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Author Topic:   The Illusion of Free Will
Modulous
Member (Idle past 233 days)
Posts: 7801
From: Manchester, UK
Joined: 05-01-2005


Message 286 of 359 (652730)
02-15-2012 5:33 PM
Reply to: Message 269 by Straggler
02-15-2012 3:19 PM


Re: Mr Mits' illusory freedom
But Mod doesn't seem to be advocating "the most relevant or strongest" causes as such. He seems to be making a very explicit differentiation between internal and external causes.
Indeed. That's because free will is an ability of the human mind. If my mind causes the decision to be made it is an internal decision. If someone elses mind causes the decision to be made, then that is an external decision.
I don't think this differentiation holds up to scrutiny because ultimately any internal state of mind is the product of external factors.
I don't disagree that external information has an effect on the internal mind. I would have thought that would be obvious, right?
Think of it as a matter of where in the process of things does the excessive narrowing of possibilities occur.
Going back to the shirt example: Let's say I have three shirts: Red, Blue and Black. External factors are not conspiring to limit these choices. From an outside perspective there is nothing you can reasonably know about the world outside my brain, that will tell you with reasonable accuracy, which shirt I'm going to pick. All the important determining factors that narrow down the possibilities, ultimately to one single choice, occurs within my mind. In this example, compatabilist free will is preserved.
Now someone pulls a gun on me and says 'pick the red shirt or die'. We might be wrong, but there is good reason in the world, external to my mind, to predict which shirt I'll pick. This is not of my own free will.
The determining factor in which shirt I pick is almost certainly going to be something that is not 'my will' since it occurs outside of 'my mind'. I can say with utmost confidence that something that occurs outside of my mind cannot be my free will. If it is anyone's free will it is the gunman's.
Now granted, without the gun - external factors will be important influences. What colours my missus likes, what colour my boss likes, what colours don't require as much ironing to look decent. But the point is that it is my mind weighing up these options, and it is my mind that is making the decision. It is not something external to my mind that is essentially determining my actions (a life threatening situation for example).
The gunman narrows down the possibility space with sufficient force that Mr Mits and Dr A both agree that the person's will should not be considered 'free'. The constraints are so severe that almost every person would follow the gunman's orders and so should not be held accountable for his poor fashion choices.
How can there ever be any situation in which "the only constraints in play, are the contents of my own mind".......'
Sure, in the spirit of what I was saying. For instance: Picking shirts. There are plenty of constraints one can talk about: The number of shirts, the social pressures to avoid wearing the polka dot shirt and all that stuff. But when those are mild pressures and not the absolute constraints of having a gun pointed at your head: we can still reasonably call it free will.
This is just really to point out that Dr A and Mr Mits are in agreement that when a person acts according to their personal wishes (ie., internal determining factors) - rather than because of some external constraints, they are acting of their own free will.
It isn't some formal explanation, its just a way of getting across where there is agreement between two parties. I'm sure Mr Mits would agree with Dr A that having a gun pointed at your head would mean you weren't acting of your own free will.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 269 by Straggler, posted 02-15-2012 3:19 PM Straggler has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 300 by Straggler, posted 02-16-2012 1:23 PM Modulous has replied

  
Modulous
Member (Idle past 233 days)
Posts: 7801
From: Manchester, UK
Joined: 05-01-2005


Message 287 of 359 (652732)
02-15-2012 5:48 PM
Reply to: Message 265 by Perdition
02-15-2012 2:36 PM


