Existence of the soul

Out of body experiences may be due to a specific part of the brain being stimulated. In the process of researching a paper I wrote for an evolutionary biology class I came across this fascinating article. CNN Article

Yes, I've read this article myself in the past. The unique thing about Hypothermic Cardiac Arrest is that during the procedure the brain is clinically dead for up to 60 minutes, and therefore is no longer responding to stimuli at all.BTW - are you a Cougar? My parents both are, though from years ago.Blessings,::

Yeh, I suppose you could call me a Cougar Go Cougs ! eheh Stimulation of that portion of the brain could occur at the time of revival and induce the out of body experience.

The other side is that there is pretty strong evidence that the mind is heavily dependent on the brain. The effects of the "split brain" operation (severing the corpus callosum) are probably the strongest evidence. If the mind really were independant of the brain it would not be so reliant on a physical connection between the hemispheres.I rate that more highly than a collection of anecdotes.

The mind/body debate is an ontological issue, and the NDE reports suggest the capability of the mind to exist independant of the brain. These effects you describe are only behavioral in scope, and as such can't reveal anything with regard to the ontological primacy of mind or body. IOW, they show how we can affect the mind's interaction with reality by affecting the brain, but it cannot tell us anything about the status of its existence. Indeed, if mind was ontologically primary to matter, we would still expect that altering the mind's vessel of interaction (the brain) would necessarily alter post-procedure behavioral observations.If we cut off your leg, I think its reasonable to predict that you'll be unable to walk, yet that doesn't tell us that you've lost any inherent capability or capacity to walk -- you're just unable of performing a demonstration of that capability. Attach a prosthetic and its likely you will walk again. You might say, "If I had a leg, I could show that I can walk." Analogously, if we alter the mechanism by which one performs measurable acts of cognition, a change in that behavior does not indicate a loss in the capability to cognate unless one assumes the ontological primacy of matter. Its behavior, perhaps. Its existence, perhaps not. Here we run into Chalmer's Hard Problem, and obviously your stance there will influence your interpretation of experimental data.Blessings,::

I can only assume that you are not aware of the effects we are discussing. As one site puts it, splitting the brain, splits the mind. It is not simply a matter of behaviour at all.Indiana University Bloomingtonhttp://designweb.otago.ac.nz/grant/psyc/TWOBRAIN.HTMLhttp://brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/full/123/7/1293

PaulK--Skimming the articles to which you linked, I don't easily see how what I've said is contradicted. I'm aware of the split-brain phenomena, and to the best of my knowledge my statements are valid, but I will need to spend more time reviewing the material contained in your articles in attempt to discover exactly that which you think I am ignoring. Thanks for the references.Blessings,::

Oh dear, I suggest you consider your own analogy.Just as you cannot walk without a physical leg (although you might possess the capability to walk if your physical leg was restored or replaced) the hemispheres cannot properly communicate without the corpus callousum. Unless you wish to claim that a disembodied mind somehow has a corpus callosum (where would it come from ? if it is possible why doesn't an embodied mind have one ?) then a disembodied mind would have the same problems as a split-brain patient. So by your own analogy some aspects of proper mental function are dependant on the physical brain.Now consider the differences in the hemispheres - why would a disembodied mind (without ANY hemispheres) have those ? Really the best explanation is that the mind really is dependant on the physical brain even if we can't work out how. We don't have to solve David Chalmers "Hard Problem" to conclude that - it is as compatible with property dualism as it is with physical reductionism.

