I hate being right

It's a difficult conundrum faced by field commanders in a potential chem environment: given the degradation in combat effectiveness faced by troops in protective gear, but given the potentially devastating effects of the use of chemical weapons on unprotected troops, how do you determine how much protection is enough?The answer depends mostly on battlefield intelligence (can they do it) and to a greatly lesser extent on strategic intelligence (are they willing to do it). US doctrine uses a four tier system that is adapted based on perceived immediacy of the threat (called "MOPP", or Military Operational Protective Posture in typical military jargon-speak). This roughly translates into how much gear each soldier is required to wear and how much is required to be carried. The lower the MOPP level, the less effectiveness is degraded. There are quite a number of different test and warning systems deployed when there is some threat - from hand-held detectors (is that stuff just smoke or is it gas?), to sophisticated mobile detectors that can sniff out mere traces.As an example, during Gulf War I, the gas masks carried by several Iraqi troops who'd surrendered prior to the ground offensive were found to contain traces of Sarin in their filters. Obviously, this bit of news was taken to mean that Iraq had forward-deployed chemical weapons. As a result, troops went in under full protective gear during the attack in Kuwait. It was only later that the determination was made that the traces were more probably from the Iran-Iraq War (the Iraqis used Sarin against the Pasdaran in the Hawizeh Marshes offensive and during several defensive campaigns in and around Al Faw).Interestingly enough, during Gulf War II, this wasn't the case from what I've read. As to the Iraqi's fearing US use of chem - I don't consider that likely. Chem protective gear (although shoddy Soviet-style) was routinely issued to Iraqi troops as a protection against their own weapons should the Iraqi central command determine to do so. A much more interesting question is why they didn't even at the end. Three possible reasons present themselves: 1) they didn't have 'em after all; 2) Iraqi C-cubed was so badly disrupted that release authority couldn't be provided either to the depot to distribute or to the field commanders to use them (not as unlikely as it might seem given the fluidity and speed of the battle - the Iraqi military is notoriously prone to flailing about in the "fog of war" if they don't have a set-piece battle to fight because of the way their command structure is set up - you'd think they'd have learned after the first go-around); or 3) the Iraqi high command decided that - even losing - use of these weapons would obliterate any support they might have around the world. Any of those are possible.Just my perspective.

Well, I'm not Scott, but I might be able to answer. Basically, they used the stuff liberally and everywhere. Beginning in 1984 after the repeated Iranian counteroffensives managed to smash the Iraqi defenses in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) and actually cross into Iraq, Saddam ordered deployment of chemical munitions. This consisted mostly of H-series mustard gas, the nerve agents Tabun and Sarin, and cyanide gas (useful for filling abandoned trenches since it's heavier than air). Most of the gas was delivered either by artillery or 500 lb bombs from aircraft, although there were reports of the use of jury-rigged sprayers from helicopters and even dropping 50-gal drums (probably mustard) from planes. This was primarily arid mountain terrain. According to the Kurds (and you can take this with however large a grain of salt you want), there were at least 180 separate chemical attacks in Kurdistan between 1984-86.In '86, a new major Iranian ground offensive through the Al-Hawizeh marshes managed to cross the Shatt al Arab and capture the Al Faw penninsula and the Iraqi oil terminus at Majnoon Island. The Iranians were halted short of Basrah by both chemical weapons and the nearly impregnable fixed defenses around the city. In addition, Iraq reportedly used persistent agents to interdict Iranian supply lines through the marshes themselves. I don't know what flavor - one report claimed the majority was mustard. So in this case we have arid and semi-arid low-land or salt marsh.Finally, the Iraqis used chem during their 1988 final offensive against Iran that allowed them to retake Al Faw. It was during this time that the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja was struck by chemical weapons (March 1988). The idea was to break up the Iranian offensive against the hydroelectric dam at Dukan without using ground forces. In this they succeeded - and the reinforcements that would have had to be used to defend the dam were instead used to recapture Al Faw and Majnoon - again assisted by one of the heaviest chemical bombardments of the war. Iran accepted the UN mandated ceasefire on 18 July 1988.The total butcher's bill for the war was between 750k-1.2m on both sides. It is unclear how many were caused by chemical attack, but it IS certain that when used, the Iraqis used quantities similar to that deployed in WWI. Whether the attacks were individually very successful (except the Dukan attack), I don't know. Overall, however, I'd say the use of such weapons prevented an Iranian victory - or at least prevented an Iraqi defeat (since they started it anyway). Whether it was decisive (in the sense that they wouldn't have won without it), is unclear.Hope that answers your questions.(edited fur speling)[This message has been edited by Quetzal, 08-01-2003]

