Objective reality

What subjective concept is that?If the aliens and us both independently arrive at pi free from similar psychological, cultural or even perceptual biases - How is that NOT objective?It is arguably more "objective" in some very pure sense of the word than those messy and inexact empirical discoveries that rely on limited perceptual capabilities but which we consider to be the height of objective reasoning.

And yet our mathematical models are often as indicative of reality as they are reflective of it. Does that tell us anything? Is C=2*pi*r true regardless of anyone to conceive of it? Or not? Sorry to be dum - But are you saying cats don't exist or that pi does? In what way are they the same or in what way are they different? I am unclear as to what you mean by your comparison here.

Of course specific nomenclature or method of expression is not objective. I wouldn't expect aliens to look at "c=pi(2r)" and have any idea what it meant.But I would expect them to have the concept of the pi as the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference AND to consider that as something more fundamental than simply an empirical measurement that they have taken of lots of circles which then happen to all give approximately the same value. What does it represent in your view? Do you think an alien civilisation would, like us, have calculated pi to an extent that defies empirical usefulness and have gotten an identical result?All I am saying here is that there appears to be something about mathematical constructs like pi that transcend empirical measurable objective reality in some sense. But which are no less objective or "real" in their own right.

So you are saying that we discovered pi rather than invented it?Have we determined the precise value of pi empirically or mathematically? Would we expect an alien civilisation to get the same result assuming they could achieve the same levels of accuracy? Do you think an alien civilisation would, like us, have calculated pi to an extent that defies empirical usefulness and have gotten an identical result?If so why? (as in why is the result identical not why would they bother to do this)If this cannot be determined empirically is it still "science"? Is it still objective?

How can we and the aliens agree on pi to 50 decimal places (or equivalent accuracy using whatever nomenclature they use) by empirical measurement? No. I am suggesting (and attempting to make the argument in favour of) the idea that maths is objective whilst not being necessarily empirical.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

You asked: I am proposing that pi is such a concept and that it's objectivity distinct from the scientific method is demonstrated by the fact that an alien civilisation and us would agree on pi to an accuracy that lies beyond scientific empirical investigation. We seem to both agree that mathematics is objective. But you seem to think that it is objective because it is ultimately empirical.I am merely questioning that assumption by pointing out that an objectively verifiable result of a quantity that can be determined mathematically to a degree of accuracy unachievable by empirical means would be shared by all intelligent beings in our universe.Pi as a mathematical rather than an empirical construct seems to be part of the shared (i.e. objective) reality of our universe.

Which reality? If the reality in question is not empirical but platonistic. Because mathematical constructs exist in some sense that is objective but not empirical?There is a platonistic view of maths that you seem to be unaware of here. I am not necessarily advocating it. Just countering your assumptions about what you seem to think is blatantly obvious. Why do you think that?Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

Because (in my role of arguing the platonic objective mathematical reality) I dispute that measuring empirical circles is the way to establish the value of pi at all. The fact that we and the aliens may have discovered the concept of pi through some poor empirical manifestation leading to a shoddy physical approximation does not mean that pi itself is an empirical quantity. Indeed no empirical circle will ever give us an accurate value of pi. We and the aliens can independently go off an measure as many physical circles as we wish. We can average our results and no doubt come to some limited agreement on a value for pi. Perhaps to a few decimal places in our nomenclature. Thus we would establish that pi is an objectively measurable and verifiable empirical quantity. That would be the empirical methodology would it not?But we and the aliens would both be better off laying our rulers aside and simply trusting the objectivity of the mathematics. If we did we would both agree on a value for pi that defies empirical investigation. We would agree to an accuracy that makes any empirical agreement from which objectivity might be claimed pale into insignificance. Mathematically we would independently agree to such an extent that the objectivity of the quantity in question would be all but indisputable. No. If anything I am saying that the 1+1+1+1+1+1=6 conclusion is independent of how many apples he has or even the existence of apples at all. Because it is not an empirical conclusion as such.If you add 13 heffalumps to 6 heffalumps how many heffalumps do you have? But has anyone ever added heffalumps together? Or indeed ever empirically encountered a heffalump? So how do we know that 13 heffalumps + 6 heffalumps will give us 19 heffalumps? Are we simply applying inductive reasoning? Is it possible that 6 heffalumps + 13 heffalumps will NOT give us 19 heffalumps?If our reasoning is purely inductive (which empirically it would have to be be given that we have never even seen 1 heffalump never mind counted different numbers of them) then we would have to say that Yes — It is quite possible that heffalumps will behave differently to every other addable entity we have ever encountered (e.g. apples). We would have to acknowledge the possibility that 13 heffalumps + 6 heffalumps will give us 74 heffalumps because until we actually make the observation any un-refuted answer is possible.But you and I both know that regardless of empirical observation we can say with mathematical certainty how many heffalumps we will end up with. So why do you think that is?

