Pretty much the way I see it on 10, but 14 doesn't ask the same question.
In 14 it asks 'is it belief, not rational?'
The problem is that you have limited options with the true\false format, and thus you are stuck with either saying:
(1) true -- it is belief devoid of rationality (2) true -- it is belief more than rationality (3) false -- it is both belief and rationality (4) false -- it is rationality more than belief (5) false -- it is rational devoid of belief
Right - the epistemological assumption is what leads to the conclusion. If you conclude that the Nessie case is rational, but you use a contradictory epistemological assumption in the God case to conclude that it is not rational - there is a contradiction.
Thus we know there are elements of both, so we can eliminate (1) and (5) above as a valid answers. You are left with gray answers, of which (3) is a false negative ... you are left choosing which is more critical to the conclusion -- the belief element or the rational element.
To be consistent you have to answer true. You've already admitted it is a belief (in 10 and above), and you've noted that it is the assumption that is critical to the conclusion.
Message 41 10. When you have a belief that is not supported or contradicted by loads of evidence and logic - is it rationality to conclude
the belief is true
the belief is false 14. When you have a belief that is not supported or contradicted by loads of evidence and logic - is it more a matter of faith (the confident belief in the truth of your conclusion) or one of rationality to conclude
the belief is true
the belief is false
For me, the answer to both questions is "yes" to both options, and the only way to show this is to answer "true" to both 10 and 14. Only that way does the answer to 10 modify and inform the answer to 14.
If the first one is rational, so is the second one.
And it is still a belief.
However, I am saying that it seems to be something of a stretch, some gymnastics, are required to find the kind of problem with this question that you see.
It's in the words Mod, there is a difference between 10 and 14 that makes them different questions.
14 asks you to distinguish between the belief part and the rational part, 10 doesn't.
Of course it is a belief. The question is, is it rational or faith-based? If the first one is rational, so is the second one.
It's belief. The question is, is it a belief or a fact? If the first one is a belief so is the second.
I understand your reading - .... Do you understand mine?
Not really. I can't see how those two questions can possibly be the same.
No mental squinting or contortions on my part, they are different. The only way I see you parsimoniously parsing the questions to get your answers is by leaving parts out, parts that relate to the questions asked. Removing critical elements is not parsimonious.
And beliefs that are not rational (for instance, beliefs that based solely on a strong conviction that they are true and nothing else - aka faith).
Such as the belief that the evidence will continue to be negative?
. I'm making a mistake by putting too much weight on the first sentence and thinking that it says he believes that God wanted him to do these things (which it does right?).
The way it is phrased is confusing, it doesn't seem to be asking if his 'firm inner conviction' is justified, but if his belief in his own 'firm inner conviction' is.
By answering true, you are explicitly saying that it (not believing in the existence of x) is not rational when it comes to God but it is rational when it comes to monsters.
By answering true you are explicitly saying it is belief. It was a belief in 10, and it is still a belief in 14.
When belief {A} is rational and belief not{A} is rational, then whether {A} or not{A} is rational is not relevant to -- does not predict -- the result.
quote:10. If, despite years of trying, no strong evidence or argument has been presented to show that there is a Loch Ness monster, it is rational to believe that such a monster does not exist.
It is a belief.
quote:14. As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, atheism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
It is the same kind of belief.
As long as there is no compelling arguments or evidence one way or the other, it is as rational to believe one thing as the other. Therefore what you believe is a matter of faith rather than rationality.
What critical element am I missing from the actual statements?
That "it" - no matter how rational - is belief.
That when you come to your conclusion, it is a matter of your faith in the truth of your belief - rather than rationality - that makes the difference.
Do you want to understand my reading or should we just leave it at that?
What I see it that you put all the emphasis on rationality, and ignore belief and that the other choice is equally rational. It's like being asked to choose one of two chips, and you say the reason you chose your chip is because it is blue when both chips are blue. The reason you chose your chip is because you liked it, not because it was blue.
You suggest that not believing in Nessie is rational by answering true to that question. Then it is rational the second time too, right?
Yes, both those chips are blue.
Yet I have said numerous times that it is a belief. It's the type of belief that the statements are probing. Is it a rational belief or is it a belief centred around faith? Those are the options.
False dichotomy, all beliefs are part faith, and we have already established that we are talking about rational beliefs. The question is how you decide between different rational beliefs.
The standard set in question 10 and reinforced in question 14 is that an absence of compelling arguments or evidence contrary to your belief makes it a rational choice.
14a: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, atheism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
14b: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
Both those chips have the same blueness.
