Free will vs Omniscience

Oh don't be daft, it doesn't take any kind of grading to realize that some accomplishments are greater than others. I remembered to put the toilet seat back down before I left for work this morning!Oh, oh yeah, I also got a nice salary increase for a promotion that I got at work today.

What does that have to do with what I am proud of?

Grace isn't grace when there's a caveat.

What does that have to do with the price of tea in China?

I'm not sure if "believe it" is the right phrase... It's a simple matter of what the words mean, so yeah, I still think I'm correct, but its not something that carries any weight with me, or anything that I really care about enough to have a belief in.I don't find omnipotence to be a very useful concept, and it is pretty ridiculous in itself. As my subtitle says, it can be used to trump anything and everything.Could omnipotence create a rock so heavy that it couldn't lift it? Well sure, it can do anything. It could create a situation where the rock exists in logical contradiction of being both too heavy to lift, while as also being lift-able.'cause if it couldn't, then that would be something that it couldn't do, which would mean that it couldn't do anything and everything, which would mean that it isn't omnipotence.But what does that do for me? How can the concept of omnipotence offer any utility at all?

Its a question of whether of not the universe is deterministic, and if it is, then you never really did have a choice between red or blue... it was already set in stone.But that question comes from an incompatibilist view (where determinism and free will cannot coexist), and you are arguing from a compatibilist view (where free will can still exists even if the universe is deterministic).In the compatibilist view, it doesn't matter if the future is set in stone or not, because the mental act of choosing red or blue still takes place and thus the will is still free. The incompatibilist then argues that there never really was a choice in the first place, rather it was only an illusion, and therefore the will is not free.Turns out, we really don't know if the universe is deterministic or not, and we really don't know if free will exists or not.But who am I kidding, its never stopped these philosophical discussions from continuing ad infinitum

Maybe you just don't realize the deterministic ramifications of your position In order for Thomas to truly predict the color, i.e. not just getting lucky with his guess but actually knowing what it will be, then there is no way for you to be able to choose a different color.Basically, perfect foreknowledge requires determinism. Yes, that's the compatibilist definition of free will: you aren't restricted from acting according to your motivations.But the incompatibilist would say that you do have to, otherwise Thomas couldn't see that future - for you may still choose the other color... you haven't decided yet. Its because if you truly have a choice, and it has not been made yet, then it is impossible for anyone to know what that choice will be before you actually make it.Thomas didn't know what you'd choose, he just got lucky with his guess... so that's not really seeing the future. The question is: if the future is set in stone, then are you really making your decision based on your own thoughts/feelings/experiences?According to the incompatibilists, if the future is actually set in stone, then your thoughts/feelings/experiences are not what making your decision is based on. You're just another rock rolling down a hill following the laws of physics with no actual input of your own.The compatibilist counter that even though they are set in stone, they are still your thoughts/feelings/experiences that your decision are made on, so your will is still free to make the choice.Then the incompatibilists say that you are really talking about "soft determinism" and that in real determinism the fact that it is set in stone means that you don't really get to choose.And round and round we go.Think about it this way: If Thomas can predict what you would choose, and you haven't yet had the thoughts/feelings/experiences upon which to motivate your action, then how could that action be based on them? They haven't happened yet, and still the choice has been made...That's what having a choice, as opposed to an illusion of one, means: nobody but you knows what you are going to choose. That's how you know that it is based on your own thoughts/feelings/experiences.ABE:I had another thought:If I have access to your motivations for your actions, then in what sense are they really yours? Wouldn't they at best be ours?Edited by Cat Sci, : No reason given.

What is it about you choosing that makes it different from the determinations of the unconscious universe? Cannot the unconscious universe determine what you will choose?I guess that's really the ultimate question though, isn't it? When I say determinism, I'm talking about being put in motion at the big bang and not just that something was determined by somebody. In order for you to actually be making the choice yourself, it cannot be known what you have chosen until you actally make it. Otherwise, in what sense is it actually you doing the choosing yourself? Then how can the decision be known before you've had your own thought/feelings/experiences?Its not set in stone until you do make the decision, so how could anyone know what it is before that happens?Doesn't it have to be set in stone before you've had your own thought/feelings/experiences, in order for the person to be able to predict it?And if they can predict it before you've had your own thought/feelings/experiences, then doesn't that mean that something else is setting it in stone? Except that you haven't done it yet, 'cause it's in the future. So how can it be set in stone already?And if it is, then how could your own thought/feelings/experiences that haven't happened yet do the setting? Because of the second part; you never make any decisions, you're just following an unbroken chain of events leading back to the beginning. Yup, but as long as we know that's what we're doing then who cares. I started posting because I saw an incompatibilist and a compatibilist arguing about whether or not free will and determinism can coexist...Neither of you are right, and both of you are wrong Just kidding, this is all just a bunch of silly philosobabble. If he is describing something that is already set in stone, then how can the action that hasn't taken place yet be the thing that is setting it in stone? Let's get some context first. This question really only matters in the sense of moral responsibility, otherwise it doesn't really matter if you yourself are making the choice or if you're really just blindly following the universe's determinations. I agree that either way is possible and that we can't really know, and outside of any context the discussion is pointless.So, let's say we are observing 100 rocks rolling down a hill and one of them runs into a tree. You're the tree cop and you want to punish that rock for running into the tree.The incompatibilist would argue that since the rock is just following the laws of physics, it had no choice in hitting the tree, so you shouldn't punish it.The compatibilist (you) would argue that it still was the one that had the experiences that lead to hitting the tree, so that still counts as its own choice under its own free will, so you still get to punish it.Now, let's say that I am sitting back in time when all the rocks are at the top of the hill. I can see the future and see all the paths that all the rocks will take and can point to the one that is going to hit the tree.From the perspective of moral responsibility, don't both me and the rock both have the experiences that lead up to it hitting the tree, and if I don't do anything to prevent it, but instead simply stand by and watch it happen, then don't I bear some of the moral responsibility?If I know what you are going to do, then the choice is not simply yours, it's both of ours and I should bear some of the responsibility.