Re: Mr Mits' real freedom
All the gunman is doing is placing two desires in conflict that would not normally come into conflict, namely my desire to live, and my desire to wear the shirt I want. Obviously, my desire to wear the shirt I want pales in significance to wanting to stay alive, thus I do what the gunman wants.
Agreed.
However, in the real world, desires come into conflict all the time. Sometimes they do so naturally, sometimes they do so through the actions of yourself and others. There is no functional difference except that we can point at the gunman and say "He forced this outcome." instead of having to point to the world at large and say "This all forced this outcome."
I agree.
Will I say I'm freer without the gunman. I probably would. WOuld I say I'm free? No.
That's really all I'm going with here. I'm not proposing that you are free of determinism!
Ok, I can grant that. That means your will is freer when no gunman is present. That does not mean it is free.
And when Dr A says 'free will' he doesn't mean 'will: free of everything'. He means 'will: as free as it can actually be'
But the thing is, what they agree on, I also agree with. What they agree on is something just about anyone would agree with. It does nothing for the debate to assert something that everyone already agrees on. What is important in a debate is where they differ.
Actually, where they agree is as important as where they disagree. And my entire reason for entering this debate was to take the position that Mr Mits and Dr A are in more agreement with one another than some people were saying.
I was essentially responding to this:
quote:
But if we are revising the terminology we are (by definition) not using the term "free-will" in the same way as the man in the street. Which Dr A also says we should do.
My point is that he can't have it both ways. Either we use man-in-the-street terminology and end up with an incoherent concept. Or we don't really apply a man-in-the-street definition and end up with something more coherent and philosophically useful.
From Message 204. I was building a case for why Dr A can indeed have it both ways: He is using 'free will' the same as Mr Mits, and he can disagree with Mr Mits on some of the metaphysical fine print.
Ok, what about a chip imoplanted in the brain that makes you raise your arm?
Probably not free to you either.
What about a chip that makes you want to raise your arm, and you subsequently do it?
Is the will free in this case?
As interesting as it might be, I'm not here to draw the line on the limits of free will. You could even point out that a person isn't deterministically determined to pick a red shirt with a gun pointed at him and that he could fight the gunman, or pick the blue shirt anyway. There are lots of interesting scenarios we could imagine to test our notions.
But none of this is about Mr Mits and Dr A's positions. I'm sure Dr A and Mr Mits may disagree about the answers to your questions, but it's not really relevant to the point I was making when I started this sub - thread.
Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 265 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 2:36 PM Perdition has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 288 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 5:56 PM Modulous has replied

  
Perdition
Member (Idle past 3486 days)
Posts: 1593
From: Wisconsin
Joined: 05-15-2003


Message 288 of 359 (652734)
02-15-2012 5:56 PM
Reply to: Message 287 by Modulous
02-15-2012 5:48 PM


Re: Mr Mits' real freedom
And when Dr A says 'free will' he doesn't mean 'will: free of everything'. He means 'will: as free as it can actually be'
Ok, then he's not talking about the same free will as Mr. Mits.
Actually, where they agree is as important as where they disagree. And my entire reason for entering this debate was to take the position that Mr Mits and Dr A are in more agreement with one another than some people were saying.
I'm saying that Mr. Mits and Dr. A are in agreement on 99.9%. In fact, if you divorce the word "free" from the conversation, I'm going to agree with 99.9% of what they're saying.
All I'm saying is that there is a debate between Libertarians (like Mr Mits) and Determinists, and in that debate, we're using free as meaning free from determinism. Having compatibilists come in and say that free doesn't mean free from determinism does nothing for the debate. If you don't mean free from determinism, then all three of us agree, but that still leaves the question about whether we are free from determinism.
I then go one step further, and say that the compatibilist should know this, so their entering the debate and proposing a different definition of free in order to "solve" the debate is disingenuous. It sows confusion, either intentionally or not.
From Message 204. I was building a case for why Dr A can indeed have it both ways: He is using 'free will' the same as Mr Mits, and he can disagree with Mr Mits on some of the metaphysical fine print.
And I'm saying he's not using it in the same way. He's conflating terms. Just like my eyesight analogy.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 287 by Modulous, posted 02-15-2012 5:48 PM Modulous has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 289 by Modulous, posted 02-15-2012 6:00 PM Perdition has replied
 Message 295 by bluegenes, posted 02-16-2012 4:34 AM Perdition has replied

