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Author Topic:   Why "Immaterial Pink Unicorns" are not a logical argument
Rahvin
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Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 62 of 304 (500054)
02-22-2009 1:13 PM
Reply to: Message 61 by RAZD
02-22-2009 12:05 PM


Re: replacement for the IPU?
Thus, in addition to the logical fallacy of hasty generalization, it is the logical fallacy of ad hominem attack and ridicule
It's not an ad hominem. Calling your oppenent an idiot directly isn't even an ad hominem. An ad hominem requires that you accuse your opponent of being wrong because of (insert personal attack here.)
In other words, saying "You're an idiot, therefore you are wrong" is an ad hominem.
Saying "You're wrong, for x, y and z reasons, you idiot," is not an ad hominem.
Ridicule of an opponent is bad manners, but unless the ridicule is the basis of your argument, it's not an ad hominem.
Making the IPU argument does not include the assertion that belief in dieties is wrong because theists are stupid. It's an attempt at applying theistic reasoning to a made-up and purposefully ridiculous entity to show that the theist's reasoning, when applied universally, is absurd. Its intent is to point out the special pleading of the theist, where some unevidenced and unfalsifiable claims are okay, and all others are not.
A better tactic may well be to replace the IPU with an actual deity, preferably a totally ridiculous one that actually had followers in the past - something like the Flying Spaghetti Monster, except where the believers were serious. In reality, the IPU argument is no different from an identical argument using Thor or Zeus or any other unfalsifiable, unevidenced entity. You simply don't like it because it paints all theism as unreasonable and ridiculous. Personally, I don' much care about how offensive an argument may or may not be to an opponent - emotion is irrelevant, and only the argument matters. In the case of the IPU, it frequently makes theists extremely angry, but also makes a valid point.
The IPU argument is this:
"Belief in a deity can be described as a belief in an entity for which there is not objective evidence. Frequently these beliefs have no contradicting evidence either, and are in fact completely unfalsifiable. Such beliefs make an unfounded assertion, and when applied to other unfalsifiable entities for which there is no evidence, special pleading is invoked. For example, believing in "god" when no evidence for such an entity exists and whose existence cannot be tested is similar to belief in an Invisible Pink Unicorn - neither have evidence to suggest that they actually exist, neither are falsifiable, and neither are contradicted by evidence. Therefore the same reasoning used to justify belief in "god" also applies to the IPU. The IPU is a completely made-up entity, and there is nothing that distinguishes "god" from the IPU. This means that, if the theist believes in "god" and not in the IPU, the theist invokes special pleading. Because the IPU sounds utterly ridiculous, most theists will fall into the trap of denying its existence and exposing their special pleading, revealing their fallacious reasoning for the existence of deities."
The IPU argument does not insist that, because the IPU is ridiculous, all deities are also ridiclous. It does not make the arguemnt that the opponent is stupid and therefore his reasoning is false.
It is a valid argument that baits the theist into rejecting the existence of one entity while embracing the existence of another, both of which are not supported by evidence and are unfalsifiable, thus revealing that the theist is using special pleading.
An ad lapidem fallacy involves accusations of absurdity without demonstrating that the argument is absurd, effectively ignoring the argument. It's possible that some debaters would fail to use the IPU argument correctly and thus commit an ad lapidem, but the actual argument is not about an accusation of absurdity without demonstrating the absurdity of the opponent's position. It's about revealing special pleading by comparing deities to something ridiculous - it's a trap. One that most theists fall for, because they're unwilling to compare their belief in one unevidenced and unfalsifiable entity with another if the second "sounds funny." If the IPU is replaced by other popular deities like the Muslim god, the argument remains exactly the same and yet theists will not reject it so quickly - the assertion of a different, widely accepted unevidenced and unfalsifiable entity is not as offensive.
The IPU argument inspires cognitive dissonance - a feeling of discomfort caused by conflicting internal beliefs (that is, belief in entity "x" is okay because there is no contradictory evidence, but belief in the IPU is not okay even though there is no contradictory evidence). This typically results in accusations of ad hominem fallacies (and others) as the theist attempts to dismiss the argument while retaining their belief and ignoring the special pleading.
Even the hasty generalization fallacy does not apply; a hasty generalization is an argument from limited or inadequate information. This is not similar to the IPU argument, where one unevidenced and unfalsifiable entity is compared to another.
Granted, some debaters may use the IPU in a hasty generalization, like saying "deity x does not exists, therefore deity y does not exist," or make an ad lapidem by saying "The IPU is utterly ridiculous, therefore belief in deity x is also ridiculous." However, these are misapplications of the IPU argument. I will agree that these should not be used. The correct form of the IPU argument however, where a ridiculous entity (or any other entity, really) is used to demonstrate the special pleading of the theistic position, is not fallacious.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 61 by RAZD, posted 02-22-2009 12:05 PM RAZD has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 65 by Modulous, posted 02-22-2009 3:40 PM Rahvin has not replied
 Message 67 by RAZD, posted 02-22-2009 4:13 PM Rahvin has replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 72 of 304 (500085)
02-22-2009 6:42 PM
Reply to: Message 67 by RAZD
02-22-2009 4:13 PM


