit together - and that seems to be the approach you want to take.
Fair enough then. I accept your criticism, but can assure you I am not being intentionally equivocal. And in some way, it seems easier to discussnot just better for meon individual parts, as opposed to answering every objection to the entire argument, which you must admit are multifarious. I think philosophical arguments in general can sometimes appear equivocal. However, the same can be true of opposing disciplines. People in all fields tend to have serious biases regarding their favored discipline. As a non physicist, I think mathematically constructed parallel universes are incredibly far-fetched, primarily because they don’t appeal to me. That aside, each premiss must be plausible for the whole to be sound. If one premiss is false, then the argument’s conclusion is obviously false. All one need do is demonstrate how ANYTHING begins to exist without a cause to falsify premiss one.
PaulK writes:
I'e said what is required to make the argument sound - at least on these issues. And it really is necessary. If you can't provide it, then the argument is dead, exactly as I said.
Maybe so, we haven’t concluded that yet. I still think it is sound. By the way, we are a long, long, way from proving anything at this point. Nevertheless, I think we are on the right course. My goal is not at all to prove that the argument is irrefutable; but, only that it is plausible. Other arguments exist that I think are more convincing. There is, however, no need to throw the baby out just yet.
By the way, I must go. I am working twelve hour shifts lately, and must leave the discussion for now. Undoubtedly, I can look forward to an inbox full of replies.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 138 by PaulK, posted 03-16-2012 7:49 PM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 140 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-16-2012 11:35 PM Shimbabwe has replied
 Message 141 by PaulK, posted 03-17-2012 3:48 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 146 of 177 (656286)
03-17-2012 1:36 PM
Reply to: Message 140 by Dr Adequate
03-16-2012 11:35 PM


Re: Objections to premiss one
Shimbabwe writes:
I am stating that a beginningless entity need not have an explanationor else one starts on the slippery slope of explaining the explanation ad infinitum.
Dr Adequate writes:
Well, a couple of points. Firstly, there is no logical reason why we should not get onto that slippery slope. There is a theological reason --- theists don't like that sort of talk. For them it's a slippery slope, for someone who looks at it dispassionately it's not a problem.
Perhaps this is true. As a theist, my bias has not been hidden. Nevertheless, the point remains.
Dr Adequate writes:
Second, there's no logical reason why looking one step back before the creator of the universe should lead us to an infinite chain. We can conceive of a situation where Fred created the universe, Bob created Fred, and Bob is the "ultimate causal entity". Again, why not? If we can look one step behind the universe, then we can at least consider that there's something one step behind that
.
Yes of course. One step plainly doesn’t constitute a slippery slope. The argument is just not advanced in any meaningful way. There really would be no point in stepping back multiple times until we reached the ultimate cause. I think we can agree on that, even if 50 steps were necessary. Although one may argue that there need be 50 steps, we would just as well remain agnostic on the point being considering. I would argue that we could reach a non arbitrary stoppingor starting point long before that.
Shimbabwe writes:
As a non physicist, I think mathematically constructed parallel universes are incredibly far-fetched, primarily because they don’t appeal to me.
Dr Adequate writes:
Well, that's not an argument.
You are correct. My intention was not to argue a point, but to simply reveal my own bias toward other disciplines, namely physics. That does not mean I think it is dubious as a field of study. I very much enjoy reading Hawking, Tegmark etc. I find their ideas fascinating.
ShImbabwe writes:
If one premiss is false, then the argument’s conclusion is obviously false.
Dr Adequate writes:
Nuh-uh.
Premise 1: I am Penn Gilette.
Premise 2: Penn Gilette lives in Las Vegas.
Conclusion: I live in Las Vegas.
Premise 1 is false. The conclusion is true.
Oops! In my haste I missed that one. Thanks for catching it. I needed to state then, that if both premises are true and the argument is validthe logic soundthen the argument is a good one. The Kalam meets these criteria. In your case the argument is valid, but it is based on a false premiss, which is indeed difficult to argue against in the absence of more facts; nevertheless, one could expose your sleight of hand (your next -door neighbor, for example) in this case. Your argument would then be significantly weakened, even though your conclusion would still be true. This is the point I am hoping to make. I will grant that this is a point in favor of discussing the argument as a whole. I still believe it is far more difficult to do so, in light of the broad scope.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 140 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-16-2012 11:35 PM Dr Adequate has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 148 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-17-2012 2:19 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 147 of 177 (656287)
03-17-2012 1:39 PM
Reply to: Message 141 by PaulK
03-17-2012 3:48 AM