  
Modulous
Member (Idle past 233 days)
Posts: 7801
From: Manchester, UK
Joined: 05-01-2005


Message 289 of 359 (652735)
02-15-2012 6:00 PM
Reply to: Message 288 by Perdition
02-15-2012 5:56 PM


Re: Mr Mits' real freedom
Ok, then he's not talking about the same free will as Mr. Mits.
They don't define it the same and they disagree about the metaphysics, but they both refer to the same phenomonlogical event when they use the words.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 288 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 5:56 PM Perdition has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 291 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 6:05 PM Modulous has replied

  
New Cat's Eye
Inactive Member


Message 290 of 359 (652736)
02-15-2012 6:02 PM
Reply to: Message 285 by Perdition
02-15-2012 5:13 PM


Re: absolutely free
I'm not much of a determinist.
What do you mean by this? Do you believe you can break causality?
It sure seems like I can*... but I don't know how to tell if that's really an illusion or not.
And I'm not totally convinced that the laws of physics are entirely deterministic... even that could be illusory because we're mostly dealing with idealizations.
I do know one thing: If it is all predetermined, then we are just robots and we don't have free will.
* I think thats a big part of it: With the simple approach of: "Hrm, do I have free will?" \raises arm\ "Yup, sure do" -- you get to the conclusion of free will. Its denying all that as an illusion that I'm not much for. At least, I don't find it convincing.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 285 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 5:13 PM Perdition has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 292 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 6:18 PM New Cat's Eye has replied

  
Perdition
Member (Idle past 3486 days)
Posts: 1593
From: Wisconsin
Joined: 05-15-2003


Message 291 of 359 (652737)
02-15-2012 6:05 PM
Reply to: Message 289 by Modulous
02-15-2012 6:00 PM


Re: Mr Mits' real freedom
They don't define it the same and they disagree about the metaphysics, but they both refer to the same phenomonlogical event when they use the words.
We've disagreed about this before. They point to the same visible effect, riasing hands and such, and they both say "Free will caused that."
However, they have completely different mechanisms for what they mean by that sentence. One means "He, as a prime cause, raised his hand despite the possibility that he would not raise his hand."
The other means, "He raised his hand because he wanted to, and there was no possibility of him not raising his hand."
Did you get a chance to read through my eyesight analogy? Do you think both Mits and the Compatibilist are talking about the same phenomonological thing, but differing on the mechanics in that case?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 289 by Modulous, posted 02-15-2012 6:00 PM Modulous has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 293 by Modulous, posted 02-15-2012 6:35 PM Perdition has not replied

  
Perdition
Member (Idle past 3486 days)
Posts: 1593
From: Wisconsin
Joined: 05-15-2003


Message 292 of 359 (652741)
02-15-2012 6:18 PM
Reply to: Message 290 by New Cat's Eye
02-15-2012 6:02 PM


