Verifying Epistemologies

Precisely. So logical validity alone is an insufficient basis upon which to obtain reliable knowledge.It seems we agree.So the question is how do we go about obtaining reliable knowledge?That is what epistemology is all about.Well done for finally getting there.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

From the captain of ambiguity himself.........Classic.

Learn the difference between knowledge and logical validity and then get back to me.

Fact - definition of fact by The Free Dictionary

(Combining a few posts.) Huh? Agree to what? I never said what you claim I said. Stop misrepresenting me. That was actually the question in the first post. How does an epistemology demonstrate its reliability? Which definition do you want? There's a reason bare links are frowned upon in the forum guidelines. Where have I ever used them interchangeably? Where do you think I confused them? It'd be helpful if you'd point to the parts you think I fudged.JonEdited by Jon, : Forgot one...

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If you can't tell me why you'd prefer to use your eyes to detect busses rather than praying for guidance then I think that is a sure sign you've argued yourself into an absurdity.But some people are quite capable of understanding the regress problem while also being able to discuss why we have such a tendency towards naive empiricism, and arguing for certain rational caveats be included to help us around cases where 'appearances can be deceiving'.You have demanded others 'learn the basics', but if you want to have a meaningful discussion about the subject with Straggler then you're going to have to learn what happens after you've learned the basics. Why the empiricism you have chosen? Why not logical positivism? Why not phenomenalism?You kind of sound Humean in your empiricism, perhaps you agree with his conclusion?

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But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

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At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single step further; and in all questions we must terminate here at last, after our most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther researches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief, and of the customary conjunction, whence it is derived. By this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction; at least to such as love the abstract sciences, and can be entertained with speculations, which, however accurate, may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different taste; the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them, and the following enquiries may well be understood, though it be neglected.

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It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.

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Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer.

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So Hume agrees with you.

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For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.

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So how does he get out?

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It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion...

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...When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames...

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Quotes from Davd Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748, Mr Hume ends by defining knowledge in a suitably narrow fashion allowing for some sensible discussion about knowledge to follow. Can he prove it right? No. Does his treatise qualify for the flames? Possibly. But at least, if you're going to have a discussion that advances you need something better thanRationally: I'm a radical sceptic.
Pragmatically: I'm an empiricist of some description.If that is all you have to say, then I think it is agreed that is said. If you want to discuss the implications of this gap, and why might choose the path we have, rather than changing our pragmatic approach to something radically different - that might be kind of interesting. But if you're going to sit at 'radical epistemological scepticism' for the purposes of discussion, then surely no further discussion can be had?

Why? As a human, am I allowed to hold no unsupported beliefs? If I want to be an empiricist, can I not so be? Must I justify it? Does it have to be justified for me to see meaning in it? An empiricist, a Biblical Revelationist, a pull-knowledge-from-my-ass-ist could all, I believe, make the same argument I have made. I see no reason why my empiricism gets in the way. Do you? This might be interesting: the tendency towards empiricism. It would, however, be a different thread. Because I like empiricism. I also accept other non-empirical things as truth, such as Logic. I think it possible to hold beliefs in more than one Epistemology.Furthermore:I see no reason why we must conclude that if there are no verifiable premises (only axioms) to our epistemology, that we should abandon it and just wallow in stupidity. Saying that abandoning our axioms leaves us with nothing is simply no way to support them. Abandoning anything will leave us without that thingalong with all things by it supported; and this is applicable to all things, false or true; so we cannot say it applicable only to true things. We pick a point we can all agree on. The quote you give admits to this much, and gives us good reason to not be extreme skeptics in practice: "... no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour." Questioning is good for the soul, but to get somewhere, we have to start, and so we have to agree to accept some things without questioning them, even if we think them questionable and they are. For this thread, I believe that point of acceptance to be the Reality of Logic (that logical functions are real and can be used as a means to creating knowledge). It was my assumption that, come what may, we would all desire our positions to be logical, and so this seemed naturally an agreeable epistemology against which to judge the others.Now, does this represent my own failure to perform the task I laid out in the OP (verifying an epistemology without using an epistemology)? Yes. But the fact that no matter how hard I tried I could not find a way to deal with epistemologies outside of any epistemology(-ies) led me to observe that I didn't see it as possible. That is, I've yet to see evidence that it is possible, so I am willing to hold out believing it is possible until someone shows meand so we have the essence of this thread: a search for a proof to satisfy Jon (in philosophy mood, as you call me) regarding the verification of epistemologies without making use of an epistemology(-ies). It can, but we just need to pick a starting point. Like I said above, I assumed a good starting point to be Logic; perhaps my assumption was unfounded; it is becoming more evident that several participants are not particularly fond of the Reality of Logic (not directed at you). With them we can neither reason nor argueat least not logically. With them, there really is no point for discussing. They may discuss amongst themselves, and we may observe their behavior for use in anthropological journals (God knows they do it to us), but participation in their group seems fruitless. With others, though, we can have a productive and enjoyable discussion. The purpose of this thread wasn't to find pure Truth, but to come to an agreement and understanding. (I leave the matter of Truth to Higher Powers.) I don't find pure Truth to be overly desirable, simply because I believe it cannot be attained; I think agreement second to pure Truthif we can agree, then life is good. After agreement comes coffee and tea, and after those ...Anyway, hope I kept my foot out of my mouth in that rant; and left you with a better understanding of my position. Jon

