There are an awful lot of other considerations missing when discussing justification for the use of nuclear weapons. The casualties actually inflicted were unanticipated even by the American military and were the result of a "perfect storm" of specific conditions.
The first question that should have been asked when speaking about the justification of an action is "why did they do it in the first place?" None of the items listed in the OP deal with why the decision to drop the first and second nuclear devices on Japan was made in the first place.
The reason, quite simply, is the threat of an actual invasion of Japan. Remember, the American military had suffered heavy losses while "island hopping;" the Japanese didn't tend to surrender even when defeat was inevitable, and even civilians would join combat with whatever lay at hand. The casualties on
both sides were immense.
An invasion of the main Japanese island was projected to cost
far more lives, both American and Japanese, both military and civilian, than nuclear weapons were predicted to cause. US military leadership was very afraid of the cost in lives and equipment that would be required for a Japanese invasion; Normandy was still fresh in everyone's minds, remember - imagine Normandy and the invasion of Europe, except that instead of greeting the Allies as liberators, the civilians would grab a rifle or knife or sword or pitchfork and attack Allied troops on site, where suicide attacks were not unlikely, and where "surrender" was a foreign concept.
WWII had already involved mass-bombings. The only difference between the firebombing of German cities and the use of a nuclear weapon is the specific number of planes (and thus casualties) and bombs required to do the job. Nuclear weapons are more
scary because a single device can do the work of thousands of conventional bombs, but the results are similar. Bear in mind also that nobody knew at the time about the casualties due to radiation that would be caused.
As for dropping two...the American military was concerned that using only one device so late in the war would give the impression that we only
had a single weapon, and so would fail to convince the Japanese leadership of their inevitable destruction if an unconditional surrender was not offered. A second device was then used over Nagasaki shortly after the first to show that the American military could continue to annihilate Japanese cities with impunity, and that surrender was now the only option available. This is not at all an unreasonable position.
And of course, as has already been mentioned, there was
talk of surrender, but
no surrender had been offered. Military actions would
of course continue until a real surrender occurred, and to say "well, they shouldn't have continued to pursue military options 'cause the Japanese were ready to surrender" is patently absurd knowing that the Japanese
could have surrendered at any time but
did not, even in the few days after the first nuclear device was used and before the second. Everyone knows how to end a war - one side surrenders. Until there's a surrender, the war keeps going, end of story.
So just to summarize, nuclear weapons were not significantly worse than the carpet-bombing techniques already in use during the war; nuclear weapons were thought to be able to force a surrender without an actual invasion, which was projected to be far less costly in both Japanese and American lives; and the Japanese had not yet actually surrendered.
(Also, as a quick rebuttal, the Americans did
not accept the terms of surrender that Japan had wanted; rather, Emperor Hirohito intervened and
accepted the terms of surrender required by the Americans:
quote:
On August 6, the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Late in the evening of August 8, in accordance with Yalta agreements but in violation of the Soviet—Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and soon after midnight on August 9, it invaded the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Later that day the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki. The combined shock of these events caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene and order the Big Six to accept the terms for ending the war that the Allies had set down in the Potsdam Declaration.
)
The decision to use nuclear weapons, therefore, was not unjustified at all. American and Japan were still in a state of war. Carpet bombing resulting in the destruction of entire cities was not unheard of during WWII. The projected casualties from using nuclear weapons was
significantly less on both the American and Japanese side than the projected casualties of an invasion. Simply from a utilitarian standpoint, choosing to invade instead of using nuclear weapons would have been the immoral choice as it would have resulted in far more death. Surrender was not in the hands of the Americans; only the Japanese could offer surrender. One of the two options had to be taken, and so the Americans chose the option that would have ended the war more quickly and will less loss of life.
As for the actual casualties caused by the use of two nuclear weapons...
They turned out to be a lot higher than anyone anticipated, and this was largely avoidable.
In the time leading up to Hiroshima, American planes would fly over the Japanese mainland in flights of only three planes and drop small explosives that did little to no real damage. The purpose was to lull the Japanese military into largely disregarding these small flights as non-threatening; the fear was that a full air-raid response would result in the plane carrying the nuclear devices being shot down and failing in its mission. The plan worked - when Hiroshima was attacked, they didn't even sound the air raid alarm.
Unfortunately the plan worked
too well. The Japanese had already constructed mass bomb shelters in case of a bombing attack. These shelters were concrete and would have protected the vast majority of the population from harm (both from the primary and secondary effects of a nuclear initiation) had they been used. But since the small flights of American planes were largely disregarded, nobody bothered to seek shelter at all. The results, of course, were horrific - many thousands of people were killed who did not need to die.
Nagasaki's story was similar. Nobody yet really believed what had happened in Hiroshima; we weren't in the age of cell phone cameras and instant communication. A small flight of American planes was "not a threat." Nobody used the bomb shelters. Casualties were far higher than the could have, and should have, been.
As to the points actually brought up in the OP...
1. america intercepted messages from Japan to Russia indicating JAPAN WANTED to SURRENDER.
