Summations Only

Actually, he's making an obvious mistake if there's only one "universe"*. The jagged puddle will inevitably fit the jagged pothole whether there's one pothole or trillions.Looking at one world and saying "how amazing! The physical nature of this world is exactly right for its contents" is always silly. What else would we expect? If the world was wrongly "tuned" for something it contained, then a good argument could be made for the supernatural insertion of that something into the world.Fine tuning is a prediction of naturalism. The pothole must necessarily fit its puddle.Ironically, many I.D. folk see any confirmations of the fitness of the world for life as supporting evidence for supernatural design. Then they proceed to contradict themselves by arguing for the impossibility of a natural origin of life, and for the impossibility of the natural evolution of complex creatures.In other words, they argue that this world is fine tuned for life and isn't fine tuned for life.Personally, I find that hilarious.*I prefer the term "world" for the known universe, and the phrase "many worlds" for the idea that there might be others. Surely all worlds should be part of what's universal. Hopefully, the word "multiverse" will disappear from the language. WTF is a "verse" in this context?

Exactly. If the pothole were a different shape, the puddle would be. Why is that an "issue"? Certainly not. I didn't suggest that it would or could. Indeed. If the history of the U.S.A. had followed a different course, you'd be unlikely to have a president called Barak Obama. I think that the reason that many religious people have an obsession with fine tuning is that they assume that life (and particularly our species) are the central objective of the world. When naturalists like Martin Rees point out that the constants of the universe are exactly right for life, they think back to front, and see this as a sign of design.If you assume that the puddle was intended by a creator to be a particular shape, it will appear to you that he must then have intentionally shaped the pothole exactly as it is, especially when you can conceive of a virtually infinite number of other shapes.

Of course (to the last sentence, assuming a whole range of different outcomes are possible, although we can't be sure). Why is that a problem? Why would a lifeless puddle or no puddle at all be a problem? For whom?What I'm pointing out with the jagged puddle in the jagged pothole truism is that it makes no sense to look at the world and observe something that is part of it, and then say "how amazing, the physical nature of this world is exactly right to form that something". What else would we expect?I don't see a "problem" with only one world. If there is only one world, it has to have a physical character. If there were many possible alternatives that could have formed, and only one did, someone's got to win the lottery.

Why would any particular universe be a "problem"? Then we're on a slightly different page. I was countering the argument that fine tuning indicated intent (intelligent design), probably because this is EvC, and the person bringing up the subject is a creationist who thinkes fine tuning supports I.D.I think it's reasonable to assume that any world (or universe, as most people seem to be calling the known universe, presumably on the basis that lots of different things can all separately be universal) would in some senses appear to be "fine tuned" to be itself. In a similar way, the coastline of Britain will appear to be fine tuned to fit the island. I don't find that a "problem". I find it to be necessary, however many islands exist or could concievably have existed, from one to quadrillions of quadrillions. The "puddle fits the pothole" truism isn't an argument against fine tuning. It just says "big deal"! Why? Let's suppose a scenario in which there could be quadrillions of types of world formed, but there's only this one. Only a tiny fraction of those hypothetical alternatives would have had life, and and even tinier fraction, our type of life. There isn't actually a "problem", just a misunderstanding of probabilities.At any one time, America will have a single president with a name. Any particular name is very unlikely to be the result. So, do you see the improbability "Barak Obama" as a problem? Work out the probability of your own existence assuming the existence of our species. Consider all the hypothetical genetic siblings your parents could have had instead of you. Then consider that the same remote chance was required to produce those two parents, your four grand parents, the 8 in the previous generation, and so on. It appears that you shouldn't exist; that the probability is vanishingly small. Why is your existence a "problem"? Do we need a "many worlds" (or multi-verse, as you put it) hypothesis to explain you? Are you possibly making the (usually religious) mistake of seeing life as a target?

Why is the life universe the full house with jokers? What are the other 9,999,997 cards? Why is a life universe a special hand? Isn't it rather subjective of us, as life forms, to decide that a life universe is special? In my (hypothetical) one world scenario where there are many equally possible worlds and only a tiny fraction would have life, there's nothing to explain. The explanation is the same as the explanation of why Mrs Vivant won the winner takes all lottery, and no-one else did. It's only a mystery if you decide Mrs. Vivant is somehow special.That doesn't, of course, mean that it isn't worth looking for an explanation because my scenario is hypothetical, and it could be that there are unknown constraints on what kind of world can form, or that there are infinitely many worlds, making this one inevitable etc.Are you sure you're not making the mistake of thinking that, because there are far more possible non-Mrs. Vivant results for the lottery than Mrs. Vivant results, that we need to explain her good fortune?