These statements use the same rationality, but come to different conclusions. These statements use the same evidence, but come to different conclusions. Therefore the conclusions reached are not due to the rationality of the process or the evidence used, but to the belief\faith of the person making the conclusion: they are a matter of belief rather than the rationality of the process.
Both chips are blue. Blueness is not the factor used to decide which one you like better. Not using blueness to decide doesn't make the chips change color, they are still blue.
Someone using blueness to decide between the two chips would find them both equally blue, both equally valid choices: they would be agnostic. When you choose one chip over the other, the choice is based on some belief that one is a better choice than the other, not the blueness of the chips.
If not believing in Nessie is a rational belief so is not believing in God. If not believing in Nessie is not a rational belief then neither is not believing in God.
And those are not the only options. It is equally rational to believe in god, based on the criteria set here for what is rational: the lack compelling arguments or evidence that contradicts the belief.
Choosing one blue chip over the other is a matter of some other preference, not blueness.
And that depends on the definition of faith in play. The context implies the dichotomy definition and I see no reason to ignore that context.
It's part of the definition of belief:
Both belief2 and belief3 require the acceptance of the belief as being true whether it is or not. Thus all beliefs are part faith, whether they are "rational beliefs" or not. We also see that rational in this context is just needs to be a belief consistent with reason:
Because it is not based on proof it is just a matter of consistency with other beliefs to be a rational belief. This is established further in questions 10 and 14 by using the lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other to determine the rationality of the belief.
Are you disinterested in trying to understand my position?
You seem to be saying that 14 is only asking whether the choice is rational, so you only see rationality as the criteria, rather than any element of faith. It seems to me that you can only hold this view by being blind to other equally rational options.
Apply your criteria to this version:
14b: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
Or this one:
14c: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
We apply the same standard for rationality from 10 and 14 - the lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other - to determine the rationality of the belief.
We then apply the same definition of faith - belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence - to exclude all rational beliefs from the faith2 category.
Thus you should say both these statements are also false, because these are also rational beliefs and thus they don't qualify as faith2 (Belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence).
We now have 14a - atheism - and 14b/c - theism - both as conclusions based on rationality rather than faith, so how do we then get to atheism between those choices by rationality alone?
In statement 10, you think that choosing blue is rational, but it becomes a matter of faith, not rationality in statement 14.
No, in the analogy blue == rational. In 10 the question is only whether the chip is blue or not. The chip does not lose blueness in 14. It is just as blue in 14 as it was in 10. In 10 we are only concerned with blueness, in 14 we are concerned with choices between equally blue chips.
So for number 10b, we conclude that it is not rational since there is a lack of compelling argument.
In 10a you concluded that it was rational since there was a lack of compelling argument. This is also what both 10 and 14 set as a standard for what is a rational belief - a lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other.
And for 14b we see that theism is belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence so it is faith. but if I have to answer then, based on the premises 14c is true and 10c is false.
You have the same definition of faith and belief and rationality, applied the same way. In one you say it is rational in the other you say it is faith.
That is special pleading.
I know that if not believing Nessie exists is rational so is not believing in God. First we need to add an equivalent 10b:
Here you are implying that the evidence against god is equivalent to the evidence against the loch ness monster, rather than applying the standard of evidence given in both 10 and 14 for what is to be considered rational.
It is not rational to believe something exists just because it has not be shown not to.
Why not? Nothing in either question 10 or 14 leads to this conclusion, rather they set a standard for measuring the rationality of the beliefs. This contradicts the standard set for what is a rational belief, and it contradicts what you said earlier -- when I asked if you thought faith = irrational.
you distinguish belief as rational and faith as irrational?
No. I think there are many categories of belief. Some of them are faith-based (Belief that does not rest on logical proof, to quote your dictionary) some of them are rational.
This also is false when you look at instances where things were believed to exist in spite of a lack of compelling evidence or argument for their existence, and later were found to be true.
I repeat Message 63: You seem to be saying that 14 is only asking whether the choice is rational, so you only see rationality as the criteria, rather than any element of faith. It seems to me that you can only hold this view by being blind to other equally rational options.
Isn't it pretty hard to compare the evidence/lack of evidence/evidence against for something of a pretty specific description and location (Nessie) relative to something of a highly uncertain description and location (God)?
Yes. But the point is to define how you determine a rational belief. You could use other examples of "cryptozoology" to the same end.
quote:In the study of cryptozoology, cryptids are animals or creatures that have been hypothesised to exist, but have not been proven to, or animals presumed extinct (known as relicts). Their presumed existence is often derived from anecdotal evidence and/or other evidence insufficient to prove their existence with scientific certainty. Cryptids may also be known as Unidentified Mysterious Animals, or UMA, an intended variation on the term UFO.