Re: General Reply
RAZD, Im severely disappointed.
Your entire line of reasoning requires that the proposition "life may exist elsewhere in teh Universe" be based on no evidence in the same way that belief in a deity is based on no evidence. It also requires that your opponent assert that alien life actually exists, as opposed to being merely possible.
This is not true. At all. And its so obviously not true that I'm disappointed that you've used the same argument multiple times.
1) The proposition that life may exist elsewhere in teh Universe does not exist in a vacuum of evidence. We know that life exists in the Universe (us), ergo there is evidence that it is possible that life may exist elsewhere.
This is different from the proposition that deities exist - we do not have an example of a deity to show that deities can exist. Similarly, we do not have an example of an Invisible Pink Unicorn to show that IPUs are possible.
2) Your application of the IPU argument to alien life requires that your opponent agree that there is reason to be confident that life does actually exist elsewhere in the Universe, in the same way that theists are confident that deities exist. You assume this agreement, but without it your comparison falls apart. As we all know, stating that something is possible is different from having confidence that it is.
So in reality, your IPU attempt looks like this:
A) The IPU is an entity for which there is no supporting evidence.
B) There is no evidence supporting the existence of alien life.
C) Therefore, belief in alien life is as silly as the IPU.
And my response would be:
A) I agree, there is no evidence supporting the evidence of the IPU.
B) I agree, there is no evidence suggesting that alien life does actually exist. However, there is ample evidence that alien life is possible, because we know that life can exist in the Universe. This is more than we can say for the IPU.
C) I agree that confidence in the actual existence of alien life is irrational until such evidence is presented. This is different from acknowledging that alien life is a possibility.
I have a reason to think that alien lifemay exist elsewhere because life exists here. I do not have a reason to think that an IPU exists anywhere becasue I have absolutely no evidence from which to base such an assertion.
Similarly, I have no reason to think deities exist. We have no example of a deity (except those we know to be made-up) suggesting that deities are even possible.
I can lack belief in a deity exactly as I lack belief in the IPU without special pleading. I can also acknowledge that alien life is a possibility and has at least some supporting evidence without special pleading.
Your argument falls on its face.
The implication of the typical IPU argument is that you are an idiot, because you can't see that C is just like B, not that you are wrong.
Implications are irrelevant. The argument itself does not use a personal attack to dismiss an argument. It attempts to reveal special pleading. That you feel belittled by the argument is irrelevant. It's a subjective, personal emotional response to a valid logical argument. You have not shown how the IPU argument is an ad hominem attack, only that it has the tangential effect of being insulting. You know these are two different things.
Actually the implication is that belief in anything where we have no evidence one way or the other (A), is silly at best, clinically delusional at worst. This, of course, also applies to any conclusion other than "we don't know" so if this is a reductio ad absurdum argument, it applies equally to belief (+) as well as any belief (-) for any item in the class A, where A consists of:
(1) all concepts for which we currently have no validating evidence and
(2) that also have no contradictory evidence
So if you reach a conclusion on the issue of alien life in the universe, pro or con, you are "guilty as charged" of the IPU belief to the same degree that deists\theists are guilty, or do we hear special pleading here?
The "implication" is the emotional reaction used by the IPU argument as bait to reveal special pleading in one unevidenced claim over others. The absurdity is not the argument, it's the bait.
As I have described above, your example of alien life does not follow - it is not a claim in an absence of all evidence, and further it is not a belief necessarily held with any confidence by your opponent. I would need to state that I believe alien life exists in order to engage in special pleading - I claim no such thing, so your argument fall flat.
Belief in alien life in the universe is like belief in the IPU/s
...if there is apositive belief in the actual existence of extraterrestrial life, and if such a belief exists in a total vacuum of evidence as with the IPU. These are not the case, and so your argument does not follow.
Frankly RAZD, Im tired of seeing you make the same irrelevant points over and over, even when its been described how you are wrong. You're acting just as the Creationists do - making false accusations of logical fallacies to defend your own personal view. I'm disappointed, because unlike most of the Creationists, you actually know what logical fallacies really are, and yet you continue to misuse them.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 67 by RAZD, posted 02-22-2009 4:13 PM RAZD has seen this message but not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 73 of 304 (500086)
02-22-2009 6:45 PM
Reply to: Message 71 by Straggler
02-22-2009 6:24 PM


Re: Absolute Vs Relative Probability
It doesn't matter how likely or unlikely I, or you, might think abiogenesis to be.
If we accept that abiogenesis is physically possible then no matter how absolutely unlikely it may be the more planets there are in the universe the greater the probability of it actually occurring. This is mathematically indisputable.
RAZD's strict logical argument + irrational "world view" assertion is incapable of taking this relative probability into account.
Thus it is deeply and inherently flawed. He continues to evade and deny this flaw but it remains apparent for all to see.
Only if you assume that we are God's unique special creation and that abiogenesis is physically impossible anywhere else in the universe does your argument come into play.
And I see no reason to believe that is true, and I doubt RAZD does either.
Abiogenesis doesnt even come into play. We know that life can exist in the Universe, because we have an example here on Earth. Therefore it is possible that life exists elsewhere in the Universe, regardless of the source of that life.
Iano is simply wrong.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 71 by Straggler, posted 02-22-2009 6:24 PM Straggler has not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 94 of 304 (500160)
02-23-2009 5:08 PM
Reply to: Message 91 by shalamabobbi
02-23-2009 2:09 PM


Re: defining the IPU applicability
The issue I see with this is that those who have beliefs in deities(not RAZDs position but rather extending the application of the argument?) are rarely static throughout life in this belief. Usually there is some conversion event/process that amounts to the evidence that the belief is based upon, whereas the IPU has no evidence whatsoever in contradistinction.
If one were to say 'I believe in deity X' and when pressed with 'why' says 'no reason, I just assert that X exists', then the IPU fits that situation and special pleading applies. If someone claims belief in diety Y and when pressed says 'because I fell from the edge of the grand canyon and an angel caught me and placed me on a ledge where I could be rescued' then the IPU argument does not apply.
Here there is evidence that is claimed as the basis for the belief. One can now dispute that evidence/claim but can no longer compare the belief with the IPU designed for a belief held w/o evidence.
The issue is that such "conversion events" and the so-called "evidence" they provide are not really evidence at all. They're invariably subjective, and thus not "evidence."
A "feeling" is not objective evidence of the existence of anything. A "vision" is not objective evidence of the existence of anything. Personal credulity is not evidence of the existence of anything.
Belief that an "angel" caught you is simply yet another unverified claim. It's not an objective fact that you were caught by an angel. It would be an objective fact that you fell, and that you survived...but a near-death experience combined with a vision of a supernatural entity whose existence cannot be verified outside of your own mind is not evidence that the entity actually exists.
Evidence must take the form of one or more facts that support a given conclusion above other conclusions. There are no facts, nothing objective whatsoever, involved with faith - else it wouldn't be faith.
The IPU has exactly as much evidence supporting its existence as any given figment of the imagination, which includes deities. In other words, none at all. This is what makes the comparison valid in the first place - when the theist has confidence in the existence of one entity and not others when none are supported by evidence, the theist engages in special pleading.
To combat this, one would need to describe what differentiates their entity from any other imaginary one. I can do this, for example, for the phone on my desk - it has a set of observable properties that are identical independent of the observer, and I can test for its existence or nonexistence. There are a series of objective facts that support the conclusion that there is a telephone on my desk as oppose to nothing, or an invisible pink widget.
Unfortunately, there are no objective facts surrounding the existence of a deity. In fact, many deities are specifically described in such a way as to defy any attempt to define them or give the notion of their existence any sort of falsifiability. "Unknowable" deities cannot be differentiated from any other figment of one's imagination - if it's "unknowable," you cannot define it in terms that differentiate it from an Invisible Pink Unicorn, or a Flying Spaghetti Monster, or an uncaring omnipotent self-contradiction named Carl. There are no facts that support any conclusion regarding the existence or even possibility of one or more of the infinite number of imaginable but unfalsifiable entities.
This means that, even when one believes they have "evidence," unless one has objective facts that support their conclusion, they have exactly the same amount of real evidence as one who claims the existence of an Invisible Pink Unicorn - absolutely none.
RAZD may have a subjective "reason" for believing in his "deity," but subjective "reasons" are not evidence. Evidence is all that matters. Subjective "reasons" have a well-established track record of leading to false conclusions and even delusion.
RAZD has thus far not shown how the entity he refers to as a "deity" is different from the "Invisible Pink Unicorn," except that he believes in his deity and (supposedly) not in the IPU. He has confidence in entity A but no confidence in entity B, and has not presented any objective facts that support the existence of entity A above entity B. He's hemmed and hawed and distracted and generally avoided the actual issue by claiming that the IPU is different from his "deity," and by falsely identifying the IPU argument as a variety of logical fallacies, but he has still not produced a single reason to have confidence in Entity A but not in Entity B without invoking special pleading. He hasn't even described his "deity" in any way to differentiate it from the IPU - it's entirely possible given RAZD's (lack of) claims regarding his "deity" that the "unknowable deity" could in fact be an Invisible Pink Unicorn, or a Flying Spaghetti Monster, or the Purple Telletubby, or a formless coalescence of sentience with physics-defying abilities. He's dismissed several of those proposals as "ridiculous" or "silly," because they certainly sound silly, but he hasn't demonstrated how they are any more or less reasonable than his "deity." He's simply retorted with "your comparison of my beliefs to such a silly entity are insulting, and my personal offense validates my claim that the IPU is a fallacious argument."
In effect, RAZD has utterly failed to show that the IPU argument is invalid. He's had ample opportunity to do so, and has instead taken several pages from the Creationist playbook by ignoring arguments and dismissing others as fallacious without demonstrating how.
The IPU argument stands so long as "deities" can be decribed as entities about which no evidence exists. The personal credulity surrounding the IPU or "deities" or fairies or dragons or anything else is irrelvant - all that matters is evidence and argument.
IF
Confidence(Entity A) > Confidence(Entity B)
AND
Evidence(Entity A) == Evidence(Entity B)
THEN
Special pleading has been invoked.
This is the heart of the IPU argument. The IPU is designed as a ridiculous-sounding (but objectively still unfalsifiable and thus no more or less ridiculous than any other speculated entity) entity to bait theists into admitting that they have more confidence in the existence of their preferred entity than they have in the existence of other entities, where the objective evidence supporting those entities remains the same across the board. The "absurdity" of the IPU itself is not actually related to the argument, in the same way that personal insults to an opponent are not ad hominem attacks unless those personal attacks are used as the sole rebuttal. The IPU argument is identical to the "why no belief in other deities" argument ("Do you believe in Thor? Zeus? YHWH? Anubis?") with a bait to induce a knee-jerk reaction.
To invalidate the IPU argument, RAZD (or someone else) must show how
Evidence(Entity A) != Evidence(Entity B)
or show that "subjective evidence" is a rational means to draw a conclusion.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 91 by shalamabobbi, posted 02-23-2009 2:09 PM shalamabobbi has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 95 by shalamabobbi, posted 02-23-2009 9:07 PM Rahvin has replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 97 of 304 (500194)
02-23-2009 9:53 PM
Reply to: Message 95 by shalamabobbi
02-23-2009 9:07 PM


