Design Counterarguments

My personal favorite is an information argument against design. As you bring up in the "Restriction of the Conclusion", it can be shown in information theory that you cannot infer a context of interpretation without prior (assumed) knowledge of the appropriatness of that context. For example, in cryptography, the message is assumed to be from a human source, then interpretted within that context to outcome (natural language). SETI is based upon the assumption that an alien intelligence, somewhat like ours, would think like us and try to broadcast certain patterns (which carries less information than static, SETI actually looks for a lack of information to imply intelligence).I prefer this one because it castrates one of the most mistaken arguments for design, and shows that they actually have to assume a designer before they can prove it (begging the question), whereas biochemical interactions don't have to be assumed.

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When an anthropologist distinguishes the marks and shape of a rock to be intelligently designed (an arrowhead) verses naturally caused, how does he do that?

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It ain't easy, and he makes a probabilistic guess as to whether it originated with humans. Sites such as Calico are still being debated, there is no clear decision procedure, and not for lack of effort. Most of it is based upon consistency with evidence with previously known patterns of tool development and usage, living patterns, and remains. In other words, we know *something* about who designed the tools before hand, and we interpret the information in that context. ID doesn't have that (or they can claim in YHWH, Odin, or the Invisible Pink Unicorn, and it's all equally consistent). Of course, then they are relying on a hypothetical deity, not an evidentiary claim.

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There is no castration as the evidence for a creator is ubiquitous in other fields, namely cosmology. The kalam argument is sufficient to warrent belief in a creator. It may not be sufficient to prove such, however, science does not move on such proofs but on reasonable probabilities as it moves towards proof. The design inference is as reasonable and more so than the inference of design to an arrowhead.

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Hmmm... the assumption that the rock that looks like an arrowhead that was made by human cultures all over the word is pragmatically equivalent to the assumption that the universe was designed by a nebulous, ill-defined, non-evidentiary transcendental entity? At least in the first case, we have evidence that all of the entities exist. The khalam is not proof of god's existence, at the *very* most, it's proof of a first cause. Event that is doubtful, as causality is not as straight-forward as the khalam requires. There's plenty of evidence from QM that strict causality is not a reality.

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Originally posted by Lew Alton:
Arrowheads are easy to distinguish and are almost never mistaken for geofacts. The trick, as I can attest from actually attempting to do it, is to distinguish stream-shaped rocks from human shaped.

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Complete arrowheads, yes. Partials are increasingly difficult to ID. In addition, you have scrapers, spear heads, and various other lithic artifacts that aren't nearly as blatant as a piece of highly chipped quartz. It's a nitpick, but the devil's in the details.

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Originally posted by thrombosis:
You overstate your case. There is plenty of evidence from QM that physical laws may not work and apply the same way as they do in non-quantom fashion, however you are welcome to provide the type of evidence that proves that causality is not a reality.

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Alpha decay. There's a 50% chance over an atom's halflife that it will decay. There's no observable reason for the decay's lifespan for it to decay at a particular moment. It cannot be predicted, and is often used as a source of random numbers for high security cryptographic systems, precisely because of this fact. Given a kilogram of the same material, half of it will decay in one half-life, but if no decay at all occurs, there's no physical law being broken.Now, you can argue that just because it doesn't have a known cause that an unknown cause is excluded. However, I can argue that just because two things appear to be caused does not imply causal connection. Either way, we'd both be making unprovable assertions, as it deals with things that we have no knowledge of. This puts us back on metaphysical ground. Bear in mind that we must distinguish between a teleological cause and physical cause as well. The khalam *might* show the need for a physical cause, but not a teleological one.

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Originally posted by thrombosis:
1. When only unprovable assumptions are possible, then one leans on what is known. Your argument from QM is still an argument from ignorance (not yours, but all of science). With hope in a few years you will either have a great argument or further evidence of a transcendent creator.