I still think you are missing the point of the Platonist view of mathematics. Whether any of us adhere to this view or not it is worth understanding what it is that this suggests. This suggests that mathematics is both independent of, and indeed arguably more objective than, empirical reality. Actually no. Empirically all your box man can say is that 1 apple + 1 apple + 1 apple + 1 apple + 1apple + 1 apple = 6 apples. He cannot empirically conclude with certainty that this same relationship applies to pears, bananas or indeed anything else he hasn't actually observed. How does he know these rules? If you simply define objective to mean that which can be empirically verified then it is hardly surprising that you only consider things which can be empirically verified as being objective.The question of this thread is surely to ask whether that definition of objective is justified. A mathematical platonist would say not.

Can he?If he only has five apples on what empirical basis does he conclude that the number 6 exists?Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

What is the largest number that we have an empirical basis for?Does infinity exist?Does infinity have an empirical basis? Why ever not?Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

OK. So we don't know which numbers are "known to be part of objective reality". So some numbers are "known to be a part of objective reality" and some are not "known to be a part of objective reality". But we don't objectively know which are which (aside from a few "obvious" exceptions)Do I really need to point out the problem with this? If you simply define empirical evidence as the only method of establishing what is "known to be part of objective reality" then it is hardly surprising that you don't consider 6 (in this dude in a box scenario) as being "known to be part of objective reality".The question is whether or not that definition/premise is justified. I sense that I am starting to annoy you. That is fine. Annoyingness is one of my least objectionable qualities. But all I am trying to do is challenge what seems to be an over simplistic assumption on your part. You seem to be saying something along the lines of "Maths is just an idealised extrapolation of empirical experience - This is obvious"I don't think this is necessarily true and I don't think it is as simple or obvious as it first might appear to be.

Indeed. And you have cited numbers as an example of that thinking. On this basis you have seperated numbers into those that are "known to be part of objective reality" and those that are not.Yet when asked which numbers are "known to be part of objective reality" your answer is "I don't know". Can you really not see the contradiction inherent in this position?Am I to consider the number 1 more objectively real than the number 10^9999999999999999999999999999999999999999?Your answer seems to be "maybe". I think that the distinction is mildly ridiculous. I don't know what that means? You mean the emboldened statement and challenge to refute that statement made on a debate board frequented by some of the most argumentative people either of us are ever likely to encounter?Stile writes:

quote:

---

I still stand by the statement of:

​

All things that are collectively agreed to exist within objective reality are testable and verifiable through the scientific method.

​

So far, no one has provided any example that goes against this statement. "Mathematics" has been attempted... but it seems that certain aspects rest on subjective rules while other aspects actually can be verified through scientific tests (like obtaining the value of pi from observations of circles).

---

That "off hand" statement? Oh because I will argue that blue is pink is someone else will disagree with me. Nothing personal. AND it did seem a bit more than "off-hand" to be honest. How do you feel about the position that empirical reality is effectively the product of underlying objective mathematical truths? And I always think everybody elses position is obviously wrong

So what is the largest number that can be said to exist in our universe? The number of quarks in the universe?Is this number honestly more real than the number of quarks in the universe + 1?

Then why did Neo take the red pill?Anyway - Are you now in any more of a position to tell us what you mean by "objectivity is just shared subjectivity"? Or not?If maths is your example of "shared subjectivity" can you tell us which is the subjective component and how this is shared? Is gravity as curved space-time an objectively evidenced conclusion? If so which is the subjective component of this evidence and how is it shared? Is evolutionary theory objectively evidenced? If so what is the subjective component of this evidence and how is it shared?Bearing in mind that you have clearly stated that by "shared subjectivity" you don't mean:1) You don't mean "shared subjectivity" in the sense of my Allah example2) You don't mean "shared subjectivity" in the sense of popular agreement as per Rahvin's understanding.3) You don't mean "shared subjectivity" to be the necessarily subjective perception of objective reality.4) You don't mean Berkeley's idealism.Just tell us what you do mean.