Re: defining the IPU applicability
I'll re-post the first half of my previous reply, where I wrote at length about the nature of evidence as it applies here:
quote:
The issue is that such "conversion events" and the so-called "evidence" they provide are not really evidence at all. They're invariably subjective, and thus not "evidence."
A "feeling" is not objective evidence of the existence of anything. A "vision" is not objective evidence of the existence of anything. Personal credulity is not evidence of the existence of anything.
Belief that an "angel" caught you is simply yet another unverified claim. It's not an objective fact that you were caught by an angel. It would be an objective fact that you fell, and that you survived...but a near-death experience combined with a vision of a supernatural entity whose existence cannot be verified outside of your own mind is not evidence that the entity actually exists.
Evidence must take the form of one or more facts that support a given conclusion above other conclusions. There are no facts, nothing objective whatsoever, involved with faith - else it wouldn't be faith.
The IPU has exactly as much evidence supporting its existence as any given figment of the imagination, which includes deities. In other words, none at all. This is what makes the comparison valid in the first place - when the theist has confidence in the existence of one entity and not others when none are supported by evidence, the theist engages in special pleading.
To combat this, one would need to describe what differentiates their entity from any other imaginary one. I can do this, for example, for the phone on my desk - it has a set of observable properties that are identical independent of the observer, and I can test for its existence or nonexistence. There are a series of objective facts that support the conclusion that there is a telephone on my desk as oppose to nothing, or an invisible pink widget.
Unfortunately, there are no objective facts surrounding the existence of a deity. In fact, many deities are specifically described in such a way as to defy any attempt to define them or give the notion of their existence any sort of falsifiability. "Unknowable" deities cannot be differentiated from any other figment of one's imagination - if it's "unknowable," you cannot define it in terms that differentiate it from an Invisible Pink Unicorn, or a Flying Spaghetti Monster, or an uncaring omnipotent self-contradiction named Carl. There are no facts that support any conclusion regarding the existence or even possibility of one or more of the infinite number of imaginable but unfalsifiable entities.
This means that, even when one believes they have "evidence," unless one has objective facts that support their conclusion, they have exactly the same amount of real evidence as one who claims the existence of an Invisible Pink Unicorn - absolutely none.
Your initial response falls in line with what I was getting at, that you can dispute the claims to evidence. I am not sure if the IPU can be shoehorned into the argument w/o establishing that the 'evidence' is indeed subjective and not objective or can be dismissed with Stragler's 'people make shit up' etc or in some other way. Everyone will likely be convinced of such arguments against the evidence with the noteable exception of the person who claims to have experienced the evidence.
Subjective experiences are not evidence. Period. Ever.
"Evidence" is one or more facts that support one conclusion over others. Facts are not subjective. Subjective experiences and feelings do not involve facts, and thus do not qualify as evidence.
IF
Confidence(Entity A) > Confidence(Entity B)
AND
Evidence(Entity A) > Evidence(Entity B)
THEN
Special pleading is not invoked.
This does not represent any argument I have ever seen where (Entity A) is a deity. Unless you, RAZD or anyone else makes such an argument showing that evidence does exist in support of the existence of a deity, this line of reasoning is irrelevant.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 95 by shalamabobbi, posted 02-23-2009 9:07 PM shalamabobbi has not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 102 by onifre, posted 02-24-2009 5:02 PM Rahvin has not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 106 of 304 (500395)
02-25-2009 1:07 PM