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So would you care to show what is known in this situation? Is causality known, or is it a presupposition? Philosopher's have been trying for years to identify a rational basis, could you enlighten us with your proof?I must take exception with your accusation of arguing from ignorance. I am pointing out holes in your argument, not presenting one of my own. I'm not presenting reasons as to why ID is invalid, I'm presenting arguments as to why arguments for it's validity fail. You are in fact appealing to ignorance by saying that because we don't know that something isn't true, we must consider it to be true.When discussing an unprovable statement, we can only deal with what is known. We *know* that quantum looks acausal with respect to everything else that is observable. To speculate otherwise requires us to talk about something that we do not have knowledge of. For all knowledge we have, quantum is acausal.My point about QM stands.

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2. Even a quantom world exists in a material realm. If it were true that the quantom world did not operate in a causal fashion-something you don't at all know to be true-it would still be operating in the material realm. The Kalam in union with relativity and Hawking/Penrose argues convincingly for all of the material world including time coming into existence from nothing.

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So? What's your point?It's not as clear cut as this either, Penrose was a mathematician, not a physicist, and Hawking, while amazing, isn't the final authority on the beginning of the universe. Even if there was a big bang, that doesn't mean the universe "came to be", as "coming to be" requires the presence of time before time started, which we do not have knowledge of.I see a stack of rocks in the woods. The stack obviously "came to be" at some point. Does this tell me anything about who/what created it? Not without prior knowledge.

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3. The teleological cause is convincing argued from the anthropic fine tuning necessary to have life at all anywhere in the universe.

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It may be convincing, but it is certainly not sound. In the spirit of not talking about what is not known, could you please show us why you think fine tuning is necessary? You make this assertion without supporting it, and I'd like to see the numbers and/or logic behind it.

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Originally posted by thrombosis:
I typed a reply three times to Nialscorva and each time closed my browser by accident and lost the post.

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God trying to tell you something? Just kidding. I look forward to your response, don't rush on my account.

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Originally posted by thrombosis:
Causality is well understood by natural law. There is no known exception to causality. Without causality there would be no rational world in which we could exist and discuss things in an Aristotalian logic.

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I just pointed out an exception to causality, that of alpha decay. The fact that this breaks Aristotalian logic is not disproof, reality takes precedent over *any* logical system, or any desire for a particular form of rationality. You are arguing the equivalent of a geocentric universe, and rejecting presented evidence purely because it doesn't fit your notion of the world. Of course, you can just redefine causality, such as...

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Alpha decay is an example of purely random occurances. However, it does decay. This is causality. We know that it will decay. If there is a probalistic factor that is reliable, then causality is active.

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Pure randomness is does not follow a causal pattern. Causality can only exist if A implies B, for all possible instances of conditions A. I let go of the rock, and it falls. This is causality. Alpha decay does not do this. It *might* decay at any given point, or it may not. All we can say is that it's more likely to happen within a certain time period than any other. There is no known cause, which brings me to...

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1. Strong nuclear force constant:
2. Weak nuclear force constant:
3. Gravitational force constant:
4. Ratio of electron to proton mass
5. Ratio of number of protons to number of electrons
6. Mass density of the universe
7. Supernove eruptions

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You might have just said anthropic principle. For one who admonished me so early in the debate about "speak not of that which cannot be spoken of", you do an awful lot of it. You mention that if these conditions were any different, then the universe wouldn't support life as we know it. Do you *know* that the conditions could be any different? Do you *know* that all other conditions could not result in life? Do you *know* the possibility distribution among the different configurations?The original question I posed to you was "In the spirit of not talking about what is not known, could you please show us why you think fine tuning is necessary? You make this assertion without supporting it, and I'd like to see the numbers and/or logic behind it.". I see no numbers, evidence. I see a lot of "if" statements. "If" the universe were different this way. "If" the universe were different that way. "If" pigs could fly. You are making implicit claims that the current universe is highly improbable, and you don't have the knowledge to make that judgement.Continuing in the vein of unsupported statements:

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Even if there was a big bang, that doesn't mean the universe "came to be", as "coming to be" requires the presence of time before time started, which we do not have knowledge of.
This of cource is the strength of the Kalam argument. It is a compelling and reasonable argument.