Or any other precisely defined universe. Most possiblities do not include Mrs. Vivant winning the lottery. No other attempts to win the lottery in that analogy would be the equivalent of no other possible worlds but this one in a one world scenario.

But in that analogy, "attempts" in the lottery are analogous to "possible universes". If there's only one possible one, it must be this one, and my hypothetical scenario (and that of the creationists) would be wrong. That hypothetical scenario was that there were lots of possible worlds, but only one that exists.Try a different analogy. You have a massive deck of a trillion cards, with each card unique. You pick out one. It's the 43,132,753,819 of diamonds. It's a 999,999,999,999 to one chance against this result. Does the result require some kind of special explanation?

What do the blue cards represent? What are the blue cards of this world? Why is it objectively special?

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"How seriously can we take this explanation for the friendliness of nature? Not very, I think. For a start, how is the existence of the other universes to be tested? To be sure, all cosmologists accept that there are some regions of the universe that lie beyond the reach of our telescopes, but somewhere on the slippery slope between that and the idea that there are an infinite number of universes, credibility reaches a limit. As one slips down that slope, more and more must be accepted on faith, and less and less is open to scientific verification.

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Extreme multiverse explanations are therefore reminiscent of theological discussions. Indeed, invoking an infinity of unseen universes to explain the unusual features of the one we do see is just as ad hoc as invoking an unseen Creator. The multiverse theory may be dressed up in scientific language, but in essence it requires the same leap of faith."

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Paul DaviesFirstly, if you're agreeing with Paul Davies, you've thrown out your baby with the bath water. He wants to put the many worlds hypothesis on the level of the unseen Creator hypothesis, implying that neither are testable science and both require a "leap of faith".Mr. designtheorist, you now find yourself disagreeing with Ross and Dawkins on whether or not a creator God is a scientific hypothesis. (I agree with them that god hypotheses can be scientific. At least some god hypotheses are testable. The standard YEC model, for example, is both testable, falsifiable, and has long been effectively falsified by a number of lines of evidence).It should have occurred to you that if you can't test how many universes there are, then you've thrown out the standard creationist fine tuning argument, and defined it as being outside science.I don't think either the one world hypothesis or the many worlds hypothesis should be considered outside science. We can conceive of falsifications for both, and falsification is always hypothetical. If future science can positively establish one or the other then the opposite is falsified. Presently, they aren't practically falsifiable, but that applies to many scientific hypotheses of the past when they were first made, and of the present.Secondly, let's look at where (non-atheist) Paul Davies cheats in favour of a supernatural creator:

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Indeed, invoking an infinity of unseen universes to explain the unusual features of the one we do see is just as ad hoc as invoking an unseen Creator.

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He sees hypotheses about other worlds when there is an observed example of one world as equivalent to hypotheses about a supernatural being making things when we have zero established examples of the latter. Wow! That's like seeing speculation on the existence of intelligent alien biological beings travelling through space (based on the one example of ourselves) as the equivalent of speculation on the existence of werewolves, when we have zero established examples of individuals of one species that can transform instantaneously into another.Edited by bluegenes, : Gave Paul Davies credit for his nonsense as I'd forgotten to do so.Edited by bluegenes, : tpyoEdited by bluegenes, : wrong word

Certainly. But you linked to a particular quote by him (which I included in the post you've replied to) as if this in some way supported your view that all multi-universe hypotheses are unscientific. In that quote he claimed that such hypotheses were just as unscientific as the God hypothesis, which you're trying to establish as scientific. Why? The creationist fine tuning argument relies on there being only one universe. If we can never test how many universes there are, as you claim without explaining how you know this, then, by your own arguments, the fine tuning argument isn't scientific. When it's conceivably possible. How do you know that observations and experiments can never be made that could falsify the one or many universe hypotheses? For example, some multi-universe hypotheses make predictions about this universe, which means they can be tested. Of course. But hypotheses can be falsified by observations that are incompatible with them. He doesn't describe himself as one. You're the only person I know of who has done that (in the O.P.). Why did you describe him as such? I thought you wanted to include you favourite god in. Science deals with both what is directly observable and what is indirectly observable. So, when are we going to see you observe, probe, test, weigh, perturb, spin, explore or sample your god? Or any other supernatural being for that matter? We have many examples of things we cannot directly observe included in science on indirect evidence. We have one example of a universe, and no examples of supernatural beings.Somewhere, sooner or later, you've promised to present scientific evidence for a supernatural creator. We're waiting for it. Is the "fine tuning" argument supposed to be this evidence? If so, why are you objecting to universes we can't see on the basis that we can't see them while promoting a god we can't see? Would extra universes somehow become more plausible to you if we didn't have a single example of a universe?