In general here we have the theme that the absurdity of the IPU itself is only incidental to the actual argument.
The typically used IPU argument could just as easily replace the unicorn with an actually-worshipped deity, and the form of teh argument would be identical. Using an absurd-seeming entity like the unicorn is simply more likely to garner an emotional reaction from the theist.
The form of the argument is this:
IF
Confidence(Entity A) > Confidence(Entity B)
AND
Evidence(Entity A) == Evidence(Entity B)
THEN
Special pleading is invoked.
In the IPU argument Entity B is obviously the Invisible Pink Unicorn. However, the form of the argument does not change if you replace the IPU with Thor, or Zeus, or any other proposed entity for which no objective evidence (including no contradictory evidence) exists. Entity A and Entity B must both be functionally identical in terms of supporting objective evidence, but otherwise none of their specific characteristics are relevant to the argument. They don't even both need to be deities.
This means that the IPU argument does not rest on perceived absurdity, and neither does it take the form of an ad hominem attack. There is no insult involved in the logical form of the argument - any insult is strictly incidental, and wholly irrelevant to the argument itself.
RAZD would have us believe that Entity A and Entity B occupy two different sets of possibilities and so are not comparable. However, he has not demonstrated any difference that is relevant to the form and function of the IPU argument. As stated, his accusations of fallacious reasoning with regard to the IPU argument have been shown to be wholly false. For his argument to be valid, he needs to show that Entity A and Entity B are actually different in a way that is meaningful to the actual argument. Since the argument takes into consideration only a lack of either supporting or contradicting evidence, RAZD needs to show that one of the two entities is either supported or negated by some form of objective evidence. If he cannot do so, then it is apparent that Entity A and Entity B both occupy the same set: those speculative entities that are neither supported nor contradicted by objective evidence.
RAZD's only other recourse would be to either attempt to include "subjective evidence" which, as previously shown, is not actually evidence of anything objective at all. He could also claim that not all evidence is currently known, but this again speculates that the likelihood of finding future evidence supporting Entity A is greater than the likelihood of finding future evidence supporting Entity B, and such a speculation has no basis and would again invoke special pleading.
It would appear that the Invisible Pink Unicorn argument, when it takes the form used above, is in fact a logically valid argument. So long as greater confidence is held in the existence of one entity over another without a correspondingly greater amount of objective evidence, the theist is using special pleading, and as such the theistic position is logically inconsistent.

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 238 of 304 (503475)
03-19-2009 12:38 PM
Reply to: Message 237 by New Cat's Eye
03-19-2009 11:44 AM


What is reasonable?
quote:
So we have established that it is an objectively evidenced fact that humans are capable of inventing god concepts that are false.
Sure, for some god concepts but not all of them.
Which "god concepts" are not the invention of the human imagination? Is there a reason you think some "god concepts" are not the invention of the human imagination? If so, what is that reason?
If every "god concept" we have been able to test has proven to be an invention of the human imagination, why would we reasonably conclude that there is any significant likelihood that the rest of them are not similarly figments of the imagination?
Agnosticism requires the position that the existence of deities is a possibility, and thus without additional evidence we cannot know either way. Is there a reason you believe the existence of a deity to be a possibility? After all, deities are typically described as having abilities we otherwise consider to be impossible - omnipotence, omniscience, the ability to violate physics and create/destroy matter/energy, etc. How is it reasonable to conclude that the existence of such an entity is "possible" when it is described as having abilities we otherwise consider impossible? Is it not reasonable to conclude that it is highly unlikely at best that any such supernatural entity exists?
The facts surrounding deities consist of these:
1) There is no objective evidence supporting the existence of any deity
2) Nearly all deities are described as having abilities otherwise considered impossible, when those deities are described at all.
3) The only cases in which we have been able to objectively determine the existence of a deity, in every instance that deity has been shown to be the product of the human imagination (Thor is not actually responsible for lightning bolts, etc).
4) Other assertions involving seemingly impossible qualities that bear strong resemblance to known made-up entities are typically considered to not exist, such as the Immaterial Pink Unicorn, leprechauns, and fairies.
5) In the same way that people have subjective experiences attributed to deities, people also have have had subjective experiences that they have attributed to fairies, leprechauns, etc. Individuals like Modulus have had subjective experiences that they have (at the time) attributed to a variety of different and mutually exclusive entities. The attribution of a given subjective "religious" experience seems to be tied more to the pre-existing beliefs of the individual, and not tied to any objective reality.
Is it reasonable to conclude, given these facts, that "deity x":
a) may exist, we don't know
b) definitely does not exist
c) definitely does exist
d) likely exists, and while we cannot know for sure we need to fave faith
e) is most likely a product of the human imagination, though we cannot be certain.
Agnostics choose a). Deists for a variety of reasons (perhaps they've had one of these subjective experiences themselves) seem to choose d). Some Atheists choose b). Personally, given the facts, I think that e) is the most rational and reasonable choice.
Why?
There is no reason to have confidence in an unsupported assertion.
There is no reason to concede the possibility of an entity posessing abilities or properties otherwise considered impossible.
There is ample reason to have confidence that unsupported, seemingly impossible entities like deities, leprechauns and the Immaterial Pink Unicorn are all figments of the human imagination, since all examples we know of thus far have been determined to be such.
There is ample reason to believe that the "subjective experiences" typically used to support such entities are the result of false pattern recognition, wishful thinking, overactive imaginations, social pressure, hallucination, or any of the other reasons people can draw false conclusions.
These facts lead me to conclude that there is no reason to have confidence that any deities exist, or that any deities can exist. I am led to conclude that I have ample reason to be confident that any such entity is very likely the product of the human imagination. Therefore, while I cannot be certain (in the same way I cannot be certain that we are not in the Matrix), following only the evidence available to me I must hold the position that deities and other "supernatural" entities unsupported by objective evidence are all likely the products of human imagination.
Do you disagree? If so, why?
It can indicate that some concepts of god are false, but it cannot indicate that a general concept of god, that lacks specifics, is false.
What defines this "general concept of god" without using specifics, CS? Pretend that I have never heard of "god." What properties does this "god" have that differentiate it from a coaster, or an automobile, or a molecule, or a leprechaun? Is it alive? Is it sentient? Does it have the ability to affect the world around it? Is it a myth?
If you agree that there is no reason to be confident in the existence of a given unsupported entity, why should we be confident in the existence (or possibility) of an entity completely lacking in description?
Do you agree that "generalizing" your concept of "god" until it possesses no actual discrete properties to differentiate it from any other entity, real or imagined, bears the hallmarks of deliberate unfalsifiability? Do you agree that this is the ultimate example of the "god of the gaps," and that the final unknown for "god" to sink into is to make "god" itself unknowable?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 237 by New Cat's Eye, posted 03-19-2009 11:44 AM New Cat's Eye has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 241 by New Cat's Eye, posted 03-19-2009 2:54 PM Rahvin has replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 242 of 304 (503497)
03-19-2009 3:33 PM
Reply to: Message 241 by New Cat's Eye
03-19-2009 2:54 PM


