The Kalam cosmological argument

Well, obviously the logical reasoning applies as soon as we realize there is probably no end to the slope.

Of course, we would want to know, but that really isn’t the point. There would be no way to know, for example, that there was a meta-multiverse generator outside—or causally prior—our postulated multiverse. Fifty such causes I think would call for a liberal application of Occam’s razor. Wouldn’t you agree?

I’m sure it was a lively discussion. And yes, I have been absent the forum for quite some time, though I became a member in 2003. Perhaps we can revisit that topic sometime. I’ll browse through it when I get a chance.

You just did Mr. Jillette

OK. I’ll bite. Honestly, it’s personal preference. I simply like the older version’s usage of EVERY BEING, as opposed to Craig’s WHATEVER, even though I think there is little, if any, semantic difference. The sub point we have been discussing has to do with defining BEGINNING, which I think is easier on Al Ghazali’s version.

Most everyone understands that beginning to ride a bicycle, for example, is not the same as already riding a bicycle. To wit, I jump on my bicycle entering a greenway, and a person already riding her bike is passing by in a different state, as it were, than the state I am in. If one of my feet is still on the ground, a bystander would not conclude that I am riding my bike at that stage, even if my right foot is already on the pedal. The person whizzing by would have begun to ride at some point in the past, but not just now; hence the distinction between riding and beginning to ride. Our universe began to exist, irrespective of whether it began at a singularity (big bang) or at some undefined edge (Hartle, Hawking, Tegmark, Vilenkin etc.). It still began.

The other reason I switched is because I felt that the focus on Craig’s version might lead to numerous tangential objections, possibly from a personal bias toward Dr. Craig.

The Kalam need not address this issue except on a causal basis. One need not postulate—with cosmologists—numerous entities without our universe, when a single, causally prior, simultaneous, entity will suffice. Hume was correct in this regard.

On the contrary, numerous cosmological times—one for each universe or multi-verse— would not necessarily be problematic on my view. I reject some versions on philosophical or cosmological grounds, nonetheless. In my view, these hypotheses don’t escape time within their own realm, whether on A theory or B theory.

If you say I implied this, then fine. I will clarify my view. If the universe, multi-verse, or mega-multi-verse—within each of which hypothetical observers would reckon their own perception of time—were to exist for all time within their own continuum, these entities would not necessarily be beginning-less in regard to the whole. Moreover, a timeless entity—if it exists—would not have such constraints.

Alright then, we disagree. You continually use the word time in a different sense than I. Perhaps this is because my view is not clearly articulated, or maybe, your view is not. You have rejected timelessness, so we can’t possibly agree on that point. If I reject timeless entities, my argument for the KCA evaporates. Please note: For all TIME does not equal BEGINNING-LESS on my view.

Very well, then. I disagree that the universe does not require a cause.

I’m not asking you to construct an argument; nevertheless, it would be helpful to know more on your view.

Many philosophical and scientific matters are difficult to grasp. This issue does not stop one from embracing a particular viewpoint. There are a great number of things we don’t understand fully. I suspect there are several in your discipline.

Words are arguably the best way to communicating knowledge from person to person. Some concepts—and I would consider philosophical, mathematical, and psychological, theories in this—are simply not easy to articulate. That does not mean these concepts are not understood.

But there's no reason why there shouldn't be an endless slope and a beginningless succession of causes --- or if there is, you have not yet articulated it. You say we shouldn't get on that slippery slope, I say, why not?

Well, now try applying that reasoning to a god outside our observed universe.

In any case, my point still remains. Going one step back from God doesn't commit us to going an infinite number of steps back.

Edited by Dr Adequate, : No reason given.

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OK. I’ll bite. Honestly, it’s personal preference. I simply like the older version’s usage of EVERY BEING, as opposed to Craig’s WHATEVER, even though I think there is little, if any, semantic difference. The sub point we have been discussing has to do with defining BEGINNING, which I think is easier on Al Ghazali’s version.

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Which really suggests that you should have been talking about Al Ghazali since the beginning instead of consistently referring to Craig instead... So no, it doesn't explain the switch.

