Summations Only

You might choose not to, in order to demonstrate that your goodwill, no matter how impelling, can be subjugated by your free will.

I think you may well be right, or at least, it's right to say that there's perhaps confusion in the "man on the street's" attitude to the question.I think that most people do perceive themselves as caused beings, rather than uncaused prime causes of things, so that the "typical layman" who believes in free will may well be a compatibilist whether he realizes it or not.That would mean that the common usage of the expression "free will" is not really that of those who seem to be looking for completely unconstrained choices as what defines "free will".

Yes. But look at the "myself" and "I" in there. If the "man in the street" regards himself as being a caused being (a determined being), then he should agree that his decisions are both effect and cause, and therefore he's not really claiming that there's "no causal reason" for his choices. I agree that this MITS that we're discussing may be confused, but I also think that most people don't perceive themselves as being uncaused beings.In this way, a compatibilist view of what free will means may not only be a sensible solution, the MITS may already be largely there, if unwittingly so.One reason I say this is that if you ask people for causal reasons behind choices that they've made, they don't seem to consider it a strange question.Try asking your fellow cricket lovers why they've chosen to watch a certain test match on T.V., and ask them to analyse the choice beyond the level of "I like cricket". They might well readily accept that growing up in one of the world's cricketing cultures is part of the cause. Then some specific influences in their own childhood might add to the causal picture. But will they find it strange if you suggest such things? Will they perceive themselves as having uncaused cricket loving souls? I don't think so.So, if they're perceiving themselves as having freely chosen to watch the cricket, and they accept that there are causes of their cricket-loving selves, then aren't they natural compatabilists?Edited by bluegenes, : No reason given.

I suspect that that's where we'd see the confusion. Still, "chain of events" might itself be confusing. How about "complex interaction of many causal factors"?Still, weren't you describing a view of free will which claimed "no prior causal reason" for a decision?Maybe we should try asking people if they regard themselves as uncaused beings. If most don't, then they must accept that "I made a choice" means "the causes of me made a choice". Edited by bluegenes, : No reason given.

Only in the compatibilists' understanding of the phrase. The research evidence certainly suggests people are confused. For example, I read of one experiment in which the participants were described a futuristic scenario in which a supercomputer could predict all future human behaviour down to the last detail with 100% accuracy. That describes a deterministic world. The computer predicted that an individual would rob a bank. He did. 76% of the participants held the view that the robber in the scenario had freely chosen to rob the bank.Now, that might be viewed as people instinctively sticking to a libertarian view even when, in the deterministic scenario described, that's impossible. But in fact it could be better explained by instinctive compatibilism. The 76% have described the robber as having freely chosen to do something completely predetermined. So why aren't they "the man on the street"?

I think a lot of it comes traditionally from people's worries about moral responsibility. In a moralistic/creationist religion like Christianity, there's inevitable conflict. The god creator is omnipotent and omniscient (which includes knowing the future), so the set up is deterministic. But how can our actions be anything other than the responsibility of god? A moralistic religion definitely requires it to be otherwise.To resolve this, it was necessary to conceive of the libertarian type of free will. That meant giving humans a will that is independent of the creator, and implicitly, of all cause. So in some way our minds were our own and uncaused, and our important moral choices were in no way predetermined.That, I'm sure you'll agree, is a pretence.I think that incompatibilist physical determinists are taking the impossible (for determinists) libertarian view of our wills being free. In this sense, they're quite right; that sort of uncaused "free" will doesn't exist for determinists.Compatibilists are making a definition of will that belongs with determinism. We ourselves, and therefore our wills, are determined, so free will can only mean the exercise of will, and will is placed firmly as a link in the "chain" of cause and effect that you describe.The reason this might be a good idea is that the concepts of will and choice are very useful. Oh yes, I keep saying that people are confused, and I'm sure that a lot of the 76% that I mentioned would end up contradicting themselves. I don't really blame them. The subject is a natural headache!

I'd see it as more useful to understand will for what it is. You were asking about the famous "problem of free will", and I was suggesting that people's concerns about moral responsibility may have had a lot to do with it. Christians were just an example. No, it doesn't, but then I'm not consciously following a physics script because I can't read the script. And because the libertarians have a definition of will that is illusory, why do some determinists seem to want to use the same definition?

There are Dualist-Determinists and Non-Dualist Non-Determinists. So, I don't think so either.We're probably all scratching our heads a bit, because this is a kind of head-scratching topic.

