How can you demonstrate that your knowledge of how to bake a cake is correct before the fact of baking the cake in question?
That's what I'm saying; you can't have knowledge (as I define it) before the fact. You can only have knowledge of a fait accompli.
I can say I believe the sun will come up tomorrow and I believe I can bake a cake. After the sun comes up I can say I know the sun came up. After I have baked a cake I can say I know how to bake a cake.
I can say that I know x did not exist in the places I looked at the time I was looking. I can not claim to "know" any more than that about the existence of x.
I think that saying such a thing is part of the general use of the idea for "knowing things" in the general population.
That's exactly why I prefer a tighter definition. We have a tighter definition than the general population for "theory". Why not for "knowledge" too?
I think that the lack of the sun "not rising" on everyday-we-have-accumulated-data-for-such-a-thing is enough indication from our data set in order for us to conclude that "I know the sun will rise tomorrow."
I would say, more precisely, that the data suggests that it is very likely that the sun will rise tomorrow. I have a high level of confidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.
But if we're at your house, and we just came home from the grocery store, and planned to bake tomorrow morning, I would find it very strange if you said "I do not know if I can bake a cake tomorrow."
I'd say that I plan to bake a cake tomorrow and I have a fairly high level of confidence in my abilty to do so.
I find it confusing to discuss an unidentified idea for which there is no indication it could even possibly be valid.
So you fnd it confusing to discuss God. If I was interviewing you for the job of God-finder, that wouldn't give me much confidence in your ability to do the job.
Why should the term "know" be used in the way you suggest?
What is wrong with an epistemological stance that recognises the role of tentativity and fallibilism in knowledge and knowledge acquisition?
I do recognize the role of tentativity and fallibilism. Tentativity means that we can give up an idea if it is proven to be wrong. It doesn't mean that we jump to conclusions prematurely.
One more time, it has nothing whatsoever to do with absolutism. It has to do with staying tentative until we can make an informed conclusion, not saying we "know" something when we haven't bothered to look at the evidence yet.
Precise language should be important to science-minded people. They should be the first ones to say, "I haven't seen any evidence that points to God, so it seems pretty unlikely that He exists - but I don't know for sure."
You don't know the Sun will rise tomorrow and you only know how to bake the cakes created in the past but don't know how to bake a cake in the future.
I can predict that the sun will rise tomorrow. My knowledge of past events gives me a high degree of confidence in that prediction. The results of an experiment are never "known" until the experiment is done. Beforehand, they can only be predicted.
It's ridiculous and, in terms of practical communication, unworkable.
On the contrary, it's how scientists communicate. The sloppy terminology that you advocate is a tool of obfuscation, not communication.
What rationally makes you think God could exist somewhere else in the universe?
Possibility is always the default position. If there are no elephants in my back yard, is it possible that there are elephants somewhere else in the universe? Yes.
It isn't just mathematics.I also know how to bake a cake. I know how to operate a table saw. I know how an airplane flies - to the extent that I could build one. I know how to get to France.
But... you can't. You're arguing that you cannot know these things. I'm the one arguing that we can know these things because we do not have to acknowledge irrational possibilities.
I am certainly not arguing that we can not know what we do know.
What if we discover something in the future that shows you that what you thought was "baking a cake" actually was not?
You have it backwards. There are things we don't know, such as whether a god exists. There are things we do know, such as how to bake a cake. We can undo ignorance by discovering a god but we can't undo knowledge by unknowing something. We can change knowledge, such as the shape of the earth, but we can't unexist the earth.
At what point on that continuum do you decide that you "know" something?
As soon as you have the data.
The problem with knowing a negative, such as "there is no God", is that there is never enough data.
Swap "very" for "pretty", add in the evidence strongly favouring gods as made-up rather than real entities and change "sure" for "absolutely certain" and that is exactly what I am saying when I use the term "know".
With all that swapping and changing and word-salad tossing, nobody will "know" what the hell you're talking about. When you're pretty sure of something, why not just admit you're pretty sure?
In short - I know God doesn't exist. I know the Sun will rise tomorrow. I know how to bake a cake.
So you can't demonstrate that you know how to bake a cake until after the fact of baking it any more I can demonstrate the rising of the Sun until after it has risen.
So your distinction is, by your own terms, a false one.
No, the distinction is clear. Knowing how to do something is not the same as predicting a future event based on past events. George has never been late for work before so you can predict that George will be on time tomorrow but you don't know he will be on time.
The problem with never knowing a negative, such as "there is no monster under my bed" is that you can't get out of bed.
You're extrapolating incorrectly. You do have (or can get) enough evidence to know that there is no monster under the bed. You do not have anything like that amount of evidence for the non-existence of God.
I know that God does not exist based on following the evidence.
I've just dropped the "based on following the evidence" part... because in everyday life, this is generally assumed in the way everyone uses the word "know."
Yes, that is a common misuse of the word. I'm arguing against that misuse.
Theists don't know that there is a God, even if they say they do. You don't know that there isn't a God, even if you say you do.
Humans have a long history of mistakenly concluding that things are supernatural when in fact they aren't.
Sure. What does that have to do with whether or not there is anything supernatural?
Then you are talking about non-supernatural gods.
Indeed I am talking about the possibility of something on a continuum between what we know and the "common definition" of gods that you insist on. If you want to "know" that gods don't exist by defining them out of existence, go ahead.
Then the standard you are applying to the term 'knowledge' is pretty silly.
Swap "rigorous" for "silly".
But you can't know with absolute certainty that the laws of chemistry won't suddenly change.
You're confusing laws of nature with events dependent on those laws. The laws of chemistry won't change and the law of gravity won't change but the earth might be struck by an asteroid and change its rate of rotation.
It is you who is idiotically equivocating the term "knowledge".
Swap "politely" for "idiotically" and "explaining" for "equivocating".