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You do not address the point. I am questioning causality as needed by the Kalam, and I reject that "come to be" has *any* meaning outside of time. You have not addressed this objection except to repeat the mantra of "Kalam is Kool and Kompelling". Color me unimpressed.Let me ask you a question, in the spirit of Kalam. If life looks designed, and you identify the designer as YHWH, then I would say that YHWH looks equally designed. He's highly complex, and is definately something that just couldn't happen. After all, what if he were slightly different? What if he liked banging together stars more than creating carbon based life? Seems highly improbable that any diety would create us specifically. It also seems that something like god would have to "come to be"? Who is god's designer? If he doesn't need one, then why does the universe need one? Other than your assertion that it "came to be", of course.Finally, to the marginal addressing of Intelligent Design, which is what this thread is about, according to the title:

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I see a stack of rocks in the woods. The stack obviously "came to be" at some point. Does this tell me anything about who/what created it? Not without prior knowledge.

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A stack of rocks by themselves have no inference to design. Prior knowledge is not as critical as you demand. The reason for this is that there is a limit to natural causation. Intelligent causes can produce effects that unintelligent causes cannot. For example, if we were to find a structure like an Egyptian pyramid on Uranus, we would have no clue as to who put it there, however, there would be no question that it was produced by intelligence.

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So, if we find something that looks like something built by a known designer (us), it implies that there is a designer. Note that even *if* I grant you that, it doesn't tell us anything about "who" designed it. Just out of curiosity, have you heard of fairystones? These little stones certainly look designed, don't they? There's a couple areas where you can find them just sitting on the ground. There's one such park in southwestern Virginia, near where I grew up. The local legend was that it was an area where fairies lived long ago, and when they heard the news of Jesus's cruxifiction, they cried tears that turned into these crosses.Unfortunately, they're only staurolite, and are completely natural. But without knowing that, it'd certainly pass Dembski's explanatory filter. It's only due to ignorance that it can be claimed designed.You say:

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Prior knowledge is not as critical as you demand. The reason for this is that there is a limit to natural causation.

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But yet, all cases that you give for design, we have prior knowledge. I must ask, how do you define causality in such a way that the "natural limits" allow for a transcendental creator, but yet prevent the actions set in motion by that creator from producing complicated results?Define causality such that both Khalam and ID are possible.

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Originally posted by Percipient:
For the sake of those of us trying to follow along, could someone state in simple language what the opposing positions are? Thanks!

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I'm arguing that inferences about design cannot be made without prior and distinct knowledge of the designer. Thrombosis is arguing that it can based upon prior knowledge of a designer is suggested by the Khalam Cosmological Argument and the Anthropic Principle, and that design can be infered simply through comparing it to objects that we know are designed or not-designed. My counter is that neither are sufficient to obtain the needed information, as both are design arguments in themself, and thus beg the question. In addition, both rely on well ordered causality, which is not a fact in evidence.The argument between Zarathustra and Thrombosis is a bit more abstract. Zar seems to be arguing that under deontological systems of morality (ie. theism), that the decision procedure for design v non-design revolves around a moral choice rather than an epistemelogical one. It is the moral duty of the person to connect empirical data to the assumed deity, with the framework of anything that connects the two in the desired way being "good", and anything that doesn't being "evil". This is in conflict with a customary notion of good and evil, with the resulting design being evil and good simultaneously. It's the deontologist's dilemma, he must act in accordance with his moral code reqardless of the consequences, but yet must explain why the moral good produces evil. He must also explain why the higher good that he appeals to allows evil. It's a much more general case argument of "if there's a designer, then why did he do such a piss-poor job?". Thrombosis hasn't replied substantiatively to it, because Zar is still laying the groundwork.

wow, this thread just shot up in post count.

