Induction and Science

I am not really arguing on the scientific induction debate. In as much as induction is deduction with unstated premises, I'd say Science makes extensive use of 'induction'. Science is a human institution. Humans understand things by relating them in terms they can comprehend. Even if the information in the conclusion is already in the premises (which I agree it must be), its restatement and/or summary into humanly-comprehensible terms is what is important. We don't do all this for the birds or the fishwe do Science for us; that we may comprehend; that we may understand. What will happen will be that your conclusion will rest on the willingness of the audience to accept P2. The more acceptable your premises/axioms, the more convincing your argument. Thus:A1: Anything yellow is square
P1: The Sun is yellow
C: The Sun is square...is valid, but only as convincing as the willingness of the audience to buy into A1. Combine this with the fact that this is a Science threadmeaning that we work off the axiom that empirical things are true, and all conclusions must be empirically falsifiableand the number and type of axioms we can utilize w/out contradiction becomes significantly limited. So, I see no problem explaining Science in completely deductive terms.Jon

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Except that here we are dealing with Science, which severely constrains the axioms we can have and conclusions we can derive. I am thoroughly convinced that you have failed to comprehend my argument. Perhaps this has been due to my own lack of clarity, but as you've yet to ask any questions about my argument, I have been unable to pinpoint where the lack clarity lies. Which is too bad, because I would love to help you understand what I am saying. Nevertheless, if you want to continue to bash my argument based on this misunderstanding, then I suppose you are free to do so. But, keep in mind it will have no bearing on my actual argument.JonEdited by Jon, : No reason given.

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It very well could be. But I made the statement, and was ruthlessly opposed; so I fought back. If you mean 'incomplete information' in the sense that there are facts that exist which have not been considered/observed, then indeed, this is the only way to falsify this statement. But there is nothing about turning an inductive argument into a deductive one that says (a) your assumptions must not contradict unknown facts, (b) your conclusion must end up being true. Thus, I see this as having no bearing on my statement that inductive arguments are merely deductive ones with unstated premises. Are you saying this of an argument or a premise? If of the premise, see above; if of the argument, see below:P1: The Sun is pink
C1: The Sun is not yellowAn observation could be blatantly wrong. Thus, there is no need for 'general statements made from incomplete information' in order to provide the 'room' in an argument for 'wrongness'. No, it would not be. The fact that I stated the axiom despite being unable to think of anything square and yellow is proof that I can state this axiom without it having any inductive basis whatsoever. Your, and Straggler's, insistence that you can divine the source of axioms is just malarkey. If I state it as an axiom, it is an axiom; it may enjoy some special status as an axiom, but it also must suffer through the consequence of being entirely and wholly refutable at the will of anyone who dislikes it.But even if it were a premise 'inductively' derived, its 'inductive' derivation could easily be shown to be deduction with missing premises. Speaking of which, why are you arguing against this? I thought you admitted to it already upthread... JonEdited by Jon, : some readability issues fixed

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Not true. There is nothing about an observation that prevents it from serving as a premise in a deductive argument. If these observations are about the world, then we can indeed say much about the world with deduction only. Of course; but all that 'induction' is just deduction with missing premises/axioms. Sure; but all that 'induction' is just deduction with missing premises/axioms. Maybe, but all that 'induction' is just deduction with missing premises/axioms. Even if true, all that 'induction' is just deduction with missing premises/axioms. Certainly you do not mean that anything axiomatically asserted cannot be scientifically functional... do you? You've lost me. Are you only fussing over my wording? Why live in such a world? If only we admit to a degree of error/uncertainty in our conclusion that is related to the probability of our premises to support it, we no longer need this 'does not necessarily follow' crap and can get on being honest with ourselves.P: Three Crowes wear black shoes.
C: If all Crowes wear the same color shoes, all Crowes wear black shoes.This is a simple, honest, 100% premise-backed conclusion that does not give the slightest impression of voodoo logic. In fact, I would say that this is the way real, honest Science functions. It is also completely deductive! The argument's changed; the reasoning's stayed the same. As I already pointed out, given the constraint that we are, in this thread, dealing with Science, our axioms must so conform, or at least not conflict. Indeed, but, as I already pointed out, given the constraint that we are, in this thread, dealing with Science, our axioms must so conform, or at least not conflict. This is not wholly true. My argument is that the reasoning is deductive whether the premises/axioms are part of the argument or not. Below the surface of the inductive argument, the reasonings must be deductive; if not, then we're left with invalid, silly, voodoo logic. Then perhaps we should stop trying to do that!Jon

