I don't see your point here. What was the probability that the theorem was correct before Euclid proved it? Seriously, I don't know whether you think it was always equal to one or not. And what does this have to do with proving something false that's already known to be false?
Already known by
whom to be false? In this discussion between you and me, you believe that I am wrong. But the matter of which one of us is wro
I don't see your point here. What was the probability that the theorem was correct before Euclid proved it? Seriously, I don't know whether you think it was always equal to one or not. And what does this have to do with proving something false that's already known to be false?
Already known by
whom to be false? In this discussion between you and me, you believe that I am wrong. But the matter of which one of us is wrong is not a matter of probability. One of us has already made a crucial reasoning error. The person whose arguments and premises are correct is right despite the other person's belief to the contrary.
One of use is trying to convince other person that his belief is false. This discussion is an example of one of us trying to prove to the other that a proposition with zero likelihood of being correct is actually false.
Of course my position is that I am the person trying to accomplish the task that you claim cannot be done. Namely proving false a proposition that has zero chance of being correct.
Your proposition that there are probabilities that can be assigned to competing theories is in error. Propositions for truth do not work like selecting colored marbles in a bag, where taking out one colored marble changes the distribution of colors remaining. There are an infinite amount of propositions for which there is no evidence at all. Proving that Zeus did not exist does not add to any probability that Odin actually does.
For example. Let's say that there are two people holding beliefs about the earth.
One person believes that the earth is a flat disk riding on the backs of turtles and the other believing that the earth is flat and rides on the backs of elephants.
A scientist tells the two people that he has evidence regarding the true nature of the earth. He calls the first person into a sound proof room and shows him convincing proof that the earth is not a disk riding on the back of turtles.
Has the probability increased that the other proposition is true? Well the second person believes so when he sees the sad look on his colleague's face. But when he is called into the sound proof room the scientist shows the second person the same thing that he showed the first person. Absolute proof that the earth is spherical rather than disk shaped.
So did disproving the first silly theory increase the probability that the second theory was true? No. Despite the hope that the second person felt when he saw the crestfallen face of the first person, both theories were completely discredited by the same evidence.
Suppose instead the scientist had shown the first person proof that every turtle ever born or created was accounted for, and no turtles were available for the earth to ride on. That proof eliminates one theory, but does it increase some probability that the other theory is true? My guess is that you think so.
What if instead the scientist provided convincing evidence that there is no air in space and that all reptiles and mammals required air to breathe, wouldn't you suggest that that knowledge decrease the odds that either man's proposition was correct?
In fact, generally speaking we cannot assign probability that theories of reality are correct, and we cannot enumerate them. We can eliminate theories or classes of theories with evidence against a theory, but only evidence supporting a theory directly can give us increased confidence that any theory is correct.
Getting back to the original point, do you agree that disproving X does make Y more likely, assuming Y is not already known to be false (and making the other assumptions I've already described)?
Of course not!! Not in the general case anyway. Without some info regarding the relationship between X and Y and the evidence for both, it's impossible to say how new facts will affect one proposition even if the facts absolutely rule out another proposition.
Edited by NoNukes, : No reason given.
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