Re: What is reasonable?
quote:
Which "god concepts" are not the invention of the human imagination? Is there a reason you think some "god concepts" are not the invention of the human imagination? If so, what is that reason?
My own god concept is not the invention of the human imagination. I think this because I have the concept, and I did not imagine it.
You may not have been the original source of your particular "god concept." But what reason do you have to have confidence that your particular "god concept" is not the product of human imagination? Are you simply trusting the opinions of others who have similar "god concepts," but who are similarly unable to support such a concept with anything objective? T
quote:
If every "god concept" we have been able to test has proven to be an invention of the human imagination, why would we reasonably conclude that there is any significant likelihood that the rest of them are not similarly figments of the imagination?
Because we can't test every concept and my own concept was not imagined so maybe some others are not too.
You haven't established that your own "god concept" is not imagined; you've simply asserted that this is so by saying that you didn't make it up yourself. That has nothing to do with whether or not the ceoncept is the product of human imagination. I didn't imagine the Immaterial Pink Unicorn, or leprechauns, or Zeus, and they are all still the product of human imagination. Your "god concept" is objectively no different from any others.
Contrary to your reasoning, it would seem more reasonable to conclude that since those "god concepts" we have been able to test have proven to all be the product of human imagination, it is highly likely that the other "god concepts" are also the product of human imagination. Including yours, even if your personal imagination was not the original source.
quote:
Agnosticism requires the position that the existence of deities is a possibility, and thus without additional evidence we cannot know either way. Is there a reason you believe the existence of a deity to be a possibility?
Yes, my subjective experiences tell me that god does exist.
I've had such experiences. Others have had subjective experiences that led them to believe in leprechauns. Subjective experiences are notoriously unreliable when it comes to objective reality; as Straggler has said, they're functionally no better than a random guess chosen from the infinite number of conceivable assertions.
For what reason do you believe your subjective experience supports your "god concept" as opposed to false pattern recognition, social pressure, wishful thinking, self-delusion, or any of the other reasons human beings come to false conclusions? What about your personal subjective experience gives you a reason to have confidence that it has any relevance to objective reality?
quote:
After all, deities are typically described as having abilities we otherwise consider to be impossible - omnipotence, omniscience, the ability to violate physics and create/destroy matter/energy, etc. How is it reasonable to conclude that the existence of such an entity is "possible" when it is described as having abilities we otherwise consider impossible?
This discussion is limited to non-specific concepts of god. If we were talking about any specific god then my position would be different.
We have to have some attributes assigned to "god;" otherwise, how do we differentiate "god" from a toaster oven? It would seem that you're retreating your "god concept" even farther, until it's not even a "god concept" at all but rather an undefined "something concept" that could just as easily be a mouse, or a car, or a leprechaun.
How can one even have a discussion about a concept that isn't even defined in terms that differentiate the concept being discussed from all other conceivable concepts?
I'm going to repeat this bit, since you didn't respond to it:
quote:
What defines this "general concept of god" without using specifics, CS? Pretend that I have never heard of "god." What properties does this "god" have that differentiate it from a coaster, or an automobile, or a molecule, or a leprechaun? Is it alive? Is it sentient? Does it have the ability to affect the world around it? Is it a myth?
If you agree that there is no reason to be confident in the existence of a given unsupported entity, why should we be confident in the existence (or possibility) of an entity completely lacking in description?
Do you agree that "generalizing" your concept of "god" until it possesses no actual discrete properties to differentiate it from any other entity, real or imagined, bears the hallmarks of deliberate unfalsifiability? Do you agree that this is the ultimate example of the "god of the gaps," and that the final unknown for "god" to sink into is to make "god" itself unknowable?
quote:
Is it not reasonable to conclude that it is highly unlikely at best that any such supernatural entity exists?
I think its a bit of a stretch, and I wouldn't call it unreasonable, but I don't really know how reasonable I think it is. I'm not so sure you can stretch the logic to any supernatural entity.
Does that not suggest that "supernatural entities" in and of themselves are illogical assertions?
quote:
I think that e) is the most rational and reasonable choice.
Me too. And that is an agnostic position.
By whose definition? I choose e), and yet consider myself to be an Atheist becasue I have no confidence in the existence of any deity, and I consider the likelihood of their existence to be so close to zero that it's on the same level as leprechauns, the Matrix, and the Immaterial Pink Unicorn.
Does the fact that I hold all of my positions to be tentative pending new information (with the degree of tentativity corresponding to available evidence) make me agnostic? I don't think those agnostics who say "I don't know, and we cannot know" would count me amongst their ranks.
quote:
There is ample reason to have confidence that unsupported, seemingly impossible entities like deities, leprechauns and the Immaterial Pink Unicorn are all figments of the human imagination, since all examples we know of thus far have been determined to be such.
There is ample reason to believe that the "subjective experiences" typically used to support such entities are the result of false pattern recognition, wishful thinking, overactive imaginations, social pressure, hallucination, or any of the other reasons people can draw false conclusions.
You may think you have ample reason for those beliefs, but I don't think those are objectively verified facts.
You don't think that it is objectively factual that human beings recognise false patterns, maintain beliefs based on wishful thinking, have overactive imaginations, sucumb to social pressure, hallucinate, or otherwise draw false conclusions based on subjective experiences?
Really?
quote:
These facts lead me to conclude that there is no reason to have confidence that any deities exist, or that any deities can exist. I am led to conclude that I have ample reason to be confident that any such entity is very likely the product of the human imagination. Therefore, while I cannot be certain (in the same way I cannot be certain that we are not in the Matrix), following only the evidence available to me I must hold the position that deities and other "supernatural" entities unsupported by objective evidence are all likely the products of human imagination.
Do you disagree? If so, why?
I don't disagree with how you got there, but I maintain that if you are limiting yourself to the objectively verifiable facts, you would stay within agnosticism and that to get to atheism, you have to use things that are not objectively verified facts.
I have arrived at Atheism - I do not believe any deities exist, and I count them with every other conceived figment of the human imagination. What reasons have I used that are not objective facts?
We know that human beings recognize false patterns, hallucinate, maintain beliefs due to wishful thinking or social pressure, have overactive imaginations, and otherwise draw false conclusions based on subjective experiences. Children believe in Santa Claus. Drug-induced hallucinations are sometimes called religious experiences. We see patterns that don't exist all the time - all of these things are the reason we developed the scientific method for the analysis and description of objective reality in the first place.
We know that human beings have created deities and other supernatural entities from their own imaginations in the past, like Zeus or Thor. In fact, in every instance where we've been able to make a determination based on objective fact, deities and other supernatural concepts have always proven to have no connection to objective reality, but have rather been the product of human imagination. That many people believed these figments of the imagination to be objectively true (and did not make up the entities themselves) had absolutely no relevance to the actual objective existence or nonexistence of the entities they believed in.
How can one not determine that the only reasonable conclusion is that all other asserted supernatural entities are also most likely the figments of human imagination, and do not likely exist in objective reality?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 241 by New Cat's Eye, posted 03-19-2009 2:54 PM New Cat's Eye has not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 262 of 304 (504605)
03-31-2009 1:07 PM
Reply to: Message 261 by Dr Jack
03-31-2009 11:51 AM