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Modulous is a human. True, indeed. That's the beauty of having a refined topic; it helps us sort out which of the infinite axioms we may or may not insert willy nilly. This is something Straggler has yet to realize: we can have axioms in our system without having to accept every axiom ever invented, such as the 'stupid' ones. Okay. I see you are talking about the argument itself as opposed to the underlying reasoning. Indeed, we may have an 'inductive' argument, but this we must accept is either: Representative of a deductive reasoning with premises that have been removed; or
Representative of invalid, silly, voodoo logic reasoning. No. Just because the conclusion itself is weak/conditional does not mean that the premises cannot support that conclusion 100%. There is no uncertainty in the conclusion; the conclusion is a conditional, and given the premise 'Three Crowes wear black shoes', it is 100% certain that the conclusion 'If all Crowes wear the same color shoes, all Crowes wear black shoes' is true.Granted, our conclusion isn't very strong, nor does it assert much about the actual world; but this is unavoidable given our poor premise and the fact that we are attempting to avoid the use of invalid, silly, voodoo logic. Best part, though, it's honest! Blatantly false. All deductive arguments can be rewritten as an endless string of conditionals, this does not change their essential form:A1: All humans are mortal
P1: Modulous is a human
C: Modulous is mortalbecomes...C: If all humans are mortal, then if Modulous is a human, Modulous is mortal. (A→(P→C))You are being picky about the wording, but it is not about wording; it is about form, and the two arguments above are effectively identical in form. All that has changed is the strength of our conclusion to assert things; but this is not, of course, a problem of form. There is, as I've already pointed out, no formal difference between this argument and the one I gave. They are both deductive. We may be able to argue based on whether we've called our parts premises or axioms, but that is just a semantic issue and does not impact the form of the argument. All that has changed is the strength of our conclusion to assert things; but this is not, of course, a problem of form. Bullshit. We can change our argument without changing our reasoning; just like we can tell a story and leave parts outtheir absence in the spoken story does not erase them from our mind! If reasoning is the internalized mental process, and the argument is that thinking verbalized, then there is no reason to expect an individual to relate every aspect of their reasoning in their argument. If we go back and add the missing parts to their argument to make it match their reasoning, that, of course, does not impact their reasoning. Of course, I never said that it is not done. Good for Hume. But his reasoning really is invalid, silly, voodoo logic. And while it may be perfectly fine to rely on such reasoning for feeding ourselves (I'd say it is), should we really be doing Science with it? Isn't that the point of this thread? Whether this invalid, silly, voodoo logic is suitable for Science? Not at all! As I've said before:

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Jon in Message 465:

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Science is a human institution. Humans understand things by relating them in terms they can comprehend. Even if the information in the conclusion is already in the premises (which I agree it must be), its restatement and/or summary into humanly-comprehensible terms is what is important. We don't do all this for the birds or the fishwe do Science for us; that we may comprehend; that we may understand.