Japan did
not want to accept the terms of surrender set down by the Americans, which was the entire issue. If you want to debate whether the Americans should have accepted the Japanese terms for their surrender, that's an entirely separate debate, because it involves whether
continuing to prosecute the war at all was justified, and has little to do with the specific manner of hostilities.
2. Japan had already considered surrendering if america would just allow Japan's Emperor to keep his seat on the throne. america said no, but AFTER bombing Negasaki and Hiroshima, america gave into Japan's request.
Wrong. The Japanese accepted the American terms of surrender. The terms were
as follows:
quote:
On July 26, the United States, Britain and China released the Potsdam Declaration announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay." For Japan, the terms of the declaration specified:
the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"
the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"
"Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943.[1]
"The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed"
"stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"
On the other hand, the declaration offered that:
"We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, ... The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."
"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, ... Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."
"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government."
The only mention of "unconditional surrender" came at the end of the declaration:
"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Contrary to what had been intended at its conception, the declaration made no mention of the Emperor at all. Allied intentions on issues of utmost importance to the Japanese, including whether Hirohito was to be regarded as one of those who had "misled the people of Japan" or even a war criminal, or alternatively whether the Emperor might potentially become part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" were thus left unstated.
The "prompt and utter destruction" clause has been interpreted as a veiled warning about American possession of the atomic bomb (which had been successfully tested on the first day of the conference for future use).
The Japanese refused to accept the specific terms that were set down as the
only acceptable terms for their surrender...until after nuclear weapons were utilized. Shortly after Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito forced the leadership of Japan to accept
these terms. The US didn't budge at all, contrary to what the OP states.
After the unconditional surrender was offered,
then talks began regarding the future of Japan.
Again, we can debate whether the US should have taken such a hard-line stance in demanding specific nonnegotiable terms for surrender, but that's a debate on whether the war should have continued at all,
not a debate on whether nuclear weapons were justified.
3. america knew japan would surrender unconditionally when Japan found out that Russia would join the fight. So, america hastened the two bombings BEFORE Japan COULD surrender for an american show of power toward Russia.
Bullshit. I reiterate what I've already quoted:
quote:
On August 6, the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Late in the evening of August 8, in accordance with Yalta agreements but in violation of the Soviet—Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and soon after midnight on August 9, it invaded the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Later that day the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki.
There were two days between the first nuclear weapon and the Russian declaration of war. Another day passed before the Russians invaded a Japanese-controlled territory and the second bomb was dropped. The US used two nuclear weapons in relatively short order to convince the Japanese that more such devices existed and that the absolute destruction would continue if surrender was not offered. The Russians had already joined the war by the time the second device was used.
Three full days lapsed between the first and second nuclear weapons -
ample time for a declaration of surrender, which
was not offered.
When you're at war, and you don't surrender, it's
expected that the enemy will continue to attack!
4. if ANY regards towards human life was any factor at all, america could have detonated the first bomb over water as a deterent/warning.
We had
two. Two nuclear weapons after the first device was tested. It was just Fat Man and Little Boy; we used them close together to provide the illusion that we had many, but we only had
two.
You don't waste a weapon by detonating it over water. You take out a military target to eliminate the opponent's ability and will to continue to resist. The ability to annihilate cities in bombing attacks was already very well established in WWII; that we could now do it with a single weapon rather than thousands in a coordinated strike is merely a detail. The Japanese were amply warned that the US intended to utterly destroy cities if surrender was not offered, through leaflets dropped over Japan by American bombers.
5. The second, even more unnecessary, bomb was completely and utterly criminal. All communication was broken in Japan and america gave no time for the Japanese to assess the first bomb's damage before detonating the second.
Three days. The Japanese had
three days to realize that Hiroshima was
gone. You don't need to do much assessment to determine that one of your cities is a blasted wasteland! The US didn't use both nuclear weapons on the same day; they didn't use them within 24 or 48 hours; they waited three full days before using the second nuclear weapon, sufficient time for Japan to accept the terms of their surrender, and little enough time to fully establish the perception that more such weapons existed.
Moreover, as I've already explained, the reason behind using the second weapon so close to the first was to provide the illusion that many nuclear devices were primed and ready for use on Japan should surrender not be offered immediately. The Japanese offered no surrender in the meantime despite having the means to do so, and so the war was continued.
Now again, we can debate whether the US and its allies should have been so hard-line in demanding Japan's unconditional surrender. We can debate whether the US should have been more eager to seek a diplomatic end to hostilities.
But in the absence of a surrender or negotiations, the military had two choices: nuclear weapons or invasion.
Nuclear weapons cost no American lives, and were projected to cost fewer Japanese lives than an invasion. Nuclear weapons would end the war quickly, rather than a drawn out campaign of additional island-hopping and an eventual invasion of the main island, followed by continuing to fight in mainland Japan until the Japanese leadership surrendered. Nuclear weapons would minimize (yes, minimize) civilian deaths because bomb shelters were readily available, and because civilians had been shown to attack Allied troops in previous battles in the Pacific, forcing Allied soldiers to kill them and painting a grim picture for civilians in an invasion.
Simple utilitarian ethics make the usage of nuclear weapons the
obviously more moral choice if hostilities were to be continued at all.
{/ABE}
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