Re: Objections to premiss one
PaulK writes:
Let us be clear, my argument is not directly based on modern cosmology, it is simply repeating the claims made by the Kalam argument. And you have definitely referred to Craig far more often that Al Ghazali, and agreed with this point. So suddenly implying that you don't accept Craig's version and wish to discard this point seems to be a bit of a turnaround.
Very well then, I want to also be clear. On my view, there isn’t a nickel’s worth of difference between the two, at least in regard to the premisses as stated. In that sense I agree with both versions. Dr. Craig’s version uses the term WHATEVER as opposed to Al Ghazali’s ANY BEINGwhich may be viewed as antiquated. The terms are synonymous, along with the commonly used ANYTHING. Therefore, I see no problems with equivocation on the usage of these interchangeable terms. As to your contentions not being based on current cosmology, I simply erred. What I really intended was to make note of the fact that we are in a cosmologically superior position to AlGhazali, who would not have foreseen many of the objections raised here. The point is not entirely relevant at this juncture, but will be useful later.
PaulK writes:
If you are prepared to claim that there was a time prior to the existence of the universe, and hence lose Craig's argument that the cause of the universe must be timeless that is your choice. But certainly if you do so, that aspect of Craig's argument is dead. And you'd also have to take other cosmologies more seriously, when now you reject them apparently because you find them unfavourable to your views.
You seem to be reading much more into my replies than I am actually stating. I agree with Dr. Craig on this point with reservations. I categorically reject the idea of time before the universe, and have stated as much in many of my replies. The Kalam need not address this issue except on a causal basis. One need not postulatewith cosmologistsnumerous entities without our universe, when a single, causally prior, simultaneous, entity will suffice. Hume was correct in this regard.
My rejection of current cosmologies was simply to make a point on biases in general, and should not be interpreted as disdain. I enjoy reading articles and books on recent advancements, and find them quite fascinating.
PaulK writes:
Of course you contradict yourself here, because you stated that if the universe existed for all of time it would be beginningless and did not require an explanation.
Again PaulK, you linked timeless with beginningless in my statement. I did not. Even in reply number 78 that you quoted, I simply did not. You have inferred it. Why can’t you accept the fact that I agree with you that the universe has existed for all TIME, and yet has an absolute beginning, whichin my opinion requires a cause. All are perfectly consonant with my view and with current cosmology. Could not a causally priornot temporally prior — entity be a plausible explanation for the universe?
PaulK writes:
My point is that the whole concept is being kept vague, and we really need - as Kbertsche says - more precision. If we had an agreed concept of "beginning" or "beginning to exist" - whichever you wish to use - THEN we might discuss the premises individually. But it seems that you can't agree even with yourself on the matter. This is really such a key consideration that I can't understand the reluctance to address it - assuming that we are having an honest, rational investigation of the argument.
I don’t think anyone is being intentionally vague. Some concepts are necessarily vague. Trying to explain BEGINS TO EXIST in the sense I hope to convey has a whole lot to do with one’s own definition of time, which in itself can be quite difficult to articulate. Think of the definition of mind, for example. The .other issue is that a misused word may be construed as an espousal of a certain view; consequently, one is reluctant to use terms that may be seized upon by the opposition as it were. For example, I believe in a timeless, beginningless, causally prior, immaterial, efficient, cause of the universe. This may be quite difficult to articulate, and for some difficult to conceptualize. Nevertheless, many theists have held this view in one form or another most of their lives. It would be disingenuous to assume that a every naturalist, for example, would readily accept the concept with no such framework. The converse is also true, I suspect.
I suppose then that your point is made here, and the chasm is not easily bridged. One side may engage the other and find common ground, nonetheless. The definition you proposed earlier was unacceptable to me, and mine to you. Perhaps a compromise can be reached.
PaulK writes:
Well to call something far-fetched because it doesn't appeal to you is perhaps an expression of prejudice. And it is entirely separate from the use of equivocation . However, it is worth noting that other universes are a consequence of serious ideas in cosmology and are not simply invoked ad hoc to answer theistic arguments.
My point here was obviously not lost on you. I don’t hold the view that these current cosmological theories are necessarily ad hoc, as Dr. Craig and others seem to. I simply don’t find the evidence totally convincing, possibly because of my ignorance.
PaulK writes:
But I will add that we cannot reasonably be expected to tell if a premise is false without understanding the meaning of it. And that is where we are right now. Indeed, even you are there right now.
Fair enough. However, I think we both have a better understanding of the argument than you are admitting. I also think the stakes are much higher for you. If the first premiss is true, it will be difficult to resist the second. So, the argument as a whole tack is a good one for you.
PaulK writes:
For the argument to be sound you need to show that the universe has a "beginning" or "begins to exist" in a way that requires a cause and which - if you are using Craig's version or keeping your own ideas about cosmology - must also be consistent with the idea that there is no time prior to the existence of our universe. Since you have earlier said that the latter concern renders the universe "beginningless' and leaves it with no requirement for a cause it seems rather clear that this is a problematic issue even for you.
This issue has been addressed multiple times.
PaulK writes:
I have to say that the only development I see that looks at all promising from your perspective is the implication that you intend to argue that there WAS a time prior to our universe which would eliminate some of the problems - but that would also eliminate Craig's argument for a timeless cause and require you to change your views on cosmology, so even that course has problems for you. However, without such a change, you would seem to be stuck.
Ibid.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 141 by PaulK, posted 03-17-2012 3:48 AM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
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Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 151 of 177 (656459)
03-18-2012 10:00 PM
Reply to: Message 148 by Dr Adequate
03-17-2012 2:19 PM


