Creationists have a more difficult job because they deal with “subjective” terms much more often and under Revelation.
“As to evolution, its entities, species and ecologic systems, are much less closely knit than individual organisms. One may conceive of the process as involving freedom, mostly traceable in the factor called here individual adaptability. This, however, is a subjective interpretation and can have no place in the objective scientific analysis of the problem.”
Sewell Wright “Evolution in Mendelian Populations” Genetics 16 1931PDF
FACTORS OF GENETIC HOMOGENITY- FACTORS OF GENETIC HETEROGENEITY
Gene Duplication- Gene Mutation (u,v)
Gene Aggregation- Random division of aggregate
Mitosis- Chromosome aberration
Conjunction- Reduction (meiosis)
Linkage- Crossing over
Restriction of Population size (1/2N)- Hybridization (m)
Environmental pressure (s)- Individual adaptability
Crossbreeding among subgroups (m1)- Subdivision of group (1/2N1)
Individual adaptability - Local environments of subgroups (s1)
Page 143
As you can see “individual adaptability is both a factor of homogeneity and heterogeneity. When Will Provine asserts there is no free will he is denying this property of freedom tabled by Wright. I take it to be a subjective condition of creationists and one that can not be obviated sufficiently unless one argues the entire table. So while Wright found philosophical space here in last few rows Phil Johnson who wants to *know* the origin of genetic information probably is having issues more with some of the earlier rows.
But according to Wright “objective and subjective terms can not be used in the same description without danger of something like 100 percent duplication”
It is the “objective terms” that form the hearty organized structure of any specialty of science and it would be the contention of yours (contra Percy’s etc)that creationists can and do create these but use “different language” but regardless it would be hard to say that Wright’s paper (intersecting with the view of Fisher and Haldane) does not format whatever Kuhn and Popper could have in common as “problem-situation”. It is the contention of some biologists (Mayr stoping, Gould going beyond) that bean bag genetics did not really do anything to change the situation in evolution thinking despite its setting of problems etc.
Now FROM within Wright’s structure (which did show (in individual adpatibility)) some subjective feeling for what other wise was ”mystical’ in emergent or creative “evolution” (See the work of Chris Dowd
Home | Thank God For Evolutionfor instance) is qualified through the following
quote:
The present discussion has dealt with the problem of evolution as one depending wholly on mechanism and chance. In recent years, there has been some tendency to revert to more or less mystical conceptions revolving about such phrases as “emergent evolution” and “creative evolution.” The writer must confess to a certain sympathy with such viewpoint philosophically but feels that they can have no place in an attempt at scientific analysis of the problem. One may recognize that the only reality directly experienced is that of mind, including choice, that mechanism is merely a term for regular behavior, and that there can be no ultimate explanation in terms of mechanism - merely analytic description. Such a description, however, is the essential task of science and because of these very considerations .
page 154
and
quote:
“Whatever incompleteness is involved in scientific analysis applies to the simplest problems in mechanics as well as to evolution.”
page 154
The only place within this specific problem situation is one where the regular behavior of mechanics intersects with the trajectories of common descent. This however IS narrower than what is available subjectively in creationism (hence your rejction for "irrelevance"etc)but because of the dispute among rational thoughts and reason vs Biblical use, whatever potential choice that IS here, is still not inverted as the faculties of Kant. THIS IS NOT REASON TO REJECT creationism as using “bad language” nor that they can not "apphrenend" current 'normal science', but only that range of duplication (aka Wright) is rationally broader for creationists than “normal” scientists. The logic for this is what is in some kind of dipute. It is failure to specify just what this duplication consists in, intellectually, that is the current bane of creationism. Irreducible complexity
a priori is one way to avoid the duplication altogether. For that reason it does not feel adaptable to me, individually (between orthogenesis and perfection in Wright elsewhere in the paper(also severly criticized by Gould and Provine) but not by me etc.)
The question about “life and death” that Kant asks forces one to start to make answers within Wright’s table but outside of Gould and Provine's history. And I have my own ideas about where the mechanical analysis ends , thus I DO FIND A PLACEMENT you seemed to deny (in the synthesis), such that there is no incompleteness in my own analysis (from within Wright’s) but that would take me out of the topic of this thread and into all of the difficulties posters encounter with my unique posts on EvC.
So I DO not see the difference of Biblical and reason creationists to be irrelevant. The only thing is that if Percy is right as toif one has to restrict the “subjective” terms to being ”not science’ as the Kant discussion requires, one IS to reflect fully on the these terms, which is something that Provine and Gould for instance WILL NEVER DO (and Will justifies it from the same text I deny it etc), but THESE THOUGHTS (not terms) underlay the differences within creationism as it attempts to sort the subjective differences into whatever paradigm(sic!) the whole movement can be identified to sustain and narrow, if we can retain your labeling. ID however caused a broadening not a narrowing.
So if creationism is a paradigm the question is, does not the analytic description of problem-situation in ”normal science’ have to have, the same ordinality as ”creation science’? Can scientific creationism and science so-called actually have two interpreations from the same analytic. Are these different descriptions or is it only that the choice width is of a different sweep, passing over more subjective ground for creationists than evolutionists? Can the temporality of this disjuntability be culled or sorted??
I don’t know. If the lingo of creationism is just different than science and in the last operation refers to subjective qualities no matter what was intended, then this seems to be something different than what was in dispute under the term of “paradigm” because the problem-situtations do not have this degree of uncertainty. Instead the “revolution” does.
Edited by Brad McFall, : table
Edited by Brad McFall, : - and readability
Edited by Brad McFall, : link