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| Author | Topic: Terrorism - Criminal Act or Act of War? | |||||||||||||||||||||||
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Silent H Member (Idle past 5847 days)  Posts: 7405 From: satellite of love Joined: |
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Silent H Member (Idle past 5847 days) Posts: 7405 From: satellite of love Joined: |
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days)  Posts: 3228 Joined: |
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Silent H Member (Idle past 5847 days) Posts: 7405 From: satellite of love Joined: |
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days) Posts: 3228 Joined: |
Sorry about this reply taking so long. I'm forced to re-examine and redefine (at least in my own mind) some of the critical assumptions I have made. That being said...
I find that I am in fundamental agreement with much of what you wrote, both the foundations and the problems with specific extant paradigms. As such, I will limit my response to those areas of current disagreement, rather than going point by point. If I miss some aspect that you feel is particularly germane, please bring it to my attention. Otherwise, assume that if I didn’t address it we are in basic agreement. Obviously, we have both recognized the need to develop a different method for addressing the issue. I hope that we can achieve congruency on what that method might best resemble.
Here is an example of circularity: [terrorism is] warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or their policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable (Carr 2002, pg 6) Let me start out by saying that I disagree with Carr on a number of issues. For example, he commits the unpardonable sin of military historians — he occasionally gets his facts wrong. For instance, he proclaims the rejectionist front organization Black September (famous for the Munich Olympics massacre) is a legitimate guerrilla group that limits its tactics to military targets. He even goes so far as to attribute the four-airliner hijacking in 1971 to this group (an unconventional guerrilla operation where all civilians were released unharmed prior to the destruction of the planes on the ground.) This act was actually carried out by George Habash’s PFLP — a true guerrilla organization which deliberately avoided use of terror and was subsequently marginalized by the rejectionist factions (even a splinter of its own organization, Ahmed Jabril’s PFLP-GC), and ultimately reduced to impotence by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This is not an irrelevant digression, as I hope to make clear. However, the definition to me — albeit admittedly insufficient in and of itself — is not circular. The key here is that the emphasis in the definition (IMO) is not on warfare per se, but rather on the deliberately waged against civilians. In this sense, it differs little from your own definition of terrorism: TERRORISM: The systematic use of fear generated through violent action [against civilian populations, or surrendered military]*, especially as a means of coercion.. All you have really done is substitute violent action for warfare. I would argue that this is a semantic distinction that may have no practical utility. For clarification, at what point does violent action become warfare? In fact, you seem to recognize this with the subsequent statement: From the above definitions we can see that terrorism IS generally a subset of the broad definition of warfare. In fact, it's only real difference--- which makes it a subset--- stems from the bracketed clause. A statement, btw, with which I totally agree and which is consistent with Carr’s definition. Terrorism IS a subset of war.
there is a qualitative difference between unfettered warfare and that which attempts to uphold civil values and concepts of law during armed conflict. And We have imposed ideas of morality on the use of war, to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate tools of warfare. This is a key point, and one I tried to express to PaulK in one of my responses. Historically, there have been a bare handful of major conflicts — wars, by your definition — that have not included unfettered warfare as either the defining or at least a significant component of the strategies used by the belligerents. I would say the campaigns of Frederick the Great, Oliver Cromwell (until he started meddling in Ireland), and Helmut von Moltke (until he was over-ruled at the siege of Paris) are nearly the only recent examples where commanders or war leaders engaged in armed hostilities have made it a key proviso to attempt to uphold civil values and concepts of law as a strategy. Obviously, there have been any number of local commanders who have done so on the ground during other conflicts. The military history of the US, for instance, is basically a 300-year litany of unfettered war. In this they are no more guilty than any European power (except as noted) — nor are they any less. It is the disconnect between the lip service paid to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate tools of warfare — vice the reality of practice — that has led me to the conclusion that continuing to deny that terror constitutes a too-often-used component of organized warfare will serve only to perpetuate both its use by modern states AND its use against those states. Rhetorically speaking, why should any marginalized group adhere to civilized norms when the states to which they are opposed do not, and historically have not? My belief — and I emphasize that it’s a belief, although defensible — is that by beginning with a candid reflection of our own guilt (and I use the term very guardedly, because its not a question of guilt, recrimination, etc) for the use of terror, we can develop a new form of progressive war which will allow us to both take the moral high ground and develop effective humane (if I can be forgiven the use of this term in the context of organized bloodshed) counters to states and organizations that continue to practice terror, and also to move our own strategy away from unfettered war. To paraphrase, we have met the enemy, and he is us. The comprehensive paradigm shift that you outline is a succinct and accurate reflection of my views on the issue.