Re: Slippery Slope
Dr Adequate writes:
Nevertheless, it doesn't. If there's no logical reason to stay off the slippery slope, then we might as well get on it and slide all the way down shouting "wheeeeeeeeeee!"
Well, obviously the logical reasoning applies as soon as we realize there is probably no end to the slope.
Dr Adequate writes:
Well, if there was an ultimate cause and it was fifty steps back, wouldn't we still want to know about it? But even if, as a matter of personal preference, you wouldn't want to go back that far, it is still the case that it is legitimate to inquire into what caused the cause of the universe, even if for some reason you didn't want to. I'd want to; and what I would need is some valid argument why there is some particular place where I should stop and say: "But this thing doesn't require a cause."
Of course, we would want to know, but that really isn’t the point. There would be no way to know, for example, that there was a meta-multiverse generator outsideor causally priorour postulated multiverse. Fifty such causes I think would call for a liberal application of Occam’s razor. Wouldn’t you agree?
Dr Adequate writes:
You should have been here for my thread on: "Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing", but it was nearly over when you joined the forum.
I’m sure it was a lively discussion. And yes, I have been absent the forum for quite some time, though I became a member in 2003. Perhaps we can revisit that topic sometime. I’ll browse through it when I get a chance.
Dr Adequate writes:
I can't do sleight of hand. You must be confusing me with Penn Jillette.
You just did Mr. Jillette

This message is a reply to:
 Message 148 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-17-2012 2:19 PM Dr Adequate has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 153 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-18-2012 10:15 PM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 152 of 177 (656460)
03-18-2012 10:03 PM
Reply to: Message 147 by Shimbabwe
03-17-2012 1:39 PM


