Re: A Constructive Approach to "Knowing" ... so let's work together
Hi Straggles,
I do indeed. And with that spirit of friendship and helpfulness in mind I have suggested an additional component to your analysis.
It is based on the principle of contradiction and is detailed in my post above subtitled 'Probables And The Corresponding Improbables'.
Excellent.
Message 144 Probables And The Corresponding Improbables
I can agree to the above with one proviso. The proviso is this - Where we have a known truth or high confidence concept where "conclusions regarding probable reality can be made" we are also able to make equally conclusive conclusions regarding mutually exclusive alternatives. ...
If we scientifically know that the Earth is billions of years old and consider this a high confidence conclusion regarding probable reality then conversely we know that it is very improbable that in reality the Earth is just a few days, weeks or years old.
I'll provide a more complete reply to Message 144 later (I have a full day, couple of days booked), but I see no major issue here. The minor quibble I have is the language: I don't feel the terminology of "mutually exclusive alternatives" is accurate -- it implies a dichotomy that isn't necessarily applicable or necessary to imply. I would say
This table shows how we can have different levels of positive confidence in concepts. We are also able to have equally negative confidence regarding inverse or alternative concepts that are contradicted by the same information and evidence.
That could be a footnote to the table and apply to each of the levels of confidence, yes?
This would also be in keeping with this table
The inverse of a concept should logically have inverse likelihoods or possibilities.
Re: A Constructive Approach to "Knowing" - Examples NOT Abstractions
Well whenever you do get round to replying more fully it would be appreciated if you avoided long winded abstractions and repetitions of your impressively formatted but relentlessly changing charts and scales.
Instead pick an actual concrete example (e.g. the age of the Earth) and simply state:
What the conclusion regarding the actual age of the Earth is.
To what extent this conclusion can be taken as high confidence conclusion regarding probable reality.
To what extent this positive conclusion regarding reality necessitates the rejection of untestable mutually exclusive alternative conclusions about reality.
RAZD writes:
I don't feel the terminology of "mutually exclusive alternatives" is accurate -- it implies a dichotomy that isn't necessarily applicable or necessary to imply.
If you are going to conclude that the age of the Earth is billions of years old and that this is a high confidence conclusion regarding probable reality you cannot correspondingly conclude that Last Thursdayism - or any other recent omphalisms - are anything other than a description of reality that is improbable. At least not without some baseless assumptions and semantic games.
But we both know you won't engage in such things. Right RAZ?
RAZD writes:
The inverse of a concept should logically have inverse likelihoods or possibilities.
Then make sure you actually address that explicitly through example rather than by chart, table or abstraction.
Oh and one other thing - Your lack of response to Message 150 has me seriously worried about your honesty/sanity here.
Please don't even bother to continue anything here with me unless you are prepared to actually confirm that it is NOT pseudoskeptical to take the following position with regard to the non-existence of Lord Voldermort:
RAZD's scale writes:
6. Strong skepticism - {X} is considered more likely not true than true, with little uncertainty(a)
I really just could not take anyone seriously who professes to be anything other than strongly skeptical of the actual existence of Voldermort.
My keyboard just isn't up to the mirth based spillages it will be subjected to.....
Just perusing the rest of your little construction.
RAZD writes:
Is there some aspect of this that prevents you from agreeing with it?
Yes - There very much is.
RAZD writes:
All your little scenarios and concepts of "untestable this" and "untestable that" pertaining to imaginary possibilities of evidence being false are ALL in the area outside the blue circle. Once you or I and any scientist assumes that the evidence represents reality, we are in the same boat. We assume that the evidence does not lie.
Re: Is the Scientific Aproach The Same As The "Open Minded Skeptic" Approach?
I forgot that Zen Deist's Pseudoskeptic is one who holds a 6.0d or more and does NOT provide evidence supporting that position.
I have just tried dropping pen & every time it fell to the top of the desk. I have even seen other people try this. You can repeat this experiment and collect your own data.
Therefore, bolstered by this evidence, the odds on it doing something unexpected can allow me to take a 6+ level that it would do something unexpected without being a pseudoskeptic, since, apparently everyone has agreed that being a pseudoskeptic is a bad thing...it just sounds bad.
Re: Is the Scientific Approach The Same As The "Open Minded Skeptic" Approach?
