Verifying Epistemologies

Reality is the arbiter of "truth". Not you or I. Whatever epistemology one chooses to deploy.Surely this is simply inarguable? But I haven't said that the epistemology has to result in pragmatic knowledge at all. I have simply said that it needs to be able to demonstrate itself as reliable as compared with objective reality. That is not the same thing at all. No matter how you try to spin it. Whatever epistemology one chooses to deploy if reality is not the arbiter of "truthfulness" what is? But I am not saying that. So your premise is false.I am not citing the "tangibility of conclusions as a means to determine whether an epistemology is reliable or relatively lacking".I am simply insisting that whatever epistemology one chooses to deploy to gain knowledge about reality it must at some point result in conclusions that can actually somehow be objectively compared with reality.Otherwise how can your chosen epistemology be considered a method of knowing anything about reality as opposed to being a method of unjustifiably relabelling personal beliefs as knowledge? Wrong. It is a simple requirement that any epistemology be able to demonstrate itself as being reliable as compared with reality before being cited as a valid method of acquiring knowledge about reality.

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Are you actually disagreeing with this requirement?Now at this point you will say "Aha but Straggler you arch-empiricist-you how are we supposed to objectively compare intangible results with reality?"And I will say that this is a very good question and something of a stumbling block for those who advocate epistemologies that are unable to provide knowledge that can be tangibly compared to reality.But this inability of such epistemologies to demonstrate their reliability is not due to some sort of ideological position on my part. As you seem to be implying. It is a rather key failing on their part. Their invalidity in this respect is the reason for my position. Not a consequence of it as you seem to keep implying. The Mormon epistemology can have whatever aim it chooses. But, like any epistemology, it needs to be able to demonstrate itself as reliable as compared to reality if it is going to claim to provide accurate knowledge about reality.Is the Mormon epistemology able to do this? And if it isn't why do you think the "knowledge" it provides tells you anything about reality at all? Easy. By comparing conclusions derived from each epistemology with reality to see which is able to be demonstrated as reliable in comparison with reality. Then, and only then, can the epistemology in question claim to provide accurate knowledge about reality.Does that sound fair? Wrong.In my argument reality is the only arbiter of "truth". Not you or I or pragmatism or empiricism or anything else. Reality is the arbiter of "truth". Whatever epistemology one choose to deploy.Surely this is simply inarguable?So if your chosen epistemology is unable to demonstrate itself as reliable by comparison with objective reality on what basis can it ever be considered a method of knowing anything about reality as opposed to being a method of unjustifiably relabelling personal beliefs as knowledge?

It's not a question of Jon or you, merely that everyone around us is demonstrably gaining knowledge via observation and experience. They don't need to know or care what the words "epistemology" and "empiricism" mean.Reactions to Jon's O.P. were probably coloured by the fact that they all came from people familiar with Jon.As for empiricism being axiomatic, children have no problem coming to the conclusion that there's an observable reality through their observations and experiences, and it's arguable that empiricism itself is the product of observation. Philosophers might want to stick an axiom at the base of it, but whether they choose to or not, the kids would still discover it. Could be. I certainly have the tendency to read between the lines, and I could well be wrong. However, my comment was really about religious people in general. I don't think being religious is a symptom of a questioning mind searching for "knowledge" in the way that I would use the word knowledge. But I'm off topic. The problem might be avoided by a definition of "knowledge" which related to things we could be said to reasonably know, rather than "anything we feel like believing".Whether they would always fail each other or not, you are making observations about epistemologies in order to arrive at your "obvious realization", which you consider to be knowledge. Wouldn't it require an anti-empiricist epistemology in order to claim knowledge that those viewpoints are logically equal? You could say that they're equally internally consistent, but what does Omphalism have to do with knowledge?If you come across a schizophrenic sitting on a park bench, and he tells you that he has knowledge of demons who rule the world, and that this is the truth, because he hears their voices in his head, is this a valid epistemology just because he has used the words "knowledge" and "truth"? Blank posts would have expressed this better. My position is that you are taking an epistemological position on epistemological methods which puts your Mormon example and the schizophrenic's view on a level with methods that can demonstrably lead to the acquisition of knowledge.

I think bluegenes hinted at it - but it might well be noted that you are using Rationalism to deduce this 'obvious realization' - which you can't confirm without rationalism

When did you stop raping your mother? If it is actually possible to decide on an answer before picking an epistemology, then epistemology is demonstrated to be bullshit - a ridiculous made up "just so" story.

Hi, Straggler. It is the same thing. You use the term "objective reality" to refer to "empirical reality," hence, empiricism. You advocate practicality or usefulness of theories as the measure of their validity, hence pragmatism.How am I wrong about this?Edited by Bluejay, : No reason given.

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

Hi, Bluegenes. But, if we were to use a single definition of "knowledge," we would be settling the question of epistemologies before even investigating it.----- Says the guy who has filled threads with posts about "no view on God."

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

It's still in the post. Something about pretending not to be an empiricist being meaningless. How do you know whether or not I'm playing word games? Like, how do I know that you're alive?Because you can ask the question.By the way, referring to the O.P., why would anyone expect an epistemology to be "verified," rather than just be a well supported theory of how we acquire knowledge? And which epistemology do you think best describes the means by which you came to your conclusion in the O.P.?