As I said, Christianity was just an example. The Abrahamic religions are good ones, because their scriptures very clearly contain the contradictions and confusion of the MITS, not because they invented this confusion, which they most certainly did not! I like the cartoon I posted earlier of Moses identifying the problem.Your link asks the participants this [my brackets]:

quote:

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In Universe A [completely deterministic], is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?

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fully morally responsible.It then takes the clear majority answer of "no" as meaning majority incompatibilism. The trouble is that the answer "no" is compatible with compatibilism. The guy assumes that compatibilism means that determinism is compatible with an extreme libertarian concept of "will", which can't exist unless we are uncaused prime causes; essentially, gods! Then we could be fully responsible.Compatibilism can only work with a realistic concept of will.Despite that, nearly 25% of the MITS in the sample actually do hold us as being fully responsible in a fully deterministic world.The survey in your link shows clear majority of non-determinists, when the universe chosen (B) is described as nearly deterministic with the exception of some human decisions.Put similar questions phrased differently to the MITS, and it's well established that you can get different and conflicting answers.I watched the video. The guy says that, while philosophers are divided on these questions, the MITS in any culture seems to find them easy to answer, as if his results showed that. Actually, his results show both division and cultural differences.Finally, it might be a good idea not to go too much on surveys with sample sizes like this:

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Finally, our total sample size was 231, broken down as follows:

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US=66
India=55
Hong Kong=40
Colombia=70

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(And I'm sure all of the above goes for the survey I mentioned in which 75% appeared to be compatibilists in a certain described scenario).

I think you might be wrong in describing Mr. Mits as a Libertarian. I think it's best to see him as an inconsistent fence sitter. Mr. Mits is perfectly capable of saying that Mr. Action has done something of his own free will, and then examining the causes of Mr. Action's choice. He will also tend to perceive Mr. Action as a caused being, not an uncaused prime mover (or god). Mr. Mits may well also perceive history as having determined the present. However, he may well perceive the future as being non-predetermined.Mr. Mits is (understandably) confused, IMO, and can say things that imply determinism, as well as saying things that imply non-determinism. But it's by no means clear that he would use the phrase "free will" in the strict libertarian sense.It's also unclear what the MITS might mean if he says that more than one possible choice can be made. "Possible" is a difficult word. For example, if you and I are in a strange house looking for a chair, and we come across a room with a closed door, we might both agree that it's possible that there's a chair in the room, and it's possible that there isn't. From the perspective of our knowledge (or lack of it) that seems reasonable. But in a strict sense, only one of those possibilities can actually be "possible".So when the MITS is driving with you along the road and says that there are two possible choices of route ahead, why should we assume he is making some grand philosophical statement.? If you choose one route, he may well ask you what made you choose that one. And if you answer that it looked like the shorter way to your destination on the map, he will surely recognize that there's an external causal factor beyond your control that led to the "free" choice.On this thread you've stated the view that "free" is an absolute. But then you agree that free will does not imply the ability to become Superman and fly round the world merely because you want to. We can't make such impossible choices. So, free will could then mean the freedom to make all possible choices. You're a determinist, so follow that line of thought through, and you might see how you could end up as a compatibilist.

I think it's more where his confusion manifests itself. He needs to regard himself and others as uncaused beings in order to be a consistent libertarian. Most people don't think that they themselves are god. But I certainly agree that the MITS is not a consistent determinist either. So you don't really need to keep informing me that he believes in things that contradict determinism.My view of the Mr. and Mrs. Mits, the average of the views of the world, is that the Mits family does not have a consistent view, and cannot be described as libertarian, determinist or compatibilist.

Exactly. And you're a determinist. And you're a MITS. So it's very hard to tell what the MITS view is, partly because of people like you (and me, for that matter).There's probably no such thing as incompatibilist determinist behaviour. There's only libertarian and compatibilist behaviour!The world's a stage, and all the MITS merely players, but we have to play our parts, and one MITS in his time plays many parts. Although most modern philosophers are compatibilists, I think compatibilism is probably the most counter-intuitive of the three common positions.Your determinist will is both caused and a causal agent. If it is free, it can only be free to be itself, not to be a fictional uncaused will believed in by libertarians. If it could become that, it would be dead, not free, because that fiction is not it.

So, if you were discussing a hurricane with someone who believes that hurricanes are acts of God sent to punish us, you would be correct to say "there are no hurricanes"?And if you were discussing diseases with someone who believes that they are things caused by evil spirits, would you say there are no diseases?And if you were discussing human will with a libertarian who believes it has a completely uncaused element, would you say that humans have no will?Have I got this right?I can see this approach having amusing results if it was actually applied on this board when evolutionists debate creationists.