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Author | Topic: Biological Reduction and Free Will | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ben! Member (Idle past 1425 days) Posts: 1161 From: Hayward, CA Joined: |
As for my own position, I think the answer is, there is no resolving them; free will is only apparent. I am prepared listen to thoughts on the subject, but some I have heard before. There is one in particular I thought I should mention--the position position that believes that non-determinism in quantum mechanics somehow saves the notion of free will. I'm really interested to know what thoughts are out there! Thanks!Ben
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AdminAsgara Administrator (Idle past 2329 days) Posts: 2073 From: The Universe Joined: |
Thread moved here from the Proposed New Topics forum.
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PaulK Member Posts: 17827 Joined: Member Rating: 2.3 |
I don't think that the concept of "libertarian" free will (which is what is usually meant) stands up to analysis. Provided you are prepared to accept that consciousness is a product of biology, however, compatibilist formulations should stand up perfectly well. And if you don't accept that - at least for the sake of argument - then there really isn't any hope of discussion.
(Libertarian free will asserts that that we make meaningful decisions in a non-deterministic fashion. Compatibilists seek to foormulate free will in a way that is compatible with determinism yet still agrees closely with our intuitive ideas).
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Parasomnium Member Posts: 2224 Joined: |
bencip19 writes: Can science really resolve the notion of free will with that of the biological reduction of "self" ? As for my own position, I think the answer is, there is no resolving them; free will is only apparent. One way of resolving free will with "the biological reduction of "self"" might be that not only free will, but also the notion of self is only apparent (i.e. an illusion). That way, there is no need for a correlation between the two.
bencip19 writes: There is one [thought] in particular I thought I should mention--the position [...] that believes that non-determinism in quantum mechanics somehow saves the notion of free will. There's a problem with that line of thinking. It is this: to have free will necessitates having control over the processes that constitute, or cause, a willed event. Determinism, on the one hand, obviously precludes free will, in that it prescribes that every effect must have a cause, and thus implies that the chain of causes and effect extends infinitely into the past, or at least as far back as before our own existence. Since we cannot have control over causes that occur before we exist, we cannot possibly have control, in a deterministic universe, over subsequent causes and effects in the chain leading up to the final cause (in the everyday sense of the word 'final', not to be confused with the aristotelian notion of 'final cause') of a willed event. The non-determinacy of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, offers no solace because a non-determined event cannot, by definition, be controlled by anything. So, if quantum mechanical principles lie at the root of processes that cause willed events, we still cannot have control over those processes, and free will remains an elusive concept. This message has been edited by Parasomnium, 12-22-2004 05:52 AM We are all atheists about most of the gods that humanity has ever believed in. Some of us just go one god further. - Richard Dawkins
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Wounded King Member Posts: 4149 From: Cincinnati, Ohio, USA Joined: |
I was sure that there was a thread I started on the question of free-will vs. determinism in response to an ongoing debate with Syamsu. It addressed at length the question of whether what we observe as quantum indeterminacy was a valid basis for postulating free-will.
Sadly I can't find the thread at all, I don't know if I am misremembering or if it got lost in some reorganisational shuffle. I know that Hangdawg13 posted on it amongst others I would tend to agree with you that free-will is only apparent, although my own subjective feelings are highly disturbed by the concept. When I said that science had no problem acknowledging that the concept of choice exists, I was being careful in my choice of words, Syamsu and I have already gone round once or twice on the issue of whether choice actually really exists. TTFN, WK
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AdminNosy Administrator Posts: 4754 From: Vancouver, BC, Canada Joined: |
Have you tried to use Google with the site restricted to ? (under advanced search)
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contracycle Inactive Member |
quote: The question itself is unimportant, the vermiform appendix of philosophy, depending on a set of theistic premises which no longer pertain. Why does it matter whether we have free will or not? Its a religious argument about sin, about guilt, about responsibility. It is only meaningFUL in the context of judgement, specifically divine judgement. It is not meaningful in the human sphere - our law courts are already able to distinguish between intentional homicide and accidental manslaughter, so its not a question of the identificaiton of motive: its about whether that motive says something Important about us. But without the prospect of being winnowednfor heaven or hell, it does not mater. Human beings can still be individual, unpredictable, and unique without magical concerns over free will. Any concerns we may have had about "determinism" have been obviated by quantum uncertainty. There is no serious prospect of ever running a human sim that weould produce exactly the same outputs as the subject simmed - not forever anyway, even if it were possible in the short term. But as you note this does not "save" the notion of free will because free will is an irrelevant concept. All it says - as does so much other science - is that strict determinism is limited to a certain granularity.