But you're doing that in treating it as meaning "any belief", which is neither the classical definition, nor a modern one. We then get to the part of epistemology that concerns examining how we acquire knowledge, and end up in a discussion about acquiring any belief.It is only by this means that you can come up with your "epistemology," which is best described as "whim is as good as anything". That is a theory of the acquisition of belief, not knowledge. Eh?

By the terms of your argument all conclusions are as equally valid as those derived from any other internally consistent epistemology.For example I could advocate an epistemology which defines knowledge as that which I personally believe to be true and state that my method of acquiring knowledge is choosing what I want to believe.Do you consider this to be valid epistemology? (and why)
Do you consider it a reliable method of acquiring knowledge pertaining to objective reality? (and why) No I don't. I have advocated previously that mathematical truths are objective without being empirical. They can be independently derived and verified. No I don't. I advocate demonstrable reliability through an ability to draw conclusions that can be objectively verified. By conflating a simple requirement for demonstrable reliability with some sort of empiricist zealotry on my part.The simple requirement that any epistemology be able to demonstrate itself as being reliable in comparison with objective reality before being cited as a valid method of acquiring knowledge about objective reality.Are you actually disagreeing with this requirement?Do you consider all internally consistent epistemologies to be equally valid methods of gaining knowledge about objective reality and to result in equally valid conclusions? Or are some superior to others?I have answered your questions. Will you answer mine?

Charming.But it rather proves my point that you are unable to draw any conclusions at all doesn't it? If you are unable to state your position on something as well established as the age of the Earth then on what can you state a position?Can you give an example of any conclusion pertaining to objective reality (i.e. as opposed to your own subjective state of mind) which you consider to be reliable and in which you have confidence? If you can name one can you tell us which which epistemology was employed to reach this conclusion and gain this confidence?Or is it the case, as I suspect that your position forbids you from actually concluding anything at all. Intuition is a method of "knowing". Although one that has demonstrated itself to be very far from reliable. As is guessing.

Hi, Bluegenes.This comment by me--- ---was off-base. I was in a hurry and conflated "view" with "belief." Please disregard.----- No, I'm not treating it as meaning that: I'm not treating it as meaning anything at all. I can't treat it as meaning anything when the meaning is what we're testing. Once you set a definition of "knowledge," you are special pleading for one epistemology, and arriving at your conclusion before even running the test.In the case of comparing multiple epistemologies, you have to consider all relevant definitions of "knowledge," otherwise you are special pleading again. This is what I was doing when you said I was treating it as meaning "any belief."

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

But that doesn't follow at all.If you say you know something, there is usually a reason you say you know it. That reason is epistemology. It might be incoherent, ill-formed or precisely analytical. You don't need to consult epistemology before you can acquire something that you personally claim is knowledge. But if have a reason for calling it knowledge - that's epistemology. Even if you've never heard of epistemology, thought about it in any detail or at all.It would be like claiming that morality is bullshit because you can make moral decisions without 'picking a morality'.Epistemology is a descriptive concept, describing the reasons behind the methodology employed to acquire some knowledge. Whether the person realizes that they have a methodology or rational for acquiring knowledge or not. It can go both ways. You can use reason to drive practice (such as the concept of falsification), or you can try the more academic approach of justifying (or discrediting) already accepted means ("Appearances can be deceiving", if true, could be used as an argument against naive empiricism ("I know because I saw it") for example) .Nobody is suggesting you pick an epistemology before developing knowledge.
Your reasons for categorising something as 'known' and 'not known' is your 'chosen' epistemology - even if you didn't consciously make any decisions and just went with what came naturally.Like all natural behaviours - our instinctive knowledge categorising behaviour is only good enough to make babies that will grow up to make their own babies. Fortunately it is also natural to try and learn to improve instincts. If you are learning how to better categorise the known from the unknown you are engaged in the philosophical pursuit of epistemology. It is not suggested this is required to begin categorising.But I think most people would agree, on reflection, that studying to come to conclusions about your knowledge and its limits more accurately than an infant is not bullshit.

Hi, Straggler. My position is that you can't validate epistemologies, so I don't consider any epistemology to be "valid": I consider them all to be axiomatic.----- I don't know what mathematical truths are.----- What is the difference between "reliability" and "practicality"?----- Let's say I am disagreeing with this requirement.How would you respond?

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

Hi, Modulous. Ah, I see. So there is one epistemology that fails to validate itself, I guess.So, what are my options, then?I am either allowed no conclusions, or I am allowed axiomatic conclusions derived from assuming one epistemology, or I am allowed to conclude that they are all equally correct through rationalism.I don't see a way to validate or verify any particular epistemology without appealing to the epistemology that is to be verified or validated. Doesn't this mean that Jon was right?Edited by Bluejay, : No reason given.

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

I was just pointing out that Jon's argument, and yours rests on the notion that you can reason your way to knowledge.For instance, I could completely forego rationalism and say "I just know that you can verify a particular epistemology.", which would mean Jon was wrong. You can argue as to why you need to be reasonable, but that's just appealing to reason to verify appeals to reason. I'd say 'that was an interesting intellectual exercise.' and maybe wonder if I could put any of the ideas to use in sharpening up my confidence in various things I claim to know. That, I would argue - is the key purposes to engaging in epistemology, though you might prefer to keep it recreational