Perhaps this is something we can start by agreeing on: It is only through the lens of accepted practices or laws that a definition of terrorism is even distinguishable from that of warfare? I think this is an important subtext. Terrorism has been accepted practice, at least when used by legitimate states against either each other or groups to which they are opposed. It is part and parcel of the unfettered war paradigm inflicted on us by both history (in the case of the US), and by those who too-readily accepted Clausewitz’s writings on total war — and generations of military students and leaders have done so, at least in the West. It is only when such tactics are used against duly constituted states that they are proclaimed illegal acts. In spite of innumerable protocols and international treaties, terrorism up to this point has not been distinguishable from that of warfare. In fact, it has consistently been a constituent part of legitimate war, with a few exceptions notable for their rarity. It has also been unfailingly counterproductive. Doolittle’s raid was terrorism in its purest form: The systematic use of fear generated through violent action against civilian populations. It was designed specifically to bring home to the average Japanese civilian the horror of war. As well as being purely punitive, it was an effort to undermine civilian support for the government. And, as is the case of nearly every such effort throughout history, it had precisely the opposite effect. What I’m aiming for is the construction of a new paradigm where we CAN make the distinction, and correctly de-legitimize the use of terror as an acceptable tactic of any conflict. If we can reach that point, then I think we do have the moral legitimacy to invoke the rule of law. However, this has little to do with how we confront and approach terrorist organizations, especially international organizations, and defend against them, in the interim. We may, at least on this level, be talking past each other. I’ll reserve opinion on that for the moment.
SOLDIER: A militant leader, follower, or worker, usually one engaged in military service and especially in the army. GUERILLA: A person who engages in irregular warfare especially as a member of an independent unit carrying out harassment and sabotage. [note: this is also a workable definition for espionage agents involved in armed conflict] TERRORIST: A person who systematically uses violent acts against civilian or surrendered military for the purposes of shock and/or coercion. I totally concur with your definition of soldier. I have no qualms about reserving the use of that term for members of recognized state armed forces. I will henceforth use it exclusively in that fashion. I confess to a bit of hyperbole when I first used the term in this context. In attempting to stake a position in opposition to the common misconception of terrorists as marginal nutjobs, I undoubtedly overstepped and overstated what I really believe. I have no difficulty accepting your definition for guerrilla, as long as you stipulate that the definition you provided does not entail legal proscriptions per se. IOW, that guerrillas are afforded the same legal protections as any other legitimate combatant (minus inherently domestic issues of armed insurrection, etc). Otherwise, you need to make a distinction here between guerrilla and the actions of special forces and commandos which are part of national armies but may be operating independently and engaged in irregular warfare — either as an adjunct to conventional operations (c.f., British SAS/SBS in the Falklands), or wholly on their own. Terrorist — good enough. However, it’s not clear to me that it should be considered as a subset of guerrilla. My position is that once a guerrilla steps over the line into terror, they have forfeited any and all rights to be treated as a legitimate combatant under the rules of war —which I advocate for guerrillas (assuming we ever get to the point where those are worth something more than the paper they are printed on). It’s the unfettered war aspect of terrorism that should be emphasized. In re organizations using terrorism. Completely agree. My only question is why you continue to reference espionage or espionage organizations. I’m unclear as to how you are using the term. Perhaps you could provide an example? It’s a minor point, but it struck me as incongruous in the context of either irregular or conventional war.