Re: absolutely free
It sure seems like I can*... but I don't know how to tell if that's really an illusion or not.
It sure does. And except when thinking about it, or debating it, I act as if I can.
But I can point to a lot of things that it seems like I could do, but in reality can't.
And I'm not totally convinced that the laws of physics are entirely deterministic... even that could be illusory because we're mostly dealing with idealizations.
This is also true. In fact, if you read earlier in the thread, I was trying to force quantum mechanics into the equation. It turns out, I didn't need to do that.
Others are now adding Chaos Theory to the equation. The problem is, this adds randomness, but I don't see how it gives the type of free will we all seem to feel we have.
Basically, I envision it like this. I do something, then ask myself why I did it. I name a few reasons. Then I stop and think, if those reasons were enough to make me want to do something, then wasn't it really those reasons that caused my action, and not me? If I set up an exactly the same environment, with the same causes, wouldn't I take the same action? If that's the case, then, allowing those causes, did I really have the option of not taking that action?
Simply, I decide to turn left out of my drive way instead of right.
Why?
Well, turning left gets me out of my subdivision faster, it uses less gas, and I am accustomed to turning left. I'm also on my way to work, so going the shortest route ensures the higest probability of getting to work on time.
So, given those reasons, could I turn right? Why would I? Well, maybe you wanted to be late for work because you know you have a bad day ahead of you and the cost of being late is minimal.
Ah, but now you've entered another cause, one that overrides the previous ones, and the situation is not the same as when I turned left. If I really think about it, it just seems obvious that, given all the causes acting on me and my brain, the choice I make is inevitable.
I do know one thing: If it is all predetermined, then we are just robots and we don't have free will.
We would be very, very advanced robots, if we're robots at all. We're simply physical beings in a physical universe set up with causality as a central "law." Our consciousness makes us special, but not special enough to counteract the laws of the universe.
I think thats a big part of it: With the simple approach of: "Hrm, do I have free will?" \raises arm\ "Yup, sure do" -- you get to the conclusion of free will. Its denying all that as an illusion that I'm not much for. At least, I don't find it convincing.
I often say that free will is an illusion, but a necessary one. I think, if a lot of people actually believed in determinism, and understood the ramifications of it, they would probably just lay in bed, thinking nothing matters. So I have two conflicting impulses, I like to try and spread the truth (or what I believe to be the truth) through discussion and debate, but I also want everyone to be happy and find meaning in their lives. This is one case where I have conflicting desires. It's like when I'm on this forum, the part of me that wants to debate and spread truth has pointed a gun at the part of me that wants everyone to be happy.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 290 by New Cat's Eye, posted 02-15-2012 6:02 PM New Cat's Eye has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 297 by New Cat's Eye, posted 02-16-2012 11:07 AM Perdition has replied

  
Modulous
Member (Idle past 233 days)
Posts: 7801
From: Manchester, UK
Joined: 05-01-2005


Message 293 of 359 (652744)
02-15-2012 6:35 PM
Reply to: Message 291 by Perdition
02-15-2012 6:05 PM


Re: Mr Mits' real freedom
We've disagreed about this before. They point to the same visible effect, riasing hands and such, and they both say "Free will caused that."
Not just the visible effect but also the cause, namely: the self. When they raised the hand it has to be as a result of a decision made by the person raising it because it was something that they themselves wanted to do (ie., willed) and not because the alternatives were absolutely unbearable but just because they were less preferred.
However, they have completely different mechanisms for what they mean by that sentence. One means "He, as a prime cause, raised his hand despite the possibility that he would not raise his hand."
The other means, "He raised his hand because he wanted to, and there was no possibility of him not raising his hand."
Yeah, they have different beliefs about what is going on, I've not denied this for one moment. I've explained why this doesn't mean they are talking about different things, it just means they have different beliefs about the thing in question.
Did you get a chance to read through my eyesight analogy? Do you think both Mits and the Compatibilist are talking about the same phenomonological thing, but differing on the mechanics in that case?
I'll respond to that message with my view of it a little later.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 291 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 6:05 PM Perdition has not replied

  
xongsmith
Member
Posts: 2620
From: massachusetts US
Joined: 01-01-2009


Message 294 of 359 (652748)
02-15-2012 7:10 PM
Reply to: Message 267 by Perdition
02-15-2012 2:42 PM


Perdition asks:
This still doesn't allow free will, though, right? It only enters randomness into the equation.
In Message 197 I said:
For me, the illusion of freewill is the sensation of that which the individual wants to accomplish happening "close enough" and "often enough" to give a feedback of success in accomplishing their will. It is a sensation that the individual is in control of their will, albeit not perfectly because of micro-indeterminancy and the nature of Chaos Theory's exemplary field data. It is a feedback system born & learned throughout life to support the wants of this individual as tempered by their world view. However, in my opinion, it is no more of an illusion than what all of the other senses provide.
I might even go so far as to say that the moment you become aware of what you want, you have an illusion of free will. You could be tied up and immobilized, blindfolded and taped over your mouth, but that won't stop you from being able to think of escape or of flowers or mentally composing music or those sorts of things.