Re: Objections to premiss one
PaulK writes:
Which only makes it even stranger that you should suddenly switch from talking about Craig to Al Ghazali. If there is no relevant difference, why the sudden switch ?
OK. I’ll bite. Honestly, it’s personal preference. I simply like the older version’s usage of EVERY BEING, as opposed to Craig’s WHATEVER, even though I think there is little, if any, semantic difference. The sub point we have been discussing has to do with defining BEGINNING, which I think is easier on Al Ghazali’s version.
Most everyone understands that beginning to ride a bicycle, for example, is not the same as already riding a bicycle. To wit, I jump on my bicycle entering a greenway, and a person already riding her bike is passing by in a different state, as it were, than the state I am in. If one of my feet is still on the ground, a bystander would not conclude that I am riding my bike at that stage, even if my right foot is already on the pedal. The person whizzing by would have begun to ride at some point in the past, but not just now; hence the distinction between riding and beginning to ride. Our universe began to exist, irrespective of whether it began at a singularity (big bang) or at some undefined edge (Hartle, Hawking, Tegmark, Vilenkin etc.). It still began.
PaulK writes:
I don't think so. It was you who suddenly decided to switch to Al Ghazali's argument instead of Craig's simply because it lacked that aspect of the argument. At the least it implies that your intended answer to the objection was to drop that part of Craig's argument altogether.
The other reason I switched is because I felt that the focus on Craig’s version might lead to numerous tangential objections, possibly from a personal bias toward Dr. Craig.
The Kalam need not address this issue except on a causal basis. One need not postulatewith cosmologistsnumerous entities without our universe, when a single, causally prior, simultaneous, entity will suffice. Hume was correct in this regard.
PaulK writes:
Of course your opinion on the matter - prejudiced as it is - is completely beside the point. It remains true that you reject cosmologies which depict a time before the universe, so that if you accepted that to answer my objection it would cause problems for you in other aspects of your argument.
On the contrary, numerous cosmological timesone for each universe or multi-verse would not necessarily be problematic on my view. I reject some versions on philosophical or cosmological grounds, nonetheless. In my view, these hypotheses don’t escape time within their own realm, whether on A theory or B theory.
PaulK writes:
Of course I have not done this even once. The fact remains that you stated that something that had existed for all of time was beginningless and required no cause. And that's what I said, and quoted you as saying.
If you say I implied this, then fine. I will clarify my view. If the universe, multi-verse, or mega-multi-versewithin each of which hypothetical observers would reckon their own perception of timewere to exist for all time within their own continuum, these entities would not necessarily be beginning-less in regard to the whole. Moreover, a timeless entityif it existswould not have such constraints.
PaulK writes:
For a start you are NOT agreeing with me, I am simply accepting the point for the sake of argument and to show the problems it creates for the Kalam argument. And I don't see how anything wrong with pointing out that you explicitly agreed with me that a thing that has existed for all time it did not require a cause.
Alright then, we disagree. You continually use the word time in a different sense than I. Perhaps this is because my view is not clearly articulated, or maybe, your view is not. You have rejected timelessness, so we can’t possibly agree on that point. If I reject timeless entities, my argument for the KCA evaporates. Please note: For all TIME does not equal BEGINNING-LESS on my view.
PaulK writes:
I have not yet argued that the universe CANNOT have a cause, merely that it does not REQUIRE one. My point is to refute the Kalam argument, not construct an atheological argument from it's premises.
Very well, then. I disagree that the universe does not require a cause.
I’m not asking you to construct an argument; nevertheless, it would be helpful to know more on your view.
PaulK writes:
BUt this is part of my point against the argument. Bringing the beginning of time into things DOES confuse the issues, DOES call doubt on to the claims of the Kalam argument. But not doing so also brings problems to the Kalam argument. And this problem is exactly why I see your confidence in the Kalam argument as unfounded. You do not have a clear grasp of the issues.
Many philosophical and scientific matters are difficult to grasp. This issue does not stop one from embracing a particular viewpoint. There are a great number of things we don’t understand fully. I suspect there are several in your discipline.
PaulK writes:
I would maintain that you accepted it as words, but without adequate comprehension. One who does not accept it as words, will wish to understand it before accepting it, and see the problems.
Words are arguably the best way to communicating knowledge from person to person. Some conceptsand I would consider philosophical, mathematical, and psychological, theories in thisare simply not easy to articulate. That does not mean these concepts are not understood.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 147 by Shimbabwe, posted 03-17-2012 1:39 PM Shimbabwe has not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 154 by PaulK, posted 03-19-2012 2:53 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 157 of 177 (656901)
03-22-2012 11:46 PM
Reply to: Message 153 by Dr Adequate
03-18-2012 10:15 PM


