Define "Kind"

To be kind SubIE I think one might consider when discussing what a "kind" is in the history of creation and evolution that one also think of how the term "fact" might have changed or changed only legally. Bertrand Russell clearly connotes the use of 'facts' in a newer sense than that actually denoted when the claim is made that evolution is fact. I can read fairly effortlessly that Mayr uses the sense of "fact" in this way even if Simpson might not have been but the defintion after the facts found in genetics that spur on the mild form of kinds in creationism depends not on a mixing of the popular notion of a "fact" of evolution and some more refined philosophy after the kind of discussion that ensues since the 60s but instead actually requires that we be clear about the domain these "facts" syntactically remain behind in, whether legal or not.As a KIND is to be "after" the microevolved kinda like kind biology it is not a perfect form in this newer fact to criticise the slipperyness as this would disappear if the fact actually appeared. The same fact standard should apply to both philosophy as theology and theology as philosophy no matter the number that is within that fact.

To be kind SubIE, I think one might consider (when) discussing what a "kind" is, which is in the history of creation and evolution (that we do discuss on EVC) that one (should)also think of how the term "fact" might have changed or has only changed legally in the same duration.Bertrand Russell clearly connotes the use of 'facts' in a newer sense (citation available on request) than that actually denoted when the claim is made that evolution is fact.I take we all know how to search EVC for subdiscussions of this more original state of the organism of EVCs'fair fare affair.I can read fairly effortlessly that Mayr uses the sense of "fact" in this way, (see in particular his chapter on FINALITY in Towards a New Philosophy of Biology) even if Simpson might not have been (especially obvious to the reader of his classification of mammals) but the defintion after the facts found in genetics (you name the history of genome science however one likes, I dont care at this point in the thread) that spur on the mild form of kinds (in the history of creationism since the 60s to be more general once written for the duration) in creationism, depends not on a mixing of the popular notion of a "fact" of evolution (what we connote whenever we talk on evc uncritically) and some more refined philosophy (you name the the elite biology likewise propositionally as I dont also care at this place in the thread's development) after the kind of discussion that ensues since the 60s (I take it that the creation /evolution debates of the 70s are a given, at least rhetorically) but instead actually requires that we be clear about the domain these "facts" syntactically remain behind in, whether legal or not.That they remain "in a sentence" is unlikely.So from the above verbal tongue lashing I sort of wished to comment to Subbie that:as a KIND is to be "after" the microevolved(insert current EVC feedback), kinda like kind biology ,it is not a perfect form in this newer fact (see added paragraph below) to criticise the slipperyness as this would disappear if the fact actually appeared. The same fact standard should apply to both philosophy as theology and theology as philosophy no matter the number that is within that fact.I do not know if there really are two verbs or not. There really is a logical issue while moderns have used the word "principle" when they really mean future data such that phonograms and ideograms do not rely on the same histories. Given that I tend to write off the top rather crudely I am never offended by further calls for clarification or even if you chose to reword it for yourself. I think Chomsky is mistaken when refering to Russell and Wittgenstein together, about verbal occurances vs defintions of words. Deconstruction at least opened the ideogram to the breadth that biological diversity swims in, no matter the actual terrain ascended.

The idea of a kind as discussed in the creation literature DID provide me with a wider envisionable notion of FORM that I was not getting out of standard texts on evolution and interaction with actual herpetologists, that deprecated herpetology to a nonstandard division of biological thought or personalized it to particulars smaller than I had considered.I attempted to show some of the larger invariant "parameters" of this kind of dividable form in the thread

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This is a spin off from the Education forum:
Brad McFall states his ideas on a science education curricula based on the idea of baramins (created kinds):

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It can not be this as this is where I was at when you called for not tabling the point. I didnt know that Nosy an Me really do want the same thing. The work is in progress but is a bit too bslogical so if I could have the mammy razor please... Well something out of this raw short hand WILL be available to be taught onse I get my nose out of its way and work out the remaining techinical issues AND THEN FIGURE OUT the best language to introduce the teaching on an easier to comprehend basis but meanwhile it would be something like this-

Creation Biology: Towards a Unification of Baraminology and Mendelism
Google took off a paper by Dr.Kurt P.Wise from DOTankerbergDOTcom which contained a couple of sentences:
"Baraminology is a new field of science. It is the science of baramins- the study of created kinds. Baraminology will ultimately include the identifying, the classifying, and the naming of baramins. At this ponit it is concentrating on how to identify baramins.