"Comprehensive" Paradigm Shift: This new paradigm uses an overview of the intentions and capabilities of Terrorist Organizations to consider what legal definitions and legal rights Nations need to fight them on more equal footing. By defining Terrorist Acts as Acts of War (ie, cementing the broad definition of war) instead of Criminal Acts, and defining organizations that use terrorism as "combatants" engaged in War, Nations are free to mobilize more assets against those organizations. Result: Nations have their hands untied both domestically (if they choose) and internationally. They may use less rigorous rules of evidence to pursue and punish members of these organizations, than under rules regarding criminal prosecutions. They may also treat those who assist terrorists as having committed "treason" rather than simply "aiding and abetting". Furthermore Terrorist Organizations, while suffering the consequences a Nation at War is exposed to, they do NOT enjoy the benefits full statehood offers. Thus all members find themselves devoid of protections they would normally enjoy, with no payoff. This is a nicely written, succinct restatement of my basic position. I thought it would be worthwhile to repost it in the context of this discussion. The only thing that I would add is that there are also implications here for states that sponsor or provide safe-haven to terrorist organizations. Implications that I have not completely thought through, and so would be unwilling to try and discuss. However, well written.
Potential Complications: 1) This paradigm may result in more measures of expedience that empower Nations in their short term battle with Terrorist Organizations (or others organizations which use Terror), but with little to no results in actually combatting Terrorism itself. It will certainly NOT address the use of Terrorism by Nations, if the focus of our paradigm is on Terrorist Organizations. If anything, Nations may find excuses to use Terrorism as the "only effective tool in war" against those using Terrorism. I realize this is not what Quetzal is arguing for and in fact would not want to occur. I am simply saying that history shows governments will use the tools they are allowed to use. To simply label Terrorism an act of war, does not take that tool away from entities who by definition of law are allowed to make war. You have placed your finger squarely on what I conceive of as the primary weakness in my stance. After all, being the person to constantly harp on the necessity for a realistic assessment of the reality of terrorism, it would be — to say the least — inconsistent if I didn’t recognize the reality of how most modern states, including or especially the US, would misuse the capability. The temptation to do so would be seductive. So far our history has not given me much optimism that the result would be other. However, IF we start as I suggested with an honest appraisal of our own uses of this illegitimate form of war, and IF we can proceed from there to develop a more viable progressive war strategy in our own future conflicts — and by our I’m referring to the community of so-called civilized nations — then and only then can we realistically avoid falling into the trap you have mentioned. And then and only then will the benefits you listed of this paradigm be operationalized.
2) It creates artificial categories that are both unrealistic and counterproductive. All those who use terrorism are not members of the same organization and may be part of no organization at all. It would be awkward to consider each new act of terror by a new and as yet unknown entity as an act of war, as if anyone capable of delivering mass casualties to shock the public are an army/enemy Nation in and of themselves with an intent to overthrow the government. Given that only congress can declare war except in an emergency when an act of war has been committed against this Nation, do we want to give the president a blank check to declare war on anyone or any group at anytime, because from now on a singular terrorist act itself is equal to invasion from another country? The ramifications of this would be horrific... especially as the definition of Terrorist Act has already shifted to include selling drugs and threatening murder. Now this is something of a strawman. Or at least an invalid conclusion. In the first place, it’s not clear that the paradigm requires that all terrorists be members of a recognized terrorist organization, nor that they even belong to organizations of any kind. What it does do is, as you put it, untie the hands of the target nations. It speaks to a question of available methodology — the methods used to defend against and proactively counter terrorists or terrorist groups. Each individual terrorist act or organization must be weighed, and the appropriate counter strategy utilized. This isn’t a shoot first, shoot often, shoot more later approach. As I have noted previously, response should be flexible. Under current constraints, flexibility is disallowed — it’s often a case of all or nothing. I submit that you must, in fact, make the awkward consideration as a matter of course. It is fundamentally impossible to defend against the lone nutcase (although you can make it difficult in the extreme). Somewhat counterintuitively, it isn’t impossible or even impractical to defend against and proactively disrupt global organizations — merely difficult. Secondly, it is not a case of anyone capable of delivering mass casualties, but rather a case of organized groups being able to do so. In this latter case, it is not so much that a formal declaration of war by Congress must be made, but that recognition of the scope and nature of the threat posed by said groups is best characterized by the term act of war. I’m very open to the use of a different term — that just happens to be the one in common usage. And I agree that it is one that is grossly misused — witness the war on drugs, the war on porn, the war on poverty, the war on little-old-ladies-and-their-cats, or whatever erroneous and egregious hyperbole our government chooses to engage in. If it is at all possible to operationalize the concept, without indulging in hyperbole that can lead to the blank check and slippery slopes you refer to, I am all for using a different term. Remains, of course, to identify what that term might be.
