John Paul: There are a couple of things I don't understand about Dembski's model.
If I understood "Design Inference" correctly (and I'm not an information specialist), he defines specified complexity thus:
1. a phenomenon or object matches some pre-defined meaningful pattern ("specificity")
2. the phenomenon or object has a low probability of occuring through purely natural mechanisms without intelligent intervention ("complexity")
It would seem to me that it would be impossible to determine the specificity of an object without detailed knowledge of its causal history, otherwise how do you determine meaningful pattern (or determine whether a given pattern was meaningful)? I have a similar question about complexity - how do you determine the difference between "apparent complexity" (Dembski's term, I think) and true complexity?
Dembski defines a designed phenomenon or object as one that displays specified complexity, because SC can only come from intelligence. Therefore, when Dembski asserts that living organisms display specified complexity, he is essentially asserting it is designed. This appears circular: since SC can ONLY come from intelligence, the pre-requisite for something like a living organism to be designed is that it is complex (i.e., designed). The filter appears to be set up
only to accept positives. IOW: anything the user wants to declare designed will automatically be selected as designed, and anything the user doesn't want to declare designed will be an example of "apparent" design.
I'd appreciate your explanation for this seeming paradox.