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Most everyone understands that beginning to ride a bicycle, for example, is not the same as already riding a bicycle.

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But isn't the difference the transition between NOT riding a bicycle and riding a bicycle ? If the universe already exists from the very start there is no transition between not-existing and existing.

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The other reason I switched is because I felt that the focus on Craig’s version might lead to numerous tangential objections, possibly from a personal bias toward Dr. Craig.

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I don't see why. I certainly haven't focussed on Craig as a person.

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The Kalam need not address this issue except on a causal basis. One need not postulate—with cosmologists—numerous entities without our universe, when a single, causally prior, simultaneous, entity will suffice. Hume was correct in this regard.

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Look, I know that you're prejudiced against those other cosmologies and you can't be bothered to understand the reasons for proposing them, so can you please stop wasting time on the subject ? Let's just take it as read that you aren't going to be proposing a time before our universe existed and keep on track.

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On the contrary, numerous cosmological times—one for each universe or multi-verse— would not necessarily be problematic on my view. I reject some versions on philosophical or cosmological grounds, nonetheless. In my view, these hypotheses don’t escape time within their own realm, whether on A theory or B theory.

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By my understanding all of them postulate a time outside of our universe, and this is a big problem for Craig's version of the Kalam argument. Craig wishes the cause of our universe to be timeless and he can only get that by denying the existence of any time where that cause could operate.

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If you say I implied this

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I don't. I say that you EXPLICITLY stated it, and I have quoted you to prove it.

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Alright then, we disagree. You continually use the word time in a different sense than I. Perhaps this is because my view is not clearly articulated, or maybe, your view is not. You have rejected timelessness, so we can’t possibly agree on that point. If I reject timeless entities, my argument for the KCA evaporates. Please note: For all TIME does not equal BEGINNING-LESS on my view.

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I see no evidence that we are using "time" in a different sense. I haven't rejected the possibility of timeless entities (although I dare say that I have though about them a good deal more than you have). And this has nothing to do with the point you were supposedly responding to. Communicating with you is very difficult when you can't remember what you said, have difficulty following context and come up with bizarre misreadings like the above.

And your "note" explicitly contradicts your own earlier statement. Why say something that you disagree with ?

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Very well, then. I disagree that the universe does not require a cause.

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And yet you agreed with the point when it was stated without explicitly mentioning the universe. And you have given no reason to think otherwise... If something has existed for all of time, why would it require a cause of its existence ?

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Many philosophical and scientific matters are difficult to grasp. This issue does not stop one from embracing a particular viewpoint. There are a great number of things we don’t understand fully. I suspect there are several in your discipline.

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If we do not understand the concept of "beginning to exist" well enough to describe it - and given your own confusion about it - how can we trust the Kalam argument, which rests on that understanding ? And how can I know that my understanding of the argument is the same as yours ? But really I think the biggest problem is not the difficulty of the subject but finding a definition which allows the Kalam argument to work. Yet another sign of the argument's problems.

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Words are arguably the best way to communicating knowledge from person to person. Some concepts—and I would consider philosophical, mathematical, and psychological, theories in this—are simply not easy to articulate. That does not mean these concepts are not understood.

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However, in this case, words are not the issue....

Yes, I am sure your point was irrelevant. That "there are gods that can be postulated that didn't begin to exist" is beside the point. Unless you can demonstrate how/why this "god" you are postulating is necessarily "without cause", your argument is unsound and is thus irrelevant.

Would you mind explaining how it was irrelevant?

Rejecting the premise, actually. Not denying.

So, by your account, I'm not discussing the premises by addressing the argument's soundness? Did I misunderstand that? Didn't you just point out that I was rejecting the premise? How is that not addresses the premises?

Though it would require an explanation lest it can be dismissed as easily as it was concieved.

For example;
If the person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net has made a post on EVCforum.net then the person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net is a man-sized cartoon chicken.

The person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net has made posts on EVCforum.net.

Therefore, the person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net is a man-sized cartoon chicken.