- xongsmith, 5.7d

This message is a reply to:
 Message 267 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 2:42 PM Perdition has seen this message but not replied

  
bluegenes
Member (Idle past 2725 days)
Posts: 3119
From: U.K.
Joined: 01-24-2007


(1)
Message 295 of 359 (652785)
02-16-2012 4:34 AM
Reply to: Message 288 by Perdition
02-15-2012 5:56 PM


Re: Mr Mits' real freedom
Perdition writes:
All I'm saying is that there is a debate between Libertarians (like Mr Mits) and Determinists, and in that debate, we're using free as meaning free from determinism.
I think you might be wrong in describing Mr. Mits as a Libertarian. I think it's best to see him as an inconsistent fence sitter. Mr. Mits is perfectly capable of saying that Mr. Action has done something of his own free will, and then examining the causes of Mr. Action's choice. He will also tend to perceive Mr. Action as a caused being, not an uncaused prime mover (or god). Mr. Mits may well also perceive history as having determined the present. However, he may well perceive the future as being non-predetermined.
Mr. Mits is (understandably) confused, IMO, and can say things that imply determinism, as well as saying things that imply non-determinism. But it's by no means clear that he would use the phrase "free will" in the strict libertarian sense.
It's also unclear what the MITS might mean if he says that more than one possible choice can be made. "Possible" is a difficult word. For example, if you and I are in a strange house looking for a chair, and we come across a room with a closed door, we might both agree that it's possible that there's a chair in the room, and it's possible that there isn't. From the perspective of our knowledge (or lack of it) that seems reasonable. But in a strict sense, only one of those possibilities can actually be "possible".
So when the MITS is driving with you along the road and says that there are two possible choices of route ahead, why should we assume he is making some grand philosophical statement.? If you choose one route, he may well ask you what made you choose that one. And if you answer that it looked like the shorter way to your destination on the map, he will surely recognize that there's an external causal factor beyond your control that led to the "free" choice.
On this thread you've stated the view that "free" is an absolute. But then you agree that free will does not imply the ability to become Superman and fly round the world merely because you want to. We can't make such impossible choices. So, free will could then mean the freedom to make all possible choices. You're a determinist, so follow that line of thought through, and you might see how you could end up as a compatibilist.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 288 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 5:56 PM Perdition has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 302 by Straggler, posted 02-16-2012 1:38 PM bluegenes has replied
 Message 322 by Perdition, posted 02-16-2012 5:54 PM bluegenes has replied

  
Son Goku
Inactive Member


(3)
Message 296 of 359 (652803)
02-16-2012 8:42 AM
Reply to: Message 266 by xongsmith
02-15-2012 2:39 PM


I disagree. Regardless of how accurately the State of a Brain at time T may be completely known (meaning all the environmental, genetic, emotional stuff - everything that could ever be measured forever with whatever equipment might come to bear on this), the State at time T + 1 Planck unit later can only be described in probabilities because of Quantum Dynamics. It will remarkably correspond to the classical prediction, based on these probabilities - but it won't be exact to every atom in the universe, or even every atom in your closet full of shirts. There are so many events that even a few will not follow the Maximum Likelihood. Chaos Theory demonstrates that even the smallest thing can make a difference. While Chaos Theory is deterministic, it is only deterministic on the conditions of the universe it finds itself in at that Planck moment. The next Planck moment later the conditions are ever so slightly different, or maybe astonishingly the same as, from the Maximum Likelihood prediction. Chaos then chews on the new stuff.
It doesn't really work like this. Quantum effects don't really feed into classical chaos in the way you're imagining because of an effect known as decoherence and the linearity of quantum mechanics. Quantum Dynamics is completely linear, so small changes in the initial state never cause large changes in the evolution. Quantum Mechanics suppresses classical chaos for this reason. So rather than feed on Quantum Mechanical fluctuations, chaos is driven away by them.
This is where decoherence comes in. In the brain, for example, the atomic systems are constantly interacting with other atomic systems. These interactions count as a measurement which kills off the quantum effects and this is what actually allows classical chaos to appear. The classical chaos will then act on the time scales of whatever the classical dynamics of the brain are. It isn't effected by the quantum fluctuations because any time it tries to "reach that far down" quantum linearity kills it.
Quantum fluctuations have no more of an effect on the evolution of a chaotic classical system than they do on a non-chaotic one.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 266 by xongsmith, posted 02-15-2012 2:39 PM xongsmith has replied