Presumably the same logic would hold for all such "hidden animals" -- including ones presumed to be recently extinct, such as the Ivory Billed Woodpecker, but which have been found in spite of lack of evidence for over 60 years. Or other living fossils (Coelacanth, etc).
In all examples of cryptids you have reports of sightings of "something" which then gets embellished as the story/ies are retold.
And it is not like we know all there is to know about species on earth - new species are still being found, some of them rather larger than could be casually overlooked. A new species of deer in Viet Nam, among others.
I can't see how a lack of belief in Nessie and a lack of a lack of belief in God is a logical contradiction.
Eh? In our context, the definition of faith is a belief in the existence of something without compelling evidence or argument. More generally it is a belief that is not rational.
Faith: belief without evidence/compelling argument. Rational: not believing without evidence/compelling argument.
Where is the special pleading?
It's very simple:
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}.
Let {B} = not{A}
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
There is no 'standard of evidence' given.
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}. That is the standard for what constitutes a rational belief set by the game.
The reason why I think it is not rational? I don't think an in depth exploration on epistemology is necessary - we're only considering consistency.
Let {B} = not{A}
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
Consistency requires that {B} is just as rational as {A}.
So when a statement says that not believing in god is not rational I have to say 'false'.
But 14 doesn't say that, it says that the final choice is a matter of faith rather than rationality. What you have is a belief that is part faith and part rationality, and the part that is rationality does not predict the final choice, while the part that is faith does.
Both {A} and {B} are rational, by the standard of the game, and thus to choose between {A} and {B} is not a matter of rationality (that is a given), but of faith: it is the faith part that distinguishes {A} from {B}.
Faith: belief without evidence/compelling argument.
And it is a matter of faith because you have a lack of compelling evidence or argument.
Not particularly. For a start, ecologists have good reason to think that the bird has existed - and have some evidence that suggests that it still exists. We know that low population species can be elusive, and birds are no exception.
So this doesn't really fall under the 'lack of compelling argument/evidence' category.
So in the absence of convincing evidence for {B} (non-existence) it is rational to believe not{B} (existence).
And if this represents your thinking, then obviously you answered false to statement 10.
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}.
Thus a rational belief is simply one that is not contradicted by compelling evidence or argument, even though there may be some (inconclusive) evidence or argument against it, evidence that some people accept and others don't.
Question 10 doesn't ask to distinguish between faith and rationality, just to judge on the rationality: it is rational (to have faith in the absence of nessie), therefore true.
You forgot to include 'compelling argument' which in the case of the birds , is not absent.
Sorry, I was referring to the previous re-statement and missed typing that part. The argument still holds.
quote:Let {B} = not{A} In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} (non-existence) it is rational to believe not{B} (existence).
The lack of compelling evidence or argument is for contradicting the belief, not for supporting it - that is the standard set by the game: for a belief to be considered rational it cannot be contradicted by compelling evidence or argument.
The belief in the continued absence of a loch ness monster (LNM) and the belief in the continued existence (before discovery) of the ivory billed woodpecker (IBW) meet that simple standard.
Well more specifically, a belief in the absence of the existence of an entity can be rational simply on the basis that there is no evidence or argument that exists that demonstrates its existence. That's statement 10.
No, statement 10 says "compelling" which means it's inconclusive. What this means is that there is evidence and argument, some people just dismiss it.
Based on this then, we'd both agree that a belief in the absence of God is rational given the lack of evidence/argument demonstrating its existence.
With the addition of "compelling" yes -- but also that this does not rule out other rational beliefs that have the same lack of compelling argument or evidence that contradict the belief.
Just as we should agree that the lack of compelling evidence for the absence of the IBW means the belief in it's existence was rational, as was the belief in the IBW being extinct. Before rediscovery both beliefs were equally rational according to the simple test of the game. Choosing between two equally rational beliefs, beliefs without any compelling evidence or argument one way or the other, cannot be done by rational logic alone, therefore the choice is not a matter of rationality, but a matter of which one you personally believe is true.
And then according to 14, you think it is true that it is not a matter of rationality, but it is rational! And it's reading it in that light that I could not answer true to statement 14.
Yes it is rational, but so are several alternative beliefs, so choosing between several different rational beliefs, based on a lack of compelling evidence on any side, is a matter of faith, not rationality. You can only base your choice in 14 on the assumption that there are no other equally rational but different beliefs - and this is not the case.
The belief in the existence of the woodpecker doesn't meet this standard for a number of reasons. First it is about believing the existence of an entity, rather than its absence - so we cannot use the above criteria to determine whether or not it is rational.