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http://EvC Forum: Distinguishing Baramins -->EvC Forum: Distinguishing Baramins

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but since, I have reached a more critical cognition of the content involved in what seems to be causing failure to properly divide the case(again ,I know that I can respond to Percy if I wish).Identification can proceed provisionally while final determinability remains as slippery as water is wet.This message has been edited by Brad McFall, 03-02-2006 06:59 AM

Dear Faith,
What I think the "opponents" could acknowledge is that depending on whether humanity really thinks that Dawkins changed the way "we" think, IC might be true as cashing IN some difference of Bertrand Russell's use of logical and physical atomism. I tend to doubt that philosophical limits such exist for irreducibility but if such were delimited this could release the defintion of "kind" from the limbo it is presently in. There is also an empirical possibility as well, and it is the invocation of this, that probably ruffles more feathers than the bird itself has, namely, that IC might be limited opperationally to be falsified on an on-going basis where physical atoms REPLACE prior 'logical atoms' of the definitive form to have been or is being tested.This resolution for the public does not recall God but the private origin of it undoubtedly would have and did, if the evidence was out.This message has been edited by Brad McFall, 03-03-2006 07:21 AM

I will assert that at least part of the POPular difficulty with a phrase such as "kind with kind" has to do with the very close nature of the understanding on "logical saint" and "arbitrary organism" sited belowIn” Problems of Knowledge and Freedom” THE RUSSELL LECTURES, Noam Chomsky wrote, published in 1971,

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“A further residue of empiricist speculation appears in Russell’s analysis of proper names. He suggests, to begin with, that a “proper name is a word designating any continuous portion of space-time which sufficiently interests us,”16(Human Knowledge, p89) but then adds that spatiotemporal continuity is not required. Again, it is an empirical problem to determine what are the criteria for “nameability,” not by an arbitrary organism, or what Russell sometimes calls a “logical saint,” but by a biologically given human mind.

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In 1987 Boyd
(see for example-http://EvC Forum: Is science a religion? -->EvC Forum: Is science a religion?)
called my parents saying I was “becoming religious” on him but what was actually happening was that I was rejecting his thought that the difference between this logical saint and any given organism was a Kripke natural kind. Not only had Boyd gone beyond the facts of the organization of whatever this organism could have been in calling a biologically given human mind, mine, “idealistic”, he confused in his mind confusing my parents’ the similarities between some logical saint and a creature named by Adam. This was not hard because my parents do not carry as much skeptical baggage about Christ as I do and Boyd disbelieved, perhaps from the same reasoning as Russell.I was never ill in any sense but I can not change anyone’s elses mind about this but the changes in Creationism fully support this scheme as a current illegality needed to be corrected in the US Legal System.Cornell made a contract with me, they did not abide by their end of the deal(an attorney in Albany told me I have a case but who wants to try to win a lawsuit without a lot of $ to allege with), I had walked away but this did not stop a third party from attempting to rent my abode by turning my walk away into a sperm donation. Strange psychology indeed, and one I eventually fell prey to and very hard to inscribe even if the description is clear in ones’ own flesh if not blood. This was about what Chomsky called “arbitrary organism” and still it is not over for me. I don’t doubt that there are others to whom this is happening or has happened to.This message has been edited by Brad McFall, 03-03-2006 03:22 PM

Within a scheme (and Darwin had referred to this term in his earlier writings Mayr moves beyond) perhaps of Kant's intention, there are THOUGHTS of a not possible highest genus but a limit on the species of thought. The Bible kind would be contained in this thought as some kind of meaning, where there is no highest religious genus of the thought being a discrete genus extension (to family etc, who knows depends on the particulars) but THAT bound, is within the geographic details of a lowest species (or trinomial+- macromutation). Chomsky however in an analysis of this species specific homogeneity (this homogeneity of the structure of language as investigated by Chomsky might be a heterogeneity in the space-time monophlya of other organisms) failed to note well, that the scheme needs to be FULL, and he apparently took "invariants of language" of all languages in substitution, of a sum of a series in the sequence.So I would say if the religious unconditioned were removed, mentally, then the kind could be contained within a highest genus and lowest species. Exactly how high and how low depends on two things: the actual naming conventions of prior taxonomy and the place where the unconditioned can no longer be approximated in a limit. The key is to contain the relation of the lowest species to maximal separation in space and the highest genus of the kind below the approach to the unconditioned in time unless (and here it goes) the ostensive definitions so developed are overshadowed by the verbal occurrence of its first actual enunciation and thus subsequent memories of participants in that creative use of science and language. That is all.This message has been edited by Brad McFall, 03-04-2006 08:35 AM