This is is a valid argument.

Oh? Could you quote me where I accused you of being off topic? I would greatly appreciate it.

Apparantly.

Just as I can't see where I made the claim that it did. Strawmen aren't anybody's friends.

Odd that one of the proponents of the KA made my exact same point in Message 126...

But I'm staying within the premises. Ya know, assuming them true for the sake of arguing? Everything that begins to exist has a cause, and an eternal god wouldn't begin to exist, so we don't have a reason for supposing its cause. You don't have to assume the premesis are true, but if I am for the sake of arguing, then its beside the point for you to start talking about the premises not being true.

Sure, lets use the example you provided:

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If the person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net has made a post on EVCforum.net then the person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net is a man-sized cartoon chicken.

The person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net has made posts on EVCforum.net.

Therefore, the person known as "Catholic Scientist" on EVCforum.net is a man-sized cartoon chicken.

This is is a valid argument.

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I can assume your premesis are true and discuss the validity of the argument or come to the conclusion that I am a man-sized cartoon chicken. For you to come in and start rejecting the premises would be irrlevelant to the arguments that assume the premises are true.

Huh? I'm saying that rejecting an argument because the premises aren't true is perfectly fine, but if someone is assuming the premesis are true for the sake of argument, then its beside the point to argue that the premesis aren't actually true. Its just a different argument.

In Message 93, the author was exploring one of the premesis:

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1. Every being which begins to exist has a cause for its existence

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Therefore, any god postulated must also have a cause for it's existence, another greater god, maybe? In the end its turtles, all the way down. Unless you want to employ special pleading.

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They've assumed the premise as true and are following it through to a conclusion.

I chime in with this:

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You could postulate a god that always existed and therefore did not begin to exist. Just sayin'.

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I'm still assuming the premise is true, but showing that the conclusion that the author made doesn't necessarily follow.

Then you reply with:

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You could apply Occam's razer, postulate a universe that always existed and therefore did not begin to exist or require a creator to create it, as well.

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Which doesn't have anything to do with whether or not there could be a god that didn't have a cause for its existence. As I said: its beside the point. Its irrelevant.

And that's when you starting getting into whether or not what I was saying was relevant to the topic:

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True, but your point is irrelivant, as it does pertain to the Kalam cosmological argument (the topic of this thread).

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And you still haven't addressed my point:

Within the KA, how would an eternal god require a cause?

You’re tellin’ me! At this rate we’ll never get there. Honestly, we haven’t gotten to premiss two quite yet, although it has been touched on. There, I hope we can discuss actual and potential infinites.

No, it doesn’t. Except, on my view, any proposed entity that is causally prior to the ultimate, would itself be the ultimate.

Perhaps my view is in agreement with both. I don’t think this should present a problem, as there is no trickery involved. I’ll happily defend either. If one fails, the other fails, in my opinion.

Yes. The difference is exactly as you conclude; and, I maintain—I am restating this for the sake of everyone else, not you—that the universe has not always existed, but began a finite time ago. This, I think, is consonant with both versions of KCA under examination. I do agree, for argument’s sake, that the universe has existed for all TIME—its own cosmological time—but I don’t think it is actually beginning-less. Incidentally, this is Craig’s position on the matter, as I have heard him elucidate it on a number of occasions. I agree with him in this regard.

Time outside the universe is not really problematic on Craig’s view, or on mine. Nevertheless, he posits an immaterial, timeless, and enormously powerful—if not omnipotent—causally prior, personal entity, which has the ability to create the universe (or multi-verse) ex nihilo. This entity apprehends all propositional knowledge in a single intuition, and therefore its cognitive faculties don’t necessitate a passage of time sans the universe. The being’s very intuition, in fact, brings about causal change(s). Hence, the ultimate cause of the universe is simultaneous with its effect, in this sense. The personal agent may have refrained from creating the universe at all, if it so desired. The only sticky part is that its effect(s), even if potentially infinite in the later than direction, is ostensibly temporal. In light of this fact, Craig reasons that the entity becomes in some way temporal, alongside the universe.