Bill would try to choose Blue to prove Fred wrong, but that course of action would be the twist that ended up causing him to choose Red in the first place.

Yup, and nobody knows who is right. To the incompatibilist, nobody is because there isn't a choice being made at all. You're just a rock rolling down the hill thinking that you can make choices when you can't (thus the illusion). Are you saying that you've already had the thoughts/feelings/experiences that are going to happen in the future?Why aren't they in the past, then? I'm not sure it is. The future hasn't been already made though, it hasn't happened yet. You realize that's determinism, right? That's confusing...And if you have non-determinism, then there is no compatibility issue with free will.The difference to the compatibilist is that even if the universe does the initial deciding, since you go through the thoughts/feelings/experiences involved in making the "choice", then is still counts as your choice. I understand what you are saying, but I don't see how you can consider it non-determinism. Actually, more to the OP: an omniscient god.I think the more interesting question is not whether or not that can coexist with free will, but if it makes the god morally culpable for our actions.

Understood, so, is that not choices that are pre-determined (from the perspective of knowing it from the present)?That is, if you are looking at a choice of your's that you have already made in the future, then are you capable of choosing something different or not?If so, when do you experience the opportunity of making that choice?'Cause as far as a I can tell (and that's really the only thing that is important), I only get that opportunity in the present, where I'm capable of immediately and accurately deciding what actually happens.The past is forever locked in place, and the future is open to any of the possible opportunities.One of the things that makes me realize that decision making process happens when I'm playing the piano or guitar. Sometime I'll be deciding on where my fingers will go next, and it just doesn't happen that way. Something goes wrong with my fingers and they don't cooperate with what I told them to do.Don't get me wrong, I make lots of mistakes. But it's a strange experience when you don't fuck up in your mind, and instead your body just doesn't work like it should.I lost track of where I was going with that, sorry for rambling. Maybe I'll re-stumble upon the point I was trying to make.Anyways, I was talking about things being pre-determined, which stemmed from this: Which you've clarified further with this:

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1.61803 writes:

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Stile writes:

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I thought determinism was when the universe (not us) made the decisions?

How can our choice be separate from the universe or vice versa, if we are intrinsically a part of it.

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I was more referring to this understanding of determinism:

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Cat Sci writes:

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When I say determinism, I'm talking about being put in motion at the big bang and not just that something was determined by somebody.

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Message 410

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Sorry about the bad phraseologizing; I actually agree with Phi that even "something that was determined by somebody" can still be "about being put in motion at the big bang" when I am talking about determinism. I was trying to say that it was not just that.And that gets into the whole compatibilist vs. incompatibilist thing: they are both responses to determinism.You were taking a compatibilist position, but have since steared away from determinism. Now you are getting into a whole new realm of compatibilism, which is where it's not even deterministic in the first place.If it isn't deterministic, then there is no problem with Free Will. They could still be incompatible. Determinism kinda has an incompatibilist element to it that I think you are missing. Whether or not it is determinism doesn't really have a lot to do with whether or not it is you or the universe that is making the decision.It is more about whether the future is changeable or not.You keep acting like our decisions could be pre-determined, and that's determinism whether it is us or the universe making the determination beforehand. If it is before the present, then how are we who are stuck here the ones who are actually making it? Even if it is me in the future doing it, that isn't me from my perspective.Edited by Cat Sci, : missed [quote]'s

The issue is that if the future is knowable, then we are powerless to change it and therefore do not have free will. If you can change it, then it can't be knowable already. So can we change it or not? Well I didn't exist at the creation of the universe so I don't see how I could have made the choice then. Okay, so if someone that in only the loosest sense is "me" is making a decision, such that I cannot even recognize that I have made the decision, then is it right to have me be culpable for that decision?

Actually, it is. There's the me that made all the decisions at the beginning of the universe, of which I have no memory/knowledge/experience, and then there is the me in the present that is going through the experiencing of the decisions that I've already made. Well yeah, there's the new information that I receive in the form of experiencing the decisions. If I already had that info then I would already know what decisions I am going to make in the future... but I don't. I don't receive the info on what decisions I'm making until I experience them in the present. So let's say at the beginning of the universe, I decide to touch the flame of a candle on two separate occasions.God sees the future and notices that I touch a candle flame twice.Then I go through the experiencing of the first decision, and realize that it hurts to touch the flame of a candle and I don't want to do that anymore.Do I have the power, then, to change my decision and only touch the flame once?If so, then God didn't really "know" the future, he was wrong because it changed.If it cannot be changed, then how is the me that is going through the experience of making the decisions in any way in control of what decisions are going to be made in the future?

No, I'm not making the knowledge the cause. Our will can still be the cause, but if what we are going to will in the future is locked in and cannot be changed, then that will is not free.

Then, does the foreknowledge of those causes change with the will? And if so, doesn't that make the knowledge wrong at some points? Can we really call that "knowing" what is going to happen if it is subject to change? Does the foreknowledge evolve along with the whims of our will as we go through time fixing choices with our decisions?What does an ever changing foreknowledge really even know?