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 Message 299 by xongsmith, posted 02-16-2012 12:57 PM Son Goku has replied

  
New Cat's Eye
Inactive Member


Message 297 of 359 (652811)
02-16-2012 11:07 AM
Reply to: Message 292 by Perdition
02-15-2012 6:18 PM


Re: absolutely free
It sure does. And except when thinking about it, or debating it, I act as if I can.
Well, sometime I act like I can't... It can help overcome fear. If I'm poised to hit a big jump on my dirtbike, I might think to myself: "well, just go for it, if I'm not supposed to make this, then it was all pre-determined anyways and there's nothing I can do to prevent it"
This is also true. In fact, if you read earlier in the thread, I was trying to force quantum mechanics into the equation. It turns out, I didn't need to do that.
Others are now adding Chaos Theory to the equation. The problem is, this adds randomness, but I don't see how it gives the type of free will we all seem to feel we have.
Well, its about breaking causality, and thus breaking hard determinism - which has to happen to allow for true free will.
We haven't identified what causes of a particular atom radioactively decaying, or the cause of the direction of the path an electron takes in a 'random walk', etc. This doesn't mean that they are cause-less, but with randomness-including simulations accurately modeling the behavior, it can seem like there is an element of randomness present. Too, if you spend enough time in the lab, eventually you'll get something that doesn't line up with theory. Even on the chemistry level, I've had mixtures react totally unexpectedly... heh, sometimes we joke: "must've been the hand of god on that one". The point is the idealization, we'd like to think that given these things mixing, its inevitable that this is the result, and then when that doesn't happen we think that we must've done something wrong. But what really happened? Maybe things don't always go as their supposed to. Now, I've never seen a ball drop upwards, but in the physics lab we had one that didn't fall at 9.8 m/s/s... It was assumed that we did something wrong, but how do we know if we really did?
Basically, I envision it like this. I do something, then ask myself why I did it. I name a few reasons. Then I stop and think, if those reasons were enough to make me want to do something, then wasn't it really those reasons that caused my action, and not me? If I set up an exactly the same environment, with the same causes, wouldn't I take the same action? If that's the case, then, allowing those causes, did I really have the option of not taking that action?
Simply, I decide to turn left out of my drive way instead of right.
Why?
Well, turning left gets me out of my subdivision faster, it uses less gas, and I am accustomed to turning left. I'm also on my way to work, so going the shortest route ensures the higest probability of getting to work on time.
So, given those reasons, could I turn right? Why would I? Well, maybe you wanted to be late for work because you know you have a bad day ahead of you and the cost of being late is minimal.
Ah, but now you've entered another cause, one that overrides the previous ones, and the situation is not the same as when I turned left. If I really think about it, it just seems obvious that, given all the causes acting on me and my brain, the choice I make is inevitable.
There's so much variance... We've all had it happen where we're gonna go to the store and end up driving half-way to work without even realizing it. Certainly a lot of the choices on the way were made unconsciously. On the other end, I spent some minutes deciding which attachment to put on my shotgun in Battlefield 3 last night, I was gonna go with the one, but then I thought about it some more and decided to change it back at the last minute. My will itself seemed like to sole causal agent in that choice and it was kinda a flippant decision based on asthetics (I like the reticle in the red-dot sight a little bit better even tho the kobra one with the ring might be better with a shotgun).
Or you could add in another element... I throw to you a glass ball. You can either catch or watch it shatter. Its up to you whether that ball shatters or not. Without you, its definately gonna shatter, but you have the ability to cause that to not happen. You have time to weigh the options, and decide which outcome you'd prefer to see. You're having a real effect on the future and you are the cause of that future. The question is whether that future was pre-determined or if you, yourself, get to have a say in what's going to happen.
We would be very, very advanced robots, if we're robots at all.
If I was destined to break my arm on that jump from the moment of the big bang, then we aren't anything more than robots.
We're simply physical beings in a physical universe set up with causality as a central "law." Our consciousness makes us special, but not special enough to counteract the laws of the universe.
But if we, ourselves, can cause causality, then in a sense we have broken the laws of physics... or maybe not broken, but molded into our own laws. If you decide to catch the glass ball, you've changed the causality of the situation. It was going to break, but you changed the future. You caused it, yourself, seperately from the chain of causality that was in place had you not stepped in.
But that's on a different level than the reactions going on in your brain that make the decision and how those are subject to causality...