Re: Slippery Slope
Dr Adequate writes:
But there's no reason why there shouldn't be an endless slope and a beginningless succession of causes --- or if there is, you have not yet articulated it. You say we shouldn't get on that slippery slope, I say, why not?
You’re tellin’ me! At this rate we’ll never get there. Honestly, we haven’t gotten to premiss two quite yet, although it has been touched on. There, I hope we can discuss actual and potential infinites.
Dr Adequate writes:
Well, now try applying that reasoning to a god outside our observed universe.
In any case, my point still remains. Going one step back from God doesn't commit us to going an infinite number of steps back.
No, it doesn’t. Except, on my view, any proposed entity that is causally prior to the ultimate, would itself be the ultimate.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 153 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-18-2012 10:15 PM Dr Adequate has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 159 by Dr Adequate, posted 03-23-2012 1:20 AM Shimbabwe has not replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 158 of 177 (656902)
03-22-2012 11:52 PM
Reply to: Message 154 by PaulK
03-19-2012 2:53 AM


Some elucidation, I hope
PaulK writes:
Which really suggests that you should have been talking about Al Ghazali since the beginning instead of consistently referring to Craig instead... So no, it doesn't explain the switch.
Perhaps my view is in agreement with both. I don’t think this should present a problem, as there is no trickery involved. I’ll happily defend either. If one fails, the other fails, in my opinion.
PaulK writes:
But isn't the difference the transition between NOT riding a bicycle and riding a bicycle ? If the universe already exists from the very start there is no transition between not-existing and existing.
Yes. The difference is exactly as you conclude; and, I maintainI am restating this for the sake of everyone else, not youthat the universe has not always existed, but began a finite time ago. This, I think, is consonant with both versions of KCA under examination. I do agree, for argument’s sake, that the universe has existed for all TIMEits own cosmological timebut I don’t think it is actually beginning-less. Incidentally, this is Craig’s position on the matter, as I have heard him elucidate it on a number of occasions. I agree with him in this regard.
PaulK writes:
By my understanding all of them postulate a time outside of our universe, and this is a big problem for Craig's version of the Kalam argument. Craig wishes the cause of our universe to be timeless and he can only get that by denying the existence of any time where that cause could operate.
Time outside the universe is not really problematic on Craig’s view, or on mine. Nevertheless, he posits an immaterial, timeless, and enormously powerfulif not omnipotentcausally prior, personal entity, which has the ability to create the universe (or multi-verse) ex nihilo. This entity apprehends all propositional knowledge in a single intuition, and therefore its cognitive faculties don’t necessitate a passage of time sans the universe. The being’s very intuition, in fact, brings about causal change(s). Hence, the ultimate cause of the universe is simultaneous with its effect, in this sense. The personal agent may have refrained from creating the universe at all, if it so desired. The only sticky part is that its effect(s), even if potentially infinite in the later than direction, is ostensibly temporal. In light of this fact, Craig reasons that the entity becomes in some way temporal, alongside the universe.
Now, as Craig argues, there is no passage of time nor are there related eventseven cognitive onesin the logically prior realm, sans the universe. To him, the very question as to why the ultimate agent cause didn’t create the universe before it did, simply introduces a non sequitur. There is no before on his view. In one lecture he mentions a state of timelessness but stops short of elucidating the proposal. His model may not be comprehensible on a naturalistic analysis, but it works philosophically in my opinion. The question is then, does it work metaphysically? I think it very well may, though I am not as confident here.
The entity, according to Craig, does undergo some extrinsic change upon the creation of the universe, in that it stands in a (causal) relationship to the temporal realm. It does not, however, undergo a change in substance or essence. The personal agent remains changeless but not necessarily immutable (incapable of change). The latter fact permits the entity to apprehend propositional knowledge as the facts actually change in time. E.g. the entity knows that George Washington is not the president at this very moment; though the propositional statement is true in 1790.
PaulK writes:
And yet you agreed with the point when it was stated without explicitly mentioning the universe. And you have given no reason to think otherwise... If something has existed for all of time, why would it require a cause of its existence ?
Something that has existed eternally would not require a cause. But my contention is that no being could have existed forever, with respect to time, because an infinite regressin the earlier than directionwould necessarily be introduced; consequently, the thing could never be. So, even if an actually infinite is possibleit is not on KCAit would have to be realized instantaneously. Any proposed material being would be subject to some physical laws e.g. aging, decaying etc. Therefore, an immaterial and timeless being is arguably the best plausible solution for coping with this dilemma.
Time itself is relational on my view and may not exist where no events transpire. Whatever brought the universe into existence must exist without time and space in order to transcend all reality. If not, the entity would simply be another material constituent of whatever whole, whether it existed outside our known universe or not. Premiss two of KCA, if plausible, eliminates any material being as the ultimate cause. There remain few alternative causes that do not take up space, and are not subject to physical laws of some sort. The unembodied mind hypothesis allows one to deal with this predicament. Other candidates, abstract objects or numbersor anything else one can imaginedon’t stand in causal relationships so far as we know, Tegmark and Vilenkin proposals notwithstanding. Theists have nearly always implicitly or explicitly posited such an ultimate; so, this is not a novel concept for whatever that is worth. e.g. God is a Spirit (John 4:24)