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Wounded King Member Posts: 4149 From: Cincinnati, Ohio, USA Joined: |
Many thanks, oh Nosy one.
The thread was Creation Vs. Evolution = Free Will Vs Determinism. I think that there is quite a lot of material in there which is relevant to this topic. TTFN, WK
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Parasomnium Member Posts: 2224 Joined: |
contracycle writes: Why does it matter whether we have free will or not? [...] It is not meaningful in the human sphere - our law courts are already able to distinguish between intentional homicide and accidental manslaughter [...] If free will does not exist, then 'intentional homicide' isn't intentional at all, it just feels that way. It would be unfair to sentence someone who had no other choice than to 'intentionally' kill somebody. But then again, the judge would have no choice either in being unfair. Again, it would just feel that way.
contracycle writes: Any concerns we may have had about "determinism" have been obviated by quantum uncertainty. Not so, see Message 4 This message has been edited by Parasomnium, 12-24-2004 04:36 AM We are all atheists about most of the gods that humanity has ever believed in. Some of us just go one god further. - Richard Dawkins
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sidelined Member (Idle past 5934 days) Posts: 3435 From: Edmonton Alberta Canada Joined: |
In summary on a 1985 experiment by Bejamin Libet at this website.
http://scienceweek.com/2004/sa040813-1.htm 1) In 1983, Benjamin Libet and his colleagues at the University of California San Francisco published a profoundly influential paper on the source of human control. In this study, participants watched a small clock hand that completed one full revolution in 2.56 seconds. While fixated on the clock, a participant voluntarily flexed his wrist at a time of his choosing. After the movement, the clock hand continued to rotate for a random time and then stopped. Then, a participant reported the position of the clock hand at the time when she first became aware of the will to move. Libet and his colleagues called this subjective judgment W, for "will". In other parts of the experiment, participants judged when they actually moved, and Libet called this judgment M, for "movement". The timing of the W and the M told Libet and his collaborators when -- subjectively speaking --a participant formulated a will to move and actually moved. 2) In addition, Libet's team measured two objective parameters: the electrical activity over the motor areas of the brain, and the electrical activity of the muscles involved in the wrist movement. Over the motor areas, Libet recorded a well-known psychophysiological correlate of movement preparation called the "readiness potential" (RP), which Hans H. Kornhuber and Lueder Deecke first described in 1965. The RP is measured using electroencephalographic recording electrodes placed on the scalp overlying the motor areas of the frontal lobe, and appears as a ramplike buildup of electrical activity that precedes voluntary action by approximately 1 second. By also recording the electrical activity of the muscles involved in the wrist movement, Libet precisely determined the onset of muscle activity related to the RP. 3) Libet and his colleagues examined the temporal order of conscious experience and neural activity by comparing the subjective W and M judgments with the objective RP and muscular activity. First, the investigators found that, as expected, W came before M. In other words, the subjects consciously perceived the intention to move as occurring before a conscious experience of actually moving. This suggests an appropriate correspondence between the sequence of subjective experiences and the sequence of the underlying events in the brain. But Libet also found a surprising temporal relation between subjective experience and individual neural events. The actual neural preparation to move (RP) preceded conscious awareness of the intention to move (W) by 300 to 500 milliseconds. Put simply, the brain prepared a movement before a subject consciously decided to move. This result suggests that a person's feeling of intention may be an effect of motor preparatory activity in the brain rather than a cause. As Libet himself indicated, this finding ran directly contrary to the classical conception of free will. 4) Considering all the existing data, the brain is apparently going full speed ahead well before a person experiences the conscious intention of moving. Consequently, no role appears for conscious processes in the control of action -- or so it might seem. Although research casts doubt on whether conscious processes cause actions, the data remain consistent with the idea that conscious processes could still exert some effect over actions by modifying the brain processes already under way. The fact that conscious awareness of intention precedes movement by a few hundred milliseconds means that a person could still inhibit certain actions from being made.(1-5) Can anyone here expand on this or explain the meaning of free will in light of this evidence? A centipede was happy quite, until a toad in fun Said, "Pray, which leg comes after which?' This raised his doubts to such a pitch He fell distracted in the ditch Not knowing how to run.