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Jon

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Again, as I've said before. The importance in Science is not just in observing new things, but in taking the information gained in those observations and arranging it in ways that make it understandable. Everyone saw the apple fall; everyone knew when it left the tree; when it hit the ground. Newton didn't show us anything we didn't already see; he showed us what we saw but in a way we could understand it. It exists; is it Science? But that's not what I said. I said that the premise supports the conclusion 100%. This is all that is necessary in a valid deduction. In the case of the deduction on Crowes' footwear, the premise does just that. I fail to see how this is drastically different than the 'if... then' conditional conclusion I presented for the Crowes and their shoes. Malarkey! If it's good enough for a premise, it's good enough for a conclusionthere is, afterall, no difference between the two other than our own arbitrary stopping-point on the logic wheel. This is all dependent on your claim that a conditional cannot serve as a conclusion, which it can. I think you are overlooking my careful distinction between 'argument' and 'reasoning'. A claim for which you've yet to provide any support. Oh, but it is not. It is used by scientists, but that does not make it part of Science. I am not sure what you are asking from me here. Could you explain, please? Science actually does both: measures, reorders. This is its essence. Ahh, but I have. In several instances. (Message 388; if you want it more specific, I can do that for you.) And again, what is the difference between this and the deduction of conditional conclusions? I've a feeling we are arguing for the same thing; you're just not willing to call that for which I am arguing 'deduction' under the belief that deduction cannot create a conditional conclusion. If you too see this as the case, then let's call it semantics and go on our merry ways.Jon[ABE](Reply to ABE): I have not made any claims that the certainty is affected one way or the other. Given the premise(s), the certainty of the conclusion is equal in both of these:A1: All humans are mortal
P1: Modulous is a human
C: Modulous is mortalC: If all humans are mortal, then if Modulous is a human, Modulous is mortal. (A→(P→C))Given the premise(s), the certainty is 100%, as the arguments are both valid.
[/ABE]Edited by Jon, : Reply to ABE

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But it's not my premise; it's my axiom. It is something I am taking for granted without making any claims as to its actual truth. If you want to restrict us in such a way, then you may do so. We must only then reword our argument to rename our axiom the antecedent:P: Mod is a human
C: If all humans are mortal, Mod is mortal.But this doesn't really change anything. Your restriction that we can only use axioms regularly used in the scientific method goes no further in eliminating our use of 'assumptions' than my restriction that our axioms not contradict aspects of the scientific method. It just requires us to rename some things... shake the bag a little.So, again, I fear our debate is merely semantic Jon

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Replies to Message 494 & Message 495: I've never claimed that our additional premises/axioms were necessarily of any specific quality. The axiom 'all Crowes wear the same color shoes' is, indeed, a pretty crappy axiom. Its claim is simply too extraordinary for any sane human to take it for granted. But, the quality of our premises is a separate issue from the quality of our argument form. We can have good form with crappy premises; voodoo premises don't entail voodoo form. Our logic is fine; it's our starting points that suck. True. But I never said Science only works with observations. Good, honest (non-voodoo) Science works with axioms and suppositions as well. Part of that conclusion is supported by observation, part by supposed axioms. If not, it's voodoo. S'pose that'd make Newton is a witchdoctor, eh? Actually, that is not precisely what I was getting at. The probability of our conclusion being true is related to many things, for example, the quality of our premises. If we take an inductive argument and 'bridge the gap' to make it deductive, we do not have to alter the probability of our conclusion being true. What we do alter, however, is the probability of our conclusion being true given the presented premises. With the induction, it is <100%; with the deduction it is 100%. But the probability of the conclusion being true as a matter of fact remains the same. If this is how you define 'induction', then indeed. But I see this as identical to my conditional conclusion mentioned earlier. Can you spot a difference? Or, are we indeed just arguing semantics? By 'weaken' I merely meant the conclusion's ability to say something about the world: 'All Crowes wear black shoes' says more than 'If all Crowes wear the same color shoes, then all Crowes wear black shoes'; and 'If three Crowes wear black shoes, then if all Crowes wear the same color shoes, then all Crowes wear black shoes' tells us nothing useful about the world. Agreed? That would explain a lot! Bullshit. 'If all Crowes wear the same color shoes, then all Crowes wear black shoes' tells us more that just 'three Crowes wear black shoes'. There is no way to honestly claim that it doesn't. Then Science is guilty of dishonest voodoo; like nwr says. It is not what Science does that I'm after; it is what it admits to not knowinghow honest it is. The following two things produce equally-useful conclusions, one is just more honest than the other:P1: The Sun rose today
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Pn: The Sun rose on day n (long time ago)
C: The Sun will rise tomorrowP1: The Sun rose today
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Pn: The Sun rose on day n (long time ago)
C: If the Sun behaves the same on every day, the Sun will rise tomorrowCan you spot the more honest one? Do you think either conclusion is more useful? One certainly makes a stronger claim, but so what? They are both useful; I'd set my alarm clock whichever one I accepted. I'd say the second one is good science; the first is sloppy voodoo science. That such sloppy science is the science that actually gets done is all too sad and all too shameful. But; s'pose you're right: it is what we live with . Of course not; but we've been over this before. An assumption is weaker than a premise because there is no reason to accept its truth. This is not a premise supported by inductive reasoning; it is an assumption supported by the audience's goodwill to accept it as proposed. It's flimsy, but it's honest. I thought I had cleared it up before. The statement you quoted was sloppily-written by a hungry man with noodles cooking on the stove. I used 'certainty' in two different ways. So let's not dwell on that quote; I retract it on grounds of its confusing wording. Indeed! But, and here is the kicker, whether with or without the 'patch' premises, the actual probability of the conclusion being true is the same.¹ The difference is that with the 'patch' premises, the probability of the conclusion being true given the premises goes from <100% to =100%. It's a stronger form, and doesn't hide anything.Remember, I have never argued that adding the extra premises alters the truth of anything. My argument is only about form. In the broader sense, it is indeed a premise. That's all malarkey. Nothing says we can only make an assumption if it is only 'assumed true to see where it leads' or 'self-evident'. The difference between an axiom and a premise is purely formal: one is derived, the other is not. It is an assumption because it's assumed, and that is all that is needed for it to be an assumption. Hence its placement as the antecedent or the axiom (depending on which form you take). It's not an observation, and I honestly make no attempt to claim it as such. You've yet to show why that is the case. Science is mostly pragmatic; if our assumption gets us somewhere useful, then there is no reason to avoid using it. You are confusing things. I am talking about the probability of a conclusion to be true given its premises; you are talking about the probability of a conclusion to actually be true. In either argument (the inductive-form one or deductive-form one), that latter probability will be identical. Thus, we will say that, 'it is 100% true that given our premises, Mod might die' in the first case and 'based on the probability of our premises being true there is a 90% chance Mod might die' in the second case. Changing to deduction doesn't alter the actual truth of our conclusion, it just alters the degree to which our conclusion rests on our premises, changing it from <100% to =100%. Your 'confidence' and 'tentatively' in this argument is the probability of actual truth, as far as I can tell. The probability that the conclusion is true given the premises is <100%. We can make it 100% by adding premises; but this will not change the probability of actual truth (of our 'confidence' and 'tentatively'). Wouldn't it be great if it were!! Jon
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¹ After all, the patch required will be equally 'stupid' as the inductive leap required, thus our values stay the same.