3) This paradigm does not address the reason these Organizations exist in the first place, or why Terrorism as a subset of War continues to be used. I realize that this can be addressed as a separate topic but treating Terrorism as not the focus of the paradigm shift, allows Nations that would like to continue using it, to never have to discuss it. Nor was it intended to. Military response is ALWAYS to be considered as only one — and not necessarily the best or most effective — response to the threat from terrorism. In addition, any response should be a part of a broader move to address the root causes of terrorism — poverty, disenfranchisement, encroachment of foreign ideas, and downright arrogance and exploitation on the part of the democratic, open-market states in the industrialized and technological belt. As far as discussion goes, an open and frank discussion — and condemnation - of their own uses of terror is the START of the shift. If we can’t get that far, we’ll never get to the end of it. The problem remains that military response is specifically disallowed if we go with a legal or law enforcement approach.
Thus the only legal definition needed to start the ball rolling in the right direction is that a Terrorist Act is a criminal act. We can all agree that it in many cases it may also be an Act of War in the broadest sense, but legally it is at best a "war crime" and does not vary from that spot. By their nature most will begin as purely law enforcement investigations (domestic or international based on perpetrator and victim as it is known). They should work in cooperation with intelligence agencies and I advocate increased connection between law/intelligence at the evidence collection stage under the narrow paradigm. Once the perpetrators are determined the responsibility and tools available for prosecution should depend on the nature of the perpetrator. In one sense this is similar to my contention that each terrorist act or group must be assessed on its own merits, in order to generate the appropriate response. I also concur that tighter cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence is required — especially under my paradigm, where a continuum of response is assumed. It is also a reflection of the reality of transnational terrorism, wherein an inherently domestic terrorist group is provided training, material or ideological support, or even safehaven by a third party, nation or organization that is not otherwise directly involved in their activities. In this case, law enforcement efforts against the local groups and intelligence operations to identify and disrupt the external networks should be coordinated closely. However, even here you need to be clearer on what you mean by cooperation. I noted in my previous post the difficulties between law enforcement and intelligence approaches to data collection. Although you didn’t address those points specifically in either this post or the subsequent point-by-point, I would be interested in hearing your views on how the different approaches, methodologies and objectives between law enforcement and intelligence agencies can be rationalized. In addition, it might be worthwhile to revisit some of my argument concerning the ineffectiveness of law enforcement outside the territorial limits of the nation. At the risk of sounding like I’m arguing semantics, I think the key problem for me in what you have written in this paragraph is that you appear to have at least two, and possibly three mutually contradictory concepts here. I suppose it is a semantic quibble, but in this case I believe it may be justified as the stakes are high indeed. In one breath you label all terrorism a criminal act, and in the same breath you admit that in some cases it may be an act of war. By what criteria do you delineate the two? At what point does crime in this sense become an action that merits a response more on the lines of war? It’s the perceived ambiguity here that I’m objecting to. I think it may be more useful for both of us to consider a terrorist act as a continuum from crime to act of war, depending on perpetrator and scope. You do touch on this, but couch it only in terms of war crime — a term that has quite specific connotations. I might — just might — be induced to consider terrorism as crimes against humanity (if you want to stretch Art. 7 of the Rome Statute), but war crime in the sense it was used under the Nuremburg Charter, and in the sense that it is being used at the ICC, for instance, is specifically related to crimes committed by states or persons in time of war — either internal or international conflict - in direct violation of international law (see for example, text of the Additional Protocol 1 (1977) to the IV Geneva Protocol, reproduced in the Geneva Declaration of 2001, Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, especially Article 8: In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. . The sad thing is, this declaration was addressed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another