This message is a reply to:
 Message 292 by Perdition, posted 02-15-2012 6:18 PM Perdition has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 320 by Perdition, posted 02-16-2012 5:27 PM New Cat's Eye has replied

  
1.61803
Member (Idle past 1752 days)
Posts: 2928
From: Lone Star State USA
Joined: 02-19-2004


Message 298 of 359 (652814)
02-16-2012 11:21 AM


I do not know that there is yet a definate answer as to whether or not our brain is a quantum computer or not. At least this Wiki article seems to suggest the jury is still out on this one.
Quantum mind - Wikipedia
Ongoing debate
The main argument against the quantum mind proposition is that quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale, at which they could be useful for neural processing. This argument was elaborated by the physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function. He states that "This conclusion disagrees with suggestions by Penrose and others that the brain acts as a quantum computer, and that quantum coherence is related to consciousness in a fundamental way".[2][3]
A recent paper by Engel et al. in Nature does indicate quantum coherent electrons as being functional in energy transfer within photosynthetic organisms, but the quantum coherence described lasts for 660 fs[40] rather than the 25 milliseconds required by Orch-OR, and this is compatible with Tegmark's calculations. More recent papers involving Guerreshi, G., Cia, J., Popescu, S. and Briegel, H. [25] are looking to improve their model of entanglement in protein, a test which could falsify theories, such as those of Penrose and Hameroff, that require non-trivial coherence or entanglement in protein. In their reply own reply to Tegmark's paper, also published in Physical Review E, the physicists Scott Hagan, Jack Tuszynski in collaboration with Hameroff [41][42] produced counter proposals to the effect that the interiors of neurons could alternate between liquid and gel states. In the gel state, it was further hypothesized that the water electrical dipoles are oriented in the same direction, along the outer edge of the microtubule tubulin subunits. Hameroff et al. proposed that this ordered water could screen any quantum coherence within the tubulin of the microtubules from the environment of the rest of the brain.
In the last decade some other research has been argued to favour quantum theories of consciousness. Between 2003 and 2009, Elio Conte and co-authors performed a number of experiments interpreted as evidence for "possible existence of quantum interference effects on mental states during human perception and cognition of ambiguous figures".[43][44] Further, in a 2011 paper in Physical Review Letters,it is argued that the sensitivity of European robins to small changes in the prevailing magnetic field is evidence that "superposition and entanglement are sustained in this living system for at least tens of microseconds, exceeding the durations achieved in the best comparable man-made molecular systems", and the authors produce a simple model to this effect.[45][46][47]
[edit]See also
Edited by 1.61803, : spellcheck

  
xongsmith
Member
Posts: 2620
From: massachusetts US
Joined: 01-01-2009


Message 299 of 359 (652831)
02-16-2012 12:57 PM
Reply to: Message 296 by Son Goku
02-16-2012 8:42 AM