Re: Faith is not a way of knowing
Not to mention that science is not in any way a subset of "faith." We've been over that before - science is based entirely on repeatable objective evidence, while "faith" is defined as "belief that is not based on evidence." It's impossible for an evidence-based methodology to be a subset of a methodology defined by its lack of evidence.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 261 by Dr Jack, posted 03-31-2009 11:51 AM Dr Jack has not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 270 of 304 (505033)
04-06-2009 7:32 PM


Why the "Immaterial Pink Unicorn" is a valid argument
We've thoroughly explored in this thread the nature of the IPU argument, as well as the natures of faith, evidence, subjectivity and objectivity. The end seems to mimic the beginning: RAZD continues to argue that his belief in an un-evidenced entity is somehow different from other un-evidenced entities, despite being utterly unable to provide any reason that it is different, and instead has treated us with a variety of woefully inaccurate Venn diagrams where he attempts to support the notion that, so long as an idea isn't contradicted by evidence, it's perfectly rational to have confidence in that idea's accuracy.
RAZD is wrong.
Subjectivity
RAZD has pointed out, correctly, that subjective experiences are an actual cause for belief. What RAZD has pointedly ignored, however, is that beliefs based on subjective experiences have absolutely no relationship to objective reality. Subjective evidence can only lead to subjective conclusions - any beliefs spawned from subjective experience are only "true" for the individual who had the experience.
Threshold of Evidence
Technically speaking, if I see a cat run across the street and nobody else sees it, I have had a subjective experience. I cannot verify that the cat exists, and there is no reason for anyone to believe or disbelieve me. Nobody suggests that we should disbelieve any and all claims made by an individual. RAZD would have us believe that this means that an individual's "feeling" (or other subjective experience) about the existence of a deity should be given the same benefit of the doubt.
Unfortunately for RAZD, the old mantra "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" is still true just as much for his claims of the existence of a deity, just as much as they exist for the cat I may or may not have seen.
Seeing a cat run across the street is not an uncommon occurrence. I would wager that everyone reading this message has at least seen a cat before, if perhaps not a cat running across a street. If someone claims to have seen a cat, this is relatively mundane, and is supported by the evidence we have all seen that cats do exist, and so his claim has a high probability of being true ("true" in this sense meaning "the cat actually existed in objective reality, and did in fact run across the street").
Claiming that a deity exists, however, is a rather extraordinary claim, and so more evidence than RAZD's simple say-so is required to support his assertion. Nobody has ever seen a deity. RAZD may point out that many people have had subjective experiences related to deities of some sort, but this is invalidated by the fact that those subjective experiences are not actually similar at all in many cases. One cannot seriously conclude that a subjective experience involving Zeus is somehow related to a subjective experience involving Jesus, or that the fact that people have had both experiences somehow means that "something" must be "out there" supernaturally causing such experiences. This would be like claiming that, because many people have subjective experiences regarding alien abduction, aliens must have actually abducted people despite the wildly different stories told and the lack of any other evidence.
Human beings have common subjective experiences all the time. How many people have had dreams involving flying, or breathing underwater? Falling off of a cliff? Disastrous events? Storms? Talking snakes? How many people have had a "feeling" that their chosen lottery number is the winner? How many people have "seen" demons, or ghosts, or goblins? The commonality of subjective experiences is not due to the objective truth that people can fly or breathe underwater or predict disasters, but is rather due to the commonality of the human condition. We all have wishful thoughts that give rise to false confidence. We all recognize patterns that don't exist, and "see" things that aren't there at all.
To claim that one extraordinary subjective experience is valid due to commonality while dismissing all other extraordinary subjective experiences based on no evidence or reasoning whatsoever requires special pleading.
In this way, RAZD's defense that the commonality of "divine" experiences suggests the actual objective existence are simply another example of the way he uses special pleading to justify his own beliefs.
Reasonable vs. Unreasonable, Rational vs. Irrational
RAZD has said that having confidence in an un-evidenced claim that is not contradicted by evidence is non-reasonable but not unreasonable, and is rational.
RAZD is wrong.
Having confidence in any un-evidenced claim is irrational. The rational response is tentative skepticism - that is, have no confidence until a reason for confidence is supplied.
But what about a claim backed by subjective experience? If you have a vision of Jesus, or a "feeling" that "something is out there," is that not a cause for having confidence that Jesus/"Something" actually exists?
Again, subjective experiences can only support subjective conclusions. An extraordinary claim based on subjective evidence does not reach the minimum threshold for rationally having confidence that your subjective experience has anything to do with objective reality. Rationally, acknowledging that human beings have "feelings" and "visions" and other subjective experiences all the time that are demonstrably not true, the reasonable conclusion is that your extraordinary subjective experience is of a similar nature.
On what basis does RAZD claim that having confidence in an un-evidenced claim is rational? He engages special pleading. This is where the Immaterial Pink Unicorn comes into play.
The Immaterial Pink Unicorn is an entity for which no objective evidence exists. It's a concept. Nothing more. Likewise, RAZD's deity (which is apparently undefinable) is also supported by no objective evidence. It, too, is a concept. Even assuming that RAZD has had some sort of subjective experience to cause his belief in his deity, his confidence that his subjective experience (and only that one, at that - I'm sure he has had many subjective experiences that he's dismissed) is related to objective reality while insisting that other subjective experiences and the conclusions drawn from them are not reasonable exemplifies special pleading.
Venn Diagrams!
RAZD has demonstrated his artistic aptitude by gracing this thread with a variety of wonderfully colored Venn diagrams. His favorite shows that science is a subset of philosophy, which itself is a subset of faith.
His diagrams are inaccurate, and misleading in the extreme.
Science is in no way a subset of faith - science requires evidence, while faith is defined by an absence of evidence.
I would love to draw an accurate diagram, but alas, I'm at work. Also, I'm too lazy and playing with MS Paint isn't my idea of fun.
Instead, let's discuss RAZD's latest commentary on his shiny new Venn Diagram, where "D" and "C" are subsets of "A":
We have seen that C (IPU) and D (alien visitations) are both members of A (the class of objects with no convincing objective objective evidence) and we have seen that they are differentiated by the existence of subjective evidence for D that is lacking for C, so A is divided into to two subareas: A1 (no evidence of any kind) and A2 (subjective experience evidence only).
This is all well and good, barring anyone who actually has had a subjective experience regarding the IPU. Of course, all one needs to do to verify that the IPU is supported by subjective evidence is to claim to have had a subjective experience regarding the IPU, and suddenly "C" and "D" become identical. That's simply the weakness of subjective claims. But moving on...
Rather obviously (to me anyway) the solitary subjective experience of a shooting star does not mean that I need to believe in alien visitations, rather it is the documented existence of subjective experiences for alien visitations that lead me to conclude that such are possibly valid experiences.
Herein lies the flaw in RAZD's reasoning. As I have exmplained, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Shooting stars, like cats crossing streets, are not extraordinary. We know that they exist - we can reproduce them (or at least predict their reappearance), and can show objective evidence surrounding their events (paw marks in the mud along the road, or meteorites that have actually struck, actual recordings of shooting stars, etc).
Alien visitations, the IPU, and RAZD's "deity" concept have none of this. They are extraordinary claims, and as such RAZD should recognize that he and everyone else should regard them with skepticism pending extraordinary evidence to support them.
Having confidence in an un-evidenced claim that is not contradicted by other evidence is fine, when the claim is mundane. The everyday, common nature of the claim is itself evidence - it's rational to believe that a falling star was actually observed because other falling stars have been observed, and many even recovered and examined physically.
Having confidence in an un-evidenced claim that is not contradicted by other evidence is not rational when the un-evidence claim is extraordinary in nature.
No such basis exists to incline me to believe in the possible validity of the IPU.
Nobody is requiring you to. However, the fact that you have confidence in one unsupported claim that is not contradicted by evidence and do not have confidence in all other unsupported claims that are not contradicted by evidence means that you have arbitrarily chosen one claim as valid from a host of similar claims that regard as invalid. You are engaged in special pleading.
The Immaterial Pink Unicorn
As I described early on in this thread, the IPU argument is meant to demonstrate special pleading. It is constructed to present an entity for which there is no evidence one way or the other, and trigger an emotional response with its seeming ridiculousness.
RAZD has fallen for the trap.
The IPU is no more ridiculous than a man who rises from the dead, or an invisible man in the sky. It's no more ridiculous than any of the Greek myths, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster, or astral projection.
The IPU is supported by exactly as much evidence as RAZD's undefined deity - none.
The IPU is specifically constructed to be unfalsifiable - just as RAZD's deity is purposefully left undefined, the most vague concept possible in order to prevent potential falsification.
RAZD has confidence in the existence of one unsupported unfalsifiable concept, but not another. He has irrationally allowed his own personal subjective experiences to convince him of an extraordinary claim, without the extraordinary evidence required to make such confidence rational and reasonable, and yet he denies the rationality of doing exactly the same in support of the IPU.
RAZD is engaged in nothing more or less than special pleading.
The very fact that he created this thread out of emotional outrage over the ridiculousness of the IPU argument, followed by his utterly ineffectual attempts to invalidate the comparison of the IPU to other unsupported and un-contradicted concepts, proves that the IPU argument is both valid and effective.