example of how the IV Protocol is grievously ignored). The Rome Statute (Article 8.1) of the ICC maintains that war crimes are committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes i.e., that systematic and widespread violation of these protocols is grounds for a war crimes accusation. This is certainly consistent with terrorist = war criminal, but the key proviso here is that, in that case, terrorists must be accorded the status of combatant — the stance that I have maintained all along. The final disagreement I have with this paragraph is the unwarranted — or at least as yet unsupported — assumption that prosecution is in fact the objective. I would argue that deterrence or outright elimination of the threat is paramount. I would like to hear some additional argument from your standpoint as to why criminal prosecution is the preferred end state. I’m not saying you’re wrong, mind, but that to be convinced I need to see some additional argument developed in favor of this view. Also, and in a specific sense, please address how prosecution, which is an essentially reactive policy, can be made pre-emptive, and what deterrent effect you see as arising from this focus. I snipped most of your subsequent detail, because I feel that it’s primarily based on the end state assumption you made above. To comment effectively on your detailed summary, which is consistent and flows from your initial premise — if perhaps unrealistic in terms of the modern world as it stands now (wasn’t that your argument against my paradigm?) — it is necessary for us to determine whether your initial premise is indeed valid.
The international community can also put in place pre-emptive measures to remove the environments where extremism (of every shade) flourishes. There is no doubt that poverty and oppression breathe life into the use of Terrorism. Anywhere life is sufficiently devalued, the desperate will not see limiting their actions against there enemies as reasonable. This involves bringing diplomacy back onto the world stage, and a removal of the "war on terror". Beautiful! Literally. I think this is precisely the end we are both seeking. It will be intensely interesting to see if we can get from my focus on the national security problem to an international focus during the course of this discussion.
Result: The international community works to tighten law enforcement procedures on the world stage. [Q comment: we have yet to establish that law enforcement is an effective counter to terrorism.] Moreover a sense of equality is achieved between small and large Nations with regards the nature of War. Larger Nations will not be able to use Terrorism, or construct Terrorist Organizations within another country with impunity. Nations will have their hands untied to fight those who use terror, without losing the lens which we use to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate warfare. With the exception of the first sentence I commented on, I absolutely applaud this end state. We are both looking for the same result. Now how to achieve it
2) It is possible that Nations will try to wiggle on definitions of what a Terrorist Act is. This was a problem with the other paradigm as well, only in this case it is less of a problem. It is unlikely that Nations will move to label fatuous things "terror" the manufacture or sale of drugs, because such a definition would (since it is being adopted by the world community) come back to bite Nations that manufacture or sell items that are banned in other countries as well. It ends up being an either or choice. Either the community gets together and bans just about everything that is hated by someone somewhere, or build a realistic consensus dealing only with overtly violent acts perpetrated by a human directly against another. I think you may be understating the problem here. I don’t just think it’s possible, I think it is inevitable. Any state is going to examine the issue from the standpoint of their own internal politics or diplomacy. They are going to weigh the issue in the balance of their own security concerns and their individual relations with other nations. Finally, they are going to balance the risk to their own internal stability vs allowing a foreign or international organization to meddle in what many are going to consider issues relating to national sovereignty. I don’t think the risk is that governments are going to make ludicrous and spurious terrorist definitions, although that may occur. I think the risk derives from the existence of yet another toothless international organization that won’t have the coercive power to compel compliance, and no capability to investigate, and more importantly, truly prosecute, criminal terrorist cases. Well, this reply got longer than I thought it would be when I began. Looking back over it almost gives me a headache  . I hope it didn’t come off as simply a restatement of my original premise. I’ll give it a rest for the moment, and address your point-by-point tomorrow. I’m certainly enjoying the discussion. [This message has been edited by Quetzal, 10-13-2003]