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If you don't think it is absurd, again I take that as evidence of the absurdity of your position. I'm not disallowing it. To repeat, I'm not asking you to justify it. I'm just asking for you to tell me why you want to be an empiricist. And if you were a revelationist or something else you can bet I'd be asking why. Nothing to do with anything getting in the way. They were all empiricist positions. You can't say you like Alsations over Bull Terriers because you like dogs. We have agreed however, you cannot arrive at empiricism from logic. So we need to make some further steps, and explain why.We have agreed that verifying epistemologies is for one reason or another not feasible. So if a person asks "Why do scientists concern themselves with evidence, why don't they use revelation?" what would your answer be?Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

You are going to have to be more clear, Modulous. I am not sure how my reasons for being an empiricist are not satisfactory and represent my argument in this thread as being absurd. I do not believe you want me to justify empiricism, which is why I haven't attempted such a thing (and never would); but I also do not understand why when asked for my personal belief, you refuse to accept what I tell you is my belief as my belief. We have to, by the definition of 'epistemology', pick one (even if one of our own invention, and I believe we all invent our own unique one to some degree) in order to know anythingeven if not absolutely. I believe empiricism is the better approach, but that is only because I prefer the empirical mindset and world. Ultimately, any argument I give you for why I am an empiricist will be as circular as Straggler's arguments for the superiority of empiricism: I prefer empiricism because empiricism seems better to me because I prefer empiricism. If this is not satisfactory, then I fail to see what you are driving at, and you may have to reword the question. By position, do you mean my position of 'empiricism'? Because I agree, that choosing this position simply because it is what it is is quite absurd; but I admit and believe (not know, but believe) that all such positions are inherently absurd for this same reason, and that this absurdity is simply an aspect of our humanness (believe, not know).But the purpose of this thread was not to argue for 'empiricism'; so my absurdity regarding empiricism could hardly be extended to label the real part of my argument as absurd. Because they are empiricists. Whether, like Straggler, they believe empiricism to represent the path to absolute Truth, or they, like me, acknowledge the unattainability of absolute Truth and choose empiricism for the sake of preference and sanity in avoiding infinite unknowingness, or they choose empiricism for some other reason. Whatever it might be, scientists concern themselves with certain empirical evidence and not non-empirical revelation because they are empiricists. What other reason can there be? Admittedly, I am bad with names, of people and of concepts, which is why I often request or start out with definitions in any thread. I erred in replying to that question before looking up the references. I'm no philosophy buff Jon
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¹ If my alterations don't represent your intent, please let me know, but I found them the only reasonable way to read your question.