Replies to this message:
 Message 275 by RAZD, posted 04-18-2009 9:26 AM Rahvin has not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 283 of 304 (506092)
04-22-2009 12:10 PM
Reply to: Message 281 by Modulous
04-22-2009 4:03 AM


Re: Complication unnecessary
quote:
Thus I conclude that subjective can indicate possibility. I also conclude that nothing more can be concluded.
And of course, not having a subjective experience does not rule out possibility, being able to imagine something can also be indicative of possibility - but not being able to imagine it does not rule it out either. This is an entirely uncontroversial position and I've not seen anybody dispute it.
I dispute it.
Subjective evidence indicates conceivability, not possibility. Possibility is still unknown in the absence of any real evidence.
A dream about an ostrich with the head of a rhino is "subjective evidence," but it doesn't mean that such a thing can actually exist. It simply means that it's conceivable. Additional evidence is required to ascertain whether such a thing is possible.
In the case of IPUs and deities, we have no idea whether such fantastical entities are possible - nobody has ever seen one or detected evidence of one before. We know only that they are conceivable within the human mind.
Let's use a few more examples other than rhino-headed ostriches.
A woman has a dream that has overtones of impending doom. The very next day, her husband is injured in a car accident.
Does this mean that it's possible that dreams can tell the future?
Of course not!
It means only that such an idea is conceivable. There is no evidence that suggests that her vague dream and her husband's car accident were related, and neither is there any proposed mechanism by which the dream could have foretold the future. We have no idea whether it is or is not possible, given no additional information.
Jim can feel the love of Christ everywhere he goes. He sees the proof of God in every sunset, in teh beauty of creation.
Does this mean that it's possible that God exists?
No!
It means that the Christian deity is conceivable in Jim's mind, and he subjectively interprets his objective observations to support his internal concept of God. It has no bearing whatsoever on whether the Christian deity can actually exist (let alone whether it actually does).
RAZD is asserting that all concepts that are not contradicted by evidence are possibilities. That's not true. Concepts that are supported by objective evidence and are not contradicted are possibilities. Concepts that are neither supported nor contradicted remain nothing more than concepts.
Of course, there's nothing wrong with identifying conceivable ideas. But when you choose one concept out of the teeming, infinite mass of all other concepts and have confidence in that concept such that you say "I believe this," you are engaging in special pleading. This is jsut as true for such concepts as God, the Invisible Pink Unicorn, fairies, goblins, and ghosts.
Subjective evidence alone tells us nothing as to the possibility of anything. It only tells us that such a thing is conceivable by the human mind.
Possibility can only be determined in the light of additional evidence. For example, it's possible that a cat walked across the street moments agol this is determined by the fact that we know that both cats and streets actually do exist, and we know the manner in which a cat would cross a street - most of us have actually seen cats crossing streets. It is therefore possible that a cat moments ago crossed the street.
We do not know if it's possible that a gnarlfmag flew past the moon last night. We don't know what a "gnarlfmag" is, whether it's able to fly at all, or whether it even exists. If we leave the properties of teh "gnarlfmag" undefined as with RAZD's deity, then we cannot even ascertain whether the "gnarlfmag" has self-contradictory properties, or if some of those properties violate the laws of physics and therefore make the "gnarlfmag" an impossibility. The fact that I've written about the "gnarlfmag" is now subjective evidence for its existence, but that only shows that the "gnarlfmag" is conceivable. It does not show that its existence is possible, and it certainly doesn't give any reason to have confidence in its actual existence.
This is why RAZD's position (and the position of all deists) fails on so many levels. "God" is conceivable. We have no idea whether "god" is possible, and certainly no reason to have confidence in "god's" actual existence. Any such assertion without corresponding objective evidence involves special pleading.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 281 by Modulous, posted 04-22-2009 4:03 AM Modulous has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 284 by Modulous, posted 04-22-2009 1:48 PM Rahvin has replied
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Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 285 of 304 (506098)
04-22-2009 2:43 PM
Reply to: Message 284 by Modulous
04-22-2009 1:48 PM