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Originally posted by Jairo:
When the event is not necessary to the existence of the observer, one would perceive it in its true frequency. So if it happens too frequently, one can say it was designed. (ex.: arrowhead complexity)

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The only problem is that this is an ad hoc system. We can easily use this criteria to say that object X is designed, and object Y is not. The problem is that we don't *know* that they were or were not, except by virtue of our own criteria.In the example of arrowheads, we know that there are/were arrowheads being created by people. The problem is that ID wants to do this with objects that we don't know as being created. It's an entirely different question, the search for artifacts asks "Is this object consistent with the arrowheads created by humans?". SETI asks "Is this signal consistent with an intelligence like ours trying to send a message?". ID is asking "Is this object/pattern consistent with something that is created by an unknown thing?". We don't know the "thing", so we don't know if the pattern is consistent.

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sorry for the english (im not from Bagdah)

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No worries, it looked just fine to me.

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Originally posted by Jairo:
The analysis I mentioned does not need any pre-defined criteria. You can apply it in anything from rock formations to physical constants and get a good idea if there are any reasons to one claim ID.

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The analysis itself is a set of criteria for producing "design" or "not design" as an answer. Yes, you *can* apply it to anything, but the question is whether you *should* apply it. I can say that anything that's brown is designed, but that doesn't make it true. Using it's frequency/probability or necessity as criteria isn't any more accurate, unless you can justify it.

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It does not disprove a creator, it just forbids one from using the design argument to prove it.

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I misunderstood you earlier, I thought you were arguing that design could be inferred by necessity and frequency. However, I don't think that we can prove that something was *not* designed either, as it is just the negation of the design argument.

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Originally posted by Jairo:
And the analysis doesn't answers "designed" or "not designed". It just answers if an complex event implies a designer or not.

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It's slightly different.

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I'm not sure I see this. We have an attribute we wish to identify (design) presence or absence of. We need a way to do so, which is the criteria. What I'm saying is that "design" does not exist as an attribute in isolation, it's always conditioned, such as "design by primitive americans", "design by humans", or "design by god". The question of "is it designed?" requires us to ask "designed by what?" of "define design" before it can be meaningfully answered. A peice of the puzzle is missing in ID, and they assume the consequent for this critical question.

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Originally posted by Jairo:
I think the opposite. The first natural step is to check if the event implies ID. Then, we choose an explanation based on the best we know at the moment.

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What would something designed, but not by a human, look like?

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Originally posted by Jairo:
Anything that happens more frequently than expected. (I think this is the creationist definition.)

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Do you comply with it?
If not, why?

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And I remember there is a situation when the "designed by what" question matters. It's when the event seems random. When you know what you are looking for, apparently usual events can provide complex information.

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But we are analyzing complex-looking events. (No desing argument uses random-looking ones.)

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Define random, complex, and information. It's not as easy as it sounds. According to the mathematical definitions, designed things have a tendency torwards redundancy (less complex), and random is indistinguishable from complex without prior knowledge of how to decode the message in question.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jairo:
[B]Hey! I didn't use any of these words in the past definition. [/QUOTE]No, but you needed to.

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But now you asked, I'm confused. My definitions comes from dictionaries, (non-English dictionaries!)

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That's because you'll only find every-day definitions in those dictionaries, and those definitions are insufficient for technical discussions. Words like information and existence have such vague definitions that they are practically meaningless when you get into the details.

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It's ok some designed things won't be detected by us without prior knowledge. But some of them will just fall in that category.(Happening more than expected).

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Such as?

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I think it's a good indicator of design in some cases. Creationists want it to be an indicator all the times. And you?

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I think it's a good indicator when we're talking about things that we commonly run across. I can use it while walking down the street, or in the woods. I don't think it applies in the hard sciences (biology, chemistry, physics), math, or philosophy. It's good enough for me to choose a place to buy lunch, but I wouldn't use it to determine the correct button on an alien doomsday device, or to solve a path integral for an electron interaction.