Omniscience of Divine Being.

Is there a difference between a perfect illusion and reality?

Is there anyone who can help me with this issue, try to answer the question of God's Omniscience existing, and Predestination. Are we Robots? What do you think? I am struggling as you can see, if anyone can shed some light on this please go ahead.

Stage Manager: You know as well as I do that the dead don't stay interested in us living people for very long. Gradually, gradually, they lose hold of the earth ... and the ambitions they had ... and the pleasures they had ... and the things they suffered .. and the people they loved. They get weaned away from earth -- that's the way I put it, -- weaned away ....
They're waitin'. They're waitin' for something that they feel is comin'. Something important, and great. Aren't they waitin' for the eternal part in them to come out clear?
... mother'n daughter ... husband'n wife ... enemy'n enemy ... money'n miser ... all those terribly important things kind of grow pale around here. And what's left when memory's gone, and your identity, Mrs. Smith?

It would not be a perfect illusion if there were a difference.But you know this.It gains us no insight since our investigation would reveal the same information as we investigated in either case.

Have you read the experiments of Benjamin Libet concerning the the delay between the brain's "action potential " to ready an organism for action and the conscious decision to start that action?

Freewill is the power to do what you want, but where does that power come from?

Another point I have unsuccessfully tried to make is that maybe our consciousness is inside God's. Imagine a venn diagram where God is the set of all consciousness, and we are a little circle inside that set. So when we make a decision that decision is also made by God, because we are inside him and since he is timeless, our decision which we made now, was known beforehand.

Free Will: W. Grey Walter, Benjamin Libet, and Other ExperimentersHe paved the way for Benjamin Libet when in the 1960s Walter discovered the Readiness Potential, termed by him as contingent negative variation (CNV), which described a negative electrical spike appearing in the brain a half second prior to subjects becoming consciously aware of movements they are about to make. He gave his subjects a dummy button--it would not work--to change slides they viewed. They were told to press the button to change to the next slide. An electrode was attached so that their brain was wired to the slide changer. In fact, the slides were changed via the electrode by the Readiness Potential area of their brain, and before they could push the dummy button. Unaware their own brains had been the agent, the subjects complained that the slides were changing before they could push the button. They thought they had not actuated the change when in fact they had, but not by any decision on their part. The sense of decision came after their brains had already effected the change to the next slide. The slide changed before they had decided to change it. Thus decision, that to which we attribute deeds, was an illusion. This, of course, has far-reaching ramifications for what is loosely termed free will.It suggests that free agency is an illusion and that we assume we choose when in fact we don't. Instead, we are creatures of cause and effect, determined by stimuli and forces in the environment.The basic findings have been repeated by various experimenters as the concept is straightforward and its protocols are simple to devise. The term Readiness Potential has come into wide use because of translation of a German term with the same meaning, Bereitschaftpotential, as named by German researchers, Hans Kornhuber and Lder Deeke. Kornhuber and Deeke had findings in a comparable behavioral context as a Finn, Risto Nten later had. Because various experiments have been conducted on the Readiness Potential with consistently similar results, we must conclude that the findings are not an anomaly.Nor can their implications for consciousness and free agency be lightly dismissed, given the consistency in the experiments--that the decision to act follows the action. In effect, the observer can predict what the subject will do before the subject knows his own response.
Mind Shadows: April 2005

Hangdawg13 writes:I've heard of it, but I'm not sure how that effects freewill. Care to elaborate?

The following points are made by S.S. Obhi and P. Haggard (American Scientist 2004 92:358):1) In 1983, Benjamin Libet and his colleagues at the University of California San Francisco published a profoundly influential paper on the source of human control. In this study, participants watched a small clock hand that completed one full revolution in 2.56 seconds. While fixated on the clock, a participant voluntarily flexed his wrist at a time of his choosing. After the movement, the clock hand continued to rotate for a random time and then stopped. Then, a participant reported the position of the clock hand at the time when she first became aware of the will to move. Libet and his colleagues called this subjective judgment W, for "will". In other parts of the experiment, participants judged when they actually moved, and Libet called this judgment M, for "movement". The timing of the W and the M told Libet and his collaborators when -- subjectively speaking --a participant formulated a will to move and actually moved.2) In addition, Libet's team measured two objective parameters: the electrical activity over the motor areas of the brain, and the electrical activity of the muscles involved in the wrist movement. Over the motor areas, Libet recorded a well-known psychophysiological correlate of movement preparation called the "readiness potential" (RP), which Hans H. Kornhuber and Lueder Deecke first described in 1965. The RP is measured using electroencephalographic recording electrodes placed on the scalp overlying the motor areas of the frontal lobe, and appears as a ramplike buildup of electrical activity that precedes voluntary action by approximately 1 second. By also recording the electrical activity of the muscles involved in the wrist movement, Libet precisely determined the onset of muscle activity related to the RP.3) Libet and his colleagues examined the temporal order of conscious experience and neural activity by comparing the subjective W and M judgments with the objective RP and muscular activity. First, the investigators found that, as expected, W came before M. In other words, the subjects consciously perceived the intention to move as occurring before a conscious experience of actually moving. This suggests an appropriate correspondence between the sequence of subjective experiences and the sequence of the underlying events in the brain. But Libet also found a surprising temporal relation between subjective experience and individual neural events. The actual neural preparation to move (RP) preceded conscious awareness of the intention to move (W) by 300 to 500 milliseconds. Put simply, the brain prepared a movement before a subject consciously decided to move. This result suggests that a person's feeling of intention may be an effect of motor preparatory activity in the brain rather than a cause. As Libet himself indicated, this finding ran directly contrary to the classical conception of free will.4) Considering all the existing data, the brain is apparently going full speed ahead well before a person experiences the conscious intention of moving. Consequently, no role appears for conscious processes in the control of action -- or so it might seem. Although research casts doubt on whether conscious processes cause actions, the data remain consistent with the idea that conscious processes could still exert some effect over actions by modifying the brain processes already under way. The fact that conscious awareness of intention precedes movement by a few hundred milliseconds means that a person could still inhibit certain actions from being made.