You are making life special, whether you realise it or not. There is no objective reason to do so.Mrs. Vivant won the lottery, and she lives on George Street, Philadelphia PA. Only 7 people on George Street did the lottery, when there were 70 million participants. Nothing needs explaining unless you make George Street (like the set of life universes) special in your mind, and there's no objective reason to do so.

The hypothetical situation we're discussing doesn't assume that this universe is the only one possible. You seem to think that some kind of special explanation is required because the "winning" type of universe is appropriate for life when most hypothetical universes with different parameters wouldn't be. That is exactly like thinking that the lottery winner coming from George Street requires some kind of explanation because most participants live elsewhere.

Yes. That's the hypothetical scenario I'm working on, and that of the creationists who make the fine tuning argument. No I'm not. I do not consider this universe to be special or a blue marble. I do not consider all the other potential universes to be identical. You keep suggesting, whether you realise it or not, that there's something extraordinary about Mrs. Vivant winning the lottery. For you, the result is the special blue marble.Try this. We take an ordinary 52 card deck. Look at the scenario I've quoted you describing above:......"it assumes that there is only one in existence. In other words, our assumption is that before the big bang, many were possible. But we've had only one attempt and now there is only one. The other universes are now impossible according to the possibility we are exploring.".Just one universe. So, from our deck of cards we deal one ten card hand (representing one universe - the cards can represent ten cosmological constants if you like). What you and the creationists are doing is looking at that one hand, deciding it's special, and therefore claiming that its improbability (1 in 144,555,105,949,057,024) requires a special explanation.You are assuming your conclusion.

That fits the scenario. We're talking about masses of different potential universes, like lots of different potential lottery winners. Obviously. This is where you make life special, while saying that you don't. You have divided the potential lottery winners into the tiny minority of participants who live on the same street as the winner and the great majority who don't. You have therefore invented your own problem that requires solving. We can happily include "extremely rare" in our hypothetical scenario. You are making life special. You just said that you elected to do so "for the purpose of this discussion".I did tell you why the grouping makes no sense. We have no objective reason for making life special. Now you seem to be contradicting yourself. We roll the die once (our one universe from many potential ones scenario). We get a three. You've been looking at the three after the event, dividing outcomes into "three" and "not three", then pointing out that the set of "not three" is by far the greatest, and saying that therefore the result requires some kind of special explanation. You could do the same whatever number comes up. The nature of the scenario (one throw, 1 million different sides) determines that every result will be a one in a million chance.It's the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. The guy blindfolds himself, then shoots a bullet into the wall of his barn. He then finds the bullet hole, paints a target of concentric circles round it, and says to his buddies "I hit that blindfold. Aren't I the greatest of sharpshooters?"Theists who make the fine tuning argument believe that we are here by the intent of their god. Therefore, they draw a target around this universe or the set of "life" universes. Then they use our scenario to claim that the best explanation of hitting the rare target is intelligent design. They've assumed their conclusion.This is exactly like seeing a particular lottery winner or the participants living on the same street as the target of a lottery draw after the draw, then crying foul play, and claiming that the draw being intentionally rigged to get the desired result is the best explanation of hitting the target. The appearance of intelligent design in the draw is only because of the unfounded assumption that the chance result is an intended target.I'm asking you to stop painting a target around life or life universes after the event of a life universe winning the lottery.

No. It means that the probability of any colour is remote, and whatever the resulting colour is, nothing requires explaining except to those who have decided, after the event, that the particular resulting colour was the target. Blue is not a target in a chance universe scenario, and our hypothetical scenario is one of chance. I am certainly not phrasing the question as blue vs teal (50/50), and the "problem" is an artificial one of your making. I am pointing out what should be obvious to you. Any resulting colour will be a "microscopic bit". Looking at the result after the event and deluding oneself that it's the target is what makes the problem in some people's minds.Why do you think a lottery win by a particular person who lives on a street with seven out of the tens of millions of participants needs a special explanation?The type of situation we're describing is common. Consider the results of the last complete NBA season, meaning all the exact scores of all the games. The teams would have to play quadrillions of seasons in quadrillions of parallel universes in order to be likely to replicate that season. The set of all past NBA seasons is a truly "microscopic bit" of the set of all possible seasons that could be played. This will only appear to be problematic to you if you delude yourself that last season's results were the target of an intelligent designer, in which case it might appear to have been fixed by bribing the players (intelligently designed).The set of you and any siblings you've got are a "microscopic bit" of the set of all the trillions of potential siblings with different genomes that your parents could have had instead.So what? Edited by bluegenes, : Added missing word.