Usually the attempt to get around the Euthyphro dilemna is to appeal to God's nature as being the basis for His morality ansd therefore insistign that morality is not arbitrary.
Such a response suffers from two serious flaws. Firstly that God's decisions are dependant on His nature is a given - all decisions are dependant on the nature of the being making them. Moreover according to DCT the only possible moral asis for any of Gods decisions is a previous command from God (and even that could presumably be set aside). Therefore it does not address the point that morality is based on aritrary decisions.
The second and more serious flaw is that for such an argument to make sense it is necessary to insist that God's nature is good. But this requires denying DCT to avoid a circularity - instead God's nature must be set up as the basis for morality. But this immediately falls prey to a variant of the Euthyphro dilemma - is God's nature inherently good because it *is* God's nature or is it the case that God has the nature He does becuase it is good.
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