Re: Complication unnecessary
I think you are just using words to mean things differently, but once we extract the communal meanings, we'll find that we agree.
I'm sure we do agree for the most part. But I also think that the distinction between (conceivable) and (possible) is important.
It is possible that an ostrich with a Rhino head could exist,
Is it?
Or is it simply a concept that you are able to hold in your mind?
Let's use a more outlandish example to prove the point:
The comic book character "Wolverine" has the ability to regenerate. In one case, he regenerated from a single cell in a matter of minutes, without any outside input of additional mass or energy, and he retained his memories despite the total annihilation of his brain. He also regenerated non-organic implants, which in later storylines he proved unable to do.
I have subjective evidence that Wolverine exists and is able to perform the feats described above: I read about them in a comic book.
It is conceivable that Wolverine could exist.
Is his existence possible?
Considering that the feats described above both compeltely and utterly violate the laws of physics, contradict everything we know about the brain and memory, and even contradict themselves due to inconsistent writers, it does not seem that Wolverine is a possibility.
But what if none of Wolverine's descriptors were self-contradictory? What if they matched closely to what has been actually observed in objective reality? Then Wolverine would be a possiblity. We would still have no reason to have confidence in his actual existence, but we could at least say "maybe."
With deities (and IPUs), we don't have any information on whether their existence is or is not possible. They are simply concepts. We have not observed any deity, nor do we have even the barest mechanism by which such an entity could perform supernatural feats. Such an entity could, in fact, be impossible, and that determination is independant of the determination of whether or not such an entity actually exists (at least insofar as possibility does not imply existence, though impossibility excludes existence).
This is true of any concept supported by subjective evidence alone - and the fact that subjective evidence causes belief in human beings is evidence of absolutely nothing more than the fact that human beings are not entirely rational.
and you don't need a dream to have that experience. It is easy enough to conceive of an amusing confluence of events which leads someone to actually see what appears to be an ostrich with the head of a rhino.
That's a separate assertion from asserting that an ostrich with a rhino head can actually exist. Hallucination != existence.
What I interpreted RAZD to be saying is that there are a number of possibilities here:
1) The ostrich has the head of a rhino, amazing!
2) It's a strange illusion caused by a peculiar alignment of the two animals and various obfuscating factors.
3) It's an hallucination.
4) etc.
I agree - but this I think is more due to the limitations of the English language. COntextually, the word "possibilities" in your statement means "one of the following must be true." That's correct.
Hoerver, not all of the "possibilities" are necessarily possible, as in they can be self-contradictory or violate one or more of the laws of physics and therefore have no actual potential to actually exist.
Do you see the distinction?
Now, it may turn out that it is impossible for a human to have a hallucination of an ostrich with a rhino head. Maybe our brains simply cannot conjur that image in an hallucinatory fashion.
If that were the case, a rhino-headed ostrich would be "inconceivable." This is independant of the possibility of a rhino-headed ostrich actually existing, which is itself somewhat independant of the actuality of a rhino-headed ostrich existing.
But let's not get bogged down in equivocating over the word 'possible'. See the subtitle I chose!
I think the distinction between "conceivable," "possible," and "actual" is very important to this discussion.
Let's use one of RAZDs previous arguments (alien life) to further illustrate.
It is conceivable that intelligent alien life has visited Earth in faster-than-light spaceships. Considering the laws of physics and what appears to be the impossibility of faster-than-light travel, it is not necessarily possible that intelligent alien life has visited Earth in faster-than-light spaceships. We don't know whether such a thing is possible or not, only tha tit is conceivable (and tentatively contradicted by the laws of physics).
It is demonstrably possible that life can exist (since life exists here); ergo it is possible that life may exist somewhere else in the Universe in some form. This does not mean that life does exist, simply that it exists in the realm of possibility.
It is actually true that life exists here, because we can directly observe it.
Do you see the distinction?
RAZD's deity, along with the IPU, are conceivable but not necessarily possible, meaning we do not have enough information to determine whether they potentially actually exist. Asserting that a deity possibly exists is just as unfounded as asserting that a "gnarlfmag" possibly exists.
Asserting that a possible entity actually exists without supporting observable evidence is bad enough; asserting that a conceivable entity of unknown possibility actually exists constitutes a wild leap in logic. RAZD has no idea whether his deity is a possibility in this Universe, let alone whether it actually exists, and yet he has confidence in the existence of that deity. Despite any nonsense arguments he may propose regarding the causal relationship between subjective evidence and belief, he is still irrationally asserting with no objective reasoning that his undefined entity is both possible and actually exists. Simultaneously, RAZD rejects the existence of other entities whose possibility and actual existence are unknown, and for whom subjective evidence exists even if not directly experienced by him. He's engaged in special pleading on multiple levels.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 284 by Modulous, posted 04-22-2009 1:48 PM Modulous has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 286 by Modulous, posted 04-22-2009 3:06 PM Rahvin has replied
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Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 287 of 304 (506102)
04-22-2009 3:30 PM
Reply to: Message 286 by Modulous
04-22-2009 3:06 PM


Re: Complication unnecessary
Hmm, interesting, so you think we are using the same words to mean different things?
Yes, but that's pretty common in English. Context is everything, as we unfortunately see all the time with the word "theory."
If you want to argue semantics with RAZD, go ahead, but I don't see that you are fundamentally disagreeing with me in any interesting way.
"Interesting," of course, being a subjective personal assessment of value. I'm certainly not disagreeing with any of your points. I'm simply pointing out that when someone says "It's possible that a deity exists," they're still making an unfounded assertion despite the fact that they have not asserted that a deity does exist.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 286 by Modulous, posted 04-22-2009 3:06 PM Modulous has not replied

Replies to this message:
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Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4039
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 8.2


Message 304 of 304 (506874)
04-30-2009 12:22 AM
Reply to: Message 303 by RAZD
04-29-2009 11:29 PM


Re: Thread Closing Now
It does not matter how many immaterial pink unicorns can dance on the head of a pin, it is not a logical argument. There is a spectrum of possibilities, and there are many aspects of reality that cannot be ruled out, just because they do not seem probable to some people.
And in your summation, you once again demonstrate that the entire argument is going over your head.
This isn't about ruling out a possibility, or even about probability. The IPU argument is about demonstrating the special pleading required to have confidence in one unsupported possibility, while not having confidence in any other unsupported possibility, despite the lack of any objective and relevant difference between the chosen possibility and others like the IPU.
You have confidence that your unsupported possibility (the existence of an undefined "deity") is valid - you believe it to be true.
You do not have confidence that the IPU is valid - you do not beleive it to be true.
The two possibilities (your deity and the IPU) are functionally identical in that they are unfalsifiable, supernatural entities supported by no evidence whatsoever. You have confidence in one without having any evidence-grounded reason for doing so, and you do not have confidence in the other. You are engaged in special pleading.
It doesn't matter how many deities can dance on the head of a pin either, RAZD. The IPU argument is perfectly valid for demonstrating the sort of special pleading you have attempted to justify throughout this debate.

This message is a reply to:
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