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NosyNed Member Posts: 9003 From: Canada Joined: |
My tought would be that "mind" (which is discussed elsewhere) is an emergent property of many brain processes.
We might be conflating mind and consciousness here or even consciousness and "I". If consciousness is just another one of the brain processes that go on then it may well be separate (as indicated by those experiments) from something like "will". Let me see if I can unconfuse myself here: We seem to be stuck on thinking of ourselves, the "I" as being a little homonucluum sitting in control of everything. Perhaps like a hydralic shovel operator sitting just behind our forehead and pulling levers etc. We then use a word like "mind" or "consciousness" and have back in our toughts a picture of this little guy in control. Perhaps this is not the right picture. Perhaps the guy who is pulling the levers is NOT the guy who sits in the box up front and can see what is going on. Maybe how minds are more like an ant nest. All the different parts react to the various stimulae and do what is needed. Then we have one addtional property. We have something that is aware of the whole thing -- the consciousness. But it is only "being aware" not actually doing anything. Now I'm sure that this is wrong and even if it contains a grain of truth it would by no means that simple. One would expect that the consciousness does have some feed back into the various parts that are 'doing' things. That feed back is where something that might be called free will would come in.
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lfen Member (Idle past 4704 days) Posts: 2189 From: Oregon Joined: |
sidelined,
Thank you for this well cited example. Antonio Damasio discussed it in one of his books but I've been unable to find it to cite it for Ben. It is a provocative study but I don't yet know if it's been replicated or further explored. It does seem to indicate consciousness as an inhibiting function (do I perceive a "Thou Shalt NOT..." theme arising here?) And in side note to Ben, now that you can check this out I'll be interested in what your examination of this turns up. lfen
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lfen Member (Idle past 4704 days) Posts: 2189 From: Oregon Joined: |
Then we have one addtional property. We have something that is aware of the whole thing -- the consciousness. Nosy, Two things I note. The first is I'm not sure what you intended by the "whole thing" but it's not the whole brain. There a lot of brain functions that we don't seem to ever be consciously aware of except perhaps in the sense of the final result. Blind sight is one and some other pathological states demonstrate aspects of this.
But it is only "being aware" not actually doing anything. Consciousness could be used to inhibit a forming action. But, interestingly to me is that this position is that of the classic nondual Heart of Awakening Gita that Consciousness is the witness but not the doer. lfen
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NosyNed Member Posts: 9003 From: Canada Joined: |
But, interestingly to me is that this position is that of the classic nondual Heart of Awakening Gita that Consciousness is the witness but not the doer. Very interesting.
Two things I note. The first is I'm not sure what you intended by the "whole thing" but it's not the whole brain. There a lot of brain functions that we don't seem to ever be consciously aware of except perhaps in the sense of the final result. Blind sight is one and some other pathological states demonstrate aspects of this. Yea, I wasn't being very careful. Clearly not the "whole" whole thing, just the overall stuff. Care to elaborate on that last sentence? This message has been edited by NosyNed, 12-24-2004 02:05 PM
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sidelined Member (Idle past 5934 days) Posts: 3435 From: Edmonton Alberta Canada Joined: |
Nosyned
We then use a word like "mind" or "consciousness" and have back in our toughts a picture of this little guy in control. Perhaps this is not the right picture. Perhaps the guy who is pulling the levers is NOT the guy who sits in the box up front and can see what is going on I mentioned this to Ifen and benecip in another topic.Since our brains do not have a feedback loop in the way it does our body then we attribute activity in the brain as a source seperate from that brain,hence our identity of self.
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