"Oh dear"? Don't get yourself too worked up there, Paul. (j/k) As I said before, I'm going to withold my comments until I've had time to thoroughly review your references. I'm putting it off for now, and I can likely have a response for you tonight or tomorrow.Blessings,::

Hello, PaulK.I haven't completed examining the articles you provided me, but having read this last post of yours a few times now, I'm somewhat confused by your statements, and hopefully if you can clarify them it will help me extract the important material from the pages you provided me. I'm with you this far... ...but you lost me here. A disembodied mind would not have a corpus callosum simply because the CC is necessarily a part of the physical anatomy. I don't see where it follows though that "a disembodied mind would have the same problems as a split brain patient." No, according to my analogy measuring proper function requires the existence of the phsyical apparatus, but the absence of that apparatus (and thus the absence of measureability) does not necessitate that mental capability ceases. Simply the ability to measure it does. Have what, the differences? Where did I say it did? I'm saying that the mind hasn't those differences, but affecting the phsyical apparatus changes its meausurable properties such that the differences appear externally. As in my analogy, you won't walk if we cut off your leg (change in measureable properties due to affecting the physical appratus), yet your inherent capability is unaffected (no actual difference after losing the leg). Only if one arbitrarily presupposes the ontological primacy of matter. Disagree. That you think this way indicates to me that you haven't entirely grasped my argument.Blessings,::

I don't see why you are having problems. If the mind can operate entirely normally wihout a corpus callosum while disembodied then why would it need one when embodied ? It seems a simple enough idea - and quite in line with your "leg" analogy where the leg must be somehow replaced for walking to be possible.

The question is one of subjective experience. So, whether or not the brain is responding to stimuli seems to be beside the point. The workings of the brain remain largely mysterious, providing a lot of room for speculation. i.e. - Can a person perceive without delivering evidence of that perception to the instruments of science? I guess: Yes.Lightning and thunder were once thought to be separate phenomena. Epilepsy was once thought to be demon possession. Out-of-body experience, and other "spiritual" phenomena will, I trust, join the ranks of these classical mysteries.db

Neither do I, though I don't think that I'm the only one having difficulty. I wonder what your definition of "normal function" would be with regard to the mind as I suspect it begs the question. Further, it seems that you might be confusing normal function of the brain with normal function of the mind. It is not a given that the two are one-and-the-same in this discussion. The tests for "normal function" which are described in your articles only can only assail the former, and by arbitrarily presupposing the ontological primacy of matter they conclude that therefore the mind necessarily malfunctions to that extent also. You ignore, however, that the mental capability to walk was never lost. To return to the experiments described in your articles, the mental capability to communicate between the two cerebral hemispheres may have never been lost (or at least cannot be demonstrated to have vanished), but this doesn't reveal malfunction of the mind unless one arbitrarily presupposes the ontological primacy of the brain with respect to the mind.I wonder: have there been any successful restorations of the corpus collosum (I doubt that there have)? Would you guess that the behavior would return to "normal" if a restoration was accomplished? If it did, would you accept this as evidence that my assertions have merit? It seems you have no problem understanding that the mind's capabilities function unaffected even at the loss of a leg, and that it can operate the leg if it were to be restored, yet propose a similar loss of measureable behavior as evidence that altering the physical organism necessarily alters the mind. Seems to be a double-standard, or to beg the question at least of exactly that which is in disupte: the relation of the mind to the body.Blessings,::

The question is whether or not the existence of subjective experience requires a functioning brain, so the reponsiveness of the brain whilst subjective experience continues is highly relevant. I agree that there is much room for speculation, and my guess is identical to your own. Perhaps, and indeed I hope that this comes to pass. My issue is simply that the presuppositions which undergird the methodologies inhibit them from actually assailing the phenomena.Blessings,::

No, I am not confusing the operation of the brain with that of the mind, in this case the operation of the mind is impaired.And no, I am not ignoring the fact that removal of the leg does not cause a loss of mental capacity except in the sense of dismissing it as the total irrelevance that it is. Indeed to assert that it is relevant is to beg the question.Moreover I fail to see any justification for your accusation that I am somehow applying a "double standard". Indeed it rests on your assertion that the effects are equivalent - so far as the function of the mind goes - to the loss of a leg. Now that assumption is on the face of it absurd - and despite your claim to be familiar with the evidence you have yet produced no argument to support your view. This strognly suggests that either you were not familiar with the evidence at all or that you are simply wiritng it off without examining it.