This thought came upon me when examining theistic claims. For instance we cannot *prove* that the Flying Spaghetti Monster does not exist somewhere because we lack complete knowledge of everything. However, I find it unsatisfying to say that we conclude that the FSM is nonexistent in a practical sense because the same could be said for other things that do not particularly influence our daily lives. For instance, I don’t see anything in my daily life that hinges on my belief or disbelief of a hydrogen atom. I could very well choose to disbelieve its existence for practicality and get by fairly well.
Does this mean that we cannot deny the existence of the FSM? Well, no. In fact I support the 100% decision that it does not exist. My response to the argument that we possess subjectively sufficient information but not objectively complete information and should therefore only conclude that it probably does not exist is thus: To modify our conclusion in such a manner is necessitated by the assumption that we cannot be incorrect, an assumption that I find arrogant and more importantly highly inaccurate.
We can, and for proper conclusions should, make absolute statements about things in the appropriate circumstances. For instance, energy can neither be created nor destroyed. We don’t say probably because the concept that we could be in error is already part of the scientific system in which the statement is set. I argue that all human discussion, even in philosophy, should and for the most part does contain this understanding. Because of this I suggest the argument against absolute statements about gods is invalid because it attempts to damage an argument through selectively restating ground rules.
Now to the question: Do you think that there are situations in which this ground rule should not apply, making its inclusion in the statement necessary? Is the possibility of error justification for any belief?
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