I have read this thread's posts, have sensed there are (IMO) tangentials, and certainly I may have inadvertently overlooked reasonable answers to the query which follows (bear with me).
1. It is fairly reasonable, even without citing the innumerable examples which bring the notion to bear, that by faith, or by emotion or autosuggestion, one can come to believe practically anything at all.
2. For the sake of perspective, assuming the validity of "objective truth" (whether the premise is a theistic one or not), for each correct perception there is an infinite number of possible false perceptions. (For every correct appreciation of "truth" there is an infinite number of possible "lies".)
Let me first express my disregard for spurious "excuse-permutations", such as were brought up in the (IMO tangential) prayer subset of this thread. Arguing for a "possible reason", on behalf of one or more presumed entities possessing will, begs the question of whether, for all practical purposes, the exercise does not inure itself quite comfortably to statements of "chance" or "randomness". If we are to reach at the proverbial straw that leads from a murderous act through a series of otherwise disjointed events (conected reasonably only by the common thread of having occured within the same reality, our universe), we may as well assert, with equal if not greater conviction, that events so spuriously connected occur by "chance" or "randomness". From this consideration, I wonder if I may inspire an explanation for exactly *what* differentiates that series of otherwise "random" events from an alleged cosmic Will. In other words, what, other than an emotional inuring or suggestion, should impel me to believe those events are the cause of a distinct Will? (Please limit responses to that which is rational... let's not bring circular arguments into this.)
The more important question I wanted to pose is this: Given that humans are prone to believing falsehoods, and given that reason is the most reliable conduit by which to differentiate between falsehood and fact, and by which to systematically (with the lowest arbitrariness possible) categorize perceived events according to their plausibilities, would not a just and interested God ensure that his existence, and all other aspects of his message to his fallible creatures, make the most rational [human] sense possible?
To finish the implied thought: I believe that a just, interested God, who is capable of at least this much, would in fact ensure that his message (including the veracity of his alleged realness) make the absolutely most rational sense possible, and by human standards. Conversely, should it happen that his alleged message is true, but does not make the absolutely most rational sense possible (by human standards), and I were to reject it on precisely those grounds, I am certain a just, interested God would certainly not reprimand me for my decision. In fact, woe unto them who accept a message so rationally flawed (by human standards), I should think would be God's sentiment.
Your comments, and answers, please.
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