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I think you are getting things confused, Straggler. A prediction is not accurate at the time it is made; it is accurate at the time it is fulfilled. There is, thus, no reason why 'guesses' and 'opinions' cannot be accurate predictions. Science tends to favor those 'guesses' and 'opinions' that create accurate predictions, along with the assumptions and premises upon which those 'guesses' and 'opinions' are built. That we favor the 'opinions' that have accurately predicted the continued rising and setting of the Sun is good reason to favor some of the assumptions and premises upon which these 'opinions' have been built, for example, the assumption that 'nature will behave as observed to behave thus far'.But, I think your wording implies some sort of complete certainty (not just favoring) in our conclusion that 'nature will behave as observed to behave thus far'; this notion is ridiculous, and so the confusion between you and nwr is completely understandable.So, to help clear things up: what certainty do you place in the conclusion that 'nature will behave as observed to behave thus far'?JonEdited by Jon, : +ng

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That was actually the reason they were there; as something of a replacement for your P2. A minor difference, though. Well, let's set aside the 'making stuff up' bit, since (as I'll argue below) induction is equally as guilty. That said, I've provided such a deduction a couple of times now. Let's take a look at Deductive-Newton again: D-Newton's conclusion was that all stuff would be describable by the laws he developed. This is built (deductively) on the premises of his observations and the assumption that all stuff behaved the same. This assumption is a prediction. It can be tested (find other stuff) and falsified (show that it behaves differently). In a scientific conclusion, the predictions will be the unstated implications of that conclusion along with any deductive assumptions required to derive that conclusion. Because it is Science, these assumptions will have to meet special standards, as we've already discussed (for example, D-Newton's assumption is falsifiable). Okay; the support that the premises have toward the conclusion is a separate issue from the truth of the conclusion. But you are, again, dealing with two separate issues. Deduction says nothing about the actual truth of anything. The following argument is deductive: One Crowe wears black shoes
All Crowes wear the same color shoes
∴ All Crowes wear black shoesIt is deductive not because the conclusion is true (its actual truth will hinge on the quality of the premises), but because it is true given the premises. For example, if our second premise (in the general sense) is improbable, then so too is our conclusion. In fact, the degree of improbability of our second premise here will be equal to the degree of improbability of the inductive leap were we to remove this premise. Even beyond that, the total improbability of all the premises, assumptions, and implications of a deductive argument will be equal to the total improbability of all the premises, assumptions, implications, and inductive leaps of the corresponding inductive argument such that the improbability of the conclusion in either (as calculated from these other improbabilities) will be identical. So actual truths aren't affected; as I've said before:

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Jon in Message 497:

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The probability of our conclusion being true is related to many things, for example, the quality of our premises. If we take an inductive argument and 'bridge the gap' to make it deductive, we do not have to alter the probability of our conclusion being true. What we do alter, however, is the probability of our conclusion being true given the presented premises. With the induction, it is <100%; with the deduction it is 100%. But the probability of the conclusion being true as a matter of fact remains the same.
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But, and here is the kicker, whether with or without the 'patch' premises, the actual probability of the conclusion being true is the same.¹ The difference is that with the 'patch' premises, the probability of the conclusion being true given the premises goes from <100% to =100%. It's a stronger form, and doesn't hide anything.
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I am talking about the probability of a conclusion to be true given its premises; you are talking about the probability of a conclusion to actually be true. In either argument (the inductive-form one or deductive-form one), that latter probability will be identical. Thus, we will say that, 'it is 100% true that given our premises, Mod might die' in the first case and 'based on the probability of our premises being true there is a 90% chance Mod might die' in the second case. Changing to deduction doesn't alter the actual truth of our conclusion, it just alters the degree to which our conclusion rests on our premises, changing it from <100% to =100%.
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¹ After all, the patch required will be equally 'stupid' as the inductive leap required, thus our values stay the same.

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Thus, it is not required that deduction make 'necessarily true' conclusions, only that it make conclusions that are necessarily true given the premisesthis is, afterall, its definition. Let's rewrite our Crowe argument with some more substance: One Crowe in the room wears black shoes
There are ten Crowes in the room
All Crowes in the room wear the same color shoes
∴ All Crowes in the room wear black shoesor: One Crowe in the room wears black shoes
There are ten Crowes in the room
Inductive leap!
∴ All Crowes in the room wear black shoesThe deductive conclusion is more fully supported by the stated premises, but neither conclusion is more likely to be true, since the inductive leap is as improbable as the third premise in the deductive argument. In fact, the inductive leap is really just premise three unstated. Premise three just states the inductive leap. And, of course, both arguments are falsifiable, especially when we see that baby Crowe is wearing those cute footie-pajamas with no shoes on at all. Well then, good deal! Why are we still arguing? It will be nice to not have to do that anymore, eh!? Whether it does or whether it does not; it can always be gotten rid ofthis is my argument! Disclosing the implications/assumptions of your argument is more honest than hiding them. See D-Newton above. Of course. This is because some of the conclusion rests on either an inductive leap or a certain assumption. The fact of the matter is that it is easier to falsify something when you are aware of all the parts that go into it; stating the inductive leap in the form of an assumption gives us that added ease. It doesn't change anything about truths or falsities; it just makes the argument more open and easier to address. Not at all! I think it is perfectly fine for science to do this. What I argue for is the expression of the inductive leap in such a way that lets us examine it and attempt to falsify it. It is not important where we put it; my aim is honesty by means of full disclosure. We will either have an inductive argument with falsifiable implication B, or a deductive argument with falsifiable assumptive premise B. But B always exists; we cannot get rid of it. The problem with induction (not stating B) is that we risk fooling ourselves and others into thinking B doesn't exist. But indeed, whether stated or implied, it is there. Nonsense! Induction makes up as much shit as deduction. As I said above, your induction creates necessary implications, some of which are identical to the assumptive premises required. The difference is, I'll say again, just semantic. So, I cannot image why we are still arguing... Jon

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Why? You seem to have understood it perfectly well. Your summaries are spot on: Jon

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Good thing all the quotes you provided were of me pointing out differences between actually true conclusions and true given the premises conclusions.So, where is your evidence of this supposed equivocation?Jon

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I guess I didn't see it in that post, Straggler. Maybe you can point it out? More of this probability of gravity crap? How dull. Good thing I never argued this! The very nature of Science requires this. So what? Good thing I never argued for that! Good for you. So? That's not the topic of the debate between you and me. Did you forget what it was already?JonBTW: Still awaiting your flashy inductive argument that cannot be made deductive.

