Yes, well, the thing is that when the loony says this:
There are no physical constraints linking a sign (codon) to what it represents, called the object in semiosis (amino acid). No physical connections.
The formal rules linking the object to the interpretant are also non physical. They are intangible you cannot touch them, they are not physics. It defies mechanistic physicality quite clearly.
... he is lying. The physical processes relating the codon to the amino acid are well understood. I think someone needs to look up concepts such as ribosomes, tRNA, and aminoacyl tRNA synthetase ... except, of course, that knowing stuff about biology doesn't help one to be a creationist.
A1.Chance and Necessity cannot generate a semiotic system, whereas the necessary and sufficient conditions of a semiotic system consist of arrangements of matter that produce specific functional effects by means of inert intermediary patterns.
Or to put it another way:
A1. Without a shred of evidence or argument, I'm going to assert something which implies the conclusion I want to draw.
I think what he's trying to say is that in order to for nucleotides to be translated into proteins, there has to be a mechanism to translate nucleotides into proteins. If his post has any other meaningful content, we'll never know, because apparently he joined this discussion board in order to not discuss things.
Anyway, what matters is: whether evolution (methodological naturalism) can explain the first 'replicators', as you call them.
Perhaps this would be a good time to explain that writing --- for example --- "cat (dog)" does not actually make the word "cat" synonymous with "dog", nor, for that matter, establish any other relationship between them.
Evolution, of course, does not explain the first replicators, for the same reason that gravity doesn't.
Methodological naturalism, of course, does not explain the first replicators, for the same reason that the double-blind method doesn't.
Try to cultivate a little accuracy in thought and speech.
I take the evidence based approach that all complex specified information has been found to have an intelligent source ...
Well, no. Assuming that the vague term "complex specified information" includes the information in DNA, then DNA itself constitutes a counterexample. When we look at the DNA of (let's say) a rose-bush, we find that it was produced by mindless processes (in this case reproduction, recombination, mutation). The IDist needs to hypothesize an exception to what seems like an invariable rule for genomes --- that they are produced by unintelligent processes.
We may, however, say that whenever we can find out how "complex specified information" arises, whether it's a genome, an engineering blueprint, or a novel, it arises as a result of natural and not supernatural causes; so if you want to apply induction, you could start with that fact and draw the obvious inference.
You complain about the "constraints of scientific naturalism", but what is it except inductive inferences from facts such as these? To elaborate on this point, suppose that the usual way to get coaches was for fairy godmothers to turn pumpkins into them, as in Cinderella. Then it would be scientific to infer that that was how any given coach was produced, and we would have scientific supernaturalism. But it isn't. We infer a naturalistic explanation for any given coach not a result of some prejudice or philosophy against the supernatural in general or fairy godmothers in particular; it's just what experience has taught us. To put it another way, we dismiss the supernatural explanation, not because it is supernatural, but for the same reason that we would dismiss an explanation involving tiny purple elephants, which would be natural, but which are equally absent from our collective experience of the sorts of causes things tend to have. And I never hear anyone complaining about the "constraints of no-tiny-purple-elephantism".
The genome for a rosebush only came into existence once, when it was (arguably) created. Now, it gets passed on by replication; what we see in present day are copies of the prototype. We are discussing the origin of the prototype, not of the extant specimens.
Did you really not understand that?
Let's try another example. I have just turned 40. My genome, therefore, did not exist until 1973. My parents' genomes existed prior to my conception, mine did not. Here, then, we have an example of a genome (mine) coming into existence. Do you deny it?
"complex specified information" is a term in the English language understandable by English speakers. It means exactly what it says.
In order for someone to understand a word or phrase, it has to have operational value for them.
That is: someone who knows what "pink" means can answer the question "Is this object pink?" His definition acts as a criterion. Someone who understands what "elephant" means can answer questions such as "how many elephants are there in this picture?" (so long as he can also count). Someone who knows what "three" means can tell me if I'm holding up three fingers (so long as he also knows what "finger" means, and so can recognize a finger). And so forth.
On the other hand, the average English-speaking person would not be able to answer the question "How much CSI is in the sequence AGTCGATGCTAGTTTGCA", or even if there is any. Someone who doesn't even know it when they see it (and know it's absent when they don't see it) doesn't know what it means.
Okay, have it your way. I'll use a different term in the future.
Well if you're going to use a different term for the same thing, then we would still have a problem, since the difficulty arises not because of the choice of words to describe the thing, but in the difficulty of identifying the thing the words are meant to denote.
But perhaps you will use this different term to mean a different thing. We'll see.