This is what RAZ had to say when faced with the same question:
RAZD writes:
Straggler writes:
Where do you place yourself on your own scale of belief above with regard to the untestable notion that all of the evidence on which our scientific conclusions are based is the result of false memories implanted when the universe was created 1 second ago?
I place myself as a 5, as you would understand if you actually read my positions. Obviously we cannot know for sure, we cannot test, but we can have opinions, and my personal opinion is that it is false.
How can the scientifically evidenced conclusion that the Earth is billions of years old be indicative of "probable reality" (to use RAZ's own words as applied to highly evidenced scientific conclusions) without rejecting the notion that the universe was created 1 second ago as "improbable"?
And yet anything more than an opinion is, according to RAZ's self defined brand of "open minded skepticism" - pseudoskeptical.
It very much seems that the RAZDian "open minded skeptic" approach and the scientific approach are not compatible.
Re: Is the Scientific Approach The Same As The "Open Minded Skeptic" Approach?
Straggler seems to think that his question me:
Xongsmith — Pick up a pen. Now hold your arm out. In a moment I am going to ask you to let go of this pen to see what it does. But before you let go of the pen just stop for one moment and ponder. Ask yourself just how confident you are that the motion of the pen will be consistent with the objectively evidenced laws of physics. Ask yourself how unlikely it is that the pen will do something like loop the loop and poke your eye out or hover for a second before shooting out of the window. Ask yourself how unlikely you think it is that the pen will do anything other than obey the laws of physics as currently understood. Ask yourself how unlikely you really consider the proposition that the universe was created a few seconds ago with subtly different physical laws (particularly with regard to dropped pens) than the ones we falsely remember. Now honestly and truthfully consider whether or not very improbable is a fair expression of your conclusion.
Now drop the pen.
Honestly - What did it do? Honestly — Was very improbable a fair assessment of your conclusion before dropping that pen?
Was your conclusion scientific? Was your conclusion pseudoskeptical? Was your conclusion consistent with a 6 on our old friend the Dawkins scale?
and
Where do you place yourself on your own scale of belief above with regard to the untestable notion that all of the evidence on which our scientific conclusions are based is the result of false memories implanted when the universe was created 1 second ago?
...are the same questions???? You start your post with
This is what RAZ had to say when faced with the same question:
Straggler continues:
How can the scientifically evidenced conclusion that the Earth is billions of years old be indicative of "probable reality" (to use RAZ's own words as applied to highly evidenced scientific conclusions) without rejecting the notion that the universe was created 1 second ago as "improbable"?
I don't have any idea why Zen Deist would say that, if he did.
Re: Is the Scientific Aproach The Same As The "Open Minded Skeptic" Approach?
quote:
Therefore, bolstered by this evidence, the odds on it doing something unexpected can allow me to take a 6+ level that it would do something unexpected without being a pseudoskeptic, since, apparently everyone has agreed that being a pseudoskeptic is a bad thing...it just sounds bad.
But the argument is logically invalid and therefore according to Zen Deist it is no more than "confirmation bias" and an "appeal to popularity". Thus, I guess you must be a "pseudoskeptic" after all.
(Apparently an "open minded skeptic" must close his mind to the possibility that some arguments, although logically fallacious might nonetheless be rational).
Re: Is the Scientific Approach The Same As The "Open Minded Skeptic" Approach?
Having established your credentials as a RAZ classified "pseudoskeptic" (welcome to the club) could you state your position on the untestable Dumbledore mind manipulation proposition? Will you unequivocally agree that (at least) a 6 position is rationally justified despite this proposition being untestable?
RAZD's scale writes:
6. Strong skepticism - {X} is considered more likely not true than true, with little uncertainty(a)
If in a thread supposedly about scientific knowledge we cannot all agree that Lord Voldermort is all-but-certainly made-up then it is time to call the men in white coats to take someone away.
If we can all agree that this proposition can be rationally and robustly rejected regardless of being untestable maybe we can finally put to bed this insidious notion that testing such untestable propositions has any bearing on the validity of scientific theories.
I would say that we accept our successful theories (i.e. the ones that make accurate and reliable predictions) as being accurate (but probably imperfect) descriptions and models of physical reality. Better approximations to reality than those theories or explanations which don't "work".