So you are still arguing that "belief {A}"
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}.
is rational while "belief {B}"
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
is not rational, and that the difference is due to what {A} is, rather than to the structure of the argument: this is special pleading.
You might regard this as 'special pleading' but I think there are compelling arguments for taking the absence of existence as the null hypothesis in these kinds of discussions. I see no obligation to think that two opposite statements both have to be rational.
Obviously it is special pleading, because you distinguish between "belief {A}" and "belief {B}" based on what {A} is.
Nor is there any obligation to think that both statements cannot be rational when the measure is the lack of compelling contrary evidence and argument. Before the rediscovery of the IBW both positions were rational according to the simple measure of the game.
The belief in the existence of the woodpecker doesn't meet this standard for a number of reasons. ... Second, there are compelling reasons and evidence that supports its possible existence.
They are compelling now, yes. In this case they found "nessie."
Before the rediscovery, however, there was not compelling evidence or argument for the continued existence of the IBW. We also know that animals do go extinct, especially when an endangered species has it's habitat clear cut.
If nessie were found tomorrow it would be the same kind of situation.
If the quiz had said 'It is rational to believe in the existence of something on the basis that there is no evidence or argument to support it' I would have answered 'false'.
Now put the word "compelling" back in there, and consider that there is some inconclusive evidence and argument.
Also note that the game does not talk about having evidence or argument supporting the belief for it to be considered rational, but only about the lack of compelling argument or evidence contrary to it. You could have absolutely no evidence for your belief and it would still be rational by this measure. By this measure it is rational to believe that some kind of "nessie" exists, but we just haven't found what that something is yet.
I take it you think this back and forth is worthwhile? I really do think we have reached the point of repeating ourselves and I can't see either of us changing our minds via repetition. We read the statements in a significantly different way and we've put our best reasons forward for reading it in the way that we do. I understand your reasoning, and I disagree that it is justified from the text. I don't know if you understand my reasoning, but it seems you disagree that it is justified from the text. What else can be said here?
At the beginning of the thread (Message 1) I said "I scored a hit, but I'll take it again" -- and I see no reason to change my thinking or my answers, they are logically consistent with the terms of the game and the concepts presented in it.
I also said in Message 9 that there was a significant difference between 10 and 14 that makes a direct comparison of answers between them invalid -- in other words that it is logically and rationally possible to answer true to both. I have demonstrated how and why this is possible.
You have not shown my logic to be faulty, nor that my position is invalid. In fact you say you understand it, even though you disagree with my conclusions.
In this regard my purpose is served: the results of the game are not a proper representation of the possible valid responses.
And after that you took it upon yourself to try and and demonstrate I was wrong in my interpretation somehow.
It is incomplete, imho, because it doesn't consider if other conclusions are also rational.
I have been having difficulty reconciling your attempt to demonstrate my position as wrong somehow with your earlier statement of "But let's not open up the old atheist\belief argument that has already been done too many times on other threads".
No, what I want to look at is the logic embedded in the game, where it is wrong or incomplete. What you make of it in regard to your position is what you make of it.
Note you can go through the game and only answer certain questions and there is no back check, for instance answering only questions 10 and 14 with all permutations you get this result:
quote:10 true 14 true = hit
You've just taken a direct hit!
Earlier you agreed that it is rational to believe that the Loch Ness monster does not exist if there is an absence of strong evidence or argument that it does. No strong evidence or argument was required to show that the monster does not exist - absence of evidence or argument was enough. But now you claim that the atheist needs to be able to provide strong arguments or evidence if their belief in the non-existence of God is to be rational rather than a matter of faith.
The contradiction is that on the first ocassion (Loch Ness monster) you agreed that the absence of evidence or argument is enough to rationally justify belief in the non-existence of the Loch Ness monster, but on this occasion (God), you do not.
10 true 14 false = no hit or bullet
10 false 14 true = bullet
You've just bitten a bullet!
You say that if there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, then atheism is a matter of faith, not rationality. Therefore, it seems that you do not think that the mere absence of evidence for the existence of God is enough to justify believing that she does not exist. This view is also suggested by your earlier claim that it is not rational to believe that the Loch Ness monster does not exist even if, despite years of trying, no evidence has been presented to suggest that it does exist.
There is no logical inconsistency in your answers. But by denying that the absence of evidence, even where it has been sought, is enough to justify belief in the non-existence of things, you are required to countenance possibilities that most people would find bizarre. For example, do you really want to claim that it is not rationally justified to believe that intelligent aliens do not live on Mars?