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days) Posts: 3228 Joined: |
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Rei Member (Idle past 7041 days)  Posts: 1546 From: Iowa City, IA Joined: |
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PaulK Member Posts: 17827 Joined: Member Rating: 2.3 |
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days) Posts: 3228 Joined: |
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days) Posts: 3228 Joined: |
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PaulK Member Posts: 17827 Joined: Member Rating: 2.3 |
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days) Posts: 3228 Joined: |
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Quetzal Member (Idle past 5900 days) Posts: 3228 Joined: |
As to the question of the use of the term soldier - I concur. Fighter might be valid, but combatant has specific connotations that I think are more useful. I'm not wedded to either characterization, but I do think something along those lines is needed.
What's more, the range of activity a terrorist engages in... while potentially as broad as those available to the operatives already mentioned... are not utilized by the terrorist. Terrorists usually focus on inflicting high numbers of casualties, with perhaps some dramatic infrastructure damage as well. So we are talking about people who engage in a very limited range of actions. Although I agree in general, this isn't necessarily always the case. Terrorists are not restricted, except by logistics, to the tactics in which they engage. As we both agreed inre the Cole incident. It is, as the responses necessary to deal with them must be, something of a continuum with pure terrorism clustered at one end. Hamas, as Paul pointed out, is not a "pure terrorist" organization, and indeed started out as more of a guerrilla organization. It's only after they crossed the line into the tactics of unlimited war that they have "earned" the sobriquet and stigma of terrorist.
There were no battlefields in New York or Washington, and there won't be any on American soil for some time to come. This is where I think your definitions lend to hyperbole. Yes, that was hyperbole, for which I've already apologized. It's not the fault of the paradigm, rather my own tendency towards purple prose. It won't happen again.
There is nothing more coming, except when some other jerk or group of jerks pull off another devastating crime. And then that will be the end of that event. I disagree, at least in the case of Al Qaeda (unless their operations were so severely disrupted by the Afghan invasion they can't carry out additional attacks in the future, a stance for which I feel the evidence is lacking). I think this may be an important difference between international terrorist groups (i.e., organizations), and individuals who may engage in terrorist acts on their own hook. The groups are persistent, regardless of the success or failure of either individual acts or individual members. Some historical groups have been eliminated only after extensive disruption (Che Guevara's guerrillas, for instance), or after a single spectacular failure where they placed all/most of their eggs in one basket (Sendero Luminoso may be one such). Several domestic/transnational European groups (for instance) have been eliminated after the deaths or capture of the leadership (Badr-Meinhoff/Red Brigades) by law enforcement or internal security agencies - even though former supporters or members are still at large.
I was actually for the invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban were an awful result of our original meddling in their affairs and then abandoning them. And they were certainly protecting Al-Queda from our ability to prosecute them. We could have gone in, with surgical small unit strikes to knock a few people out, however I believe it was wiser to engage in more largescale disruption of their base in Afghanistan. This is interesting, although I think it might be off-topic to delve too far into the subject on this thread. I agree with what you wrote, concerning the Taliban. However, from a strictly counterterrorism standpoint, it would have been much more effective to simply take out the Al Qaeda leadership if that could have been accomplished. The invasion, and the continual hype and media exposure prior to the actual fighting served only to telegraph our assault to Al Qaeda, making relatively easy for them to slip away. Al Qaeda strikes me as the type of organization where a surgical decapitation might have cause the organization to "fold its tents", as it were. The remaining membership, bereft of anything resembling either ideological or operational leadership, can still be dangerous, of course. However, without that backing, they are no longer members of a global organization - simply operatives without the support to conduct substantial operations, and can be safely relegated to being tracked down by law enforcement.
