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Author | Topic: Omniscience of Divine Being. | |||||||||||||||||||||||
robinrohan Inactive Member |
One view was first given by Boethius ("The Consolation of Philosophy") and later endorsed by Calvin. This is the view that God is "outside of time."
What this means is that time is an illusion. To us it seems real. But God knows no time. For Him all is present. Our past is his present. Our future is his present. Therefore, he does not "foresee" someone doing something. He just sees them doing it. And to watch someone doing something is not the same thing as making them do it. The other view--a little less outlandish--is given by Jonathan Edwards, an 18th century American Calvinist. Here is an excerpt from his "Freedom of the Will": Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make between natural and moral necessity, as though it were altogether impertinent in this controversy: "that which is necessary (say they) is necessary; it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible,is impossible, and cannot be done: and therefore none can be to blame for not doing it," And such comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk who has lost his legs, andcondemning and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But, in these things, Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there be not a great difference between these two cases; the one, that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison; and after he has laid there a while, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth to him; and tells him, that if he will do so, and will fall down before him, and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven and set at liberty, and also be greatly enriched, and advanced to honour; the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept of the king's offer; but is confined by strong walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition; and, moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles, and has his heart possessed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign; and for his rebellion is cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy chains, and in miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison-doors to be set wide open; calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness, he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is stout and stomachful, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to accept the offer: his rooted strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart: the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far superior to the king's grace and condescension, and to all his kind offers and promises. Now, is it agreeable to common sense to assert, and stand to it, that there is no difference between these two cases, as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners; because,forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the required act in each case is impossible? It is true, a man's evil dispositions may be as strong and immoveable as the bars of a castle. But who cannot see, that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally, and in common speech; and that it may properly be said to be in the rebel's power to come out of prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases; though by reason of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it should please him? This message has been edited by robinrohan, 01-11-2005 20:46 AM
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
Prophex writes: Alright, so this is basic, not really to do with the theory of seperate time. What it is saying is that, yes, we are all the products of environment and heredity, but we know in our hearts that that does not matter: we are still responsible for our actions.
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
Prophex writes: What would you say allows us to know this? Our conscience tells us that we are responsible. We have a private experience of free will even though there are reasons to think we have no free will. From a religious point of view, assuming an omnipotent God, the Calvinist idea makes perfect sense. If we are materialists, I think we are forced to assume a lack of free will as well. Edwards was saying, in response to the Arminians, that it is true a man might be "mentally bound" to a certain action due to his raising and his heredity: nonetheless, our whole civilization tells us, and our private experience tells us, that we are responsible for our actions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
A materialist is someone who believes that reality consists of the physical and only the physical. What we call consciousness is a physical process only, according to the materialist. I would assume that a physical process has no free will. So whether we are Calvinists or materialists, there is no free will--except for that idea about God being outside of time (which Calvin did endorse in order to explain how you could have predestination and free will at the same time--but I don't know if this is mainstream Calvinism even though Calvin endorsed it)
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
Yeah, Sidelined, I'm not sure.
You throw the ball into the air, and it's not like it's deciding whether to resist coming down or not. The same would seem to be true for the processes of the brain, but maybe you have a different idea?
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
ramoss writes: A ball falling is not the same as a complex organic analog computer reacting to information. I think it is exactly the same thing. The "complexity" has nothing to do with it. It can be as complex as you like--still it's an automatic response. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
ramoss writes: I propose that you create an algorathim to show how someone reacts to choices, and be able to predict their choice on non-life threatening things 100% of the time. (Chocolate or strawberry ice cream??) I know of no such algorithm. But it seems reasonable that anything that is produced by automata can only yield more sophisticated automata. Will you please construct an algorithm by which the automata yielded a free agent? This message has been edited by robinrohan, 01-24-2005 20:35 AM The dragon is by the side of the road, watching those who pass. Beware lest he devour you. We go to the Father of Souls but it is necessary to pass by the dragon.--Cyril of Jerusalem
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robinrohan Inactive Member |
DominionSeraph writes: No, but it does mean that the future is set; so the set future would be making him do it. The concept of God being "ouside of time" means there is no future, and no past, only the present. The human concept of time is an illusion.
DominionSeraph writes: Well, this presupposes that we do have freedom of will. The example also seems to support, "might makes right;" and inextricably links sycophancy to morality. IMO, respect must be earned. I ain't gonna get on my knees and fellate someone just 'cause they happen to have power. Edward's discussion was meant to show that even though one might be mentally bound in a way that is just as imprisoning as being physically bound, nonetheless one is responsible for one's actions. The second prisoner, though not physically bound, was mentally bound by his own character traits. As regards "might makes right," the Prince in the analogy is assumed to be a lawful, rightful, and moral sovereign (like God).
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