Now, as Craig argues, there is no passage of time nor are there related events—even cognitive ones—in the logically prior realm, sans the universe. To him, the very question as to why the ultimate agent cause didn’t create the universe before it did, simply introduces a non sequitur. There is no before on his view. In one lecture he mentions a state of timelessness but stops short of elucidating the proposal. His model may not be comprehensible on a naturalistic analysis, but it works philosophically in my opinion. The question is then, does it work metaphysically? I think it very well may, though I am not as confident here.

The entity, according to Craig, does undergo some extrinsic change upon the creation of the universe, in that it stands in a (causal) relationship to the temporal realm. It does not, however, undergo a change in substance or essence. The personal agent remains changeless but not necessarily immutable (incapable of change). The latter fact permits the entity to apprehend propositional knowledge as the facts actually change in time. E.g. the entity knows that George Washington is not the president at this very moment; though the propositional statement is true in 1790.

Something that has existed eternally would not require a cause. But my contention is that no being could have existed forever, with respect to time, because an infinite regress—in the earlier than direction—would necessarily be introduced; consequently, the thing could never be. So, even if an actually infinite is possible—it is not on KCA—it would have to be realized instantaneously. Any proposed material being would be subject to some physical laws e.g. aging, decaying etc. Therefore, an immaterial and timeless being is arguably the best plausible solution for coping with this dilemma.

Time itself is relational on my view and may not exist where no events transpire. Whatever brought the universe into existence must exist without time and space in order to transcend all reality. If not, the entity would simply be another material constituent of whatever whole, whether it existed outside our known universe or not. Premiss two of KCA, if plausible, eliminates any material being as the ultimate cause. There remain few alternative causes that do not take up space, and are not subject to physical laws of some sort. The unembodied mind hypothesis allows one to deal with this predicament. Other candidates, abstract objects or numbers—or anything else one can imagine—don’t stand in causal relationships so far as we know, Tegmark and Vilenkin proposals notwithstanding. Theists have nearly always implicitly or explicitly posited such an ultimate; so, this is not a novel concept for whatever that is worth. e.g. God is a Spirit… (John 4:24)

True. But the fact is that premise one is contentious, for reasons that perhaps we have discussed sufficiently by now.

Or there's something behind that ... in any case, the creator of the universe does not have to be an ultimate explanation for everything, just for the universe. We may at least in principle have a demiurge on our hands.

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Perhaps my view is in agreement with both. I don’t think this should present a problem, as there is no trickery involved. I’ll happily defend either. If one fails, the other fails, in my opinion.

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OK, you don't want to explain why you suddenly went from talking only about Craig to insisting that you preferred Al Ghazali.

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Yes. The difference is exactly as you conclude

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And that difference is why your alleged analogy fails.

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and, I maintain—I am restating this for the sake of everyone else, not you—that the universe has not always existed, but began a finite time ago.

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In fact that's not true. You hold that the universe has always existed AND began a long time ago.

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This, I think, is consonant with both versions of KCA under examination. I do agree, for argument’s sake, that the universe has existed for all TIME—its own cosmological time—but I don’t think it is actually beginning-less. Incidentally, this is Craig’s position on the matter, as I have heard him elucidate it on a number of occasions. I agree with him in this regard.

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You're still contradicting your own statement unless the reference to "its own cosmological time" means that you are bringing in some other time - but that WOULD contradict Craig.

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Time outside the universe is not really problematic on Craig’s view, or on mine.

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It's problematic for Craig's argument for reasons that I have already given. Now you claim that Craig ASSUMES timelessness, but this is not the same thing as arguing for it at all. And in fact looking further down we see that what you say is completely untrue.

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Something that has existed eternally would not require a cause. But my contention is that no being could have existed forever, with respect to time, because an infinite regress—in the earlier than direction—would necessarily be introduced; consequently, the thing could never be

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How so ? Given finite time "existing forever" would seem best interpreted as "always existing" - meaning of course, that there never is a time when it does not exist. I don't see any need of an infinite regress in that case and you don't offer any argument for one,

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Any proposed material being would be subject to some physical laws e.g. aging, decaying etc. Therefore, an immaterial and timeless being is arguably the best plausible solution for coping with this dilemma.