This is incorrect. Or at this level of comparison there are many other organizations which would suddenly become "armies". However, they do act like an intelligence agency. Their organization on some local levels is paramilitary but never full military. Their organizational structure and nature of their operations are most similar to those of Espionage/Saboteur organizations. Hmm, if not an army, then at the very least a capable paramilitary organization with a worldwide operational reach. I AM beginning to come around to your point that there may be better ways of describing the actual threat they pose than "army". I'm not sure that there is a valid analogy. Again, I'm not sure what an espionage/saboteur organization would be, or how that would be different from say a legitimate guerrilla or insurgent group. This is one of those areas where I need to cogitate on it a bit more.
Unfortunately this appears to be more or less an exercise in semantics. There is no Nation of Islam. Neither are Islamic fundamentalist groups launching crusades to take over Western Nations. I never said there was a "nation of Islam". I said that is the way they perceive the situation. Nor was there any implication that they were trying to "take over" (oh, never mind - I see you're extrapolating from the "army" analogy). In any event, I agree they want us off their property, and have decided inflicting civilian casualties is the way to achieve it.
The nature of almost all terrorist attacks will be along the lines of what a single, crazy individual can do. What we should be doing is worrying about protecting vital assets with law enforcement (or military police, I don't care) so that no one can amplify the damage they want to do by extreme degrees. As it is intelligence officials have recently figured this major hole in their plan (which is to prevent all future attacks by finding and arresting terrorists before they strike). So now they want powers to enable them to find "lone wolves". Instead of wasting manpower and money trying to find the lone wolves, wouldn't it make more sense to protect the areas you know wolves are likely to go, or if they manage to get to can cause a lot of damage? I think it requires both. I would focus efforts on both hardening potential targets (in which case they'll go after other targets that aren't hardened) and proactively eliminating the threat, which over the long term is probably more effective. I agree that wasting time and resource going after lone wolves is at the very least inefficient, and probably ultimately futile. Organizations that pose a threat that can be rolled up or disrupted, OTOH, would seem to be valid targets.
The terrorist is not just a murderer, but a terrorist. I think it should be considered separate and greater crime than simple murder. We are in substantive agreement. My only issue is that under domestic, constitutional, and international law labelling someone as "criminal" limits the available response.
I agree with this. That is why there should be international laws put into place which define what routes Nations can take against TO's existing in other Nations. That also has the benefit of protecting other Nations from when the US has no respect for the interests of other Nations, and acts without any sense of "civilized" behavior. This happens much more often than the reverse due to our ever global presence, and insatiable appetite for the wealth of other countries. Not to mention our arrogant preparedness to take direct action to protect our own interest (but deny that ability of other Nations). Yepper. Concur wholeheartedly. The trick is to find what those routes might be.
This is the biggest red-herring intelligence agencies and their sympathizers have perpetrated on the public. As soon as 9-11 happened we heard this explanation... that the hands of law enforcement and intelligence services had been tied. Actually, that wasn't the intent of my comment. Both the FBI and military intelligence received substantial increases in their budgets during the Clinton administration for counterterrorism and intelligence collection. In spite of that fact, the reporting and analysis system within the FBI still missed several field reports describing suspicious activity relating to aircraft training. This is documented in the CRS report I referenced in the OP. It was a question of bureaucratic inefficiency coupled with information overload and a lack of trained intelligence analysts (vice criminal case workers) that caused the failure of the system - not lack of funds. I'm not clear why the military missed the call - I don't know what their collection priorities were at the time. And it's no surprise to me that the CIA bumbled again - they haven't made a single correct call since Forrestal founded the organization. It also comes as no surprise to me that Bush Jr. had other priorities .