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I get it Jon,
You can't think of any merits or advantages to using rational empiricism. You prefer it, but this preference is just your worldview bias, and you can think of no reason why that might be the case.I guess I'll just end the exchange by pointing out that sometimes other people can see the advantages and they might bring them up. This is not the same as 'verifying' the epistemology, which they may agree is an incoherent or impossible thing to attempt.Straggler was talking about the merits of knowledge gaining concepts and their methodologies. You were talking about something else entirely. When you get some time, read about the different empirical positions and maybe you'll form an opinion about them that could be discussed. You might even learn about some other ideas, and raise some objections to them.Mod

We all know that getting hit by a fast moving bus isn’t going to do you much good.We all know that any epistemology, no matter how internally consistent or logically valid it may be, which results in the conclusion that a fast moving bus will pass through you harmlessly (or some other equally stupid alternative) has led to a demonstrably wrong conclusion and thus can be considered a rather unreliable method of knowing anything at all.How do we know these things? And doesn’t our ability to know these things rather refute your silly claim that all logically valid epistemologies are equally valid methods of knowing? Question: Will I be harmed if I step in front of a fast moving bus?Now I would personally prefer it if (most) people who get hit by buses didn’t come to any harm. Unfortunately reality seems to have little regard for what either you or I would personally prefer.Why do you think that is? Bill (based on his logically valid epistemology) says that if you get hit by a fast moving bus you will be absolutely fine. You compare some of the conclusions derived from it with reality.So I suggest you get back to me after you have tested the reliability of Bill's method of knowing by testing his bus based conclusion above.I'd love to know how that works out for you.

Hi, Straggler. This is kind of a silly thing to say, Straggler. You seem to think that I require a belief or conclusion to meet the criteria of all possible epistemologies in order to count as knowledge.I assure you that this is not my position. My position is that meeting one epistemology’s criteria for knowledge is enough justification for calling it knowledge. For example, my opinion is that knowledge is pretty much what you say knowledge is, because I accept that empirical, rational and pragmatic reasoning are the best ways to find knowledge.But, in the absence of epistemology (such as the state we would have to be in to compare epistemologies), my position is that "knowledge" is entirely an arbitrary and subjective concept.----- If this is what you mean by validity, then I can’t really disagree with you on this. I would have to agree that spiritualism, omphalism, pure rationalism, and faithism are not valid epistemologies.----- Surely this multiple individual minds thing is a complete red herring, and the only real criteria you use are empirical evidence and mathematical proof. Otherwise, how could you maintain a position that multiple individual minds (e.g. Faith, ICANT, Buzsaw, Iano, etc.) have independently rejected?I have personally witnessed hundreds of people run a prayer test (found in the Book of Mormon, Moroni 10:3-5) and claim to have affirmed, independently of one another, the results of the test exactly as the Book of Mormon predicts. At one point in my life, I thought I had affirmed this, too, but, based on a comparison between their descriptions of it and mine, I no longer think that my experience with it was the same as everyone else’s. But, still, multiple individual minds independently derived the same result, and yet, you and I both reject it.Clearly, none of us here really believes that multiple minds deriving the same result is particularly indicative of anything. What you are really thinking of is empirical or mathematical results.

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

Hi, Modulous. I'm curious how you would have answered your question: what merits or advantages do you see for using rational empiricism?This isn't a challenge to prove a point: I'm hoping to get some insights from your answer.

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-Bluejay (a.k.a. Mantis, Thylacosmilus)Darwin loves you.

I'm not sure if that is what Straggler is doing. In the end it all is a bias based on my values and preferences for certain things. I could give you the specific biases, but they won't change the fact that they are biases. One such example: I tend to choose the epistemology which, if ignored and is the Truth, will lead to the most disastrous consequences; oft-times this is empiricism, occasionally it is not. Another example: I like to learn, so I choose an epistemology in which learning I find learning more fun; oft-times that is empiricism, occasionally it is not. Also, it is not uncommon for me to use several different epistemologies throughout the day, often at the same time.All of these things, of course, still represent a personal bias based on my own values and preferences. Just like the preference for 'tangible' results, etc. that lead folk to empiricism. Again, I'm not sure if that is what he was talking about. He appears not to be discussing individual preferences and biases, but is instead making claims of general superiority of a particular epistemology based on certain inherent values of the knowledge and consequences that result from its implementation.Of course, if I've misread him, that would explain a lot. Perhaps he can clarify.JonEdited by Jon, : Forgot to finish a sent

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Question for clarification's sake: Would you agree that it is not possible to absent an epistemology? It is my opinion that an epistemology is just a description of the standards against which a thing judges information to determine whether it is true or false. Does such a system of discrimination (no matter how loose the criteria) follow by necessity, in your opinion, from the simple act of existing?I'm leaning toward thinking that it does; especially for thinking beings; but I am not sure if it can be extended to non-thinking or even inanimate entities.Just picking brains...Jon

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