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Perhaps you should introduce the dilemma before claiming to have a solution.

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Whatever brought the universe into existence must exist without time and space in order to transcend all reality.

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So much for the idea that time outside the universe is not unproblematic for your argument. And really that's the only significant thing in your final argument.

You still haven't got to the point of establishing that our universe requires a cause. In fact, I must remind you that it seemed obvious to you that something that has existed for all of time (as you clearly believe that the universe has) was beginningless and required no cause. Even if you have changed your mind you've offered no reason to think that your original statement was incorrect.

Further, age and decay would only be an issue if it were assumed that the cause of our universe were temporal in our time dimension and that it had to exist for long enough for that to matter. Even if we grant the first, there is no need to grant the second. Also let me note that the "cause" of virtual particles is not material in your sense, so physical causes of that sort are not covered by that part of your argument.

Really I think that it is premature to go on go other problematic areas of the Kalam argument when you can't even provide a serious resolution of your own issues with premise 1.

If it has not always existed, then there should be a point in time where it doesn't exist. If there isn't a point in time where it does not exist, then it has existed for all time.

To get around this contradiction, you're introducing another time, "the universe's own cosmological time", that is presumably some superset to the time we actually know of.

But you don't have any other reason to suppose this other kind of time than to save face in light of the Kahlam Argument falling into a contradiction. If you have to go through these sorts of mental gymnastics to maintain the veracity of an argument, don't you think its about time to start considering that the argument isn't really that good?

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Please answer my question, if possible, rather than trying to deflect it.

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I did answer it. Your quote from Craig, however is an attempt to divert the issue because it does not address the point that I made.

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I did answer it. Your quote from Craig, however is an attempt to divert the issue because it does not address the point that I made.

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If you answered it, I missed it. I have not yet seen you post a reference that we can check.

For the third time, here is my question from message 145:

My quote from Craig in message 145 is a counter-reference, clearly showing that he does NOT insist that time is finite in his KCA.

Edited by kbertsche, : No reason given.

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If you answered it, I missed it. I have not yet seen you post a reference that we can check.

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I said that I gave an answer - and one that should be good enough for those familiar with Craig's argument.

It is a fact that within the Kalam argument, Craig argues for a timeless cause of the universe and a fact that he cannot do so except by denying that there is any time prior to the universe (for the obvious reason that if there were such a time, there could be a temporal cause operating within that time).

As for your reference, it's worthless until I can check it. The quote doesn't give enough context to tell if it is truly relevant or not (at about halfway through the book, I'd guess not, though). In fact, the same words appear in a web article and there the "argument" is the simple assertion that the universe began to exist.

God, Time and Eternity

Edited by PaulK, : Added URL

Hello Catholic Scientist. I will respond to you first, because I didn’t have time to earlier in the thread. You seem to be having difficulty with this concept because you wish to confer physical constraints on an immaterial entity. This methodology is simply not applicable to a timeless, spaceless, beginningless, cause. This entity, on Kalaam, exists causally prior to both space and time. Space and time are necessary components of the universe—given that events have occurred—or else the world does not exist as a physical reality. Some do hold this view. I do not.

There is no superset or subset of time; the only time we appreciate is the time within our own universe. I did not introduce this concept, as it is believed by most cosmologists. If a multi-verse is possible, its time would theoretically supersede our time in some way; nevertheless, time cannot go on forever in an earlier than direction, or else this moment would have never arrived, irrespective of any division of time presupposed. So we posit a timeless entity.

Certainly not at this point. The argument holds very well if timelessness is plausible. If not, then we are faced with some sort of infinite regress of time and events. Moreover, the reason for positing such an entity, on Kalaam, is exactly because of the difficulties that plague competing models. Theist have had it correct from the beginning in my opinion.

Edited by Shimbabwe, : No reason given.