Frankly, if I was to accept the idea that terrorists should be considered soldiers, then I think this flies right out the window. After all that would mean the person is no longer a US citizen, but a member of a foreign army fighting on our soil. Along these lines, since I consider terrorists criminal agents similar to enemy intelligence agents, I do believe once there is evidence that a US citizen is working for a TO, their rights of privacy should go out the window. I still think court proceedings should be public and within the scope of normal law, but rules of evidence have to be loosened. Very interesting. VERY interesting. I'm not sure what I think about this. I just realized that I've always taken it as a given that US foreign intelligence agencies would be prohibted from collecting against US citizens. But if, as you point out, they are members of a terrorist group with international connections...?? Hmmm, humm, rum tum tiddly umm tum (*sound of ruminative humming*). Yes, very interesting indeed. Have to think very long and hard about that one. The implications could be very, erm, complicated...
I think I still need a clearer picture of what your paradigm would look like in practice. Let's say for example that someone poisons a water system. Detail what happens next for when it turns out to be a 1) local crazy, 2) disgruntled local militia paying back some town, 3) a true to life international TO. Very good. In all three cases, since we're dealing with an act committed within the national confines of the US (or whatever state - I'll treat it as US because that's what I understand better), the initial investigation should be undertaken by law enforcement. I've already stated they have the forensic capability to do so. In both cases 1&2, that's where the matter would remain. After all, it's a purely domestic issue. In case #3, however, foreign collections needs to be brought into play - at the very least in an advisory capacity. Following that, specific thresholds of response would be invoked, depending on the nature of the organization, scope, potential or threat for future acts, etc., and the most effective method for preventing, disrupting or eliminating them would be initiated. Let me turn that around on you though. What, under your paradigm, would be the sequence of events if intent or potential for the act was at least indicated in the three cases? What does law enforcement do? How does law enforcement go about either deterring or disrupting the potential act?
I believe an international legal body must be created. I think it is high time that Nations view each other as citizens in a world community that requires laws to regulate their conduct (just like citizens within their borders). Tall order. But to my mind it is do it now, or live through the ensuing chaos until we realize later on we're going to have to do it anyway. Yes, I understand that this is where you are coming from. And I laud the end result you are seeking. After all, we're both looking for the same thing, ultimately. My question is, without the necessary cultural shift in how each major power views both conflict and interstatal relations, how do you avoid the problem of simply creating yet one more organization that anyone - except smaller states that can be coerced directly by the larger ones - can ignore with impunity? This is the fundamental problem I have with all such ideas. They're great, they're needed, and they are definitely past due. And they're all doomed because they start from their conclusion. Nor do they take into consideration the very real security concerns of the nations that are expected to adhere to them. How do you convince a state such as the US (or France, or the UK, or whomever) that it is in their interest - they only way they'll accept such an idea - to accede to an international body of this nature? I completely agree with the rest of this section.
I realize this is not a necessity. It doesn't HAVE to be that way. But those in power right now think it does and are fighting for it. That means unless we approach the subject by first criminalizing that form of warfare (in the broad sense), it will always remain a viable option for our governments to use. And I believe that you are putting the cart before the horse: that the shift has to begin from within. Only if a nation state can face the fact that such tactics are illegitimate, acknowledge that their own use of such tactics is just as illegitimate, make a conscious effort to develop a new strategy for dealing with conflict, then and only then will criminalizing the behavior make any sense. After all, without that shift nations will continue to ignore the criminality of their actions whenever it suits them - just as they've ignored the Geneva and Hague Conventions, not to mention almost every resolution the UN or even the UNSC has put forward.
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Silent H Member (Idle past 5847 days) Posts: 7405 From: satellite of love Joined: |
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