That's the million-dollar question for sure. The only way to know with any certainty, of course, would be to ask The Man himself - assuming he isn't lying in some unmarked grave in the desert or living in luxurious exile on some island somewhere. It is entirely possible you're right: they didn't use them because they didn't have them. However, I find that - in the absence of some kind of confirmation - to be overly simplistic an explanation. I may just be suspicious, but given the years-long shell game the Iraqi's played with the weapons inspectors inre chemical weapons (it's pretty definitive IMO that that whatever nuc plans Hussein may have had were dismantled effectively), plus the failure of the "full accounting" report Iraq made to the UN last fall makes me wonder why they went to all that trouble to lie and obfuscate the issue if they weren't trying to hide something. Not saying this means they had them, but the problem is that no one can say definitively that they didn't either - which is where the problem arises. The uncertainty allows the current US administration to claim that the weapons existed but are hidden, and its detractors to claim they never existed. Sigh.My point is that, if (and I emphasize this is pure speculation on my part) Iraq still had some chemical capability prior to GWII, it was likely limited to a percentage of the unaccounted-for shells and gas stockpiles left over from the Iran-Iraq War. Although it's conceivable they could have maintained some kind of hidden production facility under close security somewhere (Iraq is an amazingly empty place all things considered), I find it unlikely it could have been a weapons plant - which requires a huge amount of infrastructure, not to mention personnel (the old "two people can keep a secret as long as one of them is dead"). Remember Peenemunde - it was ratted out by the Norwegians working there. A little lab out in the desert is one thing (most of the gases Iraq had are really easy to produce in relatively small amounts). Production facilities for weapons are a whole 'nother.So why didn't he use what he had? Again, more speculation. I DO believe, in spite of what some people have said, that Iraqi military C3 was severely degraded right at the start. Whether or not the "decapitation" strike at the beginning actually killed anyone key or not, it apparently did have the effect of making them aware they were specifically targeted, and hence forcing them to scurry around a lot - sort of like roaches when the light comes on. As any military person would know, this will degrade communications quite a bit. A commander can't manage a battle if s/he's always moving about without very special communications equipment and a lot of practice in peacetime. Orders don't get sent, or are sent late. The commander's appreciation of the progress of the battle is hours old, etc etc. I offer as evidence the course of the fighting: the Iraqi military made no strategic movements at all once the initial dispositions were made - even when it would have been effective and possible to do so. All the heavy Iraqi formations remained more or less in place around Baghdad for the entire war. The only substantial movement that occurred was at the operational level - local corps commanders moving a brigade here or there within their designated areas of operations. Given the known rigidity of the Iraqi centralized command&control, this lack of strategic movement is an indicator that the orders weren't getting down to the commanders. The rest of the Iraqi battle smacked strongly of slavishly following set-piece, pre-planned battle orders (withdrawl into the cities, etc.) The only real creativity and initiative shown at all was at the tactical level by the security forces/baath party paramilitaries. At the end, they couldn't even execute what were probably the original plans for the final defense of Baghdad - pull the Republican Guard divisions into the city and fight it out Stalingrad-style. Primarily because the Guard divisions had been left in place to be obliterated by US and British air power without orders to execute the final defense options (whatever they were). It was certainly no walk-over like GWI was, but it also certainly showed the qualitative difference between the Western style of warfare where local commanders are encouraged to be innovative and to take initiative, and the old Soviet-style central command.To make a very long story shorter, if simple movement of forces was tightly controlled, release of unconventional munitions was likely to be even more strictly controlled. It's quite possible that even if (by the time Baghdad was invested) the Iraqis had had them and even if they had wanted to use them, there would have been no way to deploy them - no one left in a position to give OR receive the orders.

Mighty Moose -Having debated our good holmes on a (vaguely) related topic in the not too distant past, and agreeing entirely with neither he nor our newly installed poster NoniNeal, I would be happy to moderate that debate if it were to take place.Besides, beyond overspending my income for the next few weeks, I've got nothing better to do. When WILL USAID make a decision on that contract???????

I do apologize. I realize I should have brought that discussion to closure of some kind. I offer in defense that there were quite a few personal and professional issues that intervened, and then later when things calmed down somewhat, I reviewed the thread and realized that our positions were extremely close - probably >90% convergence. Our only fundamental disagreement arose really from a single difference in starting assumptions and a slightly different approach to the problem (if you will, a pragmatic vs ideal approach). IOW, there wasn't enough there to really continue a debate of that magnitude and effort. In addition, although I truly enjoyed the discussion, there was a very irritating side discussion going on that detracted from my overall enjoyment. Again, I apologize for not following through and stating this at the time.That being said... ...our positions are not diametrically opposed. The principle difference that I see is that I consider action against Hussein to have been overdue and at least marginally justifiable from a national security/strategic policy viewpoint. However, we are in complete agreement that invasion (unilateral or otherwise) was inappropriate, caused more problems than it solved, possibly created more suffering than it relieved (at least in the short term), the follow through has been terribly bungled, &etc (me: right target, right time, wrong tactic; you: right target, wrong time, wrong tactic). The Iraq war is interesting to me principally in the sense of anticipating future consequences and impact in the Muddle East (not a typo ), and as yet another (as though it were needed) example of the "biter bit" principle: assuming "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" in strategic policy is invariably fatal in the long term. IOW, we're back to disagreeing on a fine point and agreeing on everything else - from administration lying and obfuscation to the lack of justification for invasion to the potentially very bad precedent it set, etc - as we did ultimately in the other thread. This doesn't make for a very interesting debate, especially not a formal one. In that light, I fear I must decline the invitation, although I'd be happy to arbitrate your debate with NoniNeal if it ever materializes.

Let me put it this way: there were basically three people involved in the discussion. The irritation t'wasn't you and t'weren't me...