10 false 14 false = no hit or bullet
If the game was consistent, then the last iteration should have scored the same "hit" as the first one did, instead you get a "bye" because you endorse the atheist position while contradicting it for nessie. This shows bias - or myopia.
You get either a "hit" or a "bullet" if you answer 14 false no matter what you answer on 10, and this too shows bias.
Further the "bullet" employs an argument from incredulity and a straw man -- it does not show the position to be invalid, false or irrational.
The Ivory Billed Woodpecker is, again, an example where believing that absence of evidence for 60 years was not sufficient to justify not assuming\believing the absence of the woodpecker. One such example is sufficient to invalidate the claim that "absence of evidence is evidence of absence" -- all it shows is that you have not found {X} where you have looked for {X} (and it depends on how you define {X}). To believe it means anything else is a matter of faith.
"In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}" is thus demonstrated to be a rational option. The game does not consider this possibility to be rational (see "bullet" above) due to the bias built into it.
Now we could also look at the other questions that also deal with "faith" issues (see Rrhain in Message 3 and Message 25):
quote:Question 7 It is justifiable to base one's beliefs about the external world on a firm, inner conviction, regardless of the external evidence, or lack of it, for the truth or falsity of these convictions.
Question 15 The serial rapist Peter Sutcliffe had a firm, inner conviction that God wanted him to rape and murder prostitutes. He was, therefore, justified in believing that he was carrying out God's will in undertaking these actions.
The problem is that this doesn't use a proper definition of faith, but the definition of delusion (3) -- and it uses an example of a delusional person, in case you missed it, in 15:
vs
Neither of the faith definitions (1 or 2) imply "belief strongly held in spite of invalidating evidence" as is implicated in question 7: belief "... regardless of the external evidence, ... for the ... falsity of these convictions."
Thus these questions do not really address faith, although they may demonstrate the authors bias that faith is delusional.
Looking at the grid of responses for these questions we see:
quote:7 true 15 true = bullet
You've just bitten a bullet!
You are consistent in applying the principle that it is justifiable to base one's beliefs about the external world on a firm, inner conviction, regardless of the external evidence, or lack of it, for the truth or falsity this conviction. The problem is that it seems you have to accept that people might be justified in their belief that God could demand something terrible.
This is something many religious people are willing to accept. For example, Kierkegaard believed that it is precisely because Abraham had to contravene established morality to follow God's will and attempt to sacrifice his son which made his act the supreme act of faith.
But as Kierkegaard also stressed, this makes the act incomprehensible from a rational point of view. The rational alternative - that people should require more than such an inner conviction to justify such a belief - is more attractive to most people, but you reject this alternative and bite the bullet.
7 true 15 false = hit
You've just taken a direct hit!
Earlier you said that it is justifiable to base one's beliefs about the external world on a firm, inner conviction, regardless of the external evidence, or lack of it, for the truth or falsity of this conviction. But now you do not accept that the rapist Peter Sutcliffe was justified in doing just that. The example of the rapist has exposed that you do not in fact agree that any belief is justified just because one is convinced of its truth. So you need to revise your opinion here. The intellectual sniper has scored a bull's-eye!
7 false 15 true = hit
You've just taken a direct hit!
Earlier you claimed that it is not justifiable to base one's beliefs about the external world on a firm, inner-conviction, paying no regard to the external evidence, or lack of it, for the truth or falsity of this conviction. But now you say that the rapist Peter Sutcliffe was justified in basing his beliefs about God's will solely on precisely such a conviction. That's a bull's-eye for the intellectual sniper!
7 false 15 false = no hit or bullet
Again we get a smug little lecture for not taking the authors position, but at least both contradicting positions take a hit.
However there is no direct comparable relation\dependence between the answers to the questions on belief\rationality to the questions on delusion\faith, where a proper survey would have explored this side of the issue -- fairly.
To me this is a sadly missed opportunity to truly explore the faith issue. Instead it uses an extreme straw man to stand in for faith, and a weak easy to pass criteria for rationality to justify the opinion of the author without confronting the contradictions in that position.
We know that some people can read some of the strangest things into some things when not every word is explained, every statement disclaimed or entire philosophical treatises provided to justify their linguistic shortcuts etc etc. We both see certain members here concluding things quite contrary to the intent of the authors and everybody else reads things in an entirely different way. We can't 'prove' in any simple fashion, that the person is not understanding the the more accurate meaning of the words but we can simply try and explain that there is an alternative meaning of the words that would seem more to be closer to the intent of the authors or speakers.
Yes, but then each person interprets according to their world views, and may have "cognitive dissonance" blinders on for views that disagree with them.
Why should I be more concerned with properly answering according to the biases and blind spots of the author vs understanding the issues?
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