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Well, I'm not sure whether or not Science really uses induction; my argument has not really been to that matter. In as far as it is a human institution, it may well do just that. My original claim, though, was that all induction can be closedturned into deductionby adding certain premises. This was the essence of the ongoing debate between Straggler and myself. If any induction can be turned into a deduction, then this is true of any induction, including your 'inductively based premises'. I'll agree with the following:There is no induction that cannot be made into a deduction.Does that work for you? Is not such an assumption an implication in any inductive argument? We could add a 'deduction works' to any deductive argument. In both cases I think it would be superfluous. Thus, I am not sure this 'induction works' can really work as a premise to close an inductive argument and make it deductive.But whether such an assumption is proper or not, it will still be just a displaced implication. Its bearing on the conclusion will not change wherever we move it. Furthermore, all other implications (including any others I might choose to close the argument) will also still exist and bear down on the conclusion. Whichever of the many implications you pick to turn into an assumption, it will not change anything but the names we give to the various parts of our argument. That 'all stuff behaved the same' is an implication of his conclusions. Whether you set it as an implication or an assumptive premise, it exists nonetheless. It will still bear down on the probable actual truth of our conclusion. So, I'm not sure it matters where we put it. Actually, I am beginning to wonder whether measuring the inductive leap is even necessary. The only difference between an inductive argument and deductive argument is the presence of certain premises. Interestingly, the content of these premises will be contained in the implications of any inductive conclusion, and their values covered as part of the set of implications. Thus, it seems necessary only to measure all the premises, assumptions, and implications. Where you put any of them doesn't seem to matter; their bearing on the conclusion should be the same wherever they end up.So, I doubt the inductive leap has any actual value at all. Since its value is represented already by any number of implications, why even bother with it? Perhaps this is why I am not convinced of the propriety of your 'induction works' assumption above; by offering no value, I wonder how it serves to do anything at all... On the superficial level, the inductive leap certainly seems a necessary first step. But I wonder whether or not this is true on the deeper reasoning level. I'd hazard a guess, not that this is the place for such a thing, that all human thought is ultimately deductive. For example, a child learning to speak makes assumptions about how he will be understood; whether he is or is not understood determines how he will alter his deductive premises. Our deductive assumptions may be so deep and integral that we might not realize they are therethey'd be hard to find for sure. A thread on this might prove fascinating! Interesting. If it is that Science regularly expresses the implications of this leap, then that is great! I admit I do not read many science journals. I suppose you wouldn't be willing to point me to one in which the inductive leap has been spelled out in order to make the conclusion easier to falsify?Jon

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Jon in Message 521 (emphasis added):

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I guess I didn't see it in that post, Straggler.

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I asked for reference to the message to which I had previously replied. You tell me to check the thread. I take it you never mentioned 'tentativity' in that message, as I suspected. You also quote mined my request, which made it clear I was asking for a reference to the specific message. So, instead of misrepresenting me, why not provide me with an inductive argument that cannot be made deductive? The question's been answered a thousand times, Straggler. You've never shown where there was a contradiction with the answer. Stop misrepresenting me. And, this is still not an inductive argument that cannot be made deductive. Because Science favors that which leads to accurate predictions. Thus, 'opinions' and 'guesses' that do this will become part of Science. But, how does this provide an inductive argument that cannot be made deductive? Persuaded from what? I never held the position you accuse me of having held. Stop misrepresenting me. And where is your inductive argument that cannot be made deductive? That's quite funny, because none of this is a reply to my request that you provide even one inductive argument that cannot be made deductive. By quoting repeated instances of me defining, accurately, the word 'axiom', what did you hope to accomplish? All you have done in this post is misrepresented me several times and failed to provide an inductive argument that cannot be made deductive.You'll have to try again, I'm afraid.Jon Edited by Jon, : unsize

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