Yes, a lot of people would say that. We have the colloquial phrase "its been scientifically proven" that means that since there's a scientific explanation that works, then that's correct explanation. But that's not something that comes from the science, itself.
Well why do they "work" more successfully than the alternatives unless they are more accurate descriptions of reality than the alternatives? More "correct" than the alternatives, if you will.
There's multiple reasons. Part of it is how the theory is set-up (rigorous and parsimonious), how simple the falsification test would be, and what you're testing it on. For example, Newtonian Physics works great sometimes, but that doesn't mean it it is more correct than quantum mechanics. But its easier to measure the position of a falling ball, and see that the numbers fit within the simple newtonian equations, than it is to test quantum mechanics. So we'd expect some people to think that newtonian mechanics are more correct, and also to think that quantum mechanics has more problems. And we do see that from the less scientifically inclined people because they think "working" = "correct" and its a lot easier to see newtonian mechanics "work".
Science assumes that objective evidence represents reality, and thus it is within the blue area.
Everything outside the blue area is the reason that science must be tentative, no matter how strong the confidence we can have in a theory, because it is possible that objective evidence lies and does not represent reality.
All your little scenarios and concepts of "untestable this" and "untestable that" pertaining to imaginary possibilities of evidence being false are ALL in the area outside the blue circle.
Once you or I and any scientist assumes that the evidence represents reality, we are in the same boat. We assume that the evidence does not lie.
Being tentative about any one (after one after one etc ad naseum) of thousands of such concepts, is conceptually no different than science being tentative about ALL of them.
When we come to the confidence we can have in this basic foundational assumption of science, it is the confidence that comes from the massive mountain ranges of tested data that all appear to work together to produce a cohesive, consilient and comprehensive picture\map\description that is massively cross-connected and interlocked.
If the evidence is a lie, then it is an extremely, extraordinarily, well constructed lie, but none the less ... this is always a possibility.
Do you agree? yes or no
Is there some aspect of this that prevents you from agreeing with it? yes or no
More to come.
Enjoy
Note that I will come back to this part in my more detailed response to Message 144:
When we come to the confidence we can have in this basic foundational assumption of science, it is the confidence that comes from the massive mountain ranges of tested data that all appear to work together to produce a cohesive, consilient and comprehensive picture\map\description that is massively cross-connected and interlocked.
If the evidence is a lie, then it is an extremely, extraordinarily, well constructed lie, but none the less ... this is always a possibility.
That Newtonian mechanics is easier to apply than QM or GR is not in doubt. But since when did ease of use have anything to do with how correct or incorrect a theory is? The fact that Newtonian mechanics does not give accurate or reliable results in certain circumstances leads us to conclude that it is not an entirely accurate representation of reality. That other theories give more accurate and more reliable (albeit more difficult to derive) results leads us to conclude that they are superior representations of reality.
When (for example) evolutionary theory says that humans and chimps share a common ancestor is this a statement about "what works" or are we actually saying (albeit tentatively) that this actually physically occurred? Does this explanation "work" better than (for example) the biblical literalist account because it is more correct? I don’t see how you can separate what works from some notion of what is correct in the sense or being an accurate representation of reality.
CS writes:
Yes, a lot of people would say that. We have the colloquial phrase "its been scientifically proven" that means that since there's a scientific explanation that works, then that's correct explanation. But that's not something that comes from the science, itself.
If our scientific knowledge isn’t knowledge of reality what is it knowledge of?
If our scientific theories are not theories about reality itself why do some theories yield more accurate and reliable predictions regarding the behaviour of reality than others?
CS writes:
So we'd expect some people to think that newtonian mechanics are more correct, and also to think that quantum mechanics has more problems. And we do see that from the less scientifically inclined people because they think "working" = "correct" and its a lot easier to see newtonian mechanics "work".
But I am not asking less scientifically inclined people. I am asking you.
As per Message 153 I am not even going to bother talking to someone about the nature of science unless they are able to confirm that an atheistic stance towards the untestable Dumbledore mind manipulation proposition is rationally justified.
Will you unequivocally agree that (at least) a 6 position is rationally justified despite this proposition being untestable?