Son Goku writes:
This is where decoherence comes in. In the brain, for example, the atomic systems are constantly interacting with other atomic systems. These interactions count as a measurement which kills off the quantum effects and this is what actually allows classical chaos to appear. The classical chaos will then act on the time scales of whatever the classical dynamics of the brain are. It isn't effected by the quantum fluctuations because any time it tries to "reach that far down" quantum linearity kills it.
Ah, thank you.
But if I could speak in my best Maxwell Smart "would you believe" voice, how about: Would you believe if each atomic system interaction counts as a measurement and thus decoheres the region it is in, could there not be other regions in the brain still in the state of quantum entanglement? The time scale of a classical chaotic process might mean it takes some time for an atomic system interaction to get over to another unmeasured region, or for that matter all the regions that have not been measured yet. Maybe by then the first one has gone back to a state of being unmeasured, that is, reentangled, no?
So you have would all these atomic interactions constantly going on in all regions of the brain, decohering willy nilly.....
Isn't the decoherence of a brain state's region just a way of setting the initial conditions for classical chaos to operate in that particular region? And wouldn't all these regions resume becoming entangled when they get the chance? A region could be very small.
I guess I need some more help in understanding this.

- xongsmith, 5.7d

This message is a reply to:
 Message 296 by Son Goku, posted 02-16-2012 8:42 AM Son Goku has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 326 by Son Goku, posted 02-17-2012 5:38 AM xongsmith has not replied

  
Straggler
Member (Idle past 314 days)
Posts: 10333
From: London England
Joined: 09-30-2006


Message 300 of 359 (652834)
02-16-2012 1:23 PM
Reply to: Message 286 by Modulous
02-15-2012 5:33 PM


Internal and External
Straggler writes:
But Mod doesn't seem to be advocating "the most relevant or strongest" causes as such. He seems to be making a very explicit differentiation between internal and external causes.
Mod writes:
Indeed. That's because free will is an ability of the human mind. If my mind causes the decision to be made it is an internal decision. If someone elses mind causes the decision to be made, then that is an external decision.
But ALL actions are ultimately the result of internal decisions aren't they? Even in your example of the gun to the head what you do depends on the very internal basis of whether you actually want to live or not. If you didn’t care then the gun would be inconsequential to your actions. If you thought your family would be better off with the insurance money from your death then you might even act to have the trigger pulled. But what you do ultimately remains indisputably an internal decision no matter how extreme you make the scenario regarding the external factors in play. External factors of this sort only matter to the extent that you internally decide that they do.
Mod writes:
Indeed. That's because free will is an ability of the human mind. If my mind causes the decision to be made it is an internal decision. If someone elses mind causes the decision to be made, then that is an external decision.
How can anyone else possibly make the decision for you such that an action is not ultimately internally derived?
And if ALL decisions are ultimately internal do not ALL decisions qualify as "free" by your definition of "free" being that which is "internal"....?
Mod writes:
This is just really to point out that Dr A and Mr Mits are in agreement that when a person acts according to their personal wishes (ie., internal determining factors) - rather than because of some external constraints, they are acting of their own free will.
But every single action is the consequence of a complex web of internal and external factors combined. Wanting to live or not is an internal decision. Having a gun at your head is an external factor in that decision. So the distinction you are making between internal and external just doesn’t work as a way of defining which actions are free and which are not.
Mod writes:
I'm sure Mr Mits would agree with Dr A that having a gun pointed at your head would mean you weren't acting of your own free will.
And I’m sure that if you told him his actions were predetermined and inevitable anyway he wouldn’t see the gun as the only thing denying him that free-will.
Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 286 by Modulous, posted 02-15-2012 5:33 PM Modulous has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 317 by Modulous, posted 02-16-2012 4:46 PM Straggler has replied

  
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