This message is a reply to:
 Message 154 by PaulK, posted 03-19-2012 2:53 AM PaulK has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 160 by PaulK, posted 03-23-2012 3:01 AM Shimbabwe has not replied
 Message 161 by New Cat's Eye, posted 03-23-2012 9:57 AM Shimbabwe has replied

  
Shimbabwe
Member (Idle past 3869 days)
Posts: 47
From: Murfreesboro, TN USA
Joined: 09-11-2003


Message 165 of 177 (656995)
03-24-2012 1:15 PM
Reply to: Message 161 by New Cat's Eye
03-23-2012 9:57 AM


Re: bail out already
Catholic Scientist writes:
bail out already
...the universe has not always existed, but began a finite time ago. {snip}
I do agree, for argument’s sake, that the universe has existed for all TIMEits own cosmological timebut I don’t think it is actually beginning-less.
If it has not always existed, then there should be a point in time where it doesn't exist. If there isn't a point in time where it does not exist, then it has existed for all time.
Hello Catholic Scientist. I will respond to you first, because I didn’t have time to earlier in the thread. You seem to be having difficulty with this concept because you wish to confer physical constraints on an immaterial entity. This methodology is simply not applicable to a timeless, spaceless, beginningless, cause. This entity, on Kalaam, exists causally prior to both space and time. Space and time are necessary components of the universegiven that events have occurredor else the world does not exist as a physical reality. Some do hold this view. I do not.
Catholic Scientist writes:
To get around this contradiction, you're introducing another time, "the universe's own cosmological time", that is presumably some superset to the time we actually know of.
There is no superset or subset of time; the only time we appreciate is the time within our own universe. I did not introduce this concept, as it is believed by most cosmologists. If a multi-verse is possible, its time would theoretically supersede our time in some way; nevertheless, time cannot go on forever in an earlier than direction, or else this moment would have never arrived, irrespective of any division of time presupposed. So we posit a timeless entity.
Catholic Scientist writes:
But you don't have any other reason to suppose this other kind of time than to save face in light of the Kahlam Argument falling into a contradiction. If you have to go through these sorts of mental gymnastics to maintain the veracity of an argument, don't you think its about time to start considering that the argument isn't really that good?
Certainly not at this point. The argument holds very well if timelessness is plausible. If not, then we are faced with some sort of infinite regress of time and events. Moreover, the reason for positing such an entity, on Kalaam, is exactly because of the difficulties that plague competing models. Theist have had it correct from the beginning in my opinion.
Edited by Shimbabwe, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 161 by New Cat's Eye, posted 03-23-2012 9:57 AM New Cat's Eye has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 166 by cavediver, posted 03-25-2012 4:47 AM Shimbabwe has not replied
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