RAZD's scale writes:
6. Strong skepticism - {X} is considered more likely not true than true, with little uncertainty(a)
If in a thread supposedly about scientific knowledge we cannot all agree that Lord Voldermort is all-but-certainly made-up then it is time to call the men in white coats to take someone away.
If we can all agree that this proposition can be rationally and robustly rejected regardless of being untestable maybe we can finally put to bed this insidious notion that testing untestable propositions has any bearing on the validity of scientific theories or rational conclusions.
That Newtonian mechanics is easier to apply than QM or GR is not in doubt. But since when did ease of use have anything to do with how correct or incorrect a theory is?
Ease of use, and being easily seen to work, is what suggests to people a sense of correctness. A sense of correctness doesn't come from the science, itself.
When (for example) evolutionary theory says that humans and chimps share a common ancestor is this a statement about "what works" or are we actually saying (albeit tentatively) that this actually physically occurred?
The Theory of Evolution (RM+NS), itself, doesn't say that humans and chimps share a common ancestor. That is something we can deduce from assuming the theory is correct, and yes, that is a statement of actually occurrance. When we're testing the theory, we're finding that RM+NS works as an explanation. As long as it keeps working, we'll continue to use it. If we find that it doesn't work somewhere, then we'll add to or modify it. Injecting a sense of correctness is unneccessary.
I don’t see how you can separate what works from some notion of what is correct in the sense or being an accurate representation of reality.
Sometimes Newtonian Mechanics work better, but that doesn't mean they're more correct.
If our scientific knowledge isn’t knowledge of reality what is it knowledge of?
I'm not saying it is knoweldge of something else.
If our scientific theories are not theories about reality itself why do some theories yield more accurate and reliable predictions regarding the behaviour of reality than others?
quote:There's multiple reasons. Part of it is how the theory is set-up (rigorous and parsimonious), how simple the falsification test would be, and what you're testing it on. For example, Newtonian Physics works great sometimes, but that doesn't mean it it is more correct than quantum mechanics. But its easier to measure the position of a falling ball, and see that the numbers fit within the simple newtonian equations, than it is to test quantum mechanics.
If we're measure the position of a falling ball, its easier to get Newtonian Mechanics to work and "yield more accurate and reliable predictions". But we wouldn't say that it is more "correct" or more "about reality". Saying that is just unneccessary.
You can say that if you want to, but its not something comming from the science, itself.
But I am not asking less scientifically inclined people. I am asking you.
The point was that a lot of people inject a sense of correctness into scientific explanations that work and that that isn't something that comes fromt he science, itself.
If our scientific knowledge isn’t knowledge of reality what is it knowledge of?
CS writes:
I'm not saying it is knowledge of something else.
If our scientific knowledge is knowledge of reality how can our scientific theories not be attempts to accurately describe reality?
CS writes:
The Theory of Evolution (RM+NS), itself, doesn't say that humans and chimps share a common ancestor. That is something we can deduce from assuming the theory is correct, and yes, that is a statement of actually occurrance. When we're testing the theory, we're finding that RM+NS works as an explanation. As long as it keeps working, we'll continue to use it. If we find that it doesn't work somewhere, then we'll add to or modify it. Injecting a sense of correctness is unneccessary.
Huh? Is the theory of evolution a more accurate description of reality than the Genesis account or not?
CS writes:
If we're measure the position of a falling ball, its easier to get Newtonian Mechanics to work and "yield more accurate and reliable predictions".
You won't ever get more accurate or reliable results regarding a falling ball using Newtonian mechanics than General Relativity. You will get significantly easier calculations. But that has nothing to do with anything here.
Why does General Relativity yield more accurate and reliable predictions than Newtonian mechanics if GR is not a more accurate (i.e. more correct) description of reality?
Why does a heliocentric model of the Solar system yield more accurate and reliable predictions than the Ptolemaic model if the former is not a more accurate (i.e. more correct) model of reality?
CS writes:
But we wouldn't say that it is more "correct" or more "about reality". Saying that is just unneccessary.
I have no idea what you are talking about "unnecessary" for. If you want to just want to use scientific theories to predict things (e.g. in an engineering sense) then you can certainly just do that and not worry about anything else.
But if you want to ask the question as to why some theories yield more accurate and reliable results than others you inevitably have to confront the idea that some theories are better descriptions of reality (i